Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious intra-regime debate with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other senior regime officials opposed to negotiations with the United States. Ghalibaf publicly defended negotiations on Iranian state television on April 18, arguing that diplomacy with the United States, alongside military power, is necessary to secure Iran's objectives.[1] Ghalibaf also reportedly criticized hardline officials, including Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) member Saeed Jalili and hardline parliamentarian Amirhossein Sabeti, for their opposition to negotiations during a meeting with advisers, but his criticisms were likely implicitly directed at Vahidi. US officials separately told Axios on April 20 that the US negotiating delegation thought it was “negotiating with the right people“ in Islamabad on April 11 and 12 but that the IRGC effectively told the Iranian negotiating delegation upon their return to Tehran that they ”don't speak for” the IRGC.[2] Senior regime officials, including former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb, reportedly called the Iranian negotiating delegation back to Tehran after it surpassed its mandate.[3] A second US official told Axios that “we aren't sure who's in charge and neither do they.”[4] This report is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that there is a division between Vahidi and his inner circle and members of Iran‘s negotiating team over Iran's negotiations policy.[5] This report is also consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not played the role of cohering and arbitrating between various factions as his father used to do, which has likely exacerbated intra-regime fighting.[6]
Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. Vahidi is reportedly the only Iranian official with direct access to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials, according to Israeli media on April 19.[7] Israeli media also reported on April 19 that Iranian officials‘ inability to contact Mojtaba is a significant obstacle to continued US-Iran negotiations.[8] Ghalibaf’s push for diplomacy and apparent effort to reach a deal may also be a bid to protect his domestic position and maintain credibility.[9] Ghalibaf reportedly fears that both his and Araghchi’s positions are at risk if the IRGC consolidates control.[10] Ghalibaf’s removal as the parliament speaker would represent a major defeat for Ghalibaf and his domestic positions and signify a victory for Vahidi. These reports are consistent with ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely consolidated control over not only Iran's military response in the conflict but also Iran's negotiations policy.[11]
US and Iranian delegations will reportedly meet in Islamabad, Pakistan, for a second round of talks in the coming days.[12] Two US officials speaking to the New York Times on April 20 stated that US Vice President JD Vance will travel to Pakistan on April 21. Two Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the Iranian delegation in the first round of talks, would attend the upcoming talks if Vance attended.[13] US and Iranian demands appear to have largely stayed the same. US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the US delegation is pushing for the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a pause in Iranian uranium enrichment for at least 20 years, and the removal of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran.[14] The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran's demands are Iranian ”control” over the strait, the lifting of sanctions on Iran, and a shorter pause in uranium enrichment.[15] US President Donald Trump previously indicated that a pause in enrichment would be insufficient to meet US demands.[16]
The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters claimed that the April 19 seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska by the US Navy violated the US-Iran ceasefire.[17] The spokesperson for the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is functionally controlled by the IRGC, warned on April 19 that Iranian forces will respond to the US seizure of the Touska and asserted that the United States had “violated the ceasefire.”[18] Unspecified security sources told Reuters that the Touska was likely transporting dual-use items from China to Iran.[19] The sources added that the Touska had previously transported dual-use items to Iran.[20] US Central Command (CENTCOM) told United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) on April 16 that it considers raw materials such as oil, iron, steel, aluminum, and certain civilian goods with both civilian and military applications to be “conditional contraband.”[21] CENTCOM also defined electronic components, computer systems, machinery, and power generation equipment as “conditional contraband.”[22] The Touska visited the port of Zhuhai in China in March.[23] Zhuhai Port is considered a loading port for chemicals, including missile fuel precursor sodium perchlorate, according to the Washington Post.[24] The Wall Street Journal reported that a subsidiary of the US-sanctioned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management, owns the Touska.[25] Two vessels owned by Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management transported approximately 1,000 tons of material used in missile propellant in 2025, according to the Wall Street Journal.[26]
