Iran continues to try to frame the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) “management” of transit through the Strait of Hormuz as the new status quo. The United States and international community must continue to reject Iranian efforts to try to establish this new status quo, as it is detrimental to international commercial interests and sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of navigation in international waterways. The IRGC Navy has begun publishing daily roll-ups of the number of vessels that use Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy reported that 20 vessels passed through Iran's traffic separation scheme on May 30.[1] Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to force vessels to use Iran's illegal and unrecognized traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy also claimed that it provided “safe passage” to some vessels for “humanitarian reasons,” likely to try to portray the IRGC Navy as a reasonable actor despite its deployment of mines, as well as attacks and harassment of vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters separately stated on May 30 that Iranian armed forces are “fully” managing the strait and that all vessels must transit only through Iran's traffic separation scheme after receiving permission from the IRGC Navy.[2] The headquarters warned that Iranian armed forces will target any military vessel that intervenes in Iran's management of the strait or disrupts maritime traffic, likely in response to a May 29 US CENTCOM notice that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz and target vessels “engaged in, or supporting, mine-laying activities.”[3]
Neither the United States nor Iran has indicated that the two sides have narrowed gaps on key issues in the US-Iran negotiations, such as economic relief for Iran.[4] An unspecified senior Trump administration official told the New York Times on May 29 that the Trump administration believes it is close to an agreement but that the United States and Iran have still not resolved certain issues, including the unfreezing of Iranian assets.[5] Trump announced that “no money will be exchanged” in a social media post on May 29, likely referring to frozen Iranian assets.[6] Iranian officials have repeatedly demanded the release of frozen assets as a “precondition” for talks about nuclear issues.[7] An Iranian negotiating team member close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf asserted on May 30 that Iran's “irreversible” access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets is one of Iran's “main” conditions for any possible agreement.[8] Iranian state media, citing “unofficial details of a possible US-Iran memorandum of understanding,” separately claimed that the United States would give Iran full access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets within 60 days.[9] Ghalibaf recently led an Iranian delegation to Qatar to try to secure the “immediate” and “unconditional” release of $12 billion USD, but Qatar rejected Iran's request, according to anti-regime media on May 29.[10]
Iran likely seeks unrestricted access to its frozen assets to reduce the effect of US sanctions and the naval blockade and support its military reconstitution. US sanctions and the naval blockade have hindered Iran's ability to raise revenue that the regime could use to reconstitute its military capabilities.[11] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 25 that assets released under a potential agreement with the United States would go toward Iran's defense and military sectors, including Iran's missile and drone programs.[12] ISW-CTP previously assessed that granting Iran economic relief by unfreezing funds or removing sanctions would likely decrease Iranian military reconstitution timelines.
The hardline faction within the Iranian regime is not a monolith but contains a spectrum of actors with varying priorities, opinions, and political positions. ISW-CTP continues to assess that hardline IRGC officials, particularly IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, are unwilling to make meaningful concessions in negotiations with the United States. Analysts close to the Iranian regime told the New York Times on May 29 that hardliners, whom they claimed represent a “minority view,” are attempting to derail negotiations.[13] The hardliners in this report likely specifically refer to ultrahardliners affiliated with the Paydari (Stability) Front. Two unspecified senior Iranian officials told the New York Times that Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary Ali Bagheri Kani criticized Iran's negotiating team for being “too conciliatory” during the first round of US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad in April.[14] Bagheri Kani has close ties to Paydari (Stability) Front leader Saeed Jalili.[15] The Paydari (Stability) Front represents only one element of the hardline faction, and other, non-Paydari (Stability) Front hardliners have also posed an obstacle to negotiations by refusing to make concessions and insisting on maximalist demands. Vahidi and his inner circle, whom ISW-CTP assesses are currently dominating regime decision-making, have not signaled any willingness to soften their maximalist demands in negotiations, for example. The hardline faction in the regime also includes some “pragmatist” officials, such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who leads Iran's negotiating delegation. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Ghalibaf may not be aligned with key decision-makers in Tehran, such as Vahidi, and may be more willing to make concessions in negotiations.
