Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, November 11, 2025

Iranian Passive Defense Organization (PDO) head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali sought to shift blame for Iran's defensive failures during the Israel-Iran War onto government institutions in an interview on November 8. Jalali gave an interview to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ reflections on the Israel–Iran War.[24] Jalali noted that Iran is vulnerable to infiltration and that Iran's adversaries can track Iranian officials using traffic cameras and communication networks, among other means. Jalali claimed that government agencies have failed to address these security weaknesses despite years of PDO warnings.[25] Israel killed numerous senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war, highlighting the degree of Israeli infiltration in Iran. Jalali stated that Iran has prioritized rapid development over security considerations in recent years, which has exacerbated security vulnerabilities.[26] The PDO operates under the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and is responsible for developing and coordinating policies to defend Iranian civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[27] Jalali emphasized that the PDO is not responsible for the implementation of passive defense policies, however.[28]

Jalali also discussed Iran's preparations for a potential attack on its nuclear facilities before the war. Jalali stated that the PDO prepared a plan after Iran's missile strike on Israel in October 2024 to prepare for a potential attack on its nuclear sites and potential radioactive or chemical contamination.[29] Jalali stated that former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the plan, but that President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration resisted its implementation because it did not believe that war was imminent and did not want to “worry” the Iranian public.[30] Jalali stated that Iran preemptively emptied large ammonia and chlorine tanks in Esfahan Province to prevent chemical leaks and civilian harm if Iran's nuclear facilities were attacked.[31] Jalali added that the nuclear sector significantly reduced its activity and “relocated equipment” before the war. It is unclear what “equipment” Jalali was referring to.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-11-2025/

Iran Update, November 12, 2025

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors travelled to Iran on November 12 to inspect the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), according to a confidential IAEA report obtained by the Associated Press.[28] It is unclear the extent of access that the IAEA or Iran has to the facility, given that Israeli airstrikes severely damaged the facility during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, however.[29] The IAEA has not been able to verify the status of Iran’s weapons-grade uranium stockpile since the war. The IAEA report stated that Iran notified the IAEA of a new enrichment facility at the ENTC on June 12, and the IAEA immediately requested access to the facility. Iran agreed to the IAEA’s request, but the IAEA cancelled the visitation due to the onset of the war.[30] The IAEA does not currently know the precise location of the new facility or the status of its enriched uranium, which the report described as seriously concerning.[31] A previous IAEA report claimed that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium before the war, which is enough for Iran to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons if enriched to 90 percent.[32] The recent IAEA report, which was shared with all member states of the IAEA Board of Governors, precedes the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 19 to 21, during which members will discuss Iran’s nuclear program.[33]

Iran is developing regional trade routes with neighboring countries, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. Iran’s Railway Organization’s Deputy Commerce Director stated on November 8 that Iran intends to become a regional trade “hub” after the first Russian freight train arrived at Aprin Dry Cargo Terminal, which is located about 20 kilometers southwest of Tehran City, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.[34] Iran’s Railway Organization opened Aprin Dry Port in June 2025, and 30 trains from unspecified locations have stopped there so far, according to the organization’s Deputy Commerce Director.[35] The train previously transited a border checkpoint at Incheh Borun economic free zone in northeastern Iran on November 8.[36] More than 60 companies have reportedly invested in the 4,000-hectare Incheh Borun economic free zone between Iran and Turkmenistan to cut trade and transportation costs, according to Iran’s Golestan Province Governor in October 2025.[37]

Iran is developing trade routes with all its neighbors. Iran reportedly transported some of the cargo from the Russian freight train, which included paper pulp, onwards to Iraq.[38] Iran and Iraq have been cooperating to revive the Shalamcheh-Basra railway between southwestern Iran and Basra Port, Iraq, since 2023 after years of planning, but have made little progress.[39] Iran has also held several meetings with officials in neighboring countries since August 2025 to propose trade facilitation projects, including two railways with Turkmenistan near the Sarakhs Border Point in Razavi Khorsan Province, a port-sea consortium with Russia in the Caspian Sea, an economic free zone in Chabahar Port, southeastern Iran, with Pakistan, railways with Tajikistan, and the Rasht-Astara Railway project with Azerbaijan.[40] Most of these projects are part of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which Iran, Russia, and India established in 2002.[41] The corridor connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[42]