Iran likely continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Commercially available shipping data indicates that Iran forced the Marshall Islands–flagged Capetan Costas S and the Curaçao-flagged Lumina Ocean to alter course after they attempted to transit the strait via the Iranian-approved route following their departure from Basra, Iraq.[27] These incidents follow a similar incident on April 19, when the IRGC forced the Botswana-flagged Meda and the Angola-flagged G Summer to change course after the vessels attempted to cross the Strait of Hormuz.[28]
The Iranian Parliament is attempting to formalize Iranian “control” over the Strait of Hormuz.[29] Iranian parliamentary legislation requires additional approval from the Guardian Council before it is enacted into law.[30] Iranian media reported on April 19 that Iran's parliament is drafting a bill that would ban Israeli-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, require vessels from “hostile countries” to obtain approval from Iran's Supreme National Security Council to transit the strait, and bar states that “caused damage” to Iran from transiting the strait until they paid reparations to Iran.[31] The Iranian parliamentarian who announced the bill said that Iran would allocate some of the revenue from Strait of Hormuz transit fees to fund the Iranian armed forces’ reconstitution under the bill.[32] This report follows a similar report on March 26 that Iran's parliament was working to formalize a process for vessels to pay Iran in exchange for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.[33] Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission head Ebrahim Azizi told the BBC on April 20 that Iran will “never” be ready to give up its “control” of the Strait of Hormuz.[34] Azizi added that Iran's “control” of the strait will be signed into law, in reference to the Iranian parliamentary bill described above.[35] Azizi characterized Iran's “control” of the strait as “one of [Iran's] assets to face the enemy.”[36] These comments reflect the Iranian regime's view that the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's main point of leverage vis-a-vis the United States.
CENTCOM announced on April 20 that US forces have directed 27 vessels to change course since the start of the blockade.[37] These vessels likely include the US-sanctioned Guinea-flagged Raine tanker and the Iranian-flagged Artman container ship, which both changed course after approaching the US blockade line on April 19, according to commercially available shipping data.[38] Both ships likely sought to pass the US blockade line before being forced to change course.[39]
ISW-CTP is unable to assess whether two vessels that originated from Iranian ports and passed the US blockade line are in violation of or exempt from the US Navy's blockade. Commercially available shipping data shows that the Liberian-flagged Basel and Marshall Islands–flagged CECI, which departed from Bandar Imam Khomeini Port, Khuzestan Province, on April 15 continued to transit along the Omani coast toward separate ports in Brazil on April 20.[40] CENTCOM announced on April 14 that it would not allow vessels to enter or exit Iranian ports.[41] UKMTO reported on April 16 that vessels carrying humanitarian goods are exempt from the blockade, however.[42] It is unclear what cargo the Basel and CECI are transporting.[43] CENTCOM has noted that all Iranian vessels, vessels under US sanctions, and vessels suspected of carrying contraband are subject to the right of visit and search, regardless of their location.[44] ISW-CTP previously noted that US forces can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they reach their final destination.[45]
A third vessel, the Vietnam-flagged NV Aquamarine, has also continued sailing, but this ship is likely exempt from the US blockade and considered “neutral shipping,” given that it departed from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and is not under US sanctions.[46] ISW-CTP incorrectly attributed United Against Nuclear Iran's blacklisting of the NV Aquamarine as evidence that the vessel was an Iranian-linked vessel attempting to pass the US Navy's blockade line on April 19.[47]
Satellite imagery confirms that the US-Israeli combined force conducted multiple strikes on a reported IRGC command center in the Jamaran complex in northern Tehran Province.[48] The strikes occurred before the ceasefire. An Iranian OSINT analyst assessed that the United States struck the site with massive ordnance penetrator bombs.[49] Iranian media previously described the site as the most important and “strategic” broadcast transmitter in Iran.[50] The analyst claimed that the site also serves as a surveillance, signal-jamming, and command center for the IRGC.[51] Fox News, citing unspecified high-level sources, reported on April 6 that the United States struck an underground IRGC headquarters in Tehran, which the analyst assessed was referring to the strike on the Jamaran complex.[52] The analyst claimed that the strike targeted a meeting of at least 50 IRGC officers at the underground complex.[53] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify that the targeted site was an IRGC command center, or that IRGC officers were meeting at the site at the time of the combined force strikes.
