US President Donald Trump has requested several amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the United States and Iran remain at odds over key issues. A senior Trump administration official and a second unspecified source told Axios on May 30 that Trump requested several amendments to the draft MoU.[1] The officials said that Trump specifically requested amendments to the draft's text about how and when the United States would secure Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU).[2] The current draft MoU states that Iran would commit to not pursue a nuclear weapon but does not contain any Iranian commitments to hand over Iran's HEU or halt enrichment.[3] The current draft states that the United States and Iran would discuss nuclear issues during a 60-day period after the parties sign the MoU.[4] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not suspend uranium enrichment or transfer its HEU from Iran.[5]
A second informed source told Axios that Trump also requested changes to the draft MoU’s text on the Strait of Hormuz.[6] The source did not specify what specific changes Trump requested, however.[7] Trump previously called on Iran on May 29 to “immediately open” the Strait of Hormuz without tolls and to remove mines from the strait.[8] The United States and Iran have different definitions of “opening” the strait, however.[9] Iranian officials and media continue to claim that the strait is “open” despite the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy forcing vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme.[10] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on May 28 that, under the current draft MoU, Iran would allow “unrestricted” shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, stop imposing tolls and harassing vessels in the strait, and remove naval mines within 30 days, while the United States would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[11] Iranian officials have also claimed that Iran is charging vessels “protection fees” and “environmental fees” instead of “tolls.”[12] Iran remains the only power that has threatened civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during this war, meaning that its “protection fee” is a protection racket that ships must pay to avoid Iranian attack.
Three US officials separately told the New York Times on May 30 that Trump is concerned about parts of the draft MoU that would involve the United States unfreezing Iranian funds.[13] Trump previously appeared to reject unfreezing Iranian funds on May 29, stating that “no money will be exchanged until further notice.”[14] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that the United States must unfreeze frozen Iranian assets in order for Iran to accept any potential agreement.[15] An Iranian official affiliated with Iran's negotiating delegation stated on May 30 that Iran could withdraw from a US-Iran agreement if the United States “does not meet its commitments,” including unfreezing Iranian funds.[16]
Unspecified informed sources told Israeli media that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not responded to either the current draft MoU or Trump's proposed amendments.[17] IRGC-affiliated media argued that it would be better to not reach an agreement than for Iran to accept a “bad deal” that fails to secure Iranian interests.[18]
Anti-regime media, citing an unspecified informed source, claimed on May 31 that President Masoud Pezeshkian has submitted a resignation letter to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[19] Pezeshkian reportedly warned in an “unprecedented and critical tone” that the IRGC is wielding an outsized role in the regime.[20] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media denied this report and no Iranian officials have confirmed this claim at the time of this writing.[21]
Iran continues to use the Caspian Sea and overland transit routes to try to offset reduced maritime trade caused by the US blockade on Iranian ports, but these alternative routes offer less capacity and efficiency than commercial shipping through the strait. Deputy Parliament Speaker Haji Babaei stated on May 31 that Iran is avoiding the US blockade on Iranian ports by using alternative routes and land corridors.[22] He claimed that Iran now imports at least 50 percent of basic goods through the Caspian Sea and argued that Iran must continue to develop alternative trade routes to ensure Iran's economic security under the blockade.[23] Iranian state media separately claimed on May 31 that Iran has imported over 20.5 million tons of goods this year, which marks an increase compared to the past two years.[24] Iranian state media added that Indian goods are transported by rail and road to Iran via Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[25] An economics expert told Radio Free Europe (RFE) on May 6 that alternative routes can supply Iran with goods but cannot fully replace a maritime container-based economy.[26] A former US economic adviser separately told RFE on May 6 that trucking is more expensive than shipping and that Caspian Sea import throughput is constrained by limited port and fleet capacity, which the former adviser stated may raise costs and inflation in Iran.[27]
Iran fired a ballistic missile at a Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) base in Iraqi Kurdistan on May 31, likely in response to an attack by Kurdish opposition groups in Iran on May 29.[28] The IRGC and IRGC-affiliated media stated on May 31 that the IRGC fired a ballistic missile targeting a PAK base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[29] A PAK spokesperson told Kurdish media on May 31 that an Iranian ballistic missile struck a PAK headquarters in Darashakran, Erbil Province, without causing casualties.[30] The spokesperson added that Iran struck the same base on May 25 with at least four missiles and several drones, which wounded nine people, and claimed that Iranian forces and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked PAK forces over 50 times since the war began on February 28.[31] Iran's ballistic missile attack on the PAK base comes after likely Kurdish opposition fighters attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran's northwestern border on May 29.[32] It also comes after the IRGC reportedly killed two PAK members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[33] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups of fomenting unrest in Iran and facilitating Israeli operations in Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan.[34]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to conduct ground offensives beyond its “Yellow Line” and has advanced further north of the Litani River in southern Lebanon. The IDF announced on May 30 that 36th Armored Division units have launched new ground offensives on both sides of the Litani River to expand the IDF’s “Yellow Line,” destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and strengthen the IDF’s operational control in southern Lebanon.[35] Israeli military and political sources, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, announced that the IDF seized Beaufort Castle in Nabatieh District on May 31 as part of the IDF’s new ground offensives.[36] Beaufort Castle is operationally significant to the IDF because the castle is located on high ground, which is favorable for observing ground force movements. The site is also symbolic because the IDF previously seized the site after a significant battle during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[37] Hezbollah claimed that it used direct fire to defend against Israeli advances into two towns near Beaufort Castle during protracted ground engagements between May 26 and 30.[38] Hezbollah has increasingly used direct fire in protracted ground engagements with advancing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon since May 19.[39]
Hezbollah has expanded the scope of its attacks on northern Israel by targeting larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah claimed for the first time since the ceasefire began on April 16 that it fired rockets targeting Israeli cities more than 10 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, including the city of Karmiel and the Krayot suburbs of Haifa, on May 30 and 31.[41] An Israeli military correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Acre in northern Israel on May 31, although Hezbollah did not claim this attack.[42]
The United States recently warned Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaydi that the United States opposes the participation of any Iranian-backed Iraqi militia in the next Iraqi government, even if a militia states that it intends to disarm, according to an informed political source speaking to Iraqi media on May 31.[43] The US message reportedly stated that the United States may break off “political or administrative relations” with any ministry affiliated with an Iraqi militia.[44] The US warning comes after a Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on May 25 that some militias have expressed willingness to disarm and engage in Iraqi politics in exchange for securing “senior positions” within the Iraqi government.[45] An Iraqi committee comprised of Zaydi, Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani was reportedly close to finalizing a plan to disarm Iraqi militias, according to a regional media report on May 8.[46] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq, including via militia disarmament, since early 2025, but has intensified its efforts in recent months due to militia attacks against US and allied targets in Iraq and the region during the recent war.[47]
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The police force of the regime has shut down a café on Tehran’s Valiasr Street where live music performances were being held, accusing it of promoting “deviant sects” and facilitating what authorities described as “satanic activities.” According to the regime, young men and women were observed engaging in “abnormal” and “strange” movements (dance). This is part of a broader crackdown that has intensified since the recent protests. A growing wave of executions, lengthy prison sentences, arrests, and business closures has alarmed human rights activists and organizations. The video below is what the regime is calling “satanic activities” inside that café.
The Iranian regime, which ISW-CTP continues to assess is dominated by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, suspended US-Iran negotiations on June 1.[1] Vahidi and his inner circle likely calculate that the status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions to the United States in a diplomatic agreement nor is engaged in a full-scale conflict with the United States, is a favorable situation that advances their objectives. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency announced on June 1 that the regime has suspended negotiations, ostensibly in response to Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[2] The fact that IRGC-affiliated media announced the suspension of negotiations suggests that the decision to suspend negotiations was driven by the IRGC, and presumably by Vahidi. Iranian officials have consistently demanded throughout negotiations that the US-Iran ceasefire must include Hezbollah, but Iranian officials significantly increased their emphasis on this demand after Tasnim announced the suspension of negotiations.[3] Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber, for example, stated on June 1 during a meeting with Hezbollah's representative to Tehran that any ceasefire that excludes Hezbollah is “irrelevant.”[4]
The Iranian regime's decision to suspend negotiations and emphasize the Lebanon issue is almost certainly a response to US President Donald Trump's recent amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Trump requested several amendments, including changes to the draft's text about Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz.[5] An Iranian official close to Iran's negotiating team stated on June 1 that Iran has “concerns” about Trump's amendments and reiterated that Iran will not transfer its HEU to the United States and that Iran must “manage” the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Iran likely responded to Trump's amendments by reemphasizing its own maximalist demands, particularly its insistence that any ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran must include Lebanon.
The Iranian regime has likely focused on the Lebanon issue, as opposed to another key sticking point in negotiations, to try to curb Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon as part of the regime's broader objective to preserve Hezbollah. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi issued an implicit threat on June 1 to attack civilians in northern Israel if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducts airstrikes targeting Beirut.[7] Abadi’s warning comes after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to conduct strikes against Hezbollah targets in Beirut and broaden the scope of IDF operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[8] Iran rarely issues public warnings before conducting attacks, which suggests that Abadi’s threat sought to achieve an informational effect. The regime likely intended to pressure the United States to push Israel to limit its operations against Hezbollah by threatening to attack Israel if Israel expanded its operations in Lebanon.