Iranian officials continue to inspect naval units in the Persian Gulf to secure Iran’s control over the Gulf, likely as part of Iran’s effort to prepare for any potential conflict with the United States or Israel. These inspections suggest that Iranian officials continue to believe renewed war with the United States or Israel is imminent. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi inspected Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval units deployed on the Nazeat Islands on November 11.[43] The Nazeat Islands, including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island, are key positions for Iran’s ability to control maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[44] Abdollahi stated that the IRGC Navy has recently increased its capabilities.[45] Abdollahi’s inspection comes amid other key Iranian military commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour, IRGC Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General (AFGS) Abdol Rahim Mousavi, and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, inspections of southern Iranian naval units in recent weeks.[46]

Former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of additional Iranian military forces to the Nazeat Islands near the Strait of Hormuz in May 2025. These deployments could have enabled Iran to harass shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in the event of war. Bagheri said that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states that host US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.”[47] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[48]

The United States sanctioned 32 individuals and entities on November 12 for operating multiple weapon procurement networks that support Iran’s ballistic missile and drone production.[49] The sanctioned individuals and entities are based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine. The sanctions targeted a multinational network of individuals and companies that coordinated Iran’s procurement of missile propellant ingredients, including sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid, from the PRC. Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[50] European intelligence sources told CNN on October 29 that Iran received several shipments from the PRC that contained a total of 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate.[51] Iran previously received about 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China in February and May 2025.[52] Iran‘s recent, larger shipment from the PRC comes amid Iran’s efforts to rebuild its missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran sees its ballistic missile program as its main deterrent against future attacks.[53]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2025/

Iran Update, November 14, 2025

Three small Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) vessels intercepted a Marshall Islands-flagged oil products tanker, Talara, and moved it into Iranian waters in the Strait of Hormuz on November 14.[1] The vessel is operated by Cyprus-based, German- and British-owned Columbia Ship Management. The vessel is owned by Pasha Finance, which allegedly has familial ties to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.[2] The vessel was headed to Singapore from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and was carrying a cargo of high-sulfur gas oil.[3] Iranian naval forces intercepted the vessel on early Friday morning and diverted it into Iranian territorial waters.[4] Columbia Ship Management stated that it lost contact with the vessel around 0822 local time near the coast of Khor Fakkan, United Arab Emirates. The IRGC issued a statement on X on November 14, quoting a Quranic verse: “So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you,” suggesting that Iran is retaliating for a previous incident.[5]

Iran has conducted several inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War due to concerns that the United States and its allies could seize Iranian vessels. Senior Iranian IRGC and Artesh commanders inspected naval facilities at least seven times between June and November 2025 — most recently on November 11 — to evaluate combat readiness.[6] Iranian officials have warned in October 2025 that Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports, Iran’s most profitable export.[7] Several senior Iranian officials have touted Iranian naval capabilities and their destructive and deterrent effect towards Iran‘s adversaries in recent statements.[8]

ISW-CTP is considering the following three hypotheses about Iran’s objectives in seizing the vessel:

Iran may be seeking retaliation for the potential attack on the LPG tanker MV Falcon, which caught on fire after an unspecified explosion near Aden, Yemen, on October 18.[9] The non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran reported that the Falcon was an Iranian shadow fleet vessel that transports illicit Iranian oil.[10] The IRGC quoted a Quranic verse on X on November 14 that implied that the IRGC was attempting to retaliate for an earlier incident. Iran may have viewed the Falcon incident as an intentional attack and is attempting to deter any actors responsible for it.