Iran may have used a Chinese-made man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to target US aircraft during the war, according to three individuals familiar with the matter speaking to Western media. The three individuals told NBC News on May 29 that Iran “probably” struck the US F-15 fighter jet over southwestern Iran on April 3 using a Chinese-made shoulder-launched missile.[16] Iran was reportedly in discussions with the People's Republic of China (PRC) before the war began in late February 2026 to acquire MANPADS.[17] The PRC may have also provided Iran with a radar system to bolster its integrated air defense system before the war.[18] One of the sources and a US official told NBC News that the PRC may have given Iran a YLC-8B long-range anti-stealth surveillance radar in the “early days of the war.”[19]
The possible PRC military transfers underscore the nature of the PRC's military partnership with Iran. The PRC has demonstrated a willingness to bolster Iran's military capabilities without risking direct entanglement in the conflict and is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears willing to sell military equipment to Iran. The PRC reportedly sold Iran an advanced reconnaissance satellite that Iran used to target US military bases across the region during the war, for example.[20] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran reconstitute its missile program and has continued this support by sending Iran missile fuel precursor during the conflict.[21]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) continues to enforce its naval blockade against Iranian ports. US forces disabled the Gambia-flagged M/V Lian Star by firing at its engine room as the vessel attempted to run the blockade on May 29. CENTCOM said it issued numerous warnings to the vessel before firing. US forces have disabled five vessels and redirected 116 vessels since initiating the blockade on April 13.[22] US CENTCOM noted in a May 30 notice to mariners that ships that aid Iranian efforts to violate the blockade, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers with Iranian vessels, are also in violation of the blockade.[23]
The Iranian regime continues to face threats from Kurdish anti-regime groups in northwestern Iran. Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ali Akbar Javidan announced on May 29 that a likely Kurdish opposition group attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran's northwestern border.[24] IRGC forces also killed two Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[25] The regime has historically accused Kurdish armed groups of inciting anti-regime unrest in Iran. The regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement, for example.[26] The regime has also historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations in Iran.[27]
Hezbollah attacked Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions and communities in northern Israel with drones and rockets on May 29 and 30, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it has conducted at least 13 drone and rocket attacks targeting northern Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff, including attacks targeting the northern Israeli towns of Safed, Kiryat Shmona, and Nahariya.[28] Hezbollah fired over 30 rockets in the attacks, some of which struck the commercial center of Kiryat Shmona and landed off the coast of Nahariya on May 30.[29] A Hezbollah drone also struck a military area near Shomera on May 30.[30] Israeli media reported that the Hezbollah attacks did not cause any casualties.[31]
Hezbollah likely launched attacks on northern Israel in response to IDF advances beyond the “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon in recent days. The IDF 36th Division crossed the Litani River on May 29 to remove the threat of anti-tank fire to the Galilee Panhandle, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[32] A Lebanese open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst and Lebanese media reported that the IDF advanced into western Yohmor, Nabatieh District, on May 28, citing satellite imagery of IDF armored vehicles.[33] Israeli forces reportedly advanced south of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, on May 29, and into Ghandouriyeh, Bint Jbeil District, on May 30.[34] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted a complex improvised explosive device (IED) ambush on IDF forces in Ghandouriyeh on May 30, in which the group fired mortars and rockets at Israeli forces after detonating the IED.[35] The attack may support the analyst's claim that the IDF advanced into the town.[36] A Hezbollah-aligned journalist also reported that Hezbollah engaged the IDF in Ghandouriyeh on May 30.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/
While the war and U.S. blockade have ravaged Iran's already terminally struggling economy, the Guards running the country may have calculated that, though the economic damage to the U.S. is far less than to Iran, the democratic structure of the U.S. means it can't weather as great losses as Iran can.
