Replies

Iran Update Special Report, June 1, 2026

The Iranian regime, which ISW-CTP continues to assess is dominated by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, suspended US-Iran negotiations on June 1.[1] Vahidi and his inner circle likely calculate that the status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions to the United States in a diplomatic agreement nor is engaged in a full-scale conflict with the United States, is a favorable situation that advances their objectives. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency announced on June 1 that the regime has suspended negotiations, ostensibly in response to Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[2] The fact that IRGC-affiliated media announced the suspension of negotiations suggests that the decision to suspend negotiations was driven by the IRGC, and presumably by Vahidi. Iranian officials have consistently demanded throughout negotiations that the US-Iran ceasefire must include Hezbollah, but Iranian officials significantly increased their emphasis on this demand after Tasnim announced the suspension of negotiations.[3] Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber, for example, stated on June 1 during a meeting with Hezbollah's representative to Tehran that any ceasefire that excludes Hezbollah is “irrelevant.”[4]

The Iranian regime's decision to suspend negotiations and emphasize the Lebanon issue is almost certainly a response to US President Donald Trump's recent amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Trump requested several amendments, including changes to the draft's text about Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz.[5] An Iranian official close to Iran's negotiating team stated on June 1 that Iran has “concerns” about Trump's amendments and reiterated that Iran will not transfer its HEU to the United States and that Iran must “manage” the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Iran likely responded to Trump's amendments by reemphasizing its own maximalist demands, particularly its insistence that any ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran must include Lebanon.

The Iranian regime has likely focused on the Lebanon issue, as opposed to another key sticking point in negotiations, to try to curb Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon as part of the regime's broader objective to preserve Hezbollah. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi issued an implicit threat on June 1 to attack civilians in northern Israel if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducts airstrikes targeting Beirut.[7] Abadi’s warning comes after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to conduct strikes against Hezbollah targets in Beirut and broaden the scope of IDF operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[8] Iran rarely issues public warnings before conducting attacks, which suggests that Abadi’s threat sought to achieve an informational effect. The regime likely intended to pressure the United States to push Israel to limit its operations against Hezbollah by threatening to attack Israel if Israel expanded its operations in Lebanon.

President Trump held a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 1 and stated that Israel will not attack Beirut.[9] Trump also noted that he had a “very good call” with Hezbollah via representatives, during which Hezbollah reportedly agreed to halt attacks against Israel. Axios, citing an adviser to Lebanese Parliament Speaker and longtime Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri, reported on June 1 that Berri informed the United States that Hezbollah is prepared to implement a “full and immediate ceasefire.”[10] Netanyahu stated that he told Trump that Israel would not cease attacks on Beirut if Hezbollah does not halt attacks on Israeli civilians and cities and added that Israeli operations in southern Lebanon will continue as planned.[11] Iran has long viewed Hezbollah as a central component of its deterrence strategy and therefore likely views an extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and halt of Israeli operations in Lebanon as necessary to prevent the further degradation of Hezbollah.

The regime also likely seeks to drive a wedge between the United States and Israel by falsely blaming Israel and its operations in Lebanon for the collapse of the US-Iran talks. The US-Iran negotiations have been at an impasse due to disagreements over other key sticking points for weeks, however. Senior Iranian officials and state media have framed Israeli operations in Lebanon as a ceasefire violation and cited the operations as the reason for suspending negotiations.[12] These statements seek to place blame for the collapse of the talks on Israel, and the regime likely calculates that portraying Israel as undermining US diplomatic efforts could create tensions between the United States and Israel. The US-Iran negotiations have been at an impasse for weeks, however, primarily due to disagreements over the Iranian nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian demands for economic relief.[13] Iranian officials have previously tied the Lebanon issue to the negotiations, but it has not been the main sticking point preventing a deal up to this point.