Iran may be showing its willingness to close off the Strait of Hormuz as a preemptive measure amid Iranian concerns about future US actions. Iranian officials have warned that Iran is willing to close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports and have inspected naval facilities along the coast to confirm force capabilities and readiness.[11]

Iran may be demonstrating its power to actors, such as Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia. Both countries have recently taken steps to increase cooperation with Iranian adversaries. Israel and Azerbaijan have held several meetings in 2025 to discuss bilateral cooperation and Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords.[12] Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly plans to discuss a defense agreement with the United States during his visit to Washington next week.[13] The Saudi-US defense agreement would be similar to the recently signed Qatar-US agreement that pledged the United States to treat any armed attack on Qatari soil as an attack on the United States. Iran may be showing its ability to disrupt movements across the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz if it perceives any future threats from its adversaries.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-14-2025/

Iran Update, November 17, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on November 15 that the IRGC Navy seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker because it was attempting to illegally export Iranian cargo. This claim likely seeks to obfuscate the real reason why the IRGC Navy seized the vessel and may be part of an Iranian effort to prevent any retaliation for the seizure. Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[19] IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel to “return [Iran’s] property.”[20] The outlet, citing an unspecified source, stated that an Iranian individual or company intended to illegally export the materials.[21] The IRGC Navy stated on November 15 that it seized the Talara to protect Iran’s “national interests and resources” and claimed that the vessel was carrying “unauthorized cargo.” CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the vessel was carrying Iranian cargo or that its owner or operator had any links to Iran. The IRGC suggested following the seizure on November 14 that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel in retaliation for a previous incident, not because the vessel was illicitly transporting Iranian cargo. The Fars News report suggests that Iran may be trying to avoid any retaliation for seizing the tanker by attributing the seizure to a domestic issue rather than foreign tensions. Iran depends on stability in the Strait of Hormuz to export oil, which is the main source of revenue for the regime. Any naval retaliation could impact the stability of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian oil exports.

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to emphasize the importance of Iran’s missile program for its national security, which suggests that Iran will continue to invest in the development of its missile program. IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini stated in an interview on November 16 that Iran’s missile program both deters and defeats Iranian adversaries.[37] Naeini’s statement echoes other Iranian officials’ comments about Iran’s missile program since the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[38] Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari argued on October 25 that Iran’s missile program is Iran’s main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter Israel and the United States’ superior capabilities.[39] Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani similarly stated on October 20 that Iran must improve its missile capabilities and adopt an approach to confront “hybrid warfare.”[40] Naeini also identified “hybrid warfare” as a strategy used by Israel and the United States in his interview on November 16.[41] The Iranian regime defines “hybrid warfare” as the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.[42]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-17-2025/

Iran Update, November 18, 2025

Some elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are reportedly pressuring Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accelerate the reconstruction of Iran's nuclear program and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[18] An unspecified senior “energy source” who works closely with Iran's Oil Ministry told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that the IRGC is pressuring Khamenei to expedite the reconstruction of nuclear facilities that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War.[19] The source added that some elements of the IRGC are pressuring Khamenei to withdraw from the NPT.[20] Iran must implement a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an NPT member.[21] Safeguards agreements are “designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.”[22] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Oil Price report. Unspecified IRGC officials previously urged Khamenei before the Israel-Iran War to approve the development of a nuclear weapon to confront “existential threats” from the West.[23] An unspecified European Union (EU) source also told Oil Price that unanswered questions about recent Iranian activities at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province have set Iran and the West “on a collision course.”[24] Recent Iranian construction at the facility has fueled concerns that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage facility for highly enriched uranium.[25]

Iran also reportedly intends to allocate a large portion of its military budget to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multi-warhead delivery systems, according to the EU source.[26] The source stated that Iran will increase its military budget by over 200 percent in the coming year and accelerate the development of ICBMs with multi-warhead delivery systems and ranges of up to 10,000 kilometers. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. Multi-warhead delivery systems likely refer to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).[27] Iran used ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, which disperse unguided submunitions over a wide area, during the Israel-Iran War. Iran does not currently possess MIRV technology, however. Ballistic missiles with MIRVs are more difficult to defend against than regular ballistic missiles, so Iran may seek to develop MIRV technology to bypass enemy air defenses more effectively.[28]

Iran seeks to deepen its economic cooperation with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including the People's Republic of China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[29] Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. SCO officials signed a cooperation document on November 17 at the SCO’s 24th Heads of Government summit in Moscow covering a wide range of economic issues, including the use of national currencies for trade, investments in green energy technology and transportation, and increased economic diplomacy.[30] Iranian First Vice President Mohmmad Reza Aref met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on November 17 on the sidelines of the summit to discuss expanding economic ties, including the development of joint railway projects.[31] Aref separately met with Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin on November 18 and emphasized the importance of bilateral investment and production initiatives to “meet mutual needs.”[32] Aref and other participating officials signed a joint statement condemning “coercive” economic sanctions, stating that they hinder international cooperation.[33] Iran, Russia, and Belarus, among other SCO member states, are heavily sanctioned by the United States and its allies.[34]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-18-2025/