The ideological transformation of the Iranian government could also play a key role. Iran's new national security chief, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is believed to be one of the most influential figures in Iran. He's considered one of the most extremist members of the Iranian government — the Wall Street Journal reported that former Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani found him so radical that he temporarily quit the force in protest over his radicalism.
Mohsen Rezaee, a senior commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, is also listed as one of the most influential figures in the Iranian government and holds similarly extremist views. The group may fully believe they have the upper hand over the U.S. and are in a position to implement maximalist demands.
“The more extreme group in the IRGC are taking charge,” Saeid Golkar, an expert in Iran's security services at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, told the Wall Street Journal last month. “That makes the prolongation of the conflict more likely.” The outlet also outlined the rise of Mahdism in Iran's ruling circles — an apocalyptic interpretation of Islam which views the end times as imminent. Kasra Aarabi, an expert on the Guard at United Against Nuclear Iran, said Iran's actions suggest many of those in charge are genuine believers.
“How much of this is empty narrative, how much is true belief? If you look at their behavior, you can tell that they are guided by the principles of their ideology,” he said. “The apocalyptic doctrine of Mahdism has guided the regime's wartime behavior, and has provided justification for actions that could otherwise be viewed as irrational.”
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/world/4588093/us-iran-messaging-battle-peace/
US President Donald Trump has requested several amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the United States and Iran remain at odds over key issues. A senior Trump administration official and a second unspecified source told Axios on May 30 that Trump requested several amendments to the draft MoU.[1] The officials said that Trump specifically requested amendments to the draft's text about how and when the United States would secure Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU).[2] The current draft MoU states that Iran would commit to not pursue a nuclear weapon but does not contain any Iranian commitments to hand over Iran's HEU or halt enrichment.[3] The current draft states that the United States and Iran would discuss nuclear issues during a 60-day period after the parties sign the MoU.[4] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not suspend uranium enrichment or transfer its HEU from Iran.[5]
A second informed source told Axios that Trump also requested changes to the draft MoU’s text on the Strait of Hormuz.[6] The source did not specify what specific changes Trump requested, however.[7] Trump previously called on Iran on May 29 to “immediately open” the Strait of Hormuz without tolls and to remove mines from the strait.[8] The United States and Iran have different definitions of “opening” the strait, however.[9] Iranian officials and media continue to claim that the strait is “open” despite the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy forcing vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme.[10] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on May 28 that, under the current draft MoU, Iran would allow “unrestricted” shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, stop imposing tolls and harassing vessels in the strait, and remove naval mines within 30 days, while the United States would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[11] Iranian officials have also claimed that Iran is charging vessels “protection fees” and “environmental fees” instead of “tolls.”[12] Iran remains the only power that has threatened civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during this war, meaning that its “protection fee” is a protection racket that ships must pay to avoid Iranian attack.
Three US officials separately told the New York Times on May 30 that Trump is concerned about parts of the draft MoU that would involve the United States unfreezing Iranian funds.[13] Trump previously appeared to reject unfreezing Iranian funds on May 29, stating that “no money will be exchanged until further notice.”[14] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that the United States must unfreeze frozen Iranian assets in order for Iran to accept any potential agreement.[15] An Iranian official affiliated with Iran's negotiating delegation stated on May 30 that Iran could withdraw from a US-Iran agreement if the United States “does not meet its commitments,” including unfreezing Iranian funds.[16]
Unspecified informed sources told Israeli media that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not responded to either the current draft MoU or Trump's proposed amendments.[17] IRGC-affiliated media argued that it would be better to not reach an agreement than for Iran to accept a “bad deal” that fails to secure Iranian interests.[18]
Anti-regime media, citing an unspecified informed source, claimed on May 31 that President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted a resignation letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[19] Pezeshkian reportedly warned in an “unprecedented and critical tone” that the IRGC is wielding an outsized role in the regime.[20] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media denied this report and no Iranian officials have confirmed this claim at the time of this writing.[21]
