Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

various | 10-8-22

[nuconvert]

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

[AdmSmith]

ENGINEERING MINDS AND VOTES
The IRGC’s Baqiatallah Headquarters and Its Invisible Hand in Iran's Political Landscape

Following Iran's March 2024 parliamentary vote, a leaked audio file of former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was revealed where he outed Mohammad Ali Jafari, the former commander-in-chief of the IRGC, as being responsible for election engineering in Iran. According to Zarif, Jafari and the former head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization Hossein Taeb were “behind everything” in the March 2024 parliamentary elections, including preparing “the entire candidates list”.

Zarif’s reference to Jafari was particularly significant. Jafari not only has a track record in vote rigging that dates back to 2009 but, in the past five years, he has been commanding a shadowy IRGC headquarters – the Baqiatallah Cultural and Social Headquarters – which has created a full apparatus and strategy to engineer political and cultural outcomes in Iran.

Jafari is a skilled IRGC strategist who designed and oversaw the decentralization of the Guard after 2007. As the IRGC’s commander-in-chief from 2007 to 2019, Jafari was the strategist behind the decentralization of the IRGC and the creation of the IRGC provincial guards to prepare the regime to defend itself against any hard (war) or semi-hard (civil war) threats. He significantly expanded the IRGC’s security and military capabilities, consolidating the IRGC’s asymmetric warfare capabilities to deter the likelihood of US military strikes and brutally suppressing anti-regime protests in 2009 and 2017-18, which strongly challenged the Islamic Republic.

While the IRGC believes it has been able to neutralize the hard and semi-hard threats to the regime, it has been unable to control the “soft threats” to the Islamic Republic—namely Western and secular cultural penetration—due to the fundamental changes in Iranian society, not least the mass secularization of the population since the 1990s. To fix this problem, the Baqiatallah Headquarters was established to operate as an umbrella entity to coordinate all the pro-regime soft-war and cultural initiatives, including those of the IRGC and Basij. Practically speaking, this has meant all the IRGC and the Basij’s cultural, social, and propaganda institutions have been brought under Jafari’s control as part of the Baqiatallah Headquarters’ soft-war arsenal. According to Jafari, this decision was taken to help the regime achieve Khamenei’s doctrine to Islamize society as a prerequisite for creating a new Islamic civilization.

https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/UANI_Engineering%20Minds%20and%20Votes.pdf

[AdmSmith]

The West is ignoring a dangerous alliance reshaping Iran's regime. Dr Golkar and I reveal how Ahmad Vahidi has joined forces with former IRGC chief Mohammad Ali Jafari. The consequences of the Vahidi-Jafari alliance will be deadly inside Iran and beyond.

In March, we revealed that Vahidi was the main power in the regime—a report that was subsequently corroborated by Western intelligence sources. But that was only half the story. After years in senior state roles, Vahidi has been largely absent from the IRGC’s internal networks. To consolidate power, he needs to expand his constituency within the Guard — esp among younger gens. That's where Jafari—the 2nd most powerful figure in Iran today—comes in. Jafari — who has spent recent years commanding the IRGC’s shadowy Baqiatallah HQ — offers the solution to Vahidi’s problem. He controls a network of younger IRGC and Basij zealots — precisely the constituency Vahidi needs onside Jafari is one of the IRGC’s most skilled strategists. He designed the decentralisation of the Guard—a wartime strategy the IRGC is now using against the U.S. and Israel. He also founded the IRGC Intel Org, Cyber Command and strengthened its asymmetric warfare against the U.S.

Vahidi needs Jafari to mobilise younger IRGC and Basij cadres and build him a personal constituency. Jafari, meanwhile, is using Vahidi to sideline rivals—not least Ghalibaf, with whom he has a long and bitter feud. The knives are out inside the IRGC—and it could get ugly. The Vahidi-Jafari alliance is reshaping the IRGC’s body, personnel and strategy. Both men represent a puritanical, ideological vision of the Guard—one that views politics, society and the region through a hard theocratic-security lens.

Their alliance is accelerating the regime's transformation from a theocracy protected by the IRGC into a security-theocracy dominated by it. In doing so, they are advancing the vision the late Ali Khamenei long held for the Guard and the Islamic Republic—with or without war. The consequences of this alliance will be serious. At home, the regime will be even more repressive. Abroad, an IRGC that fully assumes political authority will be more aggressive: it will see confrontation with Iran's enemies not as a risk but as the natural language of power. If the regime and the Vahidi-Jafari alliance survives the war, these repercussions will be very clear—especially once Bibi and Trump are out of office.

https://x.com/KasraAarabi/status/2060389660900114497

[nuconvert]

Your posts this morning are making me feel disheartened.

[nuconvert]

I re-posted this link as a new thread.

[AdmSmith]

Key points to keep in mind:
1) Iran can’t unilaterally open the SoH: only the maritime insurance industry can. And it won’t as long as a nuclear deal remains unnegotiated, as the threat of renewed military strikes remain.
2) In other words, best case it will still take months for the SoH to get back to pre-February 28 levels.
3) The US negotiating position has to shift from all stick to some stick/some carrot, because we’ve tried the stick alone and it wasn’t enough to coerce strategic capitulation. And that carrot for Iran is $$$, either from unblocked assets or an easing of sanctions.
4) An Iranian commitment to ‘never have a nuclear weapon’ is about as dependable as a USG commitment not to attack Iran again. Any worthwhile nuclear deal needs IAEA w/Additional Protocol as a starting point.
5) Israel isn’t going to stop in Southern Lebanon.
6) Iran is not going to let the US participate in digging out the HEU.

https://x.com/AlanEyre1/status/2060478736286302408

and Danny C:

Needless to say, I fully agree with these points.

However, there is one critical aspect that policymakers in Washington need to understand about the economic dimension of the Iran challenge. The debate is often framed as a choice between sticks and carrots, but in reality there are limits to both.

As we have seen repeatedly, military and economic pressure alone cannot force the regime to abandon what it views as its core strategic assets. At the same time, economic incentives have clear limitations as well. Even if the regime were offered tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief and economic benefits, it would not relinquish what it considers its sovereign right to enrich uranium, develop ballistic missiles and drones, or maintain its network of regional proxies.