Iran reportedly planned to conduct covert sabotage operations against Israeli-linked sites, energy infrastructure, and other unspecified sites in Azerbaijan in recent weeks.[54] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Mossad and Azerbaijani authorities thwarted several Iranian sabotage attempts and planned attacks in Azerbaijan “several weeks ago.”[55] Mossad stated that an Iranian-backed militant cell was preparing to target the Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan, a synagogue in Baku, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline with improvised explosive devices (IED) and drones.[56] Israeli airstrikes at the start of the war killed the senior IRGC leaders behind these planned operations, including Unit 4000 Chief Rahman Moghadam, IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Majid Khademi, and covert operations official Mohsen Suri, according to Israeli media.[57]
The IRGC Intelligence Organization's covert operations Unit 4000 also reportedly smuggled drones through Turkey and conducted reconnaissance against US forces at Incirlik Airbase in Turkey.[58] Israeli intelligence reported that a Unit 4000 officer coordinated the smuggling of drones from Iran to Cyprus via Turkey.[59] The same officer also reportedly headed operations to gather intelligence on US forces at Incirlik Airbase in southwestern Turkey.[60]
Emirati state media separately reported on April 20 that Emirati security forces arrested 27 members of a group with connections to the Iranian regime and external actors who were planning to conduct terrorist attacks.[61]
Lebanese and Israeli officials will meet in Washington, DC, on April 23 for the second round of direct ambassador-level talks.[62] Lebanese and Israeli officials met in Washington, DC, on April 14 for the first direct talks between the two countries in over 30 years.[63] Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Hamadeh Moawad and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter will attend the talks.[64] It is unclear which US officials will attend the talks at the time of this writing. A Lebanese official told the Associated Press on April 20 that the upcoming talks will focus on “solidifying” the 10-day ceasefire and the logistics of future negotiations.[65] A Lebanese ministerial source previously told Saudi media that Lebanese officials’ top priority is to request an extension of the temporary ceasefire.[66] A senior Israeli political source recently told Israeli media that Israel assesses that it will need to agree to a ceasefire extension in Lebanon in the next few days.[67] The proposed extension period would reportedly range from 10 days to one month.[68] Israel and Lebanon's current 10-day ceasefire is set to expire on April 26.[69] These preparatory and logistical meetings aim to lay the groundwork for Israel and Lebanon to have direct negotiations in the future over long-standing issues, such as Israel's presence in Lebanese territory and Hezbollah disarmament.[70]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-20-2026/
For those wondering why we haven’t seen an uprising in Iran since the January 8–9 crackdown, the answer is on the streets.
The regime is staging daily shows of force. Basij units, men and women, parading through cities - looking ridiculously like Ninja Turtles - with flags of the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah, backed by 23mm and 12.7mm machine guns… the kind you normally point at fighter jets and armoured vehicles, not civilians. It’s not a rally. It’s intimidation. The message is simple: don’t you even think about it.
