The United States extended its ceasefire with Iran “until such time as [the Iranian] proposal is submitted and discussions are concluded.”[1] US President DonaldTrump stated on April 21 that Pakistani mediators urged the United States not to resume attacks while Iranian leaders work to produce a “unified proposal.”[2] The reference to a ”unified” proposal appears to imply that previous proposals were not unified in some way, which is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that one challenge with the ongoing negotiations is the divided nature of Iran's negotiating team. The ceasefire extension comes after a second round of US–Iran negotiations scheduled for April 21 in Islamabad, Pakistan, was cancelled because Iran did not confirm its participation and did not respond to US positions.[3] Trump confirmed that Washington will maintain its blockade of Iranian ports.[4]
Conflicting reports on April 20 and 21 about Iran's participation in the scheduled negotiations and Iran's failure to produce a unified proposal reflect the ongoing intra-regime power struggle between Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. The Wall Street Journal, citing unspecified sources, reported on April 21 that Iranian officials initially signaled that they would attend the talks but later introduced a precondition following pressure from the IRGC that the United States lift its blockade before negotiations begin.[5] That the regime then adopted this precondition as official regime policy suggests that senior-most IRGC commander Vahidi and aligned actors currently wield significant influence on Iranian decision-making. This dynamic is consistent with reporting that Vahidi is the only senior official who maintains direct access to Mojtaba Khamenei and relays key decisions, which gives him significant power.[6] Ghalibaf has publicly supported negotiations and has not explicitly called for preconditions.[7] The Trump administration seems to have been willing to negotiate in talks without preconditions.
The reported precondition that the United States lift its blockade before talks would only lift the blockade before and during the talks. The United States could then reimpose the blockade at any later time. This precondition is thus not a major concession because the blockade would be extremely time limited. The limited nature of the precondition suggests that Vahidi and those around him may have sought to derail negotiations rather than secure meaningful economic relief.
Iranian officials and IRGC-affiliated media are signaling readiness for the imminent resumption of war. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on April 21 that Iran has prepared for a new phase of fighting.[8] Tasnim added that Iran has assessed the likelihood of renewed conflict as high over the past two weeks and has conducted certain military redeployments and prepared new target lists accordingly.[9] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately assessed on April 21 that the likelihood of renewed US and Israeli attacks is high and emphasized the need for preparation.[10] An unspecified senior Israeli security official told Israel's state broadcaster on April 21 that Israel is preparing for the resumption of fighting with Iran as well.[11] The official assessed that the United States and Iran will fail to reach any understanding and noted that Israel is ready to immediately resume the war.[12]
Some senior Iranian clerical and political figures have expressed support for negotiations and for the negotiating team, but this support remains limited and does not yet reflect a unified shift within the regime. Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid publicly advocated for a negotiated resolution and criticized hardline Iranian officials for risking renewed conflict.[13] Abdol Hamid is the most prominent Sunni cleric in Iran and the Friday prayer leader in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, and he openly challenged the regime during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests.[14] Abdol Hamid stated on April 21 that a “fair agreement” is the only viable solution and warned that hardliners obstructing such an outcome will bear responsibility for the “homeland's devastation.”[15] Abdol Hamid previously called for “strong diplomacy with full authority” during his sermon on April 17 and emphasized that Iranian diplomacy should not be constrained by hardliners.[16] These remarks support the broader line that some Iranian political and clerical figures favor diplomacy and may be pushing back, at least indirectly, against the IRGC-centered camp that has constrained negotiations. Abdol Hamid remains an influential clerical figure, but his position is unlikely to meaningfully affect Iran's foreign policy decision-making. Prominent Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani separately cautioned against actions that undermine negotiators and explicitly praised the role of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[17] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Reza Bahonar emphasized confidence in Iranian negotiators and in Ghalibaf, stating that Ghalibaf is defending Iran's achievements with commitment and calling on political factions and the public to support negotiators.[18] ISW-CTP has observed that Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious internal dispute with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi (see above).[19]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on April 21 that US forces have directed 28 Iranian-linked vessels to turn around or return to port since the start of the blockade on April 13.[25] Commercially available data shows that three vessels turned around near Chabahar Port, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in the past two days.[26] Two of the three vessels, the Iranian-flagged and US-sanctioned Artman and Shamim, turned back towards Chabahar after approaching the US blockade line.[27] The third vessel, the Comoros-flagged Calista, left from Chabahar towards Karachi, Pakistan, but turned around and returned to Chabahar.[28]
Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel for the first time since the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire took effect on April 16.[39] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in the vicinity of Rab el Thalathine in southeastern Lebanon's Marjaayoun District, near the Israel-Lebanon border.[40] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets and drones targeting an IDF artillery position in Kfar Giladi, in northern Israel.[41] The attacks caused no reported casualties.[42] Hezbollah accused Israel of over 200 ceasefire “violations” in southern Lebanon since the ceasefire took effect on April 16 in its explanation of the attack.[43] The IDF called Hezbollah's rocket and drone attacks “blatant violations” of the ceasefire.[44] The IDF struck the Hezbollah rocket launcher responsible for the attack on Israeli forces in Rab el Thalathine.[45]
Iran allowed some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to conduct attacks without the Iranian regime's approval during the war, according to three Iraqi militia members and two other unspecified officials speaking to Western media on April 21.[66] An Iraqi militia member stated that “various forces” now have the authority to conduct operations based on their own “field assessments without referring back to a central command.”[67] The sources added that “hardline factions” are operating under a decentralized command structure with Iranian advisers.[68] These ”hardline” factions could refer to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, both of which are relatively more subordinate to Iran than other militias.[69]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted up to half of the roughly 1,000 drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia during the war, according to unnamed sources speaking to the Wall Street Journalon April 21.[70] Some of these sources added that Iraqi militias launched drones targeting Bahrain after US President Donald Trump announced the US-Iran ceasefire on April 8.[71] ISW-CTP assessed on April 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states.[72] ISW-CTP also assessed that it is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.[73] Bahrain's Foreign Ministry summoned the Iraqi charge d’affaires on April 13 in response to “continued” Iraqi militia drone attacks targeting Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council states.[74] Saudi Arabia similarly summoned the Iraqi ambassador to Saudi Arabia on April 12 for the same reason.[75]
A Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba political council member reportedly confirmed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have sent personnel and financial support to Iran during the war.[76] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba political council member Firas al Yasser said Iranian-backed Iraqi militias sent “support convoys” and financial aid to Iran from Iraq, according to anti-Iranian regime media on April 21.[77]Yasser said the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia support was a sign of Iraq's solidarity with Iran.[78] An Iraqi official speaking to anti- Iranian regime media claimed on March 30 that Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to Basij bases in Khorramshahr and Abadan in Khuzestan Province.[79] The same outlet previously reported that PMF fighters had entered Iran via the Shalamcheh crossing.[80] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that tend to report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[81]Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is affiliated with the 12th PMF Brigade, for example.[82] ISW-CTP previously assessed that the regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[83]
Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraq militias and the Houthis, have signaled their preparedness to resume operations against the United States, Israel, and other regional countries if the war resumes between Iran and the United States. Likely Iranian-backed militia front group Saraya Awliya al Dam warned on April 20 that the group is “fully prepared” to resume attacks against US interests in Iraq and the region.[84] The militia said that it is ready for a “long war” and threatened to conduct attacks with “more advanced weapons.”[85]It also urged the supporters of the “resistance” to support Iran and Lebanon.[86]This warning comes after Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah appeared to confirm on April 18 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad, Iraq, on April 18.[87] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have launched drone and rocket attacks targeting US and foreign interests in Iraq, as well as the Gulf countries, during the war.[88] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi warned on April 21 that the Houthis will not remain neutral and would ”escalate” if the United States and Israel escalate against Iran.[89]Abdulmalik warned that the current fragile truce is coming to an end and the possibility of escalation is “high.”[90]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-21-2026/
If you’re looking for a polite take, this isn’t it.
I’ve said it repeatedly on the Conflicted podcast: Pakistan was never a neutral mediator between Washington and Tehran. Not for a second. What we’re watching now is not diplomacy, it’s pure manipulation dressed up as statecraft.
