Well sir, I do have to tip my hat to you. Your argument was well reasoned. Much better than I am accustomed to here. Thank you for taking some time to put forth a compelling argument.
In response, if we dive deeper into Grossman, we find that the court stated “Hence, when the words to grant pardons were used in the Constitution, they conveyed to the mind the authority as exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. At that time both Englishmen and Americans attached the same meaning to the word pardon. In the Convention which framed the Constitution, no effort was made to define or change its meaning, although it was limited in cases of impeachment.’ “The king of England before our Revolution, in the exercise of his prerogative, had always exercised the power to pardon contempts of court” In Grossman the case was actually about a pardon of a contempt charge which resulted in committing Grossman to the Chicago House of Correction.
Let’s go on.
The Court wrote: “We have given the history of the clause to show that the words ‘for offenses against the United States’ were inserted by a Committee on Style, presumably to make clear that the pardon of the President was to operate upon offenses against the United States as distinguished from offenses against the states. It cannot be supposed that the Committee on Revision by adding these words, or the Convention by accepting them, intended sub silentio to narrow the scope of a pardon from one at common law or to confer any different power in this regard on our executive from that which the members of the Convention had seen exercised before the Revolution.”
“So it is clear to us that the language of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and of other cited parts of the Constitution are not of significance in determining the scope of pardons of ‘offenses against the United States’ in article 2, ยง 2, cl. 1, of the enumerated powers of the President. We think the arguments drawn from the common law, from the power of the king under the British Constitution, which plainly was the prototype of this clause, from the legislative history of the clause in the Convention, and from the ordinary meaning of its words, are much more relevant and convincing.”
Grossman while discussing pardon powers also touches on the interesting requirement that the President is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. I think that plays heavily into Tina Peters case. Also, her case is well steeped in federal election law and questions. It would be a very interesting case for SCOTUS to hear. I would love to hear John Sauer argue for the good guys on that one.
Grossman was granted his Petition for Habitus Corpus and the court clearly recognized an “enhanced” pardon power by the Executive. This case also dabbled with some interesting questions and seemed to find that Presidential pardon power came directly from the power vested in the King and that it could drift into State Court issues. This question needs to be further litigated but there is little question that Grossman leaves the door wide open for the Roberts Court to more clearly explain the pardon power held by the Executive. There is certainly precedent in Grossman to take it to the same level that the King of England enjoyed at common law.
I believe that liberals will cry over the outcome of this case if it is taken up by SCOTUS.
This case also dabbled with some interesting questions and seemed to find that Presidential pardon power came directly from the power vested in the King and that it could drift into State Court issues
I don't see anything in that opinion supporting the bolded claim at all. Literally the only time state law was referred to at all was in the language I quoted saying that the phrase "offenses against the United States" was intended to limit the President's power only in terms of state/federal law, not in any other way such as excluding contempt.
But while I think that particular Court clearly stands on the side of "the President can only pardon for federal crimes", that language is technically only dicta, and not part of the holding. So, the current Supreme Court could more easily pick a different option if it so chooses.
But I do think that based on the Constitutional language, the Grossman Court was right about what the "offenses against the United States" means, and I think the current Supreme Court would agree.