Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update Special Report, April 15, 2026

US naval forces continued to enforce the blockade on Iranian ports. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on April 15 that no vessels had breached the blockade on Iranian ports during the first 48 hours of enforcement.[1] CENTCOM stated that nine vessels complied with the US direction to turn around and return to Iranian ports or coastal areas.[2] CENTCOM added that US forces have halted economic maritime trade to and from Iran and are prepared to act against any vessels attempting to violate the blockade.[3] Additional CENTCOM reporting indicates that the US forces redirected at least one Iranian-flagged cargo vessel after it departed Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[4]

The United States has reportedly set two preconditions for another round of negotiations: first, Iran must fully “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz, and second, the Iranian negotiating delegation must have “full authority” to finalize a deal.[5] Iran has not conducted any kinetic activity targeting international shipping since April 7.[6] Iran does not need to conduct attacks against vessels to maintain the threat to international shipping, however. The decision for vessels to transit the strait is for the shipping companies, which will likely be hesitant to move vessels through the Strait until Iran provides reassurance that it does not pose a threat to their vessels and cargo.

The second precondition, which demands that Iran‘s delegation have “full authority“ from Iran’s senior leadership (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)) to finalize a deal, corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the United States is negotiating with a divided council of hardliners and pragmatists rather than a singular, unified authority.[7] US Vice President JD Vance stated on April 14 that he believed that the Iranian negotiators in Islamabad wanted to make a deal, which implies that he assesses that the hardliners in Tehran were responsible for Iran’s reticence to make a deal.[8] Anti-regime media separately reported on April 14 that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr was furious when Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi allegedly appeared open to compromising on halting Iranian funding for the Axis of Resistance at the US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad on April 11.[9] Zolghadr then reportedly briefed Araghchi’s “deviation” to senior leadership, including by sending messages to IRGC officials and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s close affiliate Hossein Taeb, which resulted in the leadership ordering the delegation to leave after 21 hours of negotiations.[10] Zolghadr was one of the founding members of the IRGC Quds Force and helped establish some of the groups that now comprise the Axis of Resistance.[11] Unspecified mediators speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 15 confirmed that Zolghadr has been “highly influential” in Iranian decision-making in US-Iran negotiations.[12] These reports follow previous anti-regime media reports on April 10 that IRGC Commander and key decisionmaker Major General Ahmad Vahidi pushed to get Zolghadr on the Iranian delegation to Islamabad, but the delegation leaders Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf pushed back due to Zolghadr’s lack of diplomatic experience.[13] The senior leadership’s response to withdraw the delegation after Araghchi’s reported openness to discussing Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance shows how unwilling the hardliners are to compromise on Iranian positions and how much sway they have over Iranian decision-making.

Some Iranian officials have signaled different levels of willingness to compromise on Iran’s nuclear program in negotiations with the United States. These statements, at least to some extent, reflect internal disagreement over Iran’s negotiating position. Iranian Deputy Parliament Speaker Ali Nikzad stated on April 15 that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium.[14] Former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appointed Nikzad to several ministerial posts while he was president, and Nikzad later served as campaign chairman for former hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in the 2017 election.[15] His relationship with hardline figures suggests that Nikzad may similarly hold hardline, anti-Western views. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei adopted a slightly more flexible tone and stated on April 15 that Iran is willing to discuss “the level and type of enrichment.”[16] Baghaei emphasized that Iran must retain the ability to enrich uranium based on its ”needs,” however.[17] Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi leads the foreign ministry and is more pragmatic than some Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials involved in negotiations, which may make him more open to supporting limited concessions (see above). Two senior Iranian officials separately told the New York Times on April 13 that Iran told the United States that it is willing to pause enrichment for up to five years.[18] These differences likely reflect the presence of competing factions in Iran with divergent objectives in negotiations, which ISW-CTP previously assessed will likely complicate efforts to reach a negotiated agreement.[19]

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on April 14 that the United States and Israel have decided that removing the enriched uranium from Iran is a “threshold condition” for ending the US-Israeli campaign.[20] Iran offered to downblend its highly enriched uranium instead of handing over its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile during US-Iran talks on April 11 and 12.[21] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran presumably seeks to dilute rather than hand over its HEU stockpile so that it could re-enrich this stockpile at some point in the future.[22]

The US Treasury continues to sanction the Iranian oil trade as part of the broader US economic pressure campaign against Iran.[23] The US Treasury sanctioned 29 targets, including three individuals, 17 companies, and nine vessels on April 15, which are tied to Iranian oil smuggling and associated financing networks.[24] The US Treasury Department designated individuals and companies involved in shipping, logistics, and financial facilitation activities that support Iranian oil exports and sanctions evasion.[25] The Treasury stated that these networks operate within the broader shipping empire of Hossein Shamkhani and generate revenue for the Iranian regime and its regional proxies, including Hezbollah.[26] Hossein is the son of former Iranian Defense Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani.[27] The United States sanctioned Hossein and his multinational shipping network in July 2025 for generating tens of billions of dollars in revenue for the Shamkhani family and the Iranian regime.[28] The Treasury separately reported on April 14 that it is maintaining “maximum pressure” on Iran and is prepared to impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that continue to support Iranian activities.[29] The Treasury added that a short-term authorization permitting the sale of Iranian oil currently stranded at sea will expire in the coming days and “will not be renewed.”[30] The Trump administration has also sent warning letters to banks in Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and the PRC, stating that financial institutions facilitating Iranian funds could face secondary sanctions and potential exclusion from the US financial system.[31]

Pakistan is reportedly pushing the United States and Iran to extend the ceasefire by 45 days.[32] US President Donald Trump told ABC News on April 14 that he is not considering extending the ceasefire.[33] The ceasefire is set to expire on April 22.

Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile forces on the tactical level. Satellite imagery observed by CNN on April 14 showed that Iran attempted to remove debris in front of the entrances to the Southwest Tabriz Missile Base in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, and the Khomein Missile Base in Khomein, Markazi Province.[34] An Israeli geospatial analyst assessed that the internal structures of the Khomein and Tabriz missile bases “appear to still be intact” and that missile stockpiles are likely still there.[35] The combined force struck the Khomein Missile Base on February 28 and the Tabriz missile base on March 3.[36] The combined force struck the entrances of multiple Iranian missile bases over the course of the conflict, likely to degrade Iran’s ability to access missiles and missile launchers.[37] Iran is exploiting the lack of combined force strikes to move and use the construction equipment (such as bulldozers) necessary to access the missile launchers at Khomein and Tabriz. Unspecified sources told CNN on April 14 that US intelligence officials assessed that roughly half of Iran’s missile launchers are still operational.[38]

Iran reportedly utilized an advanced reconnaissance satellite purchased from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2024 to target US military assets and bases across the Middle East during the war.[43] Leaked Iranian military documents obtained by the Financial Times indicate that the IRGC Aerospace Force covertly purchased the Chinese Earth Eye TEE-01B reconnaissance satellite in 2024 for $36.6 million after its launch and transferred the satellite to the IRGC while in orbit.[44] The TEE-01B’s reported half-meter-per-pixel imagery resolution is comparable to Western models and enables the IRGC to identify aircraft, vehicles, and infrastructure changes, which likely supports Iranian battle damage assessments and targeting refinement.[45] The Financial Times reported that it obtained time-stamped coordinate lists, satellite imagery, and orbital analysis, which indicated that Iranian commanders tasked the satellite with monitoring key US military sites and captured images in March before and after drone and missile attacks on said locations.[46] China also granted the IRGC Aerospace Force access to Emposat’s commercial ground stations, a Beijing-based satellite control and data provider with a global network.[47] Empostat is reportedly closely linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Aerospace Force, including PLA personnel associated with key Empostat satellite launch command centers.[48] The combined force has repeatedly struck Iranian satellite ground stations during the 12-Day War and the current war in Iran, but by utilizing commercial ground stations outside of Iran, the IRGC prevented Israeli strikes.[49] The leaked data showed that the satellite captured imagery of Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia from March 13 to 15.[50] This corresponded with Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Prince Sultan Air Base, which damaged five US KC-135 refueling tankers.[51] Other data showed that the satellite also conducted surveillance of the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan and locations close to the US Fifth Fleet naval base in Manama, Bahrain, and Erbil airport, Iraq, contemporaneous with IRGC-claimed attacks on facilities in those areas.[52] The satellite also captured imagery of critical infrastructure that Iran struck in Gulf states, such as the Alba Aluminum facility in Bahrain, which Iran struck on March 29.[53] The Financial Times report on the IRGC’s utilization of Chinese intelligence assets for offensive capabilities follows a similar Washington Post report that Russia reportedly shared intelligence with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces in the Middle East in March.[54]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-15-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 16, 2026

Iran is leveraging its position over the Strait of Hormuz to extract concessions while maintaining its claim to control access to the waterway. Reuters reported on April 15 that Iran has proposed allowing ships to transit through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz without interference if the United States agrees to conditions that prevent renewed conflict and meet Iranian demands.[1] Iran has linked increased maritime access to broader negotiations, including demands to unfreeze Iranian funds, and a permanent end to US and Israeli strikes both in this war and for posterity. The implication of Iran's “concession” is that it could threaten ships to discourage them from transiting the Omani side of the Strait unless the United States grants Iran significant concessions. Agreeing to Iranian demands along these lines would show Iran that it can coerce the United States using the Strait of Hormuz both now and in the future.

The main sticking point in current US-Iran negotiations is reportedly Iran's enrichment of uranium and its highly enriched uranium stockpile. The United States has proposed a 20-year pause to enrichment, while the Iranians offered a 3- to 5-year pause, according to Iranian sources speaking to Reuters.[2] The United States wants Iran to remove all of the highly enriched uranium from Iran, whereas Iran has proposed down-blending it or only moving part of its highly enriched uranium to another country, but not all of it, according to Iranian sources speaking to Western media in recent days.[3] Iran could still enrich the remaining stockpile relatively quickly if it retained some highly enriched uranium, and it could use a 5-year pause to improve centrifuges and build or repair them. A Western diplomat told Reuters on April 16 that the nuclear issue “remains a core obstacle.”[4] An unspecified source also told Reuters that a Pakistani mediator had made a breakthrough on “sticky issues,” but the negotiating parties have not resolved issues over Iran's nuclear ‌program.[5] An Iranian source told Reuters on April 16 that Iran is not ready to send all of its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad, but it could send “part of it” to a third-party country.[6] The source claimed that Iran needed to retain some of the stockpile because Iran needs the remaining stockpile for medical purposes at a research reactor in Tehran.[7] This research reactor runs on only a few tens of kilograms (kg) of 20 percent enriched uranium instead of 10,000kg of Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile, according to nuclear expert David Albright.[8] Only a small portion—roughly 400kg—of the 10,000kg Albright references is highly enriched uranium (60%). US objectives appear to remain at zero enrichment on Iranian soil, however. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated on April 15 that Israeli and US objectives in Iran are identical and include the removal of Iranian highly enriched uranium, the “dismantling” of Iran's nuclear enrichment capabilities, and “reinstating” a nuclear deal.[9]

Iran appears not to have compromised on its stance over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, despite Iranian sources attempting to illustrate that Iran has compromised and the two sides have made progress in negotiations, however. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) affiliated media on April 16 denied all recent Reuters reporting citing Iranian sources.[10] The same IRGC-affiliated outlet had cast doubt on progress in future US-Iran talks, due to Iran‘s distrust of the United States and US “excessive demands” earlier on April 16.[11] These conflicting reports on Iranian stances in these negotiations corroborate CTP-ISW’s continued observation that the Iranian negotiating council is not unified. This disunity will make it harder for Iran to make decisions and implement decisions throughout this negotiating process.[12]

The IRGC appears to be playing an outsized role in Iranian decision-making in these negotiations, traditionally meant for civilian leadership. Pakistani Army Chief Field Marshall Asim Munir met with Iran's negotiating delegation lead Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Iran's Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi on April 16 as part of his mediation mission in Tehran as part of the US-Iran negotiation process.[13] Munir might travel to Washington next.[14] Abdollahi Aliabadi is notably not on the Iranian negotiating team. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is responsible for joint and wartime operations and not typically diplomatic missions.[15] Munir’s meeting with Aliabadi follows recent anti-regime media reports that Abdollahi Aliabadi and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi organizing Iran‘s wartime military efforts.[16] Iranian and international media did not report whether Munir met with Vahidi at the time of this writing. Vahidi is part of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s inner circle, which pushed for the Assembly of Expert's election of Mojtaba as supreme leader in March.[17] Vahidi and his affiliates, including Supreme National Security Council Secretary Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, have also reportedly been in conflict with pragmatists in the regime, like Ghalibaf, over Iran's national security and foreign policy decisions.[18]

The United States Navy continues to enforce a blockade on Iranian ports. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth defined a blockade line that runs diagonally across the Gulf of Oman from Ras al Hadd, Oman, to the Iran-Pakistan border.[22] The blockade line appears to denote the threshold that the United States will begin to engage vessels coming from or going to Iran, but Caine and Hegseth noted that the US Navy will act beyond this area as well.[23] The US Navy will interdict Iranian-linked ships in the Pacific Ocean that crossed the line before the blockade began, for example. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that 14 vessels have complied with US directives to turn around.[24]