These are not bargaining chips from the regime’s perspective. They are fundamental pillars of its security doctrine and revolutionary identity. Preserving the regime is certainly its highest priority, but not at any price and not at the expense of the ideological principles that define its legitimacy. Assuming that unprecedented economic benefits alone can persuade Tehran to abandon these capabilities reflects a misunderstanding of how the Islamic Republic views its own survival and strategic interests.

https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2060494936391430448

We must focus on the ideological—that is, religious—aspect of the IRGC.

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update Special Report, May 30, 2026

Iran continues to try to frame the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) “management” of transit through the Strait of Hormuz as the new status quo. The United States and international community must continue to reject Iranian efforts to try to establish this new status quo, as it is detrimental to international commercial interests and sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of navigation in international waterways. The IRGC Navy has begun publishing daily roll-ups of the number of vessels that use Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy reported that 20 vessels passed through Iran's traffic separation scheme on May 30.[1] Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to force vessels to use Iran's illegal and unrecognized traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy also claimed that it provided “safe passage” to some vessels for “humanitarian reasons,” likely to try to portray the IRGC Navy as a reasonable actor despite its deployment of mines, as well as attacks and harassment of vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters separately stated on May 30 that Iranian armed forces are “fully” managing the strait and that all vessels must transit only through Iran's traffic separation scheme after receiving permission from the IRGC Navy.[2] The headquarters warned that Iranian armed forces will target any military vessel that intervenes in Iran's management of the strait or disrupts maritime traffic, likely in response to a May 29 US CENTCOM notice that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz and target vessels “engaged in, or supporting, mine-laying activities.”[3]

Neither the United States nor Iran has indicated that the two sides have narrowed gaps on key issues in the US-Iran negotiations, such as economic relief for Iran.[4] An unspecified senior Trump administration official told the New York Times on May 29 that the Trump administration believes it is close to an agreement but that the United States and Iran have still not resolved certain issues, including the unfreezing of Iranian assets.[5] Trump announced that “no money will be exchanged” in a social media post on May 29, likely referring to frozen Iranian assets.[6] Iranian officials have repeatedly demanded the release of frozen assets as a “precondition” for talks about nuclear issues.[7] An Iranian negotiating team member close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf asserted on May 30 that Iran's “irreversible” access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets is one of Iran's “main” conditions for any possible agreement.[8] Iranian state media, citing “unofficial details of a possible US-Iran memorandum of understanding,” separately claimed that the United States would give Iran full access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets within 60 days.[9] Ghalibaf recently led an Iranian delegation to Qatar to try to secure the “immediate” and “unconditional” release of $12 billion USD, but Qatar rejected Iran's request, according to anti-regime media on May 29.[10]

Iran likely seeks unrestricted access to its frozen assets to reduce the effect of US sanctions and the naval blockade and support its military reconstitution. US sanctions and the naval blockade have hindered Iran's ability to raise revenue that the regime could use to reconstitute its military capabilities.[11] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 25 that assets released under a potential agreement with the United States would go toward Iran's defense and military sectors, including Iran's missile and drone programs.[12] ISW-CTP previously assessed that granting Iran economic relief by unfreezing funds or removing sanctions would likely decrease Iranian military reconstitution timelines.

The hardline faction within the Iranian regime is not a monolith but contains a spectrum of actors with varying priorities, opinions, and political positions. ISW-CTP continues to assess that hardline IRGC officials, particularly IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, are unwilling to make meaningful concessions in negotiations with the United States. Analysts close to the Iranian regime told the New York Times on May 29 that hardliners, whom they claimed represent a “minority view,” are attempting to derail negotiations.[13] The hardliners in this report likely specifically refer to ultrahardliners affiliated with the Paydari (Stability) Front. Two unspecified senior Iranian officials told the New York Times that Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary Ali Bagheri Kani criticized Iran's negotiating team for being “too conciliatory” during the first round of US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad in April.[14] Bagheri Kani has close ties to Paydari (Stability) Front leader Saeed Jalili.[15] The Paydari (Stability) Front represents only one element of the hardline faction, and other, non-Paydari (Stability) Front hardliners have also posed an obstacle to negotiations by refusing to make concessions and insisting on maximalist demands. Vahidi and his inner circle, whom ISW-CTP assesses are currently dominating regime decision-making, have not signaled any willingness to soften their maximalist demands in negotiations, for example. The hardline faction in the regime also includes some “pragmatist” officials, such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who leads Iran's negotiating delegation. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Ghalibaf may not be aligned with key decision-makers in Tehran, such as Vahidi, and may be more willing to make concessions in negotiations.

Iran may have used a Chinese-made man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to target US aircraft during the war, according to three individuals familiar with the matter speaking to Western media. The three individuals told NBC News on May 29 that Iran “probably” struck the US F-15 fighter jet over southwestern Iran on April 3 using a Chinese-made shoulder-launched missile.[16] Iran was reportedly in discussions with the People's Republic of China (PRC) before the war began in late February 2026 to acquire MANPADS.[17] The PRC may have also provided Iran with a radar system to bolster its integrated air defense system before the war.[18] One of the sources and a US official told NBC News that the PRC may have given Iran a YLC-8B long-range anti-stealth surveillance radar in the “early days of the war.”[19]

The possible PRC military transfers underscore the nature of the PRC's military partnership with Iran. The PRC has demonstrated a willingness to bolster Iran's military capabilities without risking direct entanglement in the conflict and is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears willing to sell military equipment to Iran. The PRC reportedly sold Iran an advanced reconnaissance satellite that Iran used to target US military bases across the region during the war, for example.[20] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran reconstitute its missile program and has continued this support by sending Iran missile fuel precursor during the conflict.[21]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) continues to enforce its naval blockade against Iranian ports. US forces disabled the Gambia-flagged M/V Lian Star by firing at its engine room as the vessel attempted to run the blockade on May 29. CENTCOM said it issued numerous warnings to the vessel before firing. US forces have disabled five vessels and redirected 116 vessels since initiating the blockade on April 13.[22] US CENTCOM noted in a May 30 notice to mariners that ships that aid Iranian efforts to violate the blockade, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers with Iranian vessels, are also in violation of the blockade.[23]

