Iran is leveraging its position over the Strait of Hormuz to extract concessions while maintaining its claim to control access to the waterway. Reuters reported on April 15 that Iran has proposed allowing ships to transit through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz without interference if the United States agrees to conditions that prevent renewed conflict and meet Iranian demands.[1] Iran has linked increased maritime access to broader negotiations, including demands to unfreeze Iranian funds, and a permanent end to US and Israeli strikes both in this war and for posterity. The implication of Iran's “concession” is that it could threaten ships to discourage them from transiting the Omani side of the Strait unless the United States grants Iran significant concessions. Agreeing to Iranian demands along these lines would show Iran that it can coerce the United States using the Strait of Hormuz both now and in the future.
The main sticking point in current US-Iran negotiations is reportedly Iran's enrichment of uranium and its highly enriched uranium stockpile. The United States has proposed a 20-year pause to enrichment, while the Iranians offered a 3- to 5-year pause, according to Iranian sources speaking to Reuters.[2] The United States wants Iran to remove all of the highly enriched uranium from Iran, whereas Iran has proposed down-blending it or only moving part of its highly enriched uranium to another country, but not all of it, according to Iranian sources speaking to Western media in recent days.[3] Iran could still enrich the remaining stockpile relatively quickly if it retained some highly enriched uranium, and it could use a 5-year pause to improve centrifuges and build or repair them. A Western diplomat told Reuters on April 16 that the nuclear issue “remains a core obstacle.”[4] An unspecified source also told Reuters that a Pakistani mediator had made a breakthrough on “sticky issues,” but the negotiating parties have not resolved issues over Iran's nuclear program.[5] An Iranian source told Reuters on April 16 that Iran is not ready to send all of its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad, but it could send “part of it” to a third-party country.[6] The source claimed that Iran needed to retain some of the stockpile because Iran needs the remaining stockpile for medical purposes at a research reactor in Tehran.[7] This research reactor runs on only a few tens of kilograms (kg) of 20 percent enriched uranium instead of 10,000kg of Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile, according to nuclear expert David Albright.[8] Only a small portion—roughly 400kg—of the 10,000kg Albright references is highly enriched uranium (60%). US objectives appear to remain at zero enrichment on Iranian soil, however. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated on April 15 that Israeli and US objectives in Iran are identical and include the removal of Iranian highly enriched uranium, the “dismantling” of Iran's nuclear enrichment capabilities, and “reinstating” a nuclear deal.[9]
Iran appears not to have compromised on its stance over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, despite Iranian sources attempting to illustrate that Iran has compromised and the two sides have made progress in negotiations, however. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) affiliated media on April 16 denied all recent Reuters reporting citing Iranian sources.[10] The same IRGC-affiliated outlet had cast doubt on progress in future US-Iran talks, due to Iran‘s distrust of the United States and US “excessive demands” earlier on April 16.[11] These conflicting reports on Iranian stances in these negotiations corroborate CTP-ISW’s continued observation that the Iranian negotiating council is not unified. This disunity will make it harder for Iran to make decisions and implement decisions throughout this negotiating process.[12]
The IRGC appears to be playing an outsized role in Iranian decision-making in these negotiations, traditionally meant for civilian leadership. Pakistani Army Chief Field Marshall Asim Munir met with Iran's negotiating delegation lead Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Iran's Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi on April 16 as part of his mediation mission in Tehran as part of the US-Iran negotiation process.[13] Munir might travel to Washington next.[14] Abdollahi Aliabadi is notably not on the Iranian negotiating team. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is responsible for joint and wartime operations and not typically diplomatic missions.[15] Munir’s meeting with Aliabadi follows recent anti-regime media reports that Abdollahi Aliabadi and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi organizing Iran‘s wartime military efforts.[16] Iranian and international media did not report whether Munir met with Vahidi at the time of this writing. Vahidi is part of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s inner circle, which pushed for the Assembly of Expert's election of Mojtaba as supreme leader in March.[17] Vahidi and his affiliates, including Supreme National Security Council Secretary Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, have also reportedly been in conflict with pragmatists in the regime, like Ghalibaf, over Iran's national security and foreign policy decisions.[18]
The United States Navy continues to enforce a blockade on Iranian ports. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth defined a blockade line that runs diagonally across the Gulf of Oman from Ras al Hadd, Oman, to the Iran-Pakistan border.[22] The blockade line appears to denote the threshold that the United States will begin to engage vessels coming from or going to Iran, but Caine and Hegseth noted that the US Navy will act beyond this area as well.[23] The US Navy will interdict Iranian-linked ships in the Pacific Ocean that crossed the line before the blockade began, for example. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that 14 vessels have complied with US directives to turn around.[24]
The United States is targeting materiel support to Iran's armed forces and military capabilities through the blockade. Caine stated on April 16 that the United States will pursue any vessel in Iranian territorial waters and international waters that attempts to provide materiel support to Iran.[25] The US Navy authorized, on April 16, “visit, board, search, and seizure” operations against vessels suspected of carrying contraband to or from Iran.[26] It defines contraband as goods destined for an enemy that could support armed conflict, including arms, ammunition, and dual-use materials such as iron, steel, and aluminum.[27] These materials support Iran's military production base. Recent US-Israeli strikes have severely degraded Iran's steel and petrochemical production capacity, which likely increases Iran's reliance on imports now targeted by the blockade.[28]
The blockade also continues to impose economic costs on Iran. CENTCOM announced on April 15 that the blockade has effectively halted maritime trade to and from Iran.[29] Iran halted petrochemical exports on April 13, at least in part due to the blockade that began the same day.[30] Steel—explicitly defined as contraband—and petrochemicals are among Iran's most important exports and support both economic and military activity.[31] Iran's severely limited ability to export such goods reduces Iran's access to foreign currency. The blockade, combined with growing US sanctions on Iran's illicit oil networks and the recent US decision not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports, will also constrain Iran's oil export capabilities.[32] A sanctions-focused US analyst estimated on April 13 that a successful blockade on Iranian ports and shipping would cost the regime around $435 million USD per day.[33]