Vahidi and his inner circle also likely calculate that the status quo will help them advance several other objectives, such as solidifying Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining the Iranian nuclear program. Iran continues to use coercive measures in and around the Strait of Hormuz to force vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iran's protection racket.[14] Several countries have reached arrangements with Iran to facilitate their vessels’ safe passage through the strait.[15] Iran may calculate that protracting the status quo will force more countries to sign similar agreements with Iran, implicitly recognizing and legitimizing Iranian control over the strait.[16] Iran is also actively exploiting the US-Iran ceasefire to reconstitute elements of its ballistic missile and drone programs that Israel and the United States degraded during the June 2025 war and recent conflict.[17] Iran also continues to insist that it will not make any commitments regarding its enrichment capabilities or HEU stockpile.[18] The status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions on its nuclear program nor faces US or Israeli strikes, enables Iran to maintain its nuclear program and prevent further degradation of this program. Vahidi and those around him may assess that focusing on the Lebanon issue will cause a protracted discussion about the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire and thereby deflect attention from the above issues, which Vahidi refuses to make concessions on.

The suspension of negotiations further indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle are driving Iranian decision-making and have likely gained the upper hand over proponents of a deal, particularly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Vahidi and his inner circle have consistently opposed compromise and prioritized achieving the objectives outlined above.[19] Ghalibaf, on the other hand, has sought to reach an agreement and has appeared more willing to make concessions to the United States. The regime's decision to suspend negotiations and insist on maximalist demands, such as Hezbollah's inclusion in the ceasefire, therefore indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle continue to dominate decision-making.

US President Donald Trump told NBC News that Iran did not inform him that it had suspended negotiations.[20] He added that the United States would not necessarily resume military operations if talks collapsed but would instead maintain its naval blockade on Iranian ports because Iran is “losing a fortune.”[21]

Iran and the United States have exchanged limited fire over the past 48 hours. IRGC-affiliated media announced on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down a US MQ-1 Predator drone over “Iranian territorial waters.”[22] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down the drone but clarified that the drone was operating over international waters.[23] CENTCOM responded by launching defensive strikes targeting Iranian air defense systems, a ground control station, and two Iranian one-way attack drones on Qeshm Island and in Goruk, Hormozgan Province.[24] The IRGC retaliated against the US strikes by launching two missiles at US forces in Kuwait on May 31.[25] CENTCOM confirmed that US forces intercepted the two missiles and reported no damage or casualties.[26]

Iranian forces also likely attacked a civilian cargo vessel located off the coast of Iraq on June 1.[27] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on June 1 that an unspecified projectile struck a cargo vessel transiting the northern Persian Gulf approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of the Umm Qasr Port in Iraq.[28] Iraqi media and open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts reported that the struck civilian vessel was the Panama-flagged MSC Sariska V.[29] UKMTO reported a second impact on the same vessel several hours after the initial attack.[30] The second impact caused a fire onboard, which the crew was able to extinguish.[31] Iraqi officials told Reuters on June 1 that the second impact was likely caused by a drone.[32] The IRGC Navy warned commercial vessels on June 1 that it will identify and “[deal] with” vessels that cooperate with “extra-regional hostile forces.”[33]

Hezbollah has continued to target larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) recent advances in southern Lebanon.[34] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting the northern Israeli city of Tiberias, which is located about 20 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, on May 31.[35] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the rockets did not strike their target and caused no casualties.[36] Hezbollah has targeted several urban areas in northern Israel and has progressively targeted cities deeper inside Israeli territory in recent days.[37]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-template-053026/

Iran Update Special Report, June 2, 2026

The Iranian regime is likely trying to transform negotiations about ending the war with Iran into negotiations about ending the war in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah seek to end in Israel's capitulation. The Iranian regime is likely also using the time it is buying through this negotiation tactic to try to legitimize its illegal traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz and solidify its de facto control over the strait. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media outlets reported on June 2 that Iran has not sent a response to US President Donald Trump's amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) and that Iran and the United States have not exchanged messages for several days.[1] IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency, citing an informed source, reported on June 2 that Iran's last message to the United States was a “clear message” about Lebanon.[2] Iranian officials have previously conditioned further negotiations with the United States on a ceasefire in Lebanon, but Iranian officials have coalesced around and emphasized this demand to a greater degree following Trump's request for amendments to the draft MoU, particularly amendments related to Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz.[3] Iran is likely using the Lebanon issue to deflect attention from these core disputes and to protract discussions about a ceasefire in Lebanon, which buys Iran time to preserve its sources of leverage, such as its nuclear program and control over the Strait of Hormuz.