The United States is targeting materiel support to Iran's armed forces and military capabilities through the blockade. Caine stated on April 16 that the United States will pursue any vessel in Iranian territorial waters and international waters that attempts to provide materiel support to Iran.[25] The US Navy authorized, on April 16, “visit, board, search, and seizure” operations against vessels suspected of carrying contraband to or from Iran.[26] It defines contraband as goods destined for an enemy that could support armed conflict, including arms, ammunition, and dual-use materials such as iron, steel, and aluminum.[27] These materials support Iran's military production base. Recent US-Israeli strikes have severely degraded Iran's steel and petrochemical production capacity, which likely increases Iran's reliance on imports now targeted by the blockade.[28]

The blockade also continues to impose economic costs on Iran. CENTCOM announced on April 15 that the blockade has effectively halted maritime trade to and from Iran.[29] Iran halted petrochemical exports on April 13, at least in part due to the blockade that began the same day.[30] Steel—explicitly defined as contraband—and petrochemicals are among Iran's most important exports and support both economic and military activity.[31] Iran's severely limited ability to export such goods reduces Iran's access to foreign currency. The blockade, combined with growing US sanctions on Iran's illicit oil networks and the recent US decision not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports, will also constrain Iran's oil export capabilities.[32] A sanctions-focused US analyst estimated on April 13 that a successful blockade on Iranian ports and shipping would cost the regime around $435 million USD per day.[33]

Commercially available maritime data provides only limited information on vessel compliance with the US blockade. At least four vessels entered the Strait of Hormuz, and two vessels exited the strait since CTP-ISW’s data cutoff on April 15, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence.[34] This data does not confirm whether any of these vessels violated the blockade or received US authorization to transit. One of the entering vessels, cargo ship ZAYNAR2, departed Mumbai, India, on April 11 and entered the strait on April 15.[35] Commercially available maritime data does not indicate what the vessel was carrying. Reuters previously reported that US military guidance to mariners exempts humanitarian shipments to Iran. Open-source information also does not reveal whether the vessel communicated with US Navy forces.

The Iranian missile force is exploiting the current ceasefire to reconstitute its tactical and operational-level units, but rebuilding the industrial facilities and other components that sustain the missile force at the strategic level will be extremely challenging. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth acknowledged in a press briefing on April 16 that Iran has begun to dig up its missile launchers but noted that Iran has not determined how to “replenish” its missile stockpile.[36] Satellite imagery observed by CNN on April 14 showed that Iran attempted to remove debris in front of the entrances to the Southwest Tabriz Missile Base in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, and the Khomein Missile Base in Khomein, Markazi Province.[37] The combined force struck the entrances of multiple Iranian missile bases over the course of the conflict to disrupt Iran's ability to fire missiles.[38] Removing debris from these missile sites and restoring coordination between missile units and command and control within the force, for example, will enable the missile force to conduct more coordinated missile attacks, if it chooses to do so. These activities do not, however, alter the serious strategic damage the air campaign wrought to Iran's ballistic missile program. The campaign struck defense industry facilities related to the program, ranging from final missile component assembly to aluminum and steel mills required for the raw materials of the missiles.[39] Reconstituting these assets will take much longer, in relative terms, than it did after the June 2025 strikes because Israel struck far fewer industrial targets across far fewer segments of the ballistic missile production chain in June.

The regime's inability to profit from closing the Strait of Hormuz has exacerbated internal divisions within the regime. Anti-regime media reported on April 16, citing informed sources, that the regime formed a “Strait of Hormuz Traffic Licensing Committee” at the beginning of the war in order to generate funds from tankers that the regime allowed to pass through.[80] Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr headed the committee. The informed sources added that the committee charged about $2 million per tanker, but that the regime has not received any payments thus far due to “mismanagement.” This mismanagement has reportedly caused “serious dissatisfaction” among senior Iranian officials and the Supreme Leader's office. Some officials have proposed to reassign the responsibility of payment collection from Zolghadr to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-16-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 17, 2026

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is the Iranian entity that has disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during the war, outlined specific conditions on April 17 for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait.[1] IRGC- and Armed Forces General Staff- affiliated media emphasized that the “temporary opening” of the strait is contingent upon vessels meeting certain conditions.[2] An informed source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) told IRGC-affiliated Fars News that Iran's conditions include:

Only commercial vessels can transit the strait, and military vessels are prohibited from doing so. Vessels and the cargo they carry cannot “be related to belligerent countries.”[3] Ships must pass through the Iranian-approved transit route, which forces vessels to transit the strait through Iranian territorial waters.[4] Vessels must coordinate their passage through the strait with Iranian forces, particularly the IRGC Navy.[5]
These conditions indicate that the IRGC seeks to retain operational control over transit through the strait, likely to continue to use the strait as a point of leverage to try to extract concessions from the United States. The source close to the SNSC added that Iran will “close” the strait again if the naval blockade continues.[6] Iranian forces have not conducted an attack on international shipping since April 7.[7] Ten non-Iranian-linked vessels transited along the Omani coast outside the Iranian-approved transit route on April 17, and CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of the IRGC attempting to disrupt these vessels’ movements.[8]

The IRGC harshly criticized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi after Araghchi announced on X that the strait is “completely open.”[9] Araghchi stated that, in line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz is “completely open” to “all commercial vessels” for the duration of the ceasefire.[10] Araghchi added that vessels must transit along Iran's “coordinated route,” in reference to the Iranian-approved transit route.[11] US President Donald Trump amplified Araghchi’s statement that the strait is open.[12] IRGC-affiliated media outlets, including Fars News and Mehr News, criticized Araghchi’s post and argued that his statement created confusion, which allowed Trump to shape the narrative about the Strait of Hormuz.[13] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei defended Araghchi’s statement and said that the decision to “open” the Strait of Hormuz was “not solely the decision of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.”[14] The IRGC’s criticism of Araghchi is reflective of broader divisions within the Iranian regime, which CTP-ISW has consistently reported on in recent weeks.[15] Anti-regime media previously reported that internal disagreements within the regime disrupted the Islamabad talks and prompted senior Iranian officials to order the Iranian negotiating delegation to return to Tehran.[16] These reports suggest that different factions within the Iranian regime have very different negotiating positions. The factional infighting in the regime has been exacerbated by the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who used to cohere the regime's various factions and act as an arbiter between the factions. The absence of a strong leader to keep IRGC factions in line means that these factions will likely continue to play a dominant role in shaping Iranian decision-making.