The Iranian regime continues to face threats from Kurdish anti-regime groups in northwestern Iran. Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ali Akbar Javidan announced on May 29 that a likely Kurdish opposition group attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran's northwestern border.[24] IRGC forces also killed two Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[25] The regime has historically accused Kurdish armed groups of inciting anti-regime unrest in Iran. The regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement, for example.[26] The regime has also historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations in Iran.[27]

Hezbollah attacked Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions and communities in northern Israel with drones and rockets on May 29 and 30, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it has conducted at least 13 drone and rocket attacks targeting northern Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff, including attacks targeting the northern Israeli towns of Safed, Kiryat Shmona, and Nahariya.[28] Hezbollah fired over 30 rockets in the attacks, some of which struck the commercial center of Kiryat Shmona and landed off the coast of Nahariya on May 30.[29] A Hezbollah drone also struck a military area near Shomera on May 30.[30] Israeli media reported that the Hezbollah attacks did not cause any casualties.[31]

Hezbollah likely launched attacks on northern Israel in response to IDF advances beyond the “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon in recent days. The IDF 36th Division crossed the Litani River on May 29 to remove the threat of anti-tank fire to the Galilee Panhandle, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[32] A Lebanese open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst and Lebanese media reported that the IDF advanced into western Yohmor, Nabatieh District, on May 28, citing satellite imagery of IDF armored vehicles.[33] Israeli forces reportedly advanced south of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, on May 29, and into Ghandouriyeh, Bint Jbeil District, on May 30.[34] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted a complex improvised explosive device (IED) ambush on IDF forces in Ghandouriyeh on May 30, in which the group fired mortars and rockets at Israeli forces after detonating the IED.[35] The attack may support the analyst's claim that the IDF advanced into the town.[36] A Hezbollah-aligned journalist also reported that Hezbollah engaged the IDF in Ghandouriyeh on May 30.[37]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/

[AdmSmith]

29MAY2026 US and Iran take widely different approaches in messaging battle around peace

While the war and U.S. blockade have ravaged Iran's already terminally struggling economy, the Guards running the country may have calculated that, though the economic damage to the U.S. is far less than to Iran, the democratic structure of the U.S. means it can't weather as great losses as Iran can.

The ideological transformation of the Iranian government could also play a key role. Iran's new national security chief, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is believed to be one of the most influential figures in Iran. He's considered one of the most extremist members of the Iranian government — the Wall Street Journal reported that former Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani found him so radical that he temporarily quit the force in protest over his radicalism.

Mohsen Rezaee, a senior commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, is also listed as one of the most influential figures in the Iranian government and holds similarly extremist views. The group may fully believe they have the upper hand over the U.S. and are in a position to implement maximalist demands.

“The more extreme group in the IRGC are taking charge,” Saeid Golkar, an expert in Iran's security services at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, told the Wall Street Journal last month. “That makes the prolongation of the conflict more likely.” The outlet also outlined the rise of Mahdism in Iran's ruling circles — an apocalyptic interpretation of Islam which views the end times as imminent. Kasra Aarabi, an expert on the Guard at United Against Nuclear Iran, said Iran's actions suggest many of those in charge are genuine believers.

“How much of this is empty narrative, how much is true belief? If you look at their behavior, you can tell that they are guided by the principles of their ideology,” he said. “The apocalyptic doctrine of Mahdism has guided the regime's wartime behavior, and has provided justification for actions that could otherwise be viewed as irrational.”

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/world/4588093/us-iran-messaging-battle-peace/

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update Special Report, May 31, 2026

US President Donald Trump has requested several amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the United States and Iran remain at odds over key issues. A senior Trump administration official and a second unspecified source told Axios on May 30 that Trump requested several amendments to the draft MoU.[1] The officials said that Trump specifically requested amendments to the draft's text about how and when the United States would secure Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU).[2] The current draft MoU states that Iran would commit to not pursue a nuclear weapon but does not contain any Iranian commitments to hand over Iran's HEU or halt enrichment.[3] The current draft states that the United States and Iran would discuss nuclear issues during a 60-day period after the parties sign the MoU.[4] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not suspend uranium enrichment or transfer its HEU from Iran.[5]

A second informed source told Axios that Trump also requested changes to the draft MoU’s text on the Strait of Hormuz.[6] The source did not specify what specific changes Trump requested, however.[7] Trump previously called on Iran on May 29 to “immediately open” the Strait of Hormuz without tolls and to remove mines from the strait.[8] The United States and Iran have different definitions of “opening” the strait, however.[9] Iranian officials and media continue to claim that the strait is “open” despite the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy forcing vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme.[10] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on May 28 that, under the current draft MoU, Iran would allow “unrestricted” shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, stop imposing tolls and harassing vessels in the strait, and remove naval mines within 30 days, while the United States would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[11] Iranian officials have also claimed that Iran is charging vessels “protection fees” and “environmental fees” instead of “tolls.”[12] Iran remains the only power that has threatened civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during this war, meaning that its “protection fee” is a protection racket that ships must pay to avoid Iranian attack.

Three US officials separately told the New York Times on May 30 that Trump is concerned about parts of the draft MoU that would involve the United States unfreezing Iranian funds.[13] Trump previously appeared to reject unfreezing Iranian funds on May 29, stating that “no money will be exchanged until further notice.”[14] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that the United States must unfreeze frozen Iranian assets in order for Iran to accept any potential agreement.[15] An Iranian official affiliated with Iran's negotiating delegation stated on May 30 that Iran could withdraw from a US-Iran agreement if the United States “does not meet its commitments,” including unfreezing Iranian funds.[16]

Unspecified informed sources told Israeli media that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not responded to either the current draft MoU or Trump's proposed amendments.[17] IRGC-affiliated media argued that it would be better to not reach an agreement than for Iran to accept a “bad deal” that fails to secure Iranian interests.[18]

Anti-regime media, citing an unspecified informed source, claimed on May 31 that President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted a resignation letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[19] Pezeshkian reportedly warned in an “unprecedented and critical tone” that the IRGC is wielding an outsized role in the regime.[20] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media denied this report and no Iranian officials have confirmed this claim at the time of this writing.[21]