The United States mediated a partial agreement between Israel and Hezbollah to halt Israeli strikes against Beirut and Hezbollah strikes against northern Israel.[4] The ceasefire appears to be largely holding but is very fragile.[5] A partial ceasefire likely does not meet Iran and Hezbollah's maximalist demand for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon, which Iran and Hezbollah view as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. President Trump held a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 1 and stated that Israel agreed not to attack Beirut.[6] The Lebanese Embassy in Washington said that the Lebanese government received confirmation from Hezbollah that the group accepted the US-mediated proposal, in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would stop strikes against Beirut in exchange for Hezbollah halting attacks on Israeli territory. The embassy stated that the ceasefire “would be extended to all Lebanese territory” over an unspecified timeframe.[7] The IDF has not struck Beirut since the US and Lebanese governments announced the partial ceasefire proposal. Hezbollah has also not claimed any attacks against northern Israel since the announcement. Israeli military correspondents reported on June 1 that Hezbollah fired two rockets and one drone at targets in northern Israel, none of which caused any casualties, however.[8] The IDF and Hezbollah continued to launch attacks against each other in southern Lebanon on June 1 and 2, which could threaten to collapse the fragile US proposal.[9] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that the IDF would resume its planned strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut if Hezbollah attacks northern Israeli communities.[10]

The partial ceasefire likely does not meet Iran and Hezbollah's maximalist demand for a complete ceasefire encompassing all Lebanese territory, however. Hezbollah and Iranian officials stated on June 1 and 2 that they will not accept a partial ceasefire that only bars strikes against Beirut and demanded a complete end to Israeli operations in Lebanon.[11] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that Iran seeks a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and will not resume negotiations with the United States until the IDF ends its operations in Lebanon, for example.[12] Hezbollah media spokesperson Youssef al Zein separately emphasized that Israel must agree to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities across Lebanese territory.[13] Hezbollah Deputy Political Council head Mahmoud Qamati similarly told Western media that Hezbollah will not accept a partial ceasefire and warned that the group would respond to any Israeli strikes on Beirut.[14] Iran and Hezbollah would likely demand that Israeli forces withdraw from Lebanese territory following a complete ceasefire in Lebanon. Hezbollah officials have repeatedly called for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.[15] A complete ceasefire in Lebanon and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would achieve Iran's objective of preserving Hezbollah, which has historically played a central role in Iran's Axis of Resistance and been a key pillar of Iran's deterrence strategy.[16]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation that is likely intended to pressure the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iranian officials have threatened attacks against both Israel and shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon, likely because they calculate that the threat of an expanded conflict will drive the United States to pressure Israel to stop its operations against Hezbollah. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi threatened on June 1 to attack civilians in northern Israel if the IDF conducts airstrikes targeting Beirut.[17] Iran rarely issues public warnings before conducting attacks, which suggests that Abadi’s threat sought to achieve an informational effect. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani separately threatened on June 1 that Iran will “activate” the Bab el Mandeb Strait, just like the Strait of Hormuz, in response to Israel's operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] A senior Houthi official also warned on June 2 that the group's “hands are on the trigger.”[19] Iran and the Houthis have consistently threatened to resume attacks against shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait throughout the war, but have not acted on those threats, which suggests that their current threats are intended to achieve the effect of pressuring the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah.[20]

The Iranian regime also seeks to exploit the Lebanon issue to try to sow divisions between the United States and Israel. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Fadahossein Maleki claimed on June 2 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu increased operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon to disrupt US-Iran negotiations after Netanyahu allegedly realized that Trump's approach did not align with Israeli demands.[21] This and similar statements from Iranian officials suggest that the Iranian regime is trying to portray Israel as the main obstacle to a US-Iran deal and an end to the war with Iran.