Commercially available maritime data shows that no Iranian-linked vessels approached the US blockade line on April 17, and US officials have stated that US forces will engage Iranian-linked vessels beyond this line.[17] US forces are enforcing a blockade on Iranian ports, not the strait itself.[18] CENTCOM announced on April 17 that 19 vessels have complied with US direction to turn around and that zero vessels have successfully breached the blockade.[19] Commercially available maritime data shows that some non-Iranian-linked vessels have moved toward the US blockade line to exit the strait.[20] These ships do not fall under the US blockade and are able to freely transit in and out of the strait. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 17 that at least five Iranian-linked tankers heading from the Gulf of Oman to Malaysia altered course after the US Navy warned that it could intercept ships transporting Iranian oil in international waters.[21]

There continue to be significant gaps between the US and Iranian negotiating positions, and the status of the negotiations remains unclear. The two sides disagree on several core issues, according to US, Iranian, and other officials and sources on April 16 and 17.[22] US President Donald Trump has continued to press for the complete removal of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran, while Iran appears unwilling to surrender all of its enriched uranium.[23] The parties also remain divided over Iran's ability to enrich uranium. Iran has proposed a five‑year pause in enrichment, while previous reports indicated that US negotiators discussed a 20‑year moratorium on uranium enrichment.[24] President Trump said on April 17 that any agreement must go beyond a fixed timeframe and ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon, however.[25] Trump also denied claims that the United States would unfreeze $20 billion USD worth of Iranian assets in exchange for Iran's HEU stockpile.[26] Iranian officials have argued that a ceasefire in Lebanon must be part of Iran's ceasefire with the United States, a demand that Trump rejected on April 17 by insisting that a US–Iran deal would “in no way [be] subject to Lebanon.”[27]

Some Iranian regime officials seek a preliminary agreement to extend the ceasefire to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement. A senior Iranian official told Reuters on April 17 that Iran is pursuing an interim agreement to “create space for more talks on lifting sanctions on Iran and securing compensation for war damages.”[28] The official added that Iran would provide “assurances” to the international community about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program in exchange.[29] CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile force, and Iran would almost certainly continue to do so if the United States and Iran agreed to a preliminary agreement and extended the ceasefire.[30]

The IDF killed around 1,000 Basij members and other unspecified internal security personnel during its campaign against Iran.[31] The IDF targeted internal security and political figures at every echelon, from senior leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani, and Basij Organization Commander Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani to low-ranking Basij members manning checkpoints.[32] CTP assessed on March 19 that Israeli strikes on internal security forces likely caused shock and confusion within the Iranian internal security apparatus to some degree.[33] This effect may have been temporary, however, given that shock will dissipate if strikes on internal security targets subside.

The IDF estimated that it damaged 23 percent of Iran's gas processing capacity.[38] The IDF struck some of Iran's most important energy infrastructure, including facilities at the South Pars Gas Field in Bushehr Province.[39] These facilities are central to Iran's domestic natural gas supply and broader energy system.[40]

The IDF destroyed Iran's two satellite launchers during the campaign.[41] The Iranian Space Agency oversees satellite launches with the IRGC Aerospace Force and Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[42] The IDF struck the Iranian Space Research Center, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Space Agency, on March 14, likely to disrupt Iranian space and missile-related research that could support long-range strike capabilities.[43] The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has assessed that Iran's space launch vehicle program could enable the regime to develop a militarily viable intercontinental ballistic missile by 2035 if it chose to pursue the capability, which highlights US concerns about the overlap between Iran's space launch vehicle program and intercontinental ballistic missile development.[44] The combined force destroyed the satellite launch site at the Shahroud Space Complex in Semnan Province during the war.[45] The IDF also noted on March 29 that it struck a site in eastern Tehran that produces satellite launchers.[46]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-17-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 18, 2026

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran's military response in this conflict but also Iran's negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic.[1] Traffic through the strait has virtually halted as of this writing except for Iranian vessels, according to maritime tracking data. No Iranian vessels have approached the US blockade line, however. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands.[2] The IRGC is responsible for coordinating and conducting military actions, but has historically not directly interfered in Iranian diplomacy and negotiations to the extent it currently is.

Regime institutions aligned with Vahidi are presenting a cohesive front against Araghchi and in support of the IRGC’s actions to halt traffic in the strait. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is functionally controlled by the IRGC, cited the US naval blockade on Iranian ports as the reason for the IRGC’s reimposition of “control” over the strait.[3] Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving the regime's military decision-making, according to anti-regime media on April 7.[4] A source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) previously warned IRGC-affiliated Fars News on April 17 that Iran would “close” the strait if the United States continued its blockade.[5] The SNSC released a statement on April 18 that Iran will “exercise supervision and control” over traffic in the strait until the war ends.[6] The SNSC would almost certainly not have released this statement without the approval of SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, which indicates that Zolghadr supports the IRGC’s actions in the strait. Zolghadr, who is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran's security and judicial apparatuses, was appointed to his position during the war after Vahidi reportedly pressured Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to appoint him.[7]

Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. Vahidi attempted to insert Zolghadr into the Iranian negotiating team in Islamabad despite protests from delegation leaders Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Araghchi over Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations.[8] Vahidi presumably wanted to send Zolghadr to keep an eye on the negotiations and to inform leaders in Tehran if the negotiating delegation strayed from his or Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s directives.[9] Zolghadr sent a complaint to senior IRGC leaders, almost certainly including Vahidi, that Araghchi had surpassed his mandate during the negotiations by expressing flexibility regarding Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance.[10] Zolghadr’s anger caused senior leaders in Tehran, including former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief and long-time member of Mojtaba’s inner circle, Hossein Taeb, to call the negotiating delegation back to Tehran.[11]

The IRGC continued to play an outsized role in Iran's negotiations after the Islamabad talks. Pakistani Army Chief Field Marshall Asim Munir recently met with Ghalibaf and Aliabadi in Tehran on April 16 as part of his mediation efforts.[12] Aliabadi is not a member of the Iranian negotiating team, and it is highly unusual for the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander to be involved in diplomatic discussions about negotiations. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is formally responsible for joint and wartime operations.

The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran's negotiating positions. CTP-ISW recently assessed that the United States is negotiating with a divided committee of hardliners and pragmatists that lacks a cohesive, unified position.[13] The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated. Araghchi and Ghalibaf’s negotiating team reportedly did not have full authority to finalize a deal with the United States in Islamabad, for example.[14]

This current dynamic likely reflects Vahidi’s position, relationships, and control over IRGC military elements, which has enabled him to wield significant authority over decision-making compared to other senior regime leaders such as Ghalibaf. Vahidi holds the most influential position in the regime at this time, apart from the Supreme Leader, who is reportedly seriously injured or incapacitated.[15] Vahidi is a long-time and experienced IRGC commander, having served as Iran's first IRGC Quds Force commander between 1988 and 1997 and currently serving as the senior-most IRGC commander.[16] Vahidi was one of the senior IRGC commanders who pushed the Assembly of Experts to select Mojtaba as Supreme Leader in March.[17] Vahidi and his affiliates have reportedly fought with more pragmatic regime officials such as Ghalibaf over Iran's national security and foreign policy decisions throughout the conflict.[18] Ghalibaf, in contrast, is a former IRGC commander who transitioned into politics in the early 2000s and lacks the influence and control over military elements that Vahidi has.[19] Vahidi and his inner circle appear to have marginalized Ghalibaf, although he is publicly reiterating IRGC rhetoric.[20] Ghalibaf likely lacks the leverage or formal executive authority to shape decision-making.