Iran Update, November 19, 2025

An Iranian Defense Ministry-affiliated delegation covertly traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[1] This report corroborates CTP-ISW’s assessment from November 2024 that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons research program. CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War. The Financial Times reported on November 19 that the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) used a front company, DamavandTec, to organize a trip for Iranian laser specialists to go to St. Petersburg, Russia, in November 2024.[2] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[3] The United States sanctioned DamavandTec in October 2025 for procuring “items applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices from foreign suppliers.”[4] The Iranian laser specialists visited the US-sanctioned Russian military technology company Laser Systems. Iran has previously sought assistance from Russia to develop its nuclear program.[5] The Financial Times previously reported that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes that specialize in dual-use technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development.[6] Iranian nuclear scientists’ visits to Russia in August and November 2024 came amid other indications, such as reports that Iran had begun running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons, that Iran had resumed its nuclear weapons research program.[7] CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War.

Iran is continuing to develop parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the Iranian regime seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, however. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on November 18 that Iran is constructing a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at the Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[8] The Institute noted that high-explosive containment vessels are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons but that they can also be used for “many other conventional weapons development processes.”[9] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[10] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi stated on November 19 that there is nothing that currently necessitates an IAEA inspection at Taleghan 2 when asked about the construction of a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the site.[11]

Iranian officials continue to express openness to resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the regime has not conceded on its previous stance against zero uranium enrichment. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that Iran would be open to nuclear negotiations based on “mutual respect” with the United States in an interview with CNN on November 19. Kharrazi said that Iran would maintain its right to enrich uranium domestically for peaceful purposes, however.[12] Kharrazi stated that potential negotiations with the United States would focus on the “degree of enrichment” that Iran is allowed. Senior Iranian officials have continuously emphasized both before and after the Israel-Iran War that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium.[13] Kharrazi said that Iran has experienced difficulty in convincing the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.[14] The United States has maintained that Iran must accept zero enrichment.[15] Kharrazi stated that the United States must “make the first move” if Iran is to return to the negotiating table.[16] Kharrazi added that Iran's nuclear program cannot be eliminated with “force.”[17] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also told Iranian media on November 19 that Iran will not accept zero enrichment because enrichment has become “a matter of national pride.”[18]

Iran is continuing to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting damaged and other Iranian nuclear facilities. An unspecified European Union (EU) source told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that Iran continues to block the IAEA from inspecting nuclear sites, including sites that the United States and Israel struck in June 2025, as well as the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility near Natanz.[19] Kharrazi claimed that Iran cannot yet assess the damage at nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow in his November 19 CNN interview.[20] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stressed the urgent need for Iran to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect nuclear facilities on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 19. Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its damaged nuclear sites and highly enriched uranium stockpile to the IAEA.[21] The E3 also submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18 that demands that Iran allow IAEA inspectors to access nuclear sites.[22] The IAEA Board of Governors will vote on the resolution in the coming days.[23]

Infighting and paranoia among Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian regime officials have reportedly increased since the Israel-Iran War, which could hamper the regime's ability to make cohesive decisions. Unspecified Iranian regime officials told the Telegraph on November 19 that there is “turmoil” within the regime after the Israel-Iran War.[24] Regime officials are reportedly engaged in infighting due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[25] The regime has arrested hundreds of individuals on espionage charges since the Israel-Iran War and has executed several Iranians for allegedly spying for Israel.[26] The Iranian officials added that there is growing concern among regime officials and security services that officials who collaborate with Israel may falsely accuse loyal regime officials of treason.[27] These heightened concerns have prompted Iranian officials, particularly within the IRGC, to actively demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[28] Israeli infiltration enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to kill numerous senior Iranian military commanders and prominent nuclear scientists during the war.[29] Iranian officials’ concerns about Israeli infiltration are not new, but the Israel-Iran War exacerbated these concerns. The current environment of suspicion within the regime and lack of trust between officials could hinder the regime from being able to make cohesive decisions because trust and cooperation are critical for effective decision-making.[30]