Iran continues to use the Caspian Sea and overland transit routes to try to offset reduced maritime trade caused by the US blockade on Iranian ports, but these alternative routes offer less capacity and efficiency than commercial shipping through the strait. Deputy Parliament Speaker Haji Babaei stated on May 31 that Iran is avoiding the US blockade on Iranian ports by using alternative routes and land corridors.[22] He claimed that Iran now imports at least 50 percent of basic goods through the Caspian Sea and argued that Iran must continue to develop alternative trade routes to ensure Iran's economic security under the blockade.[23] Iranian state media separately claimed on May 31 that Iran has imported over 20.5 million tons of goods this year, which marks an increase compared to the past two years.[24] Iranian state media added that Indian goods are transported by rail and road to Iran via Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[25] An economics expert told Radio Free Europe (RFE) on May 6 that alternative routes can supply Iran with goods but cannot fully replace a maritime container-based economy.[26] A former US economic adviser separately told RFE on May 6 that trucking is more expensive than shipping and that Caspian Sea import throughput is constrained by limited port and fleet capacity, which the former adviser stated may raise costs and inflation in Iran.[27]

Iran fired a ballistic missile at a Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) base in Iraqi Kurdistan on May 31, likely in response to an attack by Kurdish opposition groups in Iran on May 29.[28] The IRGC and IRGC-affiliated media stated on May 31 that the IRGC fired a ballistic missile targeting a PAK base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[29] A PAK spokesperson told Kurdish media on May 31 that an Iranian ballistic missile struck a PAK headquarters in Darashakran, Erbil Province, without causing casualties.[30] The spokesperson added that Iran struck the same base on May 25 with at least four missiles and several drones, which wounded nine people, and claimed that Iranian forces and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked PAK forces over 50 times since the war began on February 28.[31] Iran's ballistic missile attack on the PAK base comes after likely Kurdish opposition fighters attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran's northwestern border on May 29.[32] It also comes after the IRGC reportedly killed two PAK members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[33] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups of fomenting unrest in Iran and facilitating Israeli operations in Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan.[34]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to conduct ground offensives beyond its “Yellow Line” and has advanced further north of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. The IDF announced on May 30 that 36th Armored Division units have launched new ground offensives on both sides of the Litani River to expand the IDF’s “Yellow Line,” destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and strengthen the IDF’s operational control in southern Lebanon.[35] Israeli military and political sources, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, announced that the IDF seized Beaufort Castle in Nabatieh District on May 31 as part of the IDF’s new ground offensives.[36] Beaufort Castle is operationally significant to the IDF because the castle is located on high ground, which is favorable for observing ground force movements. The site is also symbolic because the IDF previously seized the site after a significant battle during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[37] Hezbollah claimed that it used direct fire to defend against Israeli advances into two towns near Beaufort Castle during protracted ground engagements between May 26 and 30.[38] Hezbollah has increasingly used direct fire in protracted ground engagements with advancing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since May 19.[39]

Hezbollah has expanded the scope of its attacks on northern Israel by targeting larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah claimed for the first time since the ceasefire began on April 16 that it fired rockets targeting Israeli cities more than 10 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, including the city of Karmiel and the Krayot suburbs of Haifa, on May 30 and 31.[41] An Israeli military correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Acre in northern Israel on May 31, although Hezbollah did not claim this attack.[42]

The United States recently warned Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaydi that the United States opposes the participation of any Iranian-backed Iraqi militia in the next Iraqi government, even if a militia states that it intends to disarm, according to an informed political source speaking to Iraqi media on May 31.[43] The US message reportedly stated that the United States may break off “political or administrative relations” with any ministry affiliated with an Iraqi militia.[44] The US warning comes after a Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on May 25 that some militias have expressed willingness to disarm and engage in Iraqi politics in exchange for securing “senior positions” within the Iraqi government.[45] An Iraqi committee comprised of Zaydi, Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani was reportedly close to finalizing a plan to disarm Iraqi militias, according to a regional media report on May 8.[46] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025, but has intensified its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and allied targets in Iraq and the region during the recent war.[47]

more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-31-2026/

[AdmSmith]

Now the Islamic regime of Iran feels it is safe from facing U.S. and Israeli airstrikes; therefore, it no longer even pretends to tolerate the freedoms of ordinary Iranians.

The police force of the regime has shut down a café on Tehran’s Valiasr Street where live music performances were being held, accusing it of promoting “deviant sects” and facilitating what authorities described as “satanic activities.” According to the regime, young men and women were observed engaging in “abnormal” and “strange” movements (dance). This is part of a broader crackdown that has intensified since the recent protests. A growing wave of executions, lengthy prison sentences, arrests, and business closures has alarmed human rights activists and organizations. The video below is what the regime is calling “satanic activities” inside that café.

https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/2061078356846616613

[AdmSmith]

A brief assessment:

Iran is likely to respond to any U.S. military strike on its territory. In recent Iranian messaging, Kuwait has increasingly been portrayed as a potential target on the grounds that it hosts facilities allegedly used to support or launch military operations against Iran. Absent a diplomatic agreement, and against the backdrop of persistent friction in and around the Strait of Hormuz, such incidents are likely to continue.

While neither Washington nor Tehran appears to be seeking a broader conflict at present, the risk is that repeated confrontations, miscalculations, or unintended escalation could eventually trigger a crisis neither side originally intended. In other words, the greatest danger may not be a deliberate decision to go to war, but a gradual escalation driven by recurring incidents in an increasingly volatile environment.

https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2061316836898075125

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update Special Report, June 1, 2026

The Iranian regime, which ISW-CTP continues to assess is dominated by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, suspended US-Iran negotiations on June 1.[1] Vahidi and his inner circle likely calculate that the status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions to the United States in a diplomatic agreement nor is engaged in a full-scale conflict with the United States, is a favorable situation that advances their objectives. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency announced on June 1 that the regime has suspended negotiations, ostensibly in response to Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[2] The fact that IRGC-affiliated media announced the suspension of negotiations suggests that the decision to suspend negotiations was driven by the IRGC, and presumably by Vahidi. Iranian officials have consistently demanded throughout negotiations that the US-Iran ceasefire must include Hezbollah, but Iranian officials significantly increased their emphasis on this demand after Tasnim announced the suspension of negotiations.[3] Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber, for example, stated on June 1 during a meeting with Hezbollah's representative to Tehran that any ceasefire that excludes Hezbollah is “irrelevant.”[4]

The Iranian regime's decision to suspend negotiations and emphasize the Lebanon issue is almost certainly a response to US President Donald Trump's recent amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Trump requested several amendments, including changes to the draft's text about Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz.[5] An Iranian official close to Iran's negotiating team stated on June 1 that Iran has “concerns” about Trump's amendments and reiterated that Iran will not transfer its HEU to the United States and that Iran must “manage” the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Iran likely responded to Trump's amendments by reemphasizing its own maximalist demands, particularly its insistence that any ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran must include Lebanon.