Commercially available maritime data provides only limited information on vessel compliance with the US blockade. At least four vessels entered the Strait of Hormuz, and two vessels exited the strait since CTP-ISW’s data cutoff on April 15, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence.[34] This data does not confirm whether any of these vessels violated the blockade or received US authorization to transit. One of the entering vessels, cargo ship ZAYNAR2, departed Mumbai, India, on April 11 and entered the strait on April 15.[35] Commercially available maritime data does not indicate what the vessel was carrying. Reuters previously reported that US military guidance to mariners exempts humanitarian shipments to Iran. Open-source information also does not reveal whether the vessel communicated with US Navy forces.
The Iranian missile force is exploiting the current ceasefire to reconstitute its tactical and operational-level units, but rebuilding the industrial facilities and other components that sustain the missile force at the strategic level will be extremely challenging. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth acknowledged in a press briefing on April 16 that Iran has begun to dig up its missile launchers but noted that Iran has not determined how to “replenish” its missile stockpile.[36] Satellite imagery observed by CNN on April 14 showed that Iran attempted to remove debris in front of the entrances to the Southwest Tabriz Missile Base in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, and the Khomein Missile Base in Khomein, Markazi Province.[37] The combined force struck the entrances of multiple Iranian missile bases over the course of the conflict to disrupt Iran's ability to fire missiles.[38] Removing debris from these missile sites and restoring coordination between missile units and command and control within the force, for example, will enable the missile force to conduct more coordinated missile attacks, if it chooses to do so. These activities do not, however, alter the serious strategic damage the air campaign wrought to Iran's ballistic missile program. The campaign struck defense industry facilities related to the program, ranging from final missile component assembly to aluminum and steel mills required for the raw materials of the missiles.[39] Reconstituting these assets will take much longer, in relative terms, than it did after the June 2025 strikes because Israel struck far fewer industrial targets across far fewer segments of the ballistic missile production chain in June.
The regime's inability to profit from closing the Strait of Hormuz has exacerbated internal divisions within the regime. Anti-regime media reported on April 16, citing informed sources, that the regime formed a “Strait of Hormuz Traffic Licensing Committee” at the beginning of the war in order to generate funds from tankers that the regime allowed to pass through.[80] Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr headed the committee. The informed sources added that the committee charged about $2 million per tanker, but that the regime has not received any payments thus far due to “mismanagement.” This mismanagement has reportedly caused “serious dissatisfaction” among senior Iranian officials and the Supreme Leader's office. Some officials have proposed to reassign the responsibility of payment collection from Zolghadr to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-16-2026/
Liveblog link https://www.iranintl.com/en/liveblog/202604159162
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is the Iranian entity that has disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during the war, outlined specific conditions on April 17 for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait.[1] IRGC- and Armed Forces General Staff- affiliated media emphasized that the “temporary opening” of the strait is contingent upon vessels meeting certain conditions.[2] An informed source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) told IRGC-affiliated Fars News that Iran's conditions include:
Only commercial vessels can transit the strait, and military vessels are prohibited from doing so. Vessels and the cargo they carry cannot “be related to belligerent countries.”[3] Ships must pass through the Iranian-approved transit route, which forces vessels to transit the strait through Iranian territorial waters.[4] Vessels must coordinate their passage through the strait with Iranian forces, particularly the IRGC Navy.[5]
These conditions indicate that the IRGC seeks to retain operational control over transit through the strait, likely to continue to use the strait as a point of leverage to try to extract concessions from the United States. The source close to the SNSC added that Iran will “close” the strait again if the naval blockade continues.[6] Iranian forces have not conducted an attack on international shipping since April 7.[7] Ten non-Iranian-linked vessels transited along the Omani coast outside the Iranian-approved transit route on April 17, and CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of the IRGC attempting to disrupt these vessels’ movements.[8]
The IRGC harshly criticized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi after Araghchi announced on X that the strait is “completely open.”[9] Araghchi stated that, in line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz is “completely open” to “all commercial vessels” for the duration of the ceasefire.[10] Araghchi added that vessels must transit along Iran's “coordinated route,” in reference to the Iranian-approved transit route.[11] US President Donald Trump amplified Araghchi’s statement that the strait is open.[12] IRGC-affiliated media outlets, including Fars News and Mehr News, criticized Araghchi’s post and argued that his statement created confusion, which allowed Trump to shape the narrative about the Strait of Hormuz.[13] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei defended Araghchi’s statement and said that the decision to “open” the Strait of Hormuz was “not solely the decision of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.”[14] The IRGC’s criticism of Araghchi is reflective of broader divisions within the Iranian regime, which CTP-ISW has consistently reported on in recent weeks.[15] Anti-regime media previously reported that internal disagreements within the regime disrupted the Islamabad talks and prompted senior Iranian officials to order the Iranian negotiating delegation to return to Tehran.[16] These reports suggest that different factions within the Iranian regime have very different negotiating positions. The factional infighting in the regime has been exacerbated by the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who used to cohere the regime's various factions and act as an arbiter between the factions. The absence of a strong leader to keep IRGC factions in line means that these factions will likely continue to play a dominant role in shaping Iranian decision-making.