Iran is also using the time it is gaining by deflecting attention from the US-Iran negotiations to advance other objectives, such as securing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy announced on June 2 that it permitted 24 vessels to pass through the strait in the past 24 hours.[22] It warned that it will implement “smart control” over the strait and claimed that “evil foreigners” have no place in the Persian Gulf or the strait.[23] The US-sanctioned Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) separately claimed on June 1 that over 300 non-Iranian vessels have submitted information to receive permission from Iran to transit through the strait since late April, which supports Iran's efforts to normalize its control over the strait by forcing vessels to comply with its transit protocols.[24] The IRGC Navy and PGSA’s statements highlight how Iran is trying to normalize its coercive transit regime, which includes Iran's illegal and unrecognized traffic separation scheme, permit system, and toll scheme.

Even if Israel and Hezbollah reach a ceasefire in Lebanon, Iran could condition further US-Iran negotiations on additional US concessions. Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari previously stated on May 11 that Iran would not enter negotiations with the United States until the United States accepted Iran's terms, including an end to the war on “all fronts,” sanctions relief, the release of frozen Iranian assets, compensation for war-related damages, and recognition of Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.[25] Iran is currently imposing its demand for a ceasefire on “all fronts” on the United States, but could demand additional US concessions–such as economic relief–even if the United States agrees to accept Iran's demand for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon. An Iranian negotiating team member close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 2 that Iran would withdraw from any US-Iran agreement or refuse to enter the next phase of negotiations if Iran could not access its frozen assets, sell oil during the 60-day negotiations period, lift the blockade, or agree to Iranian demands related to the Strait of Hormuz.[26] Giving in to Iranian preconditions would reduce US leverage in future negotiations and make it harder to extract concessions from Iran on its nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework announced its support on June 1 for restricting arms to the state and separating the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) from all “political, partisan, and social frameworks.”[27] The framework's announcement is probably a response to intensified US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias, rather than an indicator that the framework intends to disarm the militias. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[28] The framework did not specify what it meant by “restricting weapons to the state” or “political, partisan, and social frameworks.” The framework could be referring to an effort to separate militias’ political wings from militia-controlled PMF brigades and restricting weapons to the PMF. The framework's statement affirmed the PMF as an official state institution.[29] The framework's announcement follows the framework's formation in May 2026 of a committee, including incumbent Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi, former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, to develop a mechanism to disarm the militias and integrate their members into state institutions.[30] These disarmament efforts come amid increased US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to decrease Iranian influence in Iraq, including through militia disarmament, due to US militia attacks against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war.[31] Multiple sources close to framework leaders told Iraqi media on June 2 that framework leaders are concerned that the United States will not accept the “mere formality of disarmament,” but will instead pressure Baghdad to dissolve the PMF.[32]

The framework's statement conditioned militia disarmament on the end of the international coalition's mission in Iraq.[33] US-led international coalition forces completed their mission in federal Iraq in January 2026, but continue to operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.[34] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that all US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias disproportionately attacked US positions in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias used violent and non-violent means for years to pressure the United States to remove US forces from federal Iraq.[36]

The framework is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs, and it is unclear which specific elements of the framework supported this announcement. The framework includes the political wings of multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that have recently rejected disarmament, including Kataib Hezbollah.[37] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba also reportedly reject disarmament.[38] These militias have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other Iraqi militias.[39]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq announced on June 2 that it has formed an internal committee to begin “disengaging” from the PMF. This announcement comes amid Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali’s public support for disarmament and shift toward political activity in recent years.[40] Asaib Ahl al Haq said that the group's military spokesperson will lead the committee, which will inventory personnel, weapons, vehicles, and logistical supplies.[41] The committee will also organize communication mechanisms with the prime minister, according to Asaib Ahl al Haq.[42] It is unclear if “disengaging from the PMF” refers to ending Asaib Ahl al Haq’s control over its affiliated PMF brigades or some other action. Asaib Ahl al Haq controls the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd PMF brigades.[43] Iraq analysts have long noted that Asaib Ahl al Haq’s leadership, particularly Khazali, has focused on politics more than kinetic activity in recent years, including during the October 7 War.[44] The US-Israeli combined force struck multiple Asaib Ahl al Haq positions during the recent war as part of its effort to degrade Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ ability to attack the United States and Israel.[45] The US Treasury Department also noted in April 2026 that Asaib Ahl al Haq had conducted drone attacks targeting US and coalition forces in northern Iraq in March 2026.[46] It is unclear if Asaib Ahl al Haq sanctioned this kinetic activity. Khazali has pledged his public support for militia disarmament in recent months.[47] CTP-ISW previously identified indications of splinters within Asaib Ahl al Haq regarding disarmament.[48] Asaib Ahl al Haq and several other members of the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a militia coordinating committee, signed a statement in January 2026 rejecting Iraqi militia disarmament due to the continued presence of US and Turkish troops in Iraqi Kurdistan, for example.[49]