The Iranian regime has likely focused on the Lebanon issue, as opposed to another key sticking point in negotiations, to try to curb Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon as part of the regime's broader objective to preserve Hezbollah. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi issued an implicit threat on June 1 to attack civilians in northern Israel if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducts airstrikes targeting Beirut.[7] Abadi’s warning comes after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to conduct strikes against Hezbollah targets in Beirut and broaden the scope of IDF operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[8] Iran rarely issues public warnings before conducting attacks, which suggests that Abadi’s threat sought to achieve an informational effect. The regime likely intended to pressure the United States to push Israel to limit its operations against Hezbollah by threatening to attack Israel if Israel expanded its operations in Lebanon.

President Trump held a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 1 and stated that Israel will not attack Beirut.[9] Trump also noted that he had a “very good call” with Hezbollah via representatives, during which Hezbollah reportedly agreed to halt attacks against Israel. Axios, citing an adviser to Lebanese Parliament Speaker and longtime Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri, reported on June 1 that Berri informed the United States that Hezbollah is prepared to implement a “full and immediate ceasefire.”[10] Netanyahu stated that he told Trump that Israel would not cease attacks on Beirut if Hezbollah does not halt attacks on Israeli civilians and cities and added that Israeli operations in southern Lebanon will continue as planned.[11] Iran has long viewed Hezbollah as a central component of its deterrence strategy and therefore likely views an extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and halt of Israeli operations in Lebanon as necessary to prevent the further degradation of Hezbollah.

The regime also likely seeks to drive a wedge between the United States and Israel by falsely blaming Israel and its operations in Lebanon for the collapse of the US-Iran talks. The US-Iran negotiations have been at an impasse due to disagreements over other key sticking points for weeks, however. Senior Iranian officials and state media have framed Israeli operations in Lebanon as a ceasefire violation and cited the operations as the reason for suspending negotiations.[12] These statements seek to place blame for the collapse of the talks on Israel, and the regime likely calculates that portraying Israel as undermining US diplomatic efforts could create tensions between the United States and Israel. The US-Iran negotiations have been at an impasse for weeks, however, primarily due to disagreements over the Iranian nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian demands for economic relief.[13] Iranian officials have previously tied the Lebanon issue to the negotiations, but it has not been the main sticking point preventing a deal up to this point.

Vahidi and his inner circle also likely calculate that the status quo will help them advance several other objectives, such as solidifying Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining the Iranian nuclear program. Iran continues to use coercive measures in and around the Strait of Hormuz to force vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iran's protection racket.[14] Several countries have reached arrangements with Iran to facilitate their vessels’ safe passage through the strait.[15] Iran may calculate that protracting the status quo will force more countries to sign similar agreements with Iran, implicitly recognizing and legitimizing Iranian control over the strait.[16] Iran is also actively exploiting the US-Iran ceasefire to reconstitute elements of its ballistic missile and drone programs that Israel and the United States degraded during the June 2025 war and recent conflict.[17] Iran also continues to insist that it will not make any commitments regarding its enrichment capabilities or HEU stockpile.[18] The status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions on its nuclear program nor faces US or Israeli strikes, enables Iran to maintain its nuclear program and prevent further degradation of this program. Vahidi and those around him may assess that focusing on the Lebanon issue will cause a protracted discussion about the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire and thereby deflect attention from the above issues, which Vahidi refuses to make concessions on.

The suspension of negotiations further indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle are driving Iranian decision-making and have likely gained the upper hand over proponents of a deal, particularly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Vahidi and his inner circle have consistently opposed compromise and prioritized achieving the objectives outlined above.[19] Ghalibaf, on the other hand, has sought to reach an agreement and has appeared more willing to make concessions to the United States. The regime's decision to suspend negotiations and insist on maximalist demands, such as Hezbollah's inclusion in the ceasefire, therefore indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle continue to dominate decision-making.

US President Donald Trump told NBC News that Iran did not inform him that it had suspended negotiations.[20] He added that the United States would not necessarily resume military operations if talks collapsed but would instead maintain its naval blockade on Iranian ports because Iran is “losing a fortune.”[21]

Iran and the United States have exchanged limited fire over the past 48 hours. IRGC-affiliated media announced on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down a US MQ-1 Predator drone over “Iranian territorial waters.”[22] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down the drone but clarified that the drone was operating over international waters.[23] CENTCOM responded by launching defensive strikes targeting Iranian air defense systems, a ground control station, and two Iranian one-way attack drones on Qeshm Island and in Goruk, Hormozgan Province.[24] The IRGC retaliated against the US strikes by launching two missiles at US forces in Kuwait on May 31.[25] CENTCOM confirmed that US forces intercepted the two missiles and reported no damage or casualties.[26]

Iranian forces also likely attacked a civilian cargo vessel located off the coast of Iraq on June 1.[27] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on June 1 that an unspecified projectile struck a cargo vessel transiting the northern Persian Gulf approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of the Umm Qasr Port in Iraq.[28] Iraqi media and open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts reported that the struck civilian vessel was the Panama-flagged MSC Sariska V.[29] UKMTO reported a second impact on the same vessel several hours after the initial attack.[30] The second impact caused a fire onboard, which the crew was able to extinguish.[31] Iraqi officials told Reuters on June 1 that the second impact was likely caused by a drone.[32] The IRGC Navy warned commercial vessels on June 1 that it will identify and “[deal] with” vessels that cooperate with “extra-regional hostile forces.”[33]

Hezbollah has continued to target larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) recent advances in southern Lebanon.[34] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting the northern Israeli city of Tiberias, which is located about 20 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, on May 31.[35] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the rockets did not strike their target and caused no casualties.[36] Hezbollah has targeted several urban areas in northern Israel and has progressively targeted cities deeper inside Israeli territory in recent days.[37]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-template-053026/

[AdmSmith]

An Israeli perspective:

“I had a very productive call with Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, of Israel, and there will be no Troops going to Beirut, and any Troops that are on their way, have already been turned back. Likewise, through highly placed Representatives, I had a very good call with Hezbollah, and they agreed that all shooting will stop — That Israel will not attack them, and they will not attack Israel.” (@POTUS)

We are not allowed to win the war against Hamas.
We are not allowed to win the war against Hezbollah.
We are not allowed to win the war against “PA”.
We are not allowed to win the war against the Mullah tyranny.
We are not allowed to restore democracy in Israel.
We are not allowed to have a free market.
We are not allowed free speech and freedom of religion.

