Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran's military response in this conflict but also Iran's negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic.[1] Traffic through the strait has virtually halted as of this writing except for Iranian vessels, according to maritime tracking data. No Iranian vessels have approached the US blockade line, however. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands.[2] The IRGC is responsible for coordinating and conducting military actions, but has historically not directly interfered in Iranian diplomacy and negotiations to the extent it currently is.
Regime institutions aligned with Vahidi are presenting a cohesive front against Araghchi and in support of the IRGC’s actions to halt traffic in the strait. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is functionally controlled by the IRGC, cited the US naval blockade on Iranian ports as the reason for the IRGC’s reimposition of “control” over the strait.[3] Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving the regime's military decision-making, according to anti-regime media on April 7.[4] A source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) previously warned IRGC-affiliated Fars News on April 17 that Iran would “close” the strait if the United States continued its blockade.[5] The SNSC released a statement on April 18 that Iran will “exercise supervision and control” over traffic in the strait until the war ends.[6] The SNSC would almost certainly not have released this statement without the approval of SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, which indicates that Zolghadr supports the IRGC’s actions in the strait. Zolghadr, who is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran's security and judicial apparatuses, was appointed to his position during the war after Vahidi reportedly pressured Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to appoint him.[7]
Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. Vahidi attempted to insert Zolghadr into the Iranian negotiating team in Islamabad despite protests from delegation leaders Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Araghchi over Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations.[8] Vahidi presumably wanted to send Zolghadr to keep an eye on the negotiations and to inform leaders in Tehran if the negotiating delegation strayed from his or Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s directives.[9] Zolghadr sent a complaint to senior IRGC leaders, almost certainly including Vahidi, that Araghchi had surpassed his mandate during the negotiations by expressing flexibility regarding Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance.[10] Zolghadr’s anger caused senior leaders in Tehran, including former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief and long-time member of Mojtaba’s inner circle, Hossein Taeb, to call the negotiating delegation back to Tehran.[11]
The IRGC continued to play an outsized role in Iran's negotiations after the Islamabad talks. Pakistani Army Chief Field Marshall Asim Munir recently met with Ghalibaf and Aliabadi in Tehran on April 16 as part of his mediation efforts.[12] Aliabadi is not a member of the Iranian negotiating team, and it is highly unusual for the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander to be involved in diplomatic discussions about negotiations. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is formally responsible for joint and wartime operations.
The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran's negotiating positions. CTP-ISW recently assessed that the United States is negotiating with a divided committee of hardliners and pragmatists that lacks a cohesive, unified position.[13] The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated. Araghchi and Ghalibaf’s negotiating team reportedly did not have full authority to finalize a deal with the United States in Islamabad, for example.[14]
This current dynamic likely reflects Vahidi’s position, relationships, and control over IRGC military elements, which has enabled him to wield significant authority over decision-making compared to other senior regime leaders such as Ghalibaf. Vahidi holds the most influential position in the regime at this time, apart from the Supreme Leader, who is reportedly seriously injured or incapacitated.[15] Vahidi is a long-time and experienced IRGC commander, having served as Iran's first IRGC Quds Force commander between 1988 and 1997 and currently serving as the senior-most IRGC commander.[16] Vahidi was one of the senior IRGC commanders who pushed the Assembly of Experts to select Mojtaba as Supreme Leader in March.[17] Vahidi and his affiliates have reportedly fought with more pragmatic regime officials such as Ghalibaf over Iran's national security and foreign policy decisions throughout the conflict.[18] Ghalibaf, in contrast, is a former IRGC commander who transitioned into politics in the early 2000s and lacks the influence and control over military elements that Vahidi has.[19] Vahidi and his inner circle appear to have marginalized Ghalibaf, although he is publicly reiterating IRGC rhetoric.[20] Ghalibaf likely lacks the leverage or formal executive authority to shape decision-making.
