Posted on 12/23/2025 9:37:41 AM PST by SaxxonWoods
Russia has issued a call for the remaining Ukrainian soldiers that have been surrounded in Pakovsk and Kian to surrender, noting that they have no chance of survival. And it doesn't seem as though the NATO alliance or Kiev is too concerned about the situation on the front lines as they seem more concerned about Zalinsk's latest photo op. not realizing the importance of some of these final Ukrainian strongholds and just how quickly Kiev's defensive lines are crumbling. So, what does all of this mean for the ongoing conflict and how could the possibility of tomahawks being introduced by the US change things?
(Excerpt) Read more at youtube.com ...
“British Media”= MI6. There is no freedom of press in the UK.
So I take it your 25% claim is what…. Made up ?
“So I take it your 25% claim is what…. Made up ?”
I notice you don’t dispute it.
“or is fighting to a stalemate for about three years while Ukraine has been losing lives and territory. 95% of what you and your fellow Zeepers have posted here has been wrong.”
In the last three years Ukraine has gained territory. Recovered about 25% of that lost in 2022.
In the last three years Ukraine has gained territory. Recovered about 25% of that lost in 2022.
There should be no ceasefire until Ukraine takes Moscow. They have those Russians right where they want them. Full scale Ukrainian victory is a mere matter of time.
Posted Feb., 2022. Zelensky has fled Ukraine. Russians taking Kiev.
This is highly misleading. Russia's tank "production" includes significant refurbishments and upgrades, not just new builds, and the Russian federation rates of tank production are higher than INDIVIDUAL NATO countries but not the alliance AS A WHOLE when including exports and joint programs. NATO is not "building none"—production exists but at lower peacetime rates, with surges in deals like Poland's.
The Poland-South Korea figure touted by the video is incorrect (it is 180 tanks in the latest deal, building on prior ones). Not 56 tanks—latest 2025 contract is for 180 K2 Black Panthers (~$6.5B), with 117 built in South Korea and 63 in Poland (building on 2022's 180-unit deal). Total potential: Up to 1,000 K2s. South Korea's production supports NATO indirectly via exports.
Russia does lead in refurbishing older tanks due to vast Soviet stockpiles, but these are depleting rapidly
| Category | Russia (2024–2025 Annual Est.), | NATO Collective (2024–2025 Annual Est.) |
| New Builds, | 110–300 (mostly T-90M upgrades) | ,"100–200 (Abrams, Leopard, Challenger, K2 exports)" |
| Refurbs/Upgrades, | 400–600 (T-72/T-80 from storage) | ,200–400 (various models across allies) |
| Total Output, | 500–900, | 300–600 (plus stockpiles) |
NATO now produces more than Russia overall (NATO SecGen Rutte, Nov 2025). Output sixfold increase since 2023; aiming for 100K/month (155mm) by end-2025. Ukraine receives ~2–3M shells/year from allies.
Ukraine produces 2–4M drones/year, outpacing Russia/US in output and innovation (e.g., cheap FPV killers). NATO aids via programs like UNITE/BRAVE for counter-drone tech. Scaling expected to continue in 2026.
US Dark Eagle (LRHW), CPS (naval), ARRW (tested successfully); $3.9B FY2026 budget. Entering service 2026–2027 on ships/subs. Startups booming ($2B+ VC in 2025).
Overall Johnson’s analysis is heavily biased, selective, and contains a mix of outdated, exaggerated, or misleading claims. While some elements align with Russian narratives or partial facts from earlier in the war, many are overstated or contradicted by late-2025 assessments
Johnson claims widespread encirclements and imminent collapse, with Russia calling for surrenders and Ukraine unable to hold lines.
This is OUTDATED as of late December 2025. Russian forces have made gradual advances toward Pokrovsk (a key logistics hub) over months, complicating Ukrainian logistics and capturing some surrounding areas, but no full encirclement of Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad occurred.
Ukrainian forces maintained positions in/around the towns, conducted limited counterattacks, and regained some ground (e.g., ~16 sq km near Pokrovsk in mid-December). No evidence of mass surrenders or “disaster”-level collapse; the front remains contested with high attrition on both sides.
I work with an know Ukrainians in Ukraine.
They do not want to surrender as their feeling is that it would mean their lives would be taken by Moscow or they would be enslaved again. This feeling is based on post 2014 developments in Russian occupied Crimea and the Donbas. Also they were happy enough to leave the de facto 2015 border but when Putin invaded in 2022 the Ukrainians realised that he is a bandit who will come over and over again, grabbing salami slices of their land, killing them slowly.
Would you have advised France in 1940 to “just surrender already”?
Segovia “When are you going to wake up and smell the coffee? Russia does NOT surrender. I’m no fan of the Soviet Union, but tell us, when did Russia ever surrender? “
Russia has accepted unfavorable peace terms—effectively conceding defeat—in several major wars:
World War I (1918): Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ceding vast territories (including Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltics) to Germany to exit the war.
Crimean War (1853–1856): Russia signed the Treaty of Paris (1856), surrendering southern Bessarabia and agreeing to neutralize the Black Sea (no warships allowed).
Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905): The Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) forced Russia to recognize Japanese dominance in Korea and cede southern Sakhalin and leases in Manchuria.
Russo-Polish War (1632–1634): Russia attempted to recapture Smolensk (lost earlier) but failed; the Treaty of Polyanov confirmed Polish control over Smolensk and other lands.
Russo-Sino Border Conflicts (1680s): Russian forts like Albazin were besieged and captured by Qing China; the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) forced Russia to cede claims along the Amur River and destroy settlements—a significant setback in eastward expansion.
The claim that “Russia never surrenders” is a myth; while resilient in defensive wars, it has ended conflicts on losing terms when necessary. In offensive campaigns or when overextended, it accepted unfavorable treaties to end wars, just like other powers. The myth overlooks these pragmatic concessions.
“the EU doesn’t have a large civilian market for ammo. The EU simply can’t make up for a drop in Ukrainian ammo production.”
Europe’s small-caliber ammunition market is growing (projected ~USD 3-4 billion by mid-2020s, with segments for hunting/sports in countries like Finland, Sweden, Czech Republic, Germany, and Italy), supported by organizations like AFEMS (Association of European Manufacturers of Sporting Ammunition).
But in the case of artillery ammunition the EU production has ramped up dramatically via the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and national investments. The EU targeted (and reports progress toward) 2 million 155mm shells annually by end-2025 (from ~300,000-500,000 pre-2022 levels), led by companies like Rheinmetall (new factories aiming for hundreds of thousands), Nammo, BAE Systems, and others. Ukraine itself produces some Soviet-era calibers (152mm/122mm) and has joint NATO-standard lines (e.g., with Rheinmetall). Any drop in Ukrainian output could be offset by EU/NATO surges.
Early negotiation attempts, such as the Istanbul talks in March-April 2022 (shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion), broke down over Russia’s demands for Ukrainian demilitarization, neutrality, and recognition of annexed territories.
These were existential threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty. Subsequent rounds (e.g., in 2023) failed similarly due to mutual distrust and battlefield escalations. Zelensky’s “peace formula” since late 2022 has emphasized territorial integrity, troop withdrawals, and security guarantees, which Russia dismissed.
while Ukraine’s battlefield position has weakened in some respects, active multilateral talks (e.g., Miami sessions continuing into December 2025) give Zelensky negotiating tools he lacked earlier. The war’s outcome remains uncertain, with both sides facing attrition costs—Russia’s economy strained by sanctions, Ukraine’s by losses. A negotiated end is possible but depends on mutual compromises, not one-sided capitulation.
Since November of 2022, Russia had gained about 5000 square miles of territory.
Saxon “think it’s more important that Russia fires 7 artillery shells for every one Ukraine fires. Ukraine has cannons, but a shortage of barrels, they only last about a week under typical use.”
Russia can still outshoot Ukraine overall thanks to sheer volume and imports, but the gap has narrowed dramatically this year, and it’s no longer the overwhelming 7:1 dominance it once was. Both sides are paying a heavy price for this artillery duel.
Ukraine is receiving enough shells to occasionally achieve local parity or even superiority. Ukraine prioritizes precision (Excalibur, guided Krasnopol, and increasingly drone-corrected fire), so one Ukrainian shell often achieves what several unguided Russian ones do.
Russian guns suffer barrel wear too—many Soviet-era 152 mm systems are firing at unsustainable rates, and Russia is reportedly cannibalizing barrels from storage or relying on lower-quality replacements.
Kazan “And, you and your ilk have been claiming Ukraine can take territory back or is fighting to a stalemate for about three years while Ukraine has been losing lives and territory.”
Khatkiv
Kherson.
Ukraine did take territory back.
At that time, and I have your posts, you claimed that Ukraine could not take those territories back.
Oh you kept claiming that Ukraine would surrender “in the next 2 weeks” for 2022 and 2023
Peak Russian occupation (mid-2022): Russia controlled ~22–25% of Ukraine (including pre-2022 holdings like Crimea and parts of Donbas).
Now Russia occupies ~19–20% of Ukraine.
In 2021 Russia occupied 8% of Ukraine. So in may 2022 they had gained 13% and the lost to today 5%.
So yeah, texasgator is correct that Russia lost a quarter of the Ukrainian land it gained by may 2022.
Kazan, btw isn’t that a city in the Russian federation? Do you live there now as you post this? “Since November of 2022, Russia had gained about 5000 square miles of territory.”
Total since November 2022: Approximately 4,200–5,000 square miles (~11,000–13,000 sq km), with most occurring in 2024–2025 amid intensified Russian offensives around Pokrovsk and other Donbas areas.
Impressive clawing back over 3 years and at the loss of lives and money
“Russia surrendered in the first world war. Left the battlefield to the Germans.”
not exactly. That was the Bolsheviks. The majority wanted to fight on. That is why the Kerensky Provisional Government fought on and why it took the Bolsheviks so long to finally get Brest-Litovsk done.
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