The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels and halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on April 18, likely in order to both gain leverage over the United States and consolidate the IRGC’s control over Iran's negotiations policy as part of an internally-motivated maneuver.[21] The IRGC appears to have intervened and reasserted Iranian “control” over the Strait of Hormuz after Araghchi announced on April 17 that the strait was open to commercial shipping.[22] At least nine vessels exited the strait through Omani territorial waters and outside of Iran's imposed traffic separation scheme on April 17 and early on April 18 following Araghchi’s announcement.[23] The IRGC, however, harshly criticized Araghchi’s statement and outlined specific conditions for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait.[24] The IRGC Navy later announced that “no vessel of any kind” should approach the strait, or it will be targeted.[25] The IRGC likely aims to secure leverage over the United States by halting traffic and driving up shipping and oil prices to impose economic pressure on the United States. The IRGC’s actions are also likely intended to be an internal demonstration of power designed to exhibit the IRGC’s control within the regime, and in particular, its control over Iran's negotiations policy.

The IRGC Navy likely used fast attack craft to attack and intimidate at least four vessels in order to deter vessels from transiting the strait on April 18.[26] All of the attacked vessels appear to have been transiting along the Iran-imposed traffic separation route that forces ships through Iranian territorial waters at the time of the attacks.[27] IRGC Navy “gunboats” fired on a likely Indian-flagged tanker east of Larak Island, and “unknown projectiles” struck a likely Iranian-flagged container ship in the same area.[28] Reuters also reported that two vessels reported being struck by gunfire between Qeshm and Larak islands.[29] All four vessels turned around.[30] The IRGC also broadcasted radio messages to vessels in the strait, warning them that the strait is “closed.”[31] Numerous vessels traveling toward the strait turned around after the Iranian attacks, according to maritime tracking data.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-18-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 19, 2026

Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait's role as a critical energy chokepoint. Iran has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, but Iran has no legal claim to the strait, which international law defines as an international waterway.[1] Iran has repeatedly attempted to regulate traffic through the strait by directing vessels through Iranian territorial waters, extracting fees, and attacking and threatening maritime traffic.[2] Recent Iranian proposals to the United States have also implicitly demanded that the United States and international community recognize Iran's “control” over the strait.[3] Iran has offered to “let” vessels transit the strait in these proposals, but Iran's “letting” traffic through the strait implies that Iran can “let” traffic through an international waterway.[4] These proposals are consistent with persistent Iranian messaging throughout the war that Iran seeks to impose a new status quo for transit through the strait.[5] Any US acceptance of Iran's ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.

Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. A senior Iranian official told CNN on April 18 that vessels that pay “security fees” and comply with the IRGC’s protocols will receive priority transit through the Strait of Hormuz, while those that refuse to pay will face delayed passage.[6] Iran has reportedly charged vessels around $2 million USD to transit the strait.[7] Extracting fees from commercial vessels enables Iran to earn income amid the United States’ efforts to impose economic pressure on Iran through its blockade of Iranian ports.

The IRGC has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait. Bloomberg reported on April 18 that at least five liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers reversed course after Iran warned the vessels’ captains that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz.[8] No LNG tankers have exited the Strait of Hormuz since the war began in February.[9] Iranian media separately reported on April 19 that the IRGC forced the Botswana-flagged Meda and the Angola-flagged G Summer to change course after the vessels attempted to cross the Strait of Hormuz.[10] Commercially available shipping data indicates that the G Summer later transited the Strait of Hormuz via the Iranian-approved route on April 19.[11]

US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. US President Donald Trump announced on April 19 that the US Navy's USS Spruance, a guided missile destroyer, intercepted the Touska in the Gulf of Oman, disabled the vessel's engines, and commandeered the ship after the Iranian crew refused to return to port.[12] US forces seized the Touska after it attempted to pass the US blockade line. The United States previously sanctioned the Touska, which is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.[13]

Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19. The vessels include the US-sanctioned Guinea-flagged Raine tanker, the Iranian-flagged Shamim container ship, and the Hong Kong-flagged Flora tanker, which was previously Iranian-flagged.[14]

At least four Iranian or Iranian-linked ships appear to be attempting to pass the US Navy's blockade line. US officials have stated that the United States will interdict vessels beyond the blockade line. The vessels include the Iranian-flagged Artman container ship, the Liberian-flagged Basel, the Marshall Islands-flagged CECI, and the Vietnam-flagged NV Aquamarine.[15] Both the Basel and CECI originated from Iranian ports, while the NV Aquamarine is under US sanctions and is blacklisted by United Against Nuclear Iran.[16] US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on March 16 that US forces will interdict any ship that crosses the blockade line, which runs diagonally across the Gulf of Oman from Ras al Hadd, Oman, to the Iran-Pakistan border.[17]

The US Navy is reportedly conducting naval mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz to restore the official transit route through the strait amid the Navy's continued blockade of Iranian ports. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 19 that the US Navy is using uncrewed surface vessels (USV) and submersible drones to clear an unspecified number of Iranian naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz.[18] Clearing Iranian naval mines from the Strait of Hormuz is necessary to restore trust in the safety of the official traffic separation scheme, where Iran has reportedly laid the mines.[19] Military analysts told the Wall Street Journal that US Navy USVs and submersible drones could identify naval mines in the strait relatively quickly and that the US Navy could then deploy a second wave of drones to conduct explosive ordnance disposal operations.[20] Iran deployed a limited number of naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026, but a former US Navy official told the Wall Street Journal that Iran laid fewer mines than expected due to US military pressure that constrained Iran's use of large mine-laying ships.[21]

US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21.[22] ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran's participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however. Unspecified Iranian sources, including an unidentified member of Iran's negotiating team, told Iranian state media on April 19 that Iran does not currently have any plans to participate in the next round of talks.[23] IRGC-affiliated media reported on April 19 that there are no clear prospects for future negotiations due to the United States’ demands and continued naval blockade of Iranian ports.[24] ISW-CTP assessed on April 18 that the IRGC has likely consolidated control over Iran's negotiations policy.[25] Iranian officials echoed similar sentiments to Pakistani officials on April 19.[26] The 14-day ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran is set to expire on April 22.[27]