Commercially available maritime data shows that no Iranian-linked vessels approached the US blockade line on April 17, and US officials have stated that US forces will engage Iranian-linked vessels beyond this line.[17] US forces are enforcing a blockade on Iranian ports, not the strait itself.[18] CENTCOM announced on April 17 that 19 vessels have complied with US direction to turn around and that zero vessels have successfully breached the blockade.[19] Commercially available maritime data shows that some non-Iranian-linked vessels have moved toward the US blockade line to exit the strait.[20] These ships do not fall under the US blockade and are able to freely transit in and out of the strait. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 17 that at least five Iranian-linked tankers heading from the Gulf of Oman to Malaysia altered course after the US Navy warned that it could intercept ships transporting Iranian oil in international waters.[21]
There continue to be significant gaps between the US and Iranian negotiating positions, and the status of the negotiations remains unclear. The two sides disagree on several core issues, according to US, Iranian, and other officials and sources on April 16 and 17.[22] US President Donald Trump has continued to press for the complete removal of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran, while Iran appears unwilling to surrender all of its enriched uranium.[23] The parties also remain divided over Iran's ability to enrich uranium. Iran has proposed a five‑year pause in enrichment, while previous reports indicated that US negotiators discussed a 20‑year moratorium on uranium enrichment.[24] President Trump said on April 17 that any agreement must go beyond a fixed timeframe and ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon, however.[25] Trump also denied claims that the United States would unfreeze $20 billion USD worth of Iranian assets in exchange for Iran's HEU stockpile.[26] Iranian officials have argued that a ceasefire in Lebanon must be part of Iran's ceasefire with the United States, a demand that Trump rejected on April 17 by insisting that a US–Iran deal would “in no way [be] subject to Lebanon.”[27]
Some Iranian regime officials seek a preliminary agreement to extend the ceasefire to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement. A senior Iranian official told Reuters on April 17 that Iran is pursuing an interim agreement to “create space for more talks on lifting sanctions on Iran and securing compensation for war damages.”[28] The official added that Iran would provide “assurances” to the international community about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program in exchange.[29] CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile force, and Iran would almost certainly continue to do so if the United States and Iran agreed to a preliminary agreement and extended the ceasefire.[30]
The IDF killed around 1,000 Basij members and other unspecified internal security personnel during its campaign against Iran.[31] The IDF targeted internal security and political figures at every echelon, from senior leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani, and Basij Organization Commander Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani to low-ranking Basij members manning checkpoints.[32] CTP assessed on March 19 that Israeli strikes on internal security forces likely caused shock and confusion within the Iranian internal security apparatus to some degree.[33] This effect may have been temporary, however, given that shock will dissipate if strikes on internal security targets subside.
The IDF estimated that it damaged 23 percent of Iran's gas processing capacity.[38] The IDF struck some of Iran's most important energy infrastructure, including facilities at the South Pars Gas Field in Bushehr Province.[39] These facilities are central to Iran's domestic natural gas supply and broader energy system.[40]
The IDF destroyed Iran's two satellite launchers during the campaign.[41] The Iranian Space Agency oversees satellite launches with the IRGC Aerospace Force and Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).[42] The IDF struck the Iranian Space Research Center, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Space Agency, on March 14, likely to disrupt Iranian space and missile-related research that could support long-range strike capabilities.[43] The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has assessed that Iran's space launch vehicle program could enable the regime to develop a militarily viable intercontinental ballistic missile by 2035 if it chose to pursue the capability, which highlights US concerns about the overlap between Iran's space launch vehicle program and intercontinental ballistic missile development.[44] The combined force destroyed the satellite launch site at the Shahroud Space Complex in Semnan Province during the war.[45] The IDF also noted on March 29 that it struck a site in eastern Tehran that produces satellite launchers.[46]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-17-2026/