Let’s call things by their proper names. Under field marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan isn’t some balanced civilian democracy playing honest broker. It’s a military system with a democratic façade, pursuing its own interests with a level of cynicism that should surprise no one who has followed its behavior over the past two decades. What did they sell to Donald Trump? A fantasy. A pipe dream. That the Islamic Republic can be reasoned with. That it is pragmatic, not ideological. That it is capable of compromise if only you flatter it enough and give it incentives. In short: that you can extract “the deal of the century” from a regime whose entire strategic doctrine is built on resisting precisely that outcome. And Trump - obsessed with the optics of a deal - bought it.
Meanwhile, senior voices inside Pakistan weren’t even pretending neutrality. A defence minister pushing conspiratorial narratives, blaming the “Zionists,” portraying Iran as a victim, while 6,000 missiles and drones were raining down on GCC states that host millions of Pakistani workers. That alone should have been disqualifying. If a country is willing to throw its own economic lifeline (the Gulf) under the bus for ideological or tactical alignment with Tehran, what exactly makes anyone think it would safeguard American interests?
And here’s the uncomfortable part: this isn’t new. We’ve seen this movie before. The United States spent years, treasure, and blood in Afghanistan, only to discover that Osama bin Laden, and his network, were living comfortably in Pakistan all along - while Pakistan was simultaneously cashing in on US counterterrorism billions in funding. They didn’t fail to find the target. They bloody managed it. Why end the hunt when the hunt itself pays and pays pretty well?
Fast forward to today, and the pattern repeats, only this time the battlefield is Iran. At the very moment the regime was under maximum pressure (militarily strained, economically cornered, strategically exposed) Pakistan steps in, not to mediate, but to buy Tehran time. Time to regroup, breathe, and ultimately survive. That’s not mediation. That’s intervention - on one side. From a cold, historical lens, this may well be remembered as the pivot point. The moment when pressure was lifted prematurely. When momentum was lost. When a winnable strategic position was traded for the illusion of a negotiated breakthrough that was never going to materialise, ever!
Five years from now, looking back, this could read like a familiar chapter:
First Afghanistan - undermined from within.
Now Iran - diluted from without.
In both cases, Pakistan didn’t just mislead Washington. It shaped the battlefield to its advantage, all while claiming partnership with a clueless US administration. And Washington, once again, chose to believe what it wanted to hear.
https://x.com/AimenDean/status/2046837574447267847
Unfortunately, IRGC has a lot more weapons than Parliament. I suspect that our President will have to bomb out a few hundred thousand more IRGC and Basij before saner and less ideological heads can prevail. Our Congress critters also need more information on just how brutal and evil the treatment of the protesters has been by these fanatics.
President Trump expressed considerable concern about how they had posted snipers to shoot protesters, and how when 5 or more women would end up with a bullet in their head, protesters have understandably been reluctant to stick around protesting. I don’t know if he has ever mentioned the many thousands of protesters who were deliberately blinded by small shot directly aimed at their faces. We also have not heard much about how these creeps would go to hospitals and grab or kill people who had been wounded while demonstrating.