A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict. Kataib Hezbollah Security Chief Abu Mujahid Aasaf issued a statement after Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad that called for increased coordination between the “resistance forces and other parties,” which implicitly refers to military cooperation.[28] The “other parties” may refer to other Axis of Resistance groups such as the Houthis or Hezbollah. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have launched drone and rocket attacks targeting US and foreign interests in Iraq, as well as the Gulf countries, during the war.[29] Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis may have attempted to coordinate some attacks during the war, but ISW-CTP has not observed any instances of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias coordinating their attacks with other Axis of Resistance groups.[30]

Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran's ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose. Multiple US officials told the New York Times on April 19 that Iran retains around 40 percent of its attack drones, around 60 percent of its missile launchers, and around 70 percent of its missile stockpile.[31] The officials stated that the 60 percent of missile launchers includes around 100 launchers that Iran has dug out from underground facilities since the ceasefire went into effect.[32] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran is exploiting the ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile forces on a tactical level, including by clearing debris from tunnel entrances to retrieve missile launchers from underground missile bases.[33] The recent assessments about Iran's remaining offensive capacities do not specify whether the launchers that Iran has dug out from underground facilities are intact or operational. Shockwaves from combined force strikes may have damaged launchers stored in underground facilities without directly hitting them. The recent assessments also do not specify what kinds of launchers Iran has retrieved. Iran possesses different kinds of launchers for ballistic missiles with different ranges. These gaps preclude the development of a quantitative assessment about the current status of Iran's missile program.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-19-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 20, 2026

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious intra-regime debate with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other senior regime officials opposed to negotiations with the United States. Ghalibaf publicly defended negotiations on Iranian state television on April 18, arguing that diplomacy with the United States, alongside military power, is necessary to secure Iran's objectives.[1] Ghalibaf also reportedly criticized hardline officials, including Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) member Saeed Jalili and hardline parliamentarian Amirhossein Sabeti, for their opposition to negotiations during a meeting with advisers, but his criticisms were likely implicitly directed at Vahidi. US officials separately told Axios on April 20 that the US negotiating delegation thought it was “negotiating with the right people“ in Islamabad on April 11 and 12 but that the IRGC effectively told the Iranian negotiating delegation upon their return to Tehran that they ”don't speak for” the IRGC.[2] Senior regime officials, including former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb, reportedly called the Iranian negotiating delegation back to Tehran after it surpassed its mandate.[3] A second US official told Axios that “we aren't sure who's in charge and neither do they.”[4] This report is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that there is a division between Vahidi and his inner circle and members of Iran‘s negotiating team over Iran's negotiations policy.[5] This report is also consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not played the role of cohering and arbitrating between various factions as his father used to do, which has likely exacerbated intra-regime fighting.[6]

Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. Vahidi is reportedly the only Iranian official with direct access to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials, according to Israeli media on April 19.[7] Israeli media also reported on April 19 that Iranian officials‘ inability to contact Mojtaba is a significant obstacle to continued US-Iran negotiations.[8] Ghalibaf’s push for diplomacy and apparent effort to reach a deal may also be a bid to protect his domestic position and maintain credibility.[9] Ghalibaf reportedly fears that both his and Araghchi’s positions are at risk if the IRGC consolidates control.[10] Ghalibaf’s removal as the parliament speaker would represent a major defeat for Ghalibaf and his domestic positions and signify a victory for Vahidi. These reports are consistent with ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely consolidated control over not only Iran's military response in the conflict but also Iran's negotiations policy.[11]

US and Iranian delegations will reportedly meet in Islamabad, Pakistan, for a second round of talks in the coming days.[12] Two US officials speaking to the New York Times on April 20 stated that US Vice President JD Vance will travel to Pakistan on April 21. Two Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the Iranian delegation in the first round of talks, would attend the upcoming talks if Vance attended.[13] US and Iranian demands appear to have largely stayed the same. US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the US delegation is pushing for the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a pause in Iranian uranium enrichment for at least 20 years, and the removal of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran.[14] The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran's demands are Iranian ”control” over the strait, the lifting of sanctions on Iran, and a shorter pause in uranium enrichment.[15] US President Donald Trump previously indicated that a pause in enrichment would be insufficient to meet US demands.[16]

The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters claimed that the April 19 seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska by the US Navy violated the US-Iran ceasefire.[17] The spokesperson for the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is functionally controlled by the IRGC, warned on April 19 that Iranian forces will respond to the US seizure of the Touska and asserted that the United States had “violated the ceasefire.”[18] Unspecified security sources told Reuters that the Touska was likely transporting dual-use items from China to Iran.[19] The sources added that the Touska had previously transported dual-use items to Iran.[20] US Central Command (CENTCOM) told United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) on April 16 that it considers raw materials such as oil, iron, steel, aluminum, and certain civilian goods with both civilian and military applications to be “conditional contraband.”[21] CENTCOM also defined electronic components, computer systems, machinery, and power generation equipment as “conditional contraband.”[22] The Touska visited the port of Zhuhai in China in March.[23] Zhuhai Port is considered a loading port for chemicals, including missile fuel precursor sodium perchlorate, according to the Washington Post.[24] The Wall Street Journal reported that a subsidiary of the US-sanctioned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management, owns the Touska.[25] Two vessels owned by Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management transported approximately 1,000 tons of material used in missile propellant in 2025, according to the Wall Street Journal.[26]

Iran likely continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Commercially available shipping data indicates that Iran forced the Marshall Islands–flagged Capetan Costas S and the Curaçao-flagged Lumina Ocean to alter course after they attempted to transit the strait via the Iranian-approved route following their departure from Basra, Iraq.[27] These incidents follow a similar incident on April 19, when the IRGC forced the Botswana-flagged Meda and the Angola-flagged G Summer to change course after the vessels attempted to cross the Strait of Hormuz.[28]

The Iranian Parliament is attempting to formalize Iranian “control” over the Strait of Hormuz.[29] Iranian parliamentary legislation requires additional approval from the Guardian Council before it is enacted into law.[30] Iranian media reported on April 19 that Iran's parliament is drafting a bill that would ban Israeli-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, require vessels from “hostile countries” to obtain approval from Iran's Supreme National Security Council to transit the strait, and bar states that “caused damage” to Iran from transiting the strait until they paid reparations to Iran.[31] The Iranian parliamentarian who announced the bill said that Iran would allocate some of the revenue from Strait of Hormuz transit fees to fund the Iranian armed forces’ reconstitution under the bill.[32] This report follows a similar report on March 26 that Iran's parliament was working to formalize a process for vessels to pay Iran in exchange for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.[33] Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission head Ebrahim Azizi told the BBC on April 20 that Iran will “never” be ready to give up its “control” of the Strait of Hormuz.[34] Azizi added that Iran's “control” of the strait will be signed into law, in reference to the Iranian parliamentary bill described above.[35] Azizi characterized Iran's “control” of the strait as “one of [Iran's] assets to face the enemy.”[36] These comments reflect the Iranian regime's view that the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's main point of leverage vis-a-vis the United States.