And ironically, this level of theatrics screams fear, not strength. A confident regime doesn’t need anti-aircraft guns to manage its own population. Which also explains the internet blackout, because once people can see, then they can organise! So instead, the regime may choose war over compromise. In their minds, it’s safer. If the Taliban could last 20 years, they think they can last 20 weeks. It’s a brutal calculation, and the Iranian people are the ones paying the price.🤦🏻♂️
https://x.com/AimenDean/status/2045555266859704673
2 m video
The United States extended its ceasefire with Iran “until such time as [the Iranian] proposal is submitted and discussions are concluded.”[1] US President DonaldTrump stated on April 21 that Pakistani mediators urged the United States not to resume attacks while Iranian leaders work to produce a “unified proposal.”[2] The reference to a ”unified” proposal appears to imply that previous proposals were not unified in some way, which is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that one challenge with the ongoing negotiations is the divided nature of Iran's negotiating team. The ceasefire extension comes after a second round of US–Iran negotiations scheduled for April 21 in Islamabad, Pakistan, was cancelled because Iran did not confirm its participation and did not respond to US positions.[3] Trump confirmed that Washington will maintain its blockade of Iranian ports.[4]
Conflicting reports on April 20 and 21 about Iran's participation in the scheduled negotiations and Iran's failure to produce a unified proposal reflect the ongoing intra-regime power struggle between Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. The Wall Street Journal, citing unspecified sources, reported on April 21 that Iranian officials initially signaled that they would attend the talks but later introduced a precondition following pressure from the IRGC that the United States lift its blockade before negotiations begin.[5] That the regime then adopted this precondition as official regime policy suggests that senior-most IRGC commander Vahidi and aligned actors currently wield significant influence on Iranian decision-making. This dynamic is consistent with reporting that Vahidi is the only senior official who maintains direct access to Mojtaba Khamenei and relays key decisions, which gives him significant power.[6] Ghalibaf has publicly supported negotiations and has not explicitly called for preconditions.[7] The Trump administration seems to have been willing to negotiate in talks without preconditions.
The reported precondition that the United States lift its blockade before talks would only lift the blockade before and during the talks. The United States could then reimpose the blockade at any later time. This precondition is thus not a major concession because the blockade would be extremely time limited. The limited nature of the precondition suggests that Vahidi and those around him may have sought to derail negotiations rather than secure meaningful economic relief.
Iranian officials and IRGC-affiliated media are signaling readiness for the imminent resumption of war. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on April 21 that Iran has prepared for a new phase of fighting.[8] Tasnim added that Iran has assessed the likelihood of renewed conflict as high over the past two weeks and has conducted certain military redeployments and prepared new target lists accordingly.[9] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately assessed on April 21 that the likelihood of renewed US and Israeli attacks is high and emphasized the need for preparation.[10] An unspecified senior Israeli security official told Israel's state broadcaster on April 21 that Israel is preparing for the resumption of fighting with Iran as well.[11] The official assessed that the United States and Iran will fail to reach any understanding and noted that Israel is ready to immediately resume the war.[12]
Some senior Iranian clerical and political figures have expressed support for negotiations and for the negotiating team, but this support remains limited and does not yet reflect a unified shift within the regime. Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid publicly advocated for a negotiated resolution and criticized hardline Iranian officials for risking renewed conflict.[13] Abdol Hamid is the most prominent Sunni cleric in Iran and the Friday prayer leader in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, and he openly challenged the regime during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[14] Abdol Hamid stated on April 21 that a “fair agreement” is the only viable solution and warned that hardliners obstructing such an outcome will bear responsibility for the “homeland's devastation.”[15] Abdol Hamid previously called for “strong diplomacy with full authority” during his sermon on April 17 and emphasized that Iranian diplomacy should not be constrained by hardliners.[16] These remarks support the broader line that some Iranian political and clerical figures favor diplomacy and may be pushing back, at least indirectly, against the IRGC-centered camp that has constrained negotiations. Abdol Hamid remains an influential clerical figure, but his position is unlikely to meaningfully affect Iran's foreign policy decision-making. Prominent Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani separately cautioned against actions that undermine negotiators and explicitly praised the role of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[17] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Reza Bahonar emphasized confidence in Iranian negotiators and in Ghalibaf, stating that Ghalibaf is defending Iran's achievements with commitment and calling on political factions and the public to support negotiators.[18] ISW-CTP has observed that Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious internal dispute with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi (see above).[19]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on April 21 that US forces have directed 28 Iranian-linked vessels to turn around or return to port since the start of the blockade on April 13.[25] Commercially available data shows that three vessels turned around near Chabahar Port, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in the past two days.[26] Two of the three vessels, the Iranian-flagged and US-sanctioned Artman and Shamim, turned back towards Chabahar after approaching the US blockade line.[27] The third vessel, the Comoros-flagged Calista, left from Chabahar towards Karachi, Pakistan, but turned around and returned to Chabahar.[28]
Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel for the first time since the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire took effect on April 16.[39] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in the vicinity of Rab el Thalathine in southeastern Lebanon's Marjaayoun District, near the Israel-Lebanon border.[40] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets and drones targeting an IDF artillery position in Kfar Giladi, in northern Israel.[41] The attacks caused no reported casualties.[42] Hezbollah accused Israel of over 200 ceasefire “violations” in southern Lebanon since the ceasefire took effect on April 16 in its explanation of the attack.[43] The IDF called Hezbollah's rocket and drone attacks “blatant violations” of the ceasefire.[44] The IDF struck the Hezbollah rocket launcher responsible for the attack on Israeli forces in Rab el Thalathine.[45]
Iran allowed some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct attacks without the Iranian regime's approval during the war, according to three Iraqi militia members and two other unspecified officials speaking to Western media on April 21.[66] An Iraqi militia member stated that “various forces” now have the authority to conduct operations based on their own “field assessments without referring back to a central command.”[67] The sources added that “hardline factions” are operating under a decentralized command structure with Iranian advisers.[68] These ”hardline” factions could refer to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, both of which are relatively more subordinate to Iran than other militias.[69]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted up to half of the roughly 1,000 drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia during the war, according to unnamed sources speaking to the Wall Street Journalon April 21.[70] Some of these sources added that Iraqi militias launched drones targeting Bahrain after US President Donald Trump announced the US-Iran ceasefire on April 8.[71] ISW-CTP assessed on April 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states.[72] ISW-CTP also assessed that it is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.[73] Bahrain's Foreign Ministry summoned the Iraqi charge d’affaires on April 13 in response to “continued” Iraqi militia drone attacks targeting Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council states.[74] Saudi Arabia similarly summoned the Iraqi ambassador to Saudi Arabia on April 12 for the same reason.[75]
A Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba political council member reportedly confirmed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have sent personnel and financial support to Iran during the war.[76] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba political council member Firas al Yasser said Iranian-backed Iraqi militias sent “support convoys” and financial aid to Iran from Iraq, according to anti-Iranian regime media on April 21.[77]Yasser said the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia support was a sign of Iraq's solidarity with Iran.[78] An Iraqi official speaking to anti- Iranian regime media claimed on March 30 that Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to Basij bases in Khorramshahr and Abadan in Khuzestan Province.[79] The same outlet previously reported that PMF fighters had entered Iran via the Shalamcheh crossing.[80] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that tend to report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[81]Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is affiliated with the 12th PMF Brigade, for example.[82] ISW-CTP previously assessed that the regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[83]
Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraq militias and the Houthis, have signaled their preparedness to resume operations against the United States, Israel, and other regional countries if the war resumes between Iran and the United States. Likely Iranian-backed militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam warned on April 20 that the group is “fully prepared” to resume attacks against US interests in Iraq and the region.[84] The militia said that it is ready for a “long war” and threatened to conduct attacks with “more advanced weapons.”[85]It also urged the supporters of the “resistance” to support Iran and Lebanon.[86]This warning comes after Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah appeared to confirm on April 18 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad, Iraq, on April 18.[87] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have launched drone and rocket attacks targeting US and foreign interests in Iraq, as well as the Gulf countries, during the war.[88] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi warned on April 21 that the Houthis will not remain neutral and would ”escalate” if the United States and Israel escalate against Iran.[89]Abdulmalik warned that the current fragile truce is coming to an end and the possibility of escalation is “high.”[90]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-21-2026/