So whether it is 32,000 or 90,000 killed for demonstrating this year, that is too damned many for American tastes. And all this because one woman, Kurdish I might add, objected to some strange man telling her she could not have a little bit of hair showing from under her required scarf.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked and likely redirected two vessels towards Iran on April 22, likely to enforce Iranian claims of sovereignty over the strait to disrupt global shipping and extract US concessions. The IRGC claimed that it “seized” two vessels and directed them to the Iranian coast on April 22.[1] The two vessels — the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Epaminondas and the Panamanian-flagged MSC Francesca — appear to have been exiting the Strait of Hormuz at the time of the attacks.[2] An IRGC “gunboat” inflicted “heavy damage” to the Epaminondas’s bridge, and an unspecified attack damaged the MSC Francesca's hull and accommodation.[3] Both vessels changed direction, sailed into Iranian territorial waters, and idled about seven nautical miles off the coast of Iran. Commercially available maritime tracking data showed that the Epaminondas continued to transit north in Iranian territorial waters. It is unclear why the vessels would have changed course and sailed further inland towards the Iranian coast if not under Iranian escort. The IRGC also fired on a third vessel, the Panamanian-flagged, Emirati-operated Euphoria, but the vessel continued its transit after the incident.[4] The IRGC has demanded that the United States lift its blockade over the Strait of Hormuz and effectively halted traffic through the strait on April 18 by attacking several vessels.[5] The IRGC likely aims to raise international shipping prices to extract concessions from the United States, such as ending the US blockade or yielding other demands. The IRGC also may have redirected the two vessels in response to the recent US Navy seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska in the Gulf of Oman on April 19.[6] The Iranian regime had pledged to respond to the incident.[7]
The IRGC has also used its “control” over the strait as a means for IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi to flex his own power over internal rivals, such as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Vahidi and his inner circle recently used the IRGC’s leverage over the strait to exercise influence over Iran's negotiating position.[8] The United States extended the ceasefire yesterday to allow for Iranian leaders to produce a “unified proposal,” but Iranian leaders remain fragmented over Iran's negotiating strategy, as noted below.[9]
The IRGC’s attacks on shipping and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi’s apparent willingness to scrap US-Iran talks indicate that Vahidi is prepared to resume the war if needed. Vahidi currently holds the most influential position in the regime at this time, apart from the Supreme Leader, who is reportedly seriously injured or incapacitated.[10] The IRGC’s recent attacks on commercial vessels suggest that Vahidi is willing to risk incurring a potential US military response to assert Iranian ”control” over the strait and achieve the subsequent intended effects, as described above. Vahidi also may seek to derail the negotiations and may be attempting to do so by introducing preconditions and interfering with efforts to produce a “unified proposal.”[11] These actions suggest that Vahidi and his inner circle have accepted and are prepared for the risks that such actions would lead to the resumption of the war with the United States.
Iranian decision-making remains fragmented and in disarray, which explains Iran's inability to formulate and communicate a coherent negotiating position. ISW-CTP previously assessed on April 15 that the United States is negotiating with a divided committee of hardliners and pragmatists that lacks a cohesive and unified position.[12] This intra-regime division has continued in recent days as senior Iranian officials have publicly diverged over negotiations.[13] Some reporting indicates that key actors, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, lack the authority to represent the regime's position.[14] Iranian officials have not reached a unified decision on whether to return to negotiations in recent days, and competing regime power centers appear to be blocking consensus on core issues.[15] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei told the BBC on April 21 that Iran has made “no decision” on whether to send a delegation to Islamabad and said officials continue to discuss conditions for returning to negotiations.[16] CNN reported on April 22 that US officials believe that intra-regime factions prevented a response to the US ”list of broad points.”[17] An unspecified US official told Axios on April 22 that there has been “an absolute fracture” between the negotiating team and the military and assessed that neither side has access to the supreme leader.[18] Axios added that IRGC leadership rejected much of what Iranian negotiators discussed with the United States after the first round of talks, which indicates that the negotiating team lacked the authority to represent the regime's position.[19]
The regime's formal decision-making and coordinating mechanisms are also not functioning effectively, instead reinforcing fragmentation. An unspecified US official told Axios on April 22 that Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr is not effectively coordinating between the IRGC, civilian leadership, and the supreme leader, which suggests that overlapping authorities and factional disputes are delaying Iranian decision-making and preventing the regime from presenting a unified negotiating position.[20] Vahidi reportedly pressured President Masoud Pezeshkian to appoint Zolghadr, which may have increased Zolghadr’s challenges in fulfilling his duties as a key coordinator between Vahidi and other leaders.[21] The SNSC is formally responsible for aligning national security and foreign policy decision-making across the Iranian system and for generating consensus among key regime stakeholders, including civilian leadership and military commanders.[22] The apparent inability of the SNSC to produce a unified negotiating position or coordinate between competing actors suggests that the regime's primary decision-making mechanism is not functioning effectively.