CENTCOM announced on April 20 that US forces have directed 27 vessels to change course since the start of the blockade.[37] These vessels likely include the US-sanctioned Guinea-flagged Raine tanker and the Iranian-flagged Artman container ship, which both changed course after approaching the US blockade line on April 19, according to commercially available shipping data.[38] Both ships likely sought to pass the US blockade line before being forced to change course.[39]

ISW-CTP is unable to assess whether two vessels that originated from Iranian ports and passed the US blockade line are in violation of or exempt from the US Navy's blockade. Commercially available shipping data shows that the Liberian-flagged Basel and Marshall Islands–flagged CECI, which departed from Bandar Imam Khomeini Port, Khuzestan Province, on April 15 continued to transit along the Omani coast toward separate ports in Brazil on April 20.[40] CENTCOM announced on April 14 that it would not allow vessels to enter or exit Iranian ports.[41] UKMTO reported on April 16 that vessels carrying humanitarian goods are exempt from the blockade, however.[42] It is unclear what cargo the Basel and CECI are transporting.[43] CENTCOM has noted that all Iranian vessels, vessels under US sanctions, and vessels suspected of carrying contraband are subject to the right of visit and search, regardless of their location.[44] ISW-CTP previously noted that US forces can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they reach their final destination.[45]

A third vessel, the Vietnam-flagged NV Aquamarine, has also continued sailing, but this ship is likely exempt from the US blockade and considered “neutral shipping,” given that it departed from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and is not under US sanctions.[46] ISW-CTP incorrectly attributed United Against Nuclear Iran's blacklisting of the NV Aquamarine as evidence that the vessel was an Iranian-linked vessel attempting to pass the US Navy's blockade line on April 19.[47]

Satellite imagery confirms that the US-Israeli combined force conducted multiple strikes on a reported IRGC command center in the Jamaran complex in northern Tehran Province.[48] The strikes occurred before the ceasefire. An Iranian OSINT analyst assessed that the United States struck the site with massive ordnance penetrator bombs.[49] Iranian media previously described the site as the most important and “strategic” broadcast transmitter in Iran.[50] The analyst claimed that the site also serves as a surveillance, signal-jamming, and command center for the IRGC.[51] Fox News, citing unspecified high-level sources, reported on April 6 that the United States struck an underground IRGC headquarters in Tehran, which the analyst assessed was referring to the strike on the Jamaran complex.[52] The analyst claimed that the strike targeted a meeting of at least 50 IRGC officers at the underground complex.[53] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify that the targeted site was an IRGC command center, or that IRGC officers were meeting at the site at the time of the combined force strikes.

Iran reportedly planned to conduct covert sabotage operations against Israeli-linked sites, energy infrastructure, and other unspecified sites in Azerbaijan in recent weeks.[54] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Mossad and Azerbaijani authorities thwarted several Iranian sabotage attempts and planned attacks in Azerbaijan “several weeks ago.”[55] Mossad stated that an Iranian-backed militant cell was preparing to target the Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan, a synagogue in Baku, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline with improvised explosive devices (IED) and drones.[56] Israeli airstrikes at the start of the war killed the senior IRGC leaders behind these planned operations, including Unit 4000 Chief Rahman Moghadam, IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Majid Khademi, and covert operations official Mohsen Suri, according to Israeli media.[57]

The IRGC Intelligence Organization's covert operations Unit 4000 also reportedly smuggled drones through Turkey and conducted reconnaissance against US forces at Incirlik Airbase in Turkey.[58] Israeli intelligence reported that a Unit 4000 officer coordinated the smuggling of drones from Iran to Cyprus via Turkey.[59] The same officer also reportedly headed operations to gather intelligence on US forces at Incirlik Airbase in southwestern Turkey.[60]

Emirati state media separately reported on April 20 that Emirati security forces arrested 27 members of a group with connections to the Iranian regime and external actors who were planning to conduct terrorist attacks.[61]

Lebanese and Israeli officials will meet in Washington, DC, on April 23 for the second round of direct ambassador-level talks.[62] Lebanese and Israeli officials met in Washington, DC, on April 14 for the first direct talks between the two countries in over 30 years.[63] Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Hamadeh Moawad and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter will attend the talks.[64] It is unclear which US officials will attend the talks at the time of this writing. A Lebanese official told the Associated Press on April 20 that the upcoming talks will focus on “solidifying” the 10-day ceasefire and the logistics of future negotiations.[65] A Lebanese ministerial source previously told Saudi media that Lebanese officials’ top priority is to request an extension of the temporary ceasefire.[66] A senior Israeli political source recently told Israeli media that Israel assesses that it will need to agree to a ceasefire extension in Lebanon in the next few days.[67] The proposed extension period would reportedly range from 10 days to one month.[68] Israel and Lebanon's current 10-day ceasefire is set to expire on April 26.[69] These preparatory and logistical meetings aim to lay the groundwork for Israel and Lebanon to have direct negotiations in the future over long-standing issues, such as Israel's presence in Lebanese territory and Hezbollah disarmament.[70]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-20-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, April 21, 2026

The United States extended its ceasefire with Iran “until such time as [the Iranian] proposal is submitted and discussions are concluded.”[1] US President DonaldTrump stated on April 21 that Pakistani mediators urged the United States not to resume attacks while Iranian leaders work to produce a “unified proposal.”[2] The reference to a ”unified” proposal appears to imply that previous proposals were not unified in some way, which is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that one challenge with the ongoing negotiations is the divided nature of Iran's negotiating team. The ceasefire extension comes after a second round of US–Iran negotiations scheduled for April 21 in Islamabad, Pakistan, was cancelled because Iran did not confirm its participation and did not respond to US positions.[3] Trump confirmed that Washington will maintain its blockade of Iranian ports.[4]

Conflicting reports on April 20 and 21 about Iran's participation in the scheduled negotiations and Iran's failure to produce a unified proposal reflect the ongoing intra-regime power struggle between Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. The Wall Street Journal, citing unspecified sources, reported on April 21 that Iranian officials initially signaled that they would attend the talks but later introduced a precondition following pressure from the IRGC that the United States lift its blockade before negotiations begin.[5] That the regime then adopted this precondition as official regime policy suggests that senior-most IRGC commander Vahidi and aligned actors currently wield significant influence on Iranian decision-making. This dynamic is consistent with reporting that Vahidi is the only senior official who maintains direct access to Mojtaba Khamenei and relays key decisions, which gives him significant power.[6] Ghalibaf has publicly supported negotiations and has not explicitly called for preconditions.[7] The Trump administration seems to have been willing to negotiate in talks without preconditions.