Amazing.

https://x.com/NaftaliHirschl/status/2061508003321557202

[PIF]

President Trump held a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 1 and stated that Israel will not attack Beirut. Trump also noted that he had a “very good call” with Hezbollah via representatives, during which Hezbollah reportedly agreed to halt attacks against Israel.

—
47 likes to take Hezbollah’s and Iran’s word for something, but rails against Israel & Netanyahu. Now 47 is pissing off Israel and trying to leave our only ally defenseless against Hezbollah, who’s word is worthless.

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update Special Report, June 2, 2026

The Iranian regime is likely trying to transform negotiations about ending the war with Iran into negotiations about ending the war in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah seek to end in Israel's capitulation. The Iranian regime is likely also using the time it is buying through this negotiation tactic to try to legitimize its illegal traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz and solidify its de facto control over the strait. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media outlets reported on June 2 that Iran has not sent a response to US President Donald Trump's amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) and that Iran and the United States have not exchanged messages for several days.[1] IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency, citing an informed source, reported on June 2 that Iran's last message to the United States was a “clear message” about Lebanon.[2] Iranian officials have previously conditioned further negotiations with the United States on a ceasefire in Lebanon, but Iranian officials have coalesced around and emphasized this demand to a greater degree following Trump's request for amendments to the draft MoU, particularly amendments related to Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz.[3] Iran is likely using the Lebanon issue to deflect attention from these core disputes and to protract discussions about a ceasefire in Lebanon, which buys Iran time to preserve its sources of leverage, such as its nuclear program and control over the Strait of Hormuz.

The United States mediated a partial agreement between Israel and Hezbollah to halt Israeli strikes against Beirut and Hezbollah strikes against northern Israel.[4] The ceasefire appears to be largely holding but is very fragile.[5] A partial ceasefire likely does not meet Iran and Hezbollah's maximalist demand for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah view as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. President Trump held a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 1 and stated that Israel agreed not to attack Beirut.[6] The Lebanese Embassy in Washington said that the Lebanese government received confirmation from Hezbollah that the group accepted the US-mediated proposal, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would stop strikes against Beirut in exchange for Hezbollah halting attacks on Israeli territory. The embassy stated that the ceasefire “would be extended to all Lebanese territory” over an unspecified timeframe.[7] The IDF has not struck Beirut since the US and Lebanese governments announced the partial ceasefire proposal. Hezbollah has also not claimed any attacks against northern Israel since the announcement. Israeli military correspondents reported on June 1 that Hezbollah fired two rockets and one drone at targets in northern Israel, none of which caused any casualties, however.[8] The IDF and Hezbollah continued to launch attacks against each other in southern Lebanon on June 1 and 2, which could threaten to collapse the fragile US proposal.[9] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that the IDF would resume its planned strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut if Hezbollah attacks northern Israeli communities.[10]

The partial ceasefire likely does not meet Iran and Hezbollah's maximalist demand for a complete ceasefire encompassing all Lebanese territory, however. Hezbollah and Iranian officials stated on June 1 and 2 that they will not accept a partial ceasefire that only bars strikes against Beirut and demanded a complete end to Israeli operations in Lebanon.[11] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that Iran seeks a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and will not resume negotiations with the United States until the IDF ends its operations in Lebanon, for example.[12] Hezbollah media spokesperson Youssef al Zein separately emphasized that Israel must agree to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities across Lebanese territory.[13] Hezbollah Deputy Political Council head Mahmoud Qamati similarly told Western media that Hezbollah will not accept a partial ceasefire and warned that the group would respond to any Israeli strikes on Beirut.[14] Iran and Hezbollah would likely demand that Israeli forces withdraw from Lebanese territory following a complete ceasefire in Lebanon. Hezbollah officials have repeatedly called for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.[15] A complete ceasefire in Lebanon and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would achieve Iran's objective of preserving Hezbollah, which has historically played a central role in Iran's Axis of Resistance and been a key pillar of Iran's deterrence strategy.[16]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation that is likely intended to pressure the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iranian officials have threatened attacks against both Israel and shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon, likely because they calculate that the threat of an expanded conflict will drive the United States to pressure Israel to stop its operations against Hezbollah. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi threatened on June 1 to attack civilians in northern Israel if the IDF conducts airstrikes targeting Beirut.[17] Iran rarely issues public warnings before conducting attacks, which suggests that Abadi’s threat sought to achieve an informational effect. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani separately threatened on June 1 that Iran will “activate” the Bab el Mandeb Strait, just like the Strait of Hormuz, in response to Israel's operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] A senior Houthi official also warned on June 2 that the group's “hands are on the trigger.”[19] Iran and the Houthis have consistently threatened to resume attacks against shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait throughout the war, but have not acted on those threats, which suggests that their current threats are intended to achieve the effect of pressuring the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah.[20]

The Iranian regime also seeks to exploit the Lebanon issue to try to sow divisions between the United States and Israel. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Fadahossein Maleki claimed on June 2 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu increased operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon to disrupt US-Iran negotiations after Netanyahu allegedly realized that Trump's approach did not align with Israeli demands.[21] This and similar statements from Iranian officials suggest that the Iranian regime is trying to portray Israel as the main obstacle to a US-Iran deal and an end to the war with Iran.