US officials are increasing pressure on Iran to produce a unified response, however. Unspecified US officials told Axios on April 22 that US President Donald Trump is giving Iran a limited window of several days to present a coherent counteroffer before reconsidering military action.[23] Pakistani officials and intermediaries have simultaneously worked to keep talks “alive” and tried to secure a response from Iran, according to the Associated Press.[24] Iranian officials have continued to frame US actions, particularly the naval blockade, as the primary obstacle to negotiations, however.[25] Senior Iranian figures, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, have emphasized that “breach of commitments,” blockade measures, and threats prevent “genuine negotiations.”[26] An adviser to Ghalibaf stated on April 22 that the ceasefire extension ”has no meaning” and called for a military response to the US blockade.[27]
US officials have recently leaked quantitative estimates of the number of different Iranian assets remaining after the ceasefire. It is extremely difficult to deduce the degree of degradation to Iranian forces based on these estimates because the number of remaining systems is only one of many data points required to form a complete evaluation of military strength. Recent US intelligence assessments indicate that roughly 50 percent of Iran's ballistic missile stockpile and its launch systems remain “intact,” about 60 percent of the IRGC Navy still exists, and two-thirds of Iran's air force remains operational.[28] Some of these numbers are vague and incomplete. It is unclear, for example, what assets are included in the determination that 60 percent of the IRGC Navy is “still in existence.” Other issues exist with these numbers because military strength and the capabilities of a military organization rest on more than sheer numbers. The leaks assert that “two-thirds” of Iran's Air Force remains operational, but it is unclear what that two-thirds includes and the quality of operational aircraft. There are significant qualitative differences between Iran's F-4s and F-5s (both first flew in the late 1950s, and the United States flew in Vietnam) and the American and Israeli F-35. The size of the remaining missile stockpile is relevant, but a missile force is more than its stockpile; a more complete assessment would include assessments of the status of the personnel, command and control networks, production networks, logistics assets, and more. US air campaigns seek to achieve qualitative effects, some of which are invisible in the open-source information space, and others are difficult to observe because the effects take considerable time to become apparent.[29] Assessments that rely only on quantitative measures can overlook these critical effects and therefore fail to sufficiently evaluate the campaign.
Hezbollah has continued to conduct attacks for the second consecutive day despite the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire.[37] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted two attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon on April 22.[38] Hezbollah previously conducted two attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel on April 21, for the first time since the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire took effect on April 16.[39] Hezbollah claimed an attack with two first-person view (FPV) drones targeting IDF personnel and a command vehicle in Qantara, Marjaayoun District.[40] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted one Hezbollah drone over Bayyada, Tyre District, and the attacks caused no reported casualties.[41]
The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun instructed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and other Lebanese security forces to intensify raids on weapons caches in Beirut and other areas of Lebanon during a security meeting on April 22.[55] Aoun said that Lebanese security services should show “no leniency” to “any party” since “no one” is allowed to obstruct the Lebanese government's implementation of security measures and the Lebanese state's monopoly over weapons.[56] Aoun emphasized that maintaining civil peace in Lebanon is a “red line.”[57] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam ordered the LAF on April 9 to immediately enforce the Lebanese state's monopoly over weapons in Beirut.[58] Lebanese media reported on April 10 that the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed units, including soldiers from its Commando Regiment, to secure the Government Palace and begin patrols in Beirut.[59]
US and Iraqi officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 22 that the US Treasury Department has temporarily halted shipments of Iraq's oil export revenue via the US Federal Reserve due to concerns about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia behavior.[66] The officials said that the United States first blocked a shipment of dollars to the Central Bank of Iraq when the war began in late February 2026, and recently blocked a cargo plane delivery of nearly $500 million in US banknotes.[67] The Central Bank of Iraq has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve on behalf of the Iraqi Finance Ministry since 2003 that holds the Iraqi federal government's revenue from oil exports in US dollars.[68] Oil revenue accounts for about 90 percent of the Iraqi state's budget.[69] US officials confirmed the temporary hold on Iraq's dollar shipments to the Wall Street Journal.[70] The United States has previously threatened such action, such as when the United States reportedly warned Iraqi officials in early February 2026 that the United States would reduce Iraq's access to oil export revenues if State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki becomes prime minister again.[71]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-22-2026/