The reported precondition that the United States lift its blockade before talks would only lift the blockade before and during the talks. The United States could then reimpose the blockade at any later time. This precondition is thus not a major concession because the blockade would be extremely time limited. The limited nature of the precondition suggests that Vahidi and those around him may have sought to derail negotiations rather than secure meaningful economic relief.

Iranian officials and IRGC-affiliated media are signaling readiness for the imminent resumption of war. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on April 21 that Iran has prepared for a new phase of fighting.[8] Tasnim added that Iran has assessed the likelihood of renewed conflict as high over the past two weeks and has conducted certain military redeployments and prepared new target lists accordingly.[9] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately assessed on April 21 that the likelihood of renewed US and Israeli attacks is high and emphasized the need for preparation.[10] An unspecified senior Israeli security official told Israel's state broadcaster on April 21 that Israel is preparing for the resumption of fighting with Iran as well.[11] The official assessed that the United States and Iran will fail to reach any understanding and noted that Israel is ready to immediately resume the war.[12]

Some senior Iranian clerical and political figures have expressed support for negotiations and for the negotiating team, but this support remains limited and does not yet reflect a unified shift within the regime. Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid publicly advocated for a negotiated resolution and criticized hardline Iranian officials for risking renewed conflict.[13] Abdol Hamid is the most prominent Sunni cleric in Iran and the Friday prayer leader in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, and he openly challenged the regime during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[14] Abdol Hamid stated on April 21 that a “fair agreement” is the only viable solution and warned that hardliners obstructing such an outcome will bear responsibility for the “homeland's devastation.”[15] Abdol Hamid previously called for “strong diplomacy with full authority” during his sermon on April 17 and emphasized that Iranian diplomacy should not be constrained by hardliners.[16] These remarks support the broader line that some Iranian political and clerical figures favor diplomacy and may be pushing back, at least indirectly, against the IRGC-centered camp that has constrained negotiations. Abdol Hamid remains an influential clerical figure, but his position is unlikely to meaningfully affect Iran's foreign policy decision-making. Prominent Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani separately cautioned against actions that undermine negotiators and explicitly praised the role of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[17] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Reza Bahonar emphasized confidence in Iranian negotiators and in Ghalibaf, stating that Ghalibaf is defending Iran's achievements with commitment and calling on political factions and the public to support negotiators.[18] ISW-CTP has observed that Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious internal dispute with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi (see above).[19]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on April 21 that US forces have directed 28 Iranian-linked vessels to turn around or return to port since the start of the blockade on April 13.[25] Commercially available data shows that three vessels turned around near Chabahar Port, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in the past two days.[26] Two of the three vessels, the Iranian-flagged and US-sanctioned Artman and Shamim, turned back towards Chabahar after approaching the US blockade line.[27] The third vessel, the Comoros-flagged Calista, left from Chabahar towards Karachi, Pakistan, but turned around and returned to Chabahar.[28]

Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel for the first time since the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire took effect on April 16.[39] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in the vicinity of Rab el Thalathine in southeastern Lebanon's Marjaayoun District, near the Israel-Lebanon border.[40] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets and drones targeting an IDF artillery position in Kfar Giladi, in northern Israel.[41] The attacks caused no reported casualties.[42] Hezbollah accused Israel of over 200 ceasefire “violations” in southern Lebanon since the ceasefire took effect on April 16 in its explanation of the attack.[43] The IDF called Hezbollah's rocket and drone attacks “blatant violations” of the ceasefire.[44] The IDF struck the Hezbollah rocket launcher responsible for the attack on Israeli forces in Rab el Thalathine.[45]

Iran allowed some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct attacks without the Iranian regime's approval during the war, according to three Iraqi militia members and two other unspecified officials speaking to Western media on April 21.[66] An Iraqi militia member stated that “various forces” now have the authority to conduct operations based on their own “field assessments without referring back to a central command.”[67] The sources added that “hardline factions” are operating under a decentralized command structure with Iranian advisers.[68] These ”hardline” factions could refer to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, both of which are relatively more subordinate to Iran than other militias.[69]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted up to half of the roughly 1,000 drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia during the war, according to unnamed sources speaking to the Wall Street Journalon April 21.[70] Some of these sources added that Iraqi militias launched drones targeting Bahrain after US President Donald Trump announced the US-Iran ceasefire on April 8.[71] ISW-CTP assessed on April 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states.[72] ISW-CTP also assessed that it is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.[73] Bahrain's Foreign Ministry summoned the Iraqi charge d’affaires on April 13 in response to “continued” Iraqi militia drone attacks targeting Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council states.[74] Saudi Arabia similarly summoned the Iraqi ambassador to Saudi Arabia on April 12 for the same reason.[75]

A Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba political council member reportedly confirmed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have sent personnel and financial support to Iran during the war.[76] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba political council member Firas al Yasser said Iranian-backed Iraqi militias sent “support convoys” and financial aid to Iran from Iraq, according to anti-Iranian regime media on April 21.[77]Yasser said the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia support was a sign of Iraq's solidarity with Iran.[78] An Iraqi official speaking to anti- Iranian regime media claimed on March 30 that Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to Basij bases in Khorramshahr and Abadan in Khuzestan Province.[79] The same outlet previously reported that PMF fighters had entered Iran via the Shalamcheh crossing.[80] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that tend to report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[81]Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is affiliated with the 12th PMF Brigade, for example.[82] ISW-CTP previously assessed that the regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[83]

Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraq militias and the Houthis, have signaled their preparedness to resume operations against the United States, Israel, and other regional countries if the war resumes between Iran and the United States. Likely Iranian-backed militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam warned on April 20 that the group is “fully prepared” to resume attacks against US interests in Iraq and the region.[84] The militia said that it is ready for a “long war” and threatened to conduct attacks with “more advanced weapons.”[85]It also urged the supporters of the “resistance” to support Iran and Lebanon.[86]This warning comes after Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah appeared to confirm on April 18 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad, Iraq, on April 18.[87] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have launched drone and rocket attacks targeting US and foreign interests in Iraq, as well as the Gulf countries, during the war.[88] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi warned on April 21 that the Houthis will not remain neutral and would ”escalate” if the United States and Israel escalate against Iran.[89]Abdulmalik warned that the current fragile truce is coming to an end and the possibility of escalation is “high.”[90]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-21-2026/

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