[31] The IDF issued evacuation orders to residents near targets in Deir Kifa, Chohour, and Tayr Falsay in Tyre District and in Ainatha, Bint Jbeil District, in southern Lebanon.[32] The IDF struck the targets shortly thereafter.[33] The IDF targeted five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities.[34] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah fighter who the IDF said was attempting to re-establish Hezbollah's presence in Tiri, Bint Jbeil District.[35] The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate also identified dozens of locations in the neighboring village of Beit Lif where Hezbollah is rebuilding infrastructure, including a headquarters and weapons depots.[36] The IDF said on November 19 that it had referred some of the Hezbollah infrastructure in Beit Lif to the ceasefire monitoring committee but that the LAF had not acted on this information.[37] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel warned the LAF through the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[38] Israel stated in a message that it will continue and increase attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[39] The LAF is bound by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River.[40]

Hezbollah is likely smuggling weapons from Syria to southern Lebanon that the group could use to defend against a possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon or to attack Israel. The IDF strikes on Hezbollah rocket storage facilities in southern Lebanon occurred as Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles.[41] Syrian and Lebanese authorities have thwarted numerous weapons smuggling attempts along the Lebanon-Syria border since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which indicates that Hezbollah and/or Hezbollah-aligned actors are continuing to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[42] Syrian forces seized anti-personnel fragmentation mines, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenade warheads, mortar rounds, and Grad rockets in three distinct seizures near al Qusayr, Homs Province, Syria, in September.[43] Hezbollah has historically used these types of munitions to target Israeli ground forces in Lebanon and to fire into Israeli territory. Hezbollah fired thousands of Grad rockets into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024, for example.[44] Hezbollah also launched ATGMs and mortars targeting the IDF and Israeli positions in Lebanon in late fall 2024.[45] Recent IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah fighters smuggling munitions into southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10 suggest that at least some smuggling routes between southern Lebanon and other parts of the country and Syria are active.[46]

Iran released the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker on November 19 after confiscating its cargo.[56] Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[57] Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on November 19 that the Talara is not an oil tanker and that the vessel was transporting unspecified cargo from the Persian Gulf.[58] He added that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel because the owner of the cargo failed to pay the Iranian Industry and Mine Bank for the shipment. IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed on November 15 that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel to “return [Iran's] property.”[59] CTP-ISW cannot verify the claims made by Paknejad and Fars News.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-19-2025/

Iran Update, November 20, 2025

Iran has reportedly signalled its willingness to resume negotiations with the United States if its “rights” — which refers to its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil — are guaranteed.[1] Iran's demand violates the stated US red line that Iran must halt all domestic uranium enrichment to resume negotiations.[2] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian asked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in a letter to convey Iran's openness to negotiations with the United States, “provided its rights are guaranteed,” on his recent visit to Washington, DC, according to two regional sources with knowledge of the matter who spoke to Reuters on November 20.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on November 20 that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium in an interview with The Economist.[4]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed a resolution on November 20 that mandates Iran to immediately inform the IAEA about the status of its enriched uranium and damaged nuclear facilities.[5] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its highly enriched uranium stockpile and nuclear sites. Israel and the United States struck nuclear sites that reportedly held the stockpile in June 2025. Iran continues to block IAEA access to these facilities.[6]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continues to emphasize the urgency of Tehran’s water shortage crisis, likely to create broader support for the evacuation of the city. Pezeshkian stated on November 19 that evacuation from Tehran is necessary due to the city's inability to support the population's water consumption.[7] The successful evacuation of a city as large as Tehran would require large-scale public support to ensure an orderly evacuation, reduce friction, and ultimately, prevent widespread protest against the measure. Some Iranian climatologists and a former official have called Pezeshkian‘s calls to ration Tehran‘s water supply and move the capital infeasible.[8] An unconfirmed report from an Iranian water expert stated on November 14 that the areas of Tehran that consume the most dam water would be evacuated first.[9] The first, second, and third districts in northern Tehran, which are generally considered wealthier areas, reportedly account for 50 percent of the city's water consumption, according to Tehran Provincial Water Company data.[10] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has begun taking steps for evacuation at the time of writing.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-20-2025/

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