Khazali could be signaling his willingness to disarm in order to lessen US resistance to Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing controlling an Iraqi ministry. Iraqi media reported on June 2 that the United States has continued to oppose the allocation of any ministerial portfolio to political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, even if the militias have announced their disarmament.[50] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing, Sadiqoun, won 27 seats in the November 2025 elections, which would typically be enough seats to gain control of an Iraqi ministry.[51] The Iraqi parliament approved 14 out of 23 ministers of incumbent Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s government on May 14, but multiple ministries, including the defense and interior ministries, remain unfilled.[52] Asaib Ahl al Haq has said that it will decide on its participation in the next Iraqi government after the issue of restricting arms to the state is addressed.[53] Two framework sources told AP on May 14 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani told several framework and militia leaders to postpone voting on ministries in which militia-affiliated political parties are vying for positions.[54] It is currently unclear why Ghaani called for this delay.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib al Imam Ali, whose political wing controls five seats in parliament, also announced its readiness to restrict weapons to the Iraqi state, possibly to overcome US opposition to its involvement in the next government.[55] Kataib al Imam Ali announced on June 2 that it will begin to “disengage” from the PMF and restrict weapons to the Iraqi state.[56] The militia announced that it will form multiple committees to handle issues such as the transfer of weapons to the state, the families of martyrs and wounded fighters, and the reintegration of militia personnel and affiliates into the Iraqi state.[57] US opposition to militia involvement in the next government has mainly focused on the cabinet level, but Kataib al Imam Ali could be attempting to avoid US pushback to the group's participation in the government in another capacity.[58]

The framework's announcement, along with Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali's announcements, follows reports of Iranian pressure on its Iraqi partners to stop all kinetic activity, likely to avoid US financial pressure against Iraq that negatively impacts Iran. Ghaani reportedly warned about “real dangers” that could result in a loss of military privileges and discussed the need for an “alternate plan” regarding militia disarmament with militia and framework leaders in Baghdad in April 2026.[59] Ghaani reportedly proposed that some militias end all kinetic activity while preserving the PMF and consolidating the political role of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[60] US financial pressure on Iraq, such as the US Treasury Department's reported decision to halt shipments of Iraqi export oil revenue to Iraq, heavily impacts Iran due to Iran's use of the Iraqi economy for sanctions evasion and to help fund the Axis of Resistance.[61] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran could decide to build a new cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement the political activity of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. Ghaani reportedly instructed several framework and militia leaders in May not to proceed with disarmament until the trajectory of the US-Iran negotiations becomes clear.[62] Iran likely wishes to maintain the militias’ military strength in the event of renewed conflict with the United States and Israel.

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on June 2 that Iran is securing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in preparation for a potential US ground operation to seize Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.[63] The Institute stated that Iran has created “rocky mounds” on the roads leading to Fordow’s tunnel entrances and that the mounds are positioned in a way to hinder the movement of hostile forces attempting to enter or exit the tunnels.[64] The Institute added that Iran did not completely block the roads like it has at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which indicates that Iran still seeks to access Fordow.[65] All of Fordow’s tunnel entrances have remained buried as of May 26, however.[66] Iran's HEU is buried underneath rubble at the ENTC, Fordow, and Natanz, which the United States and Israel struck during the 12-day war.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-2-2026/