Iran is also using the time it is gaining by deflecting attention from the US-Iran negotiations to advance other objectives, such as securing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy announced on June 2 that it permitted 24 vessels to pass through the strait in the past 24 hours.[22] It warned that it will implement “smart control” over the strait and claimed that “evil foreigners” have no place in the Persian Gulf or the strait.[23] The US-sanctioned Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) separately claimed on June 1 that over 300 non-Iranian vessels have submitted information to receive permission from Iran to transit through the strait since late April, which supports Iran's efforts to normalize its control over the strait by forcing vessels to comply with its transit protocols.[24] The IRGC Navy and PGSA’s statements highlight how Iran is trying to normalize its coercive transit regime, which includes Iran's illegal and unrecognized traffic separation scheme, permit system, and toll scheme.

Even if Israel and Hezbollah reach a ceasefire in Lebanon, Iran could condition further US-Iran negotiations on additional US concessions. Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari previously stated on May 11 that Iran would not enter negotiations with the United States until the United States accepted Iran's terms, including an end to the war on “all fronts,” sanctions relief, the release of frozen Iranian assets, compensation for war-related damages, and recognition of Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.[25] Iran is currently imposing its demand for a ceasefire on “all fronts” on the United States, but could demand additional US concessions–such as economic relief–even if the United States agrees to accept Iran's demand for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon. An Iranian negotiating team member close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 2 that Iran would withdraw from any US-Iran agreement or refuse to enter the next phase of negotiations if Iran could not access its frozen assets, sell oil during the 60-day negotiations period, lift the blockade, or agree to Iranian demands related to the Strait of Hormuz.[26] Giving in to Iranian preconditions would reduce US leverage in future negotiations and make it harder to extract concessions from Iran on its nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework announced its support on June 1 for restricting arms to the state and separating the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from all “political, partisan, and social frameworks.”[27] The framework's announcement is probably a response to intensified US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias, rather than an indicator that the framework intends to disarm the militias. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[28] The framework did not specify what it meant by “restricting weapons to the state” or “political, partisan, and social frameworks.” The framework could be referring to an effort to separate militias’ political wings from militia-controlled PMF brigades and restricting weapons to the PMF. The framework's statement affirmed the PMF as an official state institution.[29] The framework's announcement follows the framework's formation in May 2026 of a committee, including incumbent Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi, former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, to develop a mechanism to disarm the militias and integrate their members into state institutions.[30] These disarmament efforts come amid increased US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to decrease Iranian influence in Iraq, including through militia disarmament, due to US militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war.[31] Multiple sources close to framework leaders told Iraqi media on June 2 that framework leaders are concerned that the United States will not accept the “mere formality of disarmament,” but will instead pressure Baghdad to dissolve the PMF.[32]

The framework's statement conditioned militia disarmament on the end of the international coalition's mission in Iraq.[33] US-led international coalition forces completed their mission in federal Iraq in January 2026, but continue to operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.[34] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that all US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias disproportionately attacked US positions in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias used violent and non-violent means for years to pressure the United States to remove US forces from federal Iraq.[36]

The framework is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs, and it is unclear which specific elements of the framework supported this announcement. The framework includes the political wings of multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that have recently rejected disarmament, including Kataib Hezbollah.[37] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba also reportedly reject disarmament.[38] These militias have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other Iraqi militias.[39]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq announced on June 2 that it has formed an internal committee to begin “disengaging” from the PMF. This announcement comes amid Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali’s public support for disarmament and shift toward political activity in recent years.[40] Asaib Ahl al Haq said that the group's military spokesperson will lead the committee, which will inventory personnel, weapons, vehicles, and logistical supplies.[41] The committee will also organize communication mechanisms with the prime minister, according to Asaib Ahl al Haq.[42] It is unclear if “disengaging from the PMF” refers to ending Asaib Ahl al Haq’s control over its affiliated PMF brigades or some other action. Asaib Ahl al Haq controls the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd PMF brigades.[43] Iraq analysts have long noted that Asaib Ahl al Haq’s leadership, particularly Khazali, has focused on politics more than kinetic activity in recent years, including during the October 7 War.[44] The US-Israeli combined force struck multiple Asaib Ahl al Haq positions during the recent war as part of its effort to degrade Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ ability to attack the United States and Israel.[45] The US Treasury Department also noted in April 2026 that Asaib Ahl al Haq had conducted drone attacks targeting US and coalition forces in northern Iraq in March 2026.[46] It is unclear if Asaib Ahl al Haq sanctioned this kinetic activity. Khazali has pledged his public support for militia disarmament in recent months.[47] CTP-ISW previously identified indications of splinters within Asaib Ahl al Haq regarding disarmament.[48] Asaib Ahl al Haq and several other members of the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a militia coordinating committee, signed a statement in January 2026 rejecting Iraqi militia disarmament due to the continued presence of US and Turkish troops in Iraqi Kurdistan, for example.[49]

Khazali could be signaling his willingness to disarm in order to lessen US resistance to Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing controlling an Iraqi ministry. Iraqi media reported on June 2 that the United States has continued to oppose the allocation of any ministerial portfolio to political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, even if the militias have announced their disarmament.[50] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing, Sadiqoun, won 27 seats in the November 2025 elections, which would typically be enough seats to gain control of an Iraqi ministry.[51] The Iraqi parliament approved 14 out of 23 ministers of incumbent Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s government on May 14, but multiple ministries, including the defense and interior ministries, remain unfilled.[52] Asaib Ahl al Haq has said that it will decide on its participation in the next Iraqi government after the issue of restricting arms to the state is addressed.[53] Two framework sources told AP on May 14 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani told several framework and militia leaders to postpone voting on ministries in which militia-affiliated political parties are vying for positions.[54] It is currently unclear why Ghaani called for this delay.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Imam Ali, whose political wing controls five seats in parliament, also announced its readiness to restrict weapons to the Iraqi state, possibly to overcome US opposition to its involvement in the next government.[55] Kataib al Imam Ali announced on June 2 that it will begin to “disengage” from the PMF and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state.[56] The militia announced that it will form multiple committees to handle issues such as the transfer of weapons to the state, the families of martyrs and wounded fighters, and the reintegration of militia personnel and affiliates into the Iraqi state.[57] US opposition to militia involvement in the next government has mainly focused on the cabinet level, but Kataib al Imam Ali could be attempting to avoid US pushback to the group's participation in the government in another capacity.[58]