President Trump held a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 1 and stated that Israel will not attack Beirut.[9] Trump also noted that he had a “very good call” with Hezbollah via representatives, during which Hezbollah reportedly agreed to halt attacks against Israel. Axios, citing an adviser to Lebanese Parliament Speaker and longtime Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri, reported on June 1 that Berri informed the United States that Hezbollah is prepared to implement a “full and immediate ceasefire.”[10] Netanyahu stated that he told Trump that Israel would not cease attacks on Beirut if Hezbollah does not halt attacks on Israeli civilians and cities and added that Israeli operations in southern Lebanon will continue as planned.[11] Iran has long viewed Hezbollah as a central component of its deterrence strategy and therefore likely views an extension of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire and halt of Israeli operations in Lebanon as necessary to prevent the further degradation of Hezbollah.
The regime also likely seeks to drive a wedge between the United States and Israel by falsely blaming Israel and its operations in Lebanon for the collapse of the US-Iran talks. The US-Iran negotiations have been at an impasse due to disagreements over other key sticking points for weeks, however. Senior Iranian officials and state media have framed Israeli operations in Lebanon as a ceasefire violation and cited the operations as the reason for suspending negotiations.[12] These statements seek to place blame for the collapse of the talks on Israel, and the regime likely calculates that portraying Israel as undermining US diplomatic efforts could create tensions between the United States and Israel. The US-Iran negotiations have been at an impasse for weeks, however, primarily due to disagreements over the Iranian nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian demands for economic relief.[13] Iranian officials have previously tied the Lebanon issue to the negotiations, but it has not been the main sticking point preventing a deal up to this point.
Vahidi and his inner circle also likely calculate that the status quo will help them advance several other objectives, such as solidifying Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining the Iranian nuclear program. Iran continues to use coercive measures in and around the Strait of Hormuz to force vessels to transit through Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iran's protection racket.[14] Several countries have reached arrangements with Iran to facilitate their vessels’ safe passage through the strait.[15] Iran may calculate that protracting the status quo will force more countries to sign similar agreements with Iran, implicitly recognizing and legitimizing Iranian control over the strait.[16] Iran is also actively exploiting the US-Iran ceasefire to reconstitute elements of its ballistic missile and drone programs that Israel and the United States degraded during the June 2025 war and recent conflict.[17] Iran also continues to insist that it will not make any commitments regarding its enrichment capabilities or HEU stockpile.[18] The status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions on its nuclear program nor faces US or Israeli strikes, enables Iran to maintain its nuclear program and prevent further degradation of this program. Vahidi and those around him may assess that focusing on the Lebanon issue will cause a protracted discussion about the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire and thereby deflect attention from the above issues, which Vahidi refuses to make concessions on.
The suspension of negotiations further indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle are driving Iranian decision-making and have likely gained the upper hand over proponents of a deal, particularly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Vahidi and his inner circle have consistently opposed compromise and prioritized achieving the objectives outlined above.[19] Ghalibaf, on the other hand, has sought to reach an agreement and has appeared more willing to make concessions to the United States. The regime's decision to suspend negotiations and insist on maximalist demands, such as Hezbollah's inclusion in the ceasefire, therefore indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle continue to dominate decision-making.
US President Donald Trump told NBC News that Iran did not inform him that it had suspended negotiations.[20] He added that the United States would not necessarily resume military operations if talks collapsed but would instead maintain its naval blockade on Iranian ports because Iran is “losing a fortune.”[21]
Iran and the United States have exchanged limited fire over the past 48 hours. IRGC-affiliated media announced on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down a US MQ-1 Predator drone over “Iranian territorial waters.”[22] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down the drone but clarified that the drone was operating over international waters.[23] CENTCOM responded by launching defensive strikes targeting Iranian air defense systems, a ground control station, and two Iranian one-way attack drones on Qeshm Island and in Goruk, Hormozgan Province.[24] The IRGC retaliated against the US strikes by launching two missiles at US forces in Kuwait on May 31.[25] CENTCOM confirmed that US forces intercepted the two missiles and reported no damage or casualties.[26]
Iranian forces also likely attacked a civilian cargo vessel located off the coast of Iraq on June 1.[27] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on June 1 that an unspecified projectile struck a cargo vessel transiting the northern Persian Gulf approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of the Umm Qasr Port in Iraq.[28] Iraqi media and open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts reported that the struck civilian vessel was the Panama-flagged MSC Sariska V.[29] UKMTO reported a second impact on the same vessel several hours after the initial attack.[30] The second impact caused a fire onboard, which the crew was able to extinguish.[31] Iraqi officials told Reuters on June 1 that the second impact was likely caused by a drone.[32] The IRGC Navy warned commercial vessels on June 1 that it will identify and “[deal] with” vessels that cooperate with “extra-regional hostile forces.”[33]
Hezbollah has continued to target larger urban areas deeper inside Israeli territory, likely in response to the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) recent advances in southern Lebanon.[34] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting the northern Israeli city of Tiberias, which is located about 20 miles south of the Israel-Lebanon border, on May 31.[35] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the rockets did not strike their target and caused no casualties.[36] Hezbollah has targeted several urban areas in northern Israel and has progressively targeted cities deeper inside Israeli territory in recent days.[37]
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