Iran continues to use the Caspian Sea and overland transit routes to try to offset reduced maritime trade caused by the US blockade on Iranian ports, but these alternative routes offer less capacity and efficiency than commercial shipping through the strait. Deputy Parliament Speaker Haji Babaei stated on May 31 that Iran is avoiding the US blockade on Iranian ports by using alternative routes and land corridors.[22] He claimed that Iran now imports at least 50 percent of basic goods through the Caspian Sea and argued that Iran must continue to develop alternative trade routes to ensure Iran's economic security under the blockade.[23] Iranian state media separately claimed on May 31 that Iran has imported over 20.5 million tons of goods this year, which marks an increase compared to the past two years.[24] Iranian state media added that Indian goods are transported by rail and road to Iran via Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[25] An economics expert told Radio Free Europe (RFE) on May 6 that alternative routes can supply Iran with goods but cannot fully replace a maritime container-based economy.[26] A former US economic adviser separately told RFE on May 6 that trucking is more expensive than shipping and that Caspian Sea import throughput is constrained by limited port and fleet capacity, which the former adviser stated may raise costs and inflation in Iran.[27]
Iran fired a ballistic missile at a Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) base in Iraqi Kurdistan on May 31, likely in response to an attack by Kurdish opposition groups in Iran on May 29.[28] The IRGC and IRGC-affiliated media stated on May 31 that the IRGC fired a ballistic missile targeting a PAK base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[29] A PAK spokesperson told Kurdish media on May 31 that an Iranian ballistic missile struck a PAK headquarters in Darashakran, Erbil Province, without causing casualties.[30] The spokesperson added that Iran struck the same base on May 25 with at least four missiles and several drones, which wounded nine people, and claimed that Iranian forces and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked PAK forces over 50 times since the war began on February 28.[31] Iran's ballistic missile attack on the PAK base comes after likely Kurdish opposition fighters attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran's northwestern border on May 29.[32] It also comes after the IRGC reportedly killed two PAK members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[33] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups of fomenting unrest in Iran and facilitating Israeli operations in Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan.[34]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to conduct ground offensives beyond its “Yellow Line” and has advanced further north of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. The IDF announced on May 30 that 36th Armored Division units have launched new ground offensives on both sides of the Litani River to expand the IDF’s “Yellow Line,” destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and strengthen the IDF’s operational control in southern Lebanon.[35] Israeli military and political sources, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, announced that the IDF seized Beaufort Castle in Nabatieh District on May 31 as part of the IDF’s new ground offensives.[36] Beaufort Castle is operationally significant to the IDF because the castle is located on high ground, which is favorable for observing ground force movements. The site is also symbolic because the IDF previously seized the site after a significant battle during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[37] Hezbollah claimed that it used direct fire to defend against Israeli advances into two towns near Beaufort Castle during protracted ground engagements between May 26 and 30.[38] Hezbollah has increasingly used direct fire in protracted ground engagements with advancing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since May 19.[39]
Hezbollah has expanded the scope of its attacks on northern Israel by targeting larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah claimed for the first time since the ceasefire began on April 16 that it fired rockets targeting Israeli cities more than 10 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, including the city of Karmiel and the Krayot suburbs of Haifa, on May 30 and 31.[41] An Israeli military correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Acre in northern Israel on May 31, although Hezbollah did not claim this attack.[42]
The United States recently warned Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaydi that the United States opposes the participation of any Iranian-backed Iraqi militia in the next Iraqi government, even if a militia states that it intends to disarm, according to an informed political source speaking to Iraqi media on May 31.[43] The US message reportedly stated that the United States may break off “political or administrative relations” with any ministry affiliated with an Iraqi militia.[44] The US warning comes after a Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on May 25 that some militias have expressed willingness to disarm and engage in Iraqi politics in exchange for securing “senior positions” within the Iraqi government.[45] An Iraqi committee comprised of Zaydi, Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani was reportedly close to finalizing a plan to disarm Iraqi militias, according to a regional media report on May 8.[46] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025, but has intensified its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and allied targets in Iraq and the region during the recent war.[47]
more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-31-2026/