The framework's announcement, along with Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali's announcements, follows reports of Iranian pressure on its Iraqi partners to stop all kinetic activity, likely to avoid US financial pressure against Iraq that negatively impacts Iran. Ghaani reportedly warned about “real dangers” that could result in a loss of military privileges and discussed the need for an “alternate plan” regarding militia disarmament with militia and framework leaders in Baghdad in April 2026.[59] Ghaani reportedly proposed that some militias end all kinetic activity while preserving the PMF and consolidating the political role of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[60] US financial pressure on Iraq, such as the US Treasury Department's reported decision to halt shipments of Iraqi export oil revenue to Iraq, heavily impacts Iran due to Iran's use of the Iraqi economy for sanctions evasion and to help fund the Axis of Resistance.[61] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran could decide to build a new cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement the political activity of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. Ghaani reportedly instructed several framework and militia leaders in May not to proceed with disarmament until the trajectory of the US-Iran negotiations becomes clear.[62] Iran likely wishes to maintain the militias’ military strength in the event of renewed conflict with the United States and Israel.

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on June 2 that Iran is securing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in preparation for a potential US ground operation to seize Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.[63] The Institute stated that Iran has created “rocky mounds” on the roads leading to Fordow’s tunnel entrances and that the mounds are positioned in a way to hinder the movement of hostile forces attempting to enter or exit the tunnels.[64] The Institute added that Iran did not completely block the roads like it has at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which indicates that Iran still seeks to access Fordow.[65] All of Fordow’s tunnel entrances have remained buried as of May 26, however.[66] Iran's HEU is buried underneath rubble at the ENTC, Fordow, and Natanz, which the United States and Israel struck during the 12-day war.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-2-2026/

[AdmSmith]

Another day, another clash in the gulf:

A. Without a deal, friction inevitably drives escalation.

B. In an environment already marked by high tensions, escalation can become uncontrolled, even when neither side actively seeks a broader conflict.

C. Iran continues to operate within its established deterrence framework, but recent statements by senior officials, including Mohsen Rezaei, suggest that the scope of potential retaliation may be expanding. This time, references have reportedly included the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.

D. Through its actions, Iran is signaling that it will not allow a return to the previous status quo in the Gulf. From Tehran’s perspective, the regional landscape has changed, and any attempt to restore the old order will be challenged.

E. The continuation of the blockade creates an inherently unstable situation. Such a reality is difficult to sustain indefinitely without a direct confrontation at sea. As encounters between the parties become more frequent, the likelihood increases that an Iranian response will be more forceful and consequential.

Bottom line: another day, another incident, another round of restraint. But this pattern is unlikely to remain sustainable for long. The risk is not necessarily deliberate escalation, it is miscalculation, followed by a cycle of action and reaction that neither side initially intended.

https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2062007959643718105

[AdmSmith]

The official policy of the IRGC and Basij in Iran is simple:
“Shoot and kill.” Kill who? Kill whoever the hell you feel like killing !

https://x.com/_A_khalifa/status/2061358121193558401

1 min video

[AdmSmith]

Statement Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kuwait
Wednesday, June 3, 2026

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses the State of Kuwait's condemnation and denunciation, in the strongest terms, of the brutal and ongoing Iranian attacks using ballistic missiles and drones, the latest of which occurred at dawn today, targeting once again civilian and vital facilities, including Kuwait International Airport, resulting in the death of one individual, injuries to others, and damage to vital facilities, including diplomatic missions.

The Ministry affirms the State of Kuwait's categorical rejection of Iran's overt aggressive attacks, which lead to increased escalation, heightened tension, and undermine the security and stability of the region, constituting a flagrant violation of the rules of international law, the United Nations Charter, and Security Council Resolution 2817 of 2026.

The Ministry stresses that the security of the State of Kuwait, its sovereignty, and the safety of its citizens and residents on its territory are a red line that cannot be crossed, affirming that the repetition of these aggressions represents an organized aggressive approach, which the State of Kuwait will neither accept nor tolerate.

The Ministry affirms that the State of Kuwait reserves its full and inherent right to take appropriate measures in response to these sinful and repeated Iranian aggressions, in accordance with international law.

https://x.com/MOFAKuwait/status/2062093466306294237

[AdmSmith]

Statement Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kuwait,
Wednesday, 3 June 2026

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses the State of Kuwait's condemnation and strongest denunciation of the heinous Iranian targeting that struck the sisterly Kingdom of Bahrain, in a dangerous escalation that constitutes a flagrant violation of the rules of international law and a threat to the security and stability of the region.

The Ministry reaffirms the State of Kuwait's categorical rejection of these aggressive practices, emphasizing the necessity of halting them immediately and sparing the region further escalation and tension.

The State of Kuwait also affirms its full solidarity with the sisterly Kingdom of Bahrain, its standing by its side, and its support for all measures it takes to preserve its security, sovereignty, stability, and the safety of its territories.

https://x.com/MOFAKuwait/status/2062110248563777981

[AdmSmith]

A group of Iranian lawmakers called for the range of Iran’s missiles to be increased to reach the White House, in a letter to Mojtaba Khamenei calling for “revenge for the blood” of Iran’s former supreme leader Ali Khamenei and commanders of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

“We will support our military forces and defense industries until the day the range of our missiles reaches the office of Khamenei’s killers,” the lawmakers said in the statement.

The signatory lawmakers also called for the status of the Strait of Hormuz to become irreversible from its pre-war condition, the rejection of any negotiations over nuclear capabilities, full compensation for the material and moral damages of the war, the withdrawal of US forces from the region and punishment of the “aggressors in such a way that the possibility of repeated attacks is eliminated.”

https://www.iranintl.com/en/202606030800

[AdmSmith]

Deputy of the regime's judiciary: No one is executed for protesting!

He's telling the truth; they don't execute anyone for protesting, because they mow down the protesters in the streets with gunfire and kill thousands. And those they do execute, they label as “spies” or “corruptors” so they don't have to say they were executed for protesting.

https://x.com/Goftaniha/status/2062156049373605955

1 min video Persian