The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels and halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on April 18, likely in order to both gain leverage over the United States and consolidate the IRGC’s control over Iran's negotiations policy as part of an internally-motivated maneuver.[21] The IRGC appears to have intervened and reasserted Iranian “control” over the Strait of Hormuz after Araghchi announced on April 17 that the strait was open to commercial shipping.[22] At least nine vessels exited the strait through Omani territorial waters and outside of Iran's imposed traffic separation scheme on April 17 and early on April 18 following Araghchi’s announcement.[23] The IRGC, however, harshly criticized Araghchi’s statement and outlined specific conditions for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait.[24] The IRGC Navy later announced that “no vessel of any kind” should approach the strait, or it will be targeted.[25] The IRGC likely aims to secure leverage over the United States by halting traffic and driving up shipping and oil prices to impose economic pressure on the United States. The IRGC’s actions are also likely intended to be an internal demonstration of power designed to exhibit the IRGC’s control within the regime, and in particular, its control over Iran's negotiations policy.
The IRGC Navy likely used fast attack craft to attack and intimidate at least four vessels in order to deter vessels from transiting the strait on April 18.[26] All of the attacked vessels appear to have been transiting along the Iran-imposed traffic separation route that forces ships through Iranian territorial waters at the time of the attacks.[27] IRGC Navy “gunboats” fired on a likely Indian-flagged tanker east of Larak Island, and “unknown projectiles” struck a likely Iranian-flagged container ship in the same area.[28] Reuters also reported that two vessels reported being struck by gunfire between Qeshm and Larak islands.[29] All four vessels turned around.[30] The IRGC also broadcasted radio messages to vessels in the strait, warning them that the strait is “closed.”[31] Numerous vessels traveling toward the strait turned around after the Iranian attacks, according to maritime tracking data.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-18-2026/
Assuming the economic situation is real, what is the Iranian leadership most likely to do?
A. Capitulate - before the economic consequences become severe, and show flexibility, potentially agreeing to U.S. demands on the nuclear program, missiles, and regional proxies.
B. Raise the global cost dramatically, through escalatory, potentially military steps, including a willingness to confront the United States in order to break the pressure.
Iran’s current leadership has just endured what it perceives as an intense, multi-front confrontation involving Israel and the United States. From its perspective, absorbing that level of pressure only to surrender to economic coercion would undermine regime legitimacy at home and deterrence abroad. That makes full capitulation highly unlikely. Indeed, a direct military confrontation with the United States would pose a great risk, but with a choice between escalation or capitulation - We know how this extreme regime will behave.
There is no silver bullet to the Iran problem. Economic pressure alone is not a decisive solution, and it is unclear how long such pressure can be sustained effectively. More importantly, the current Iranian leadership is highly unlikely to capitulate under these conditions. From Tehran’s perspective, yielding to coercion, especially after enduring significant military and strategic pressure, would carry unacceptable domestic and regional costs. In that sense, an intensified economic siege may not produce compliance. Instead, it risks accelerating a return to confrontation.
Bottom line - Economic pressure can shape Iran’s behavior at the margins, but on its own, it is more likely to harden positions and hasten escalation than to produce a fundamental policy reversal.
https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2045709986014093418
Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait's role as a critical energy chokepoint. Iran has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, but Iran has no legal claim to the strait, which international law defines as an international waterway.[1] Iran has repeatedly attempted to regulate traffic through the strait by directing vessels through Iranian territorial waters, extracting fees, and attacking and threatening maritime traffic.[2] Recent Iranian proposals to the United States have also implicitly demanded that the United States and international community recognize Iran's “control” over the strait.[3] Iran has offered to “let” vessels transit the strait in these proposals, but Iran's “letting” traffic through the strait implies that Iran can “let” traffic through an international waterway.[4] These proposals are consistent with persistent Iranian messaging throughout the war that Iran seeks to impose a new status quo for transit through the strait.[5] Any US acceptance of Iran's ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.
Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. A senior Iranian official told CNN on April 18 that vessels that pay “security fees” and comply with the IRGC’s protocols will receive priority transit through the Strait of Hormuz, while those that refuse to pay will face delayed passage.[6] Iran has reportedly charged vessels around $2 million USD to transit the strait.[7] Extracting fees from commercial vessels enables Iran to earn income amid the United States’ efforts to impose economic pressure on Iran through its blockade of Iranian ports.
The IRGC has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait. Bloomberg reported on April 18 that at least five liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers reversed course after Iran warned the vessels’ captains that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz.[8] No LNG tankers have exited the Strait of Hormuz since the war began in February.[9] Iranian media separately reported on April 19 that the IRGC forced the Botswana-flagged Meda and the Angola-flagged G Summer to change course after the vessels attempted to cross the Strait of Hormuz.[10] Commercially available shipping data indicates that the G Summer later transited the Strait of Hormuz via the Iranian-approved route on April 19.[11]
US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. US President Donald Trump announced on April 19 that the US Navy's USS Spruance, a guided missile destroyer, intercepted the Touska in the Gulf of Oman, disabled the vessel's engines, and commandeered the ship after the Iranian crew refused to return to port.[12] US forces seized the Touska after it attempted to pass the US blockade line. The United States previously sanctioned the Touska, which is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.[13]
Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19. The vessels include the US-sanctioned Guinea-flagged Raine tanker, the Iranian-flagged Shamim container ship, and the Hong Kong-flagged Flora tanker, which was previously Iranian-flagged.[14]
At least four Iranian or Iranian-linked ships appear to be attempting to pass the US Navy's blockade line. US officials have stated that the United States will interdict vessels beyond the blockade line. The vessels include the Iranian-flagged Artman container ship, the Liberian-flagged Basel, the Marshall Islands-flagged CECI, and the Vietnam-flagged NV Aquamarine.[15] Both the Basel and CECI originated from Iranian ports, while the NV Aquamarine is under US sanctions and is blacklisted by United Against Nuclear Iran.[16] US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on March 16 that US forces will interdict any ship that crosses the blockade line, which runs diagonally across the Gulf of Oman from Ras al Hadd, Oman, to the Iran-Pakistan border.[17]
The US Navy is reportedly conducting naval mine-clearing operations in the Strait of Hormuz to restore the official transit route through the strait amid the Navy's continued blockade of Iranian ports. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 19 that the US Navy is using uncrewed surface vessels (USV) and submersible drones to clear an unspecified number of Iranian naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz.[18] Clearing Iranian naval mines from the Strait of Hormuz is necessary to restore trust in the safety of the official traffic separation scheme, where Iran has reportedly laid the mines.[19] Military analysts told the Wall Street Journal that US Navy USVs and submersible drones could identify naval mines in the strait relatively quickly and that the US Navy could then deploy a second wave of drones to conduct explosive ordnance disposal operations.[20] Iran deployed a limited number of naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026, but a former US Navy official told the Wall Street Journal that Iran laid fewer mines than expected due to US military pressure that constrained Iran's use of large mine-laying ships.[21]
US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21.[22] ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran's participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however. Unspecified Iranian sources, including an unidentified member of Iran's negotiating team, told Iranian state media on April 19 that Iran does not currently have any plans to participate in the next round of talks.[23] IRGC-affiliated media reported on April 19 that there are no clear prospects for future negotiations due to the United States’ demands and continued naval blockade of Iranian ports.[24] ISW-CTP assessed on April 18 that the IRGC has likely consolidated control over Iran's negotiations policy.[25] Iranian officials echoed similar sentiments to Pakistani officials on April 19.[26] The 14-day ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran is set to expire on April 22.[27]
A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict. Kataib Hezbollah Security Chief Abu Mujahid Aasaf issued a statement after Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad that called for increased coordination between the “resistance forces and other parties,” which implicitly refers to military cooperation.[28] The “other parties” may refer to other Axis of Resistance groups such as the Houthis or Hezbollah. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have launched drone and rocket attacks targeting US and foreign interests in Iraq, as well as the Gulf countries, during the war.[29] Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis may have attempted to coordinate some attacks during the war, but ISW-CTP has not observed any instances of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias coordinating their attacks with other Axis of Resistance groups.[30]
Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran's ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose. Multiple US officials told the New York Times on April 19 that Iran retains around 40 percent of its attack drones, around 60 percent of its missile launchers, and around 70 percent of its missile stockpile.[31] The officials stated that the 60 percent of missile launchers includes around 100 launchers that Iran has dug out from underground facilities since the ceasefire went into effect.[32] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran is exploiting the ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile forces on a tactical level, including by clearing debris from tunnel entrances to retrieve missile launchers from underground missile bases.[33] The recent assessments about Iran's remaining offensive capacities do not specify whether the launchers that Iran has dug out from underground facilities are intact or operational. Shockwaves from combined force strikes may have damaged launchers stored in underground facilities without directly hitting them. The recent assessments also do not specify what kinds of launchers Iran has retrieved. Iran possesses different kinds of launchers for ballistic missiles with different ranges. These gaps preclude the development of a quantitative assessment about the current status of Iran's missile program.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-19-2026/