Some elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are reportedly pressuring Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accelerate the reconstruction of Iran's nuclear program and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[18] An unspecified senior “energy source” who works closely with Iran's Oil Ministry told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that the IRGC is pressuring Khamenei to expedite the reconstruction of nuclear facilities that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War.[19] The source added that some elements of the IRGC are pressuring Khamenei to withdraw from the NPT.[20] Iran must implement a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an NPT member.[21] Safeguards agreements are “designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.”[22] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Oil Price report. Unspecified IRGC officials previously urged Khamenei before the Israel-Iran War to approve the development of a nuclear weapon to confront “existential threats” from the West.[23] An unspecified European Union (EU) source also told Oil Price that unanswered questions about recent Iranian activities at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province have set Iran and the West “on a collision course.”[24] Recent Iranian construction at the facility has fueled concerns that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage facility for highly enriched uranium.[25]
Iran also reportedly intends to allocate a large portion of its military budget to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multi-warhead delivery systems, according to the EU source.[26] The source stated that Iran will increase its military budget by over 200 percent in the coming year and accelerate the development of ICBMs with multi-warhead delivery systems and ranges of up to 10,000 kilometers. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. Multi-warhead delivery systems likely refer to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).[27] Iran used ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, which disperse unguided submunitions over a wide area, during the Israel-Iran War. Iran does not currently possess MIRV technology, however. Ballistic missiles with MIRVs are more difficult to defend against than regular ballistic missiles, so Iran may seek to develop MIRV technology to bypass enemy air defenses more effectively.[28]
Iran seeks to deepen its economic cooperation with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including the People's Republic of China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[29] Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. SCO officials signed a cooperation document on November 17 at the SCO’s 24th Heads of Government summit in Moscow covering a wide range of economic issues, including the use of national currencies for trade, investments in green energy technology and transportation, and increased economic diplomacy.[30] Iranian First Vice President Mohmmad Reza Aref met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on November 17 on the sidelines of the summit to discuss expanding economic ties, including the development of joint railway projects.[31] Aref separately met with Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin on November 18 and emphasized the importance of bilateral investment and production initiatives to “meet mutual needs.”[32] Aref and other participating officials signed a joint statement condemning “coercive” economic sanctions, stating that they hinder international cooperation.[33] Iran, Russia, and Belarus, among other SCO member states, are heavily sanctioned by the United States and its allies.[34]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-18-2025/
An Iranian Defense Ministry-affiliated delegation covertly traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[1] This report corroborates CTP-ISW’s assessment from November 2024 that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons research program. CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War. The Financial Times reported on November 19 that the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) used a front company, DamavandTec, to organize a trip for Iranian laser specialists to go to St. Petersburg, Russia, in November 2024.[2] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[3] The United States sanctioned DamavandTec in October 2025 for procuring “items applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices from foreign suppliers.”[4] The Iranian laser specialists visited the US-sanctioned Russian military technology company Laser Systems. Iran has previously sought assistance from Russia to develop its nuclear program.[5] The Financial Times previously reported that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes that specialize in dual-use technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development.[6] Iranian nuclear scientists’ visits to Russia in August and November 2024 came amid other indications, such as reports that Iran had begun running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons, that Iran had resumed its nuclear weapons research program.[7] CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War.
Iran is continuing to develop parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the Iranian regime seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, however. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on November 18 that Iran is constructing a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at the Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[8] The Institute noted that high-explosive containment vessels are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons but that they can also be used for “many other conventional weapons development processes.”[9] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[10] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi stated on November 19 that there is nothing that currently necessitates an IAEA inspection at Taleghan 2 when asked about the construction of a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the site.[11]
Iranian officials continue to express openness to resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the regime has not conceded on its previous stance against zero uranium enrichment. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that Iran would be open to nuclear negotiations based on “mutual respect” with the United States in an interview with CNN on November 19. Kharrazi said that Iran would maintain its right to enrich uranium domestically for peaceful purposes, however.[12] Kharrazi stated that potential negotiations with the United States would focus on the “degree of enrichment” that Iran is allowed. Senior Iranian officials have continuously emphasized both before and after the Israel-Iran War that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium.[13] Kharrazi said that Iran has experienced difficulty in convincing the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.[14] The United States has maintained that Iran must accept zero enrichment.[15] Kharrazi stated that the United States must “make the first move” if Iran is to return to the negotiating table.[16] Kharrazi added that Iran's nuclear program cannot be eliminated with “force.”[17] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also told Iranian media on November 19 that Iran will not accept zero enrichment because enrichment has become “a matter of national pride.”[18]
Iran is continuing to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting damaged and other Iranian nuclear facilities. An unspecified European Union (EU) source told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that Iran continues to block the IAEA from inspecting nuclear sites, including sites that the United States and Israel struck in June 2025, as well as the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility near Natanz.[19] Kharrazi claimed that Iran cannot yet assess the damage at nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow in his November 19 CNN interview.[20] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stressed the urgent need for Iran to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect nuclear facilities on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 19. Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its damaged nuclear sites and highly enriched uranium stockpile to the IAEA.[21] The E3 also submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18 that demands that Iran allow IAEA inspectors to access nuclear sites.[22] The IAEA Board of Governors will vote on the resolution in the coming days.[23]
Infighting and paranoia among Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian regime officials have reportedly increased since the Israel-Iran War, which could hamper the regime's ability to make cohesive decisions. Unspecified Iranian regime officials told the Telegraph on November 19 that there is “turmoil” within the regime after the Israel-Iran War.[24] Regime officials are reportedly engaged in infighting due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[25] The regime has arrested hundreds of individuals on espionage charges since the Israel-Iran War and has executed several Iranians for allegedly spying for Israel.[26] The Iranian officials added that there is growing concern among regime officials and security services that officials who collaborate with Israel may falsely accuse loyal regime officials of treason.[27] These heightened concerns have prompted Iranian officials, particularly within the IRGC, to actively demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[28] Israeli infiltration enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to kill numerous senior Iranian military commanders and prominent nuclear scientists during the war.[29] Iranian officials’ concerns about Israeli infiltration are not new, but the Israel-Iran War exacerbated these concerns. The current environment of suspicion within the regime and lack of trust between officials could hinder the regime from being able to make cohesive decisions because trust and cooperation are critical for effective decision-making.[30]
[31] The IDF issued evacuation orders to residents near targets in Deir Kifa, Chohour, and Tayr Falsay in Tyre District and in Ainatha, Bint Jbeil District, in southern Lebanon.[32] The IDF struck the targets shortly thereafter.[33] The IDF targeted five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities.[34] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah fighter who the IDF said was attempting to re-establish Hezbollah's presence in Tiri, Bint Jbeil District.[35] The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate also identified dozens of locations in the neighboring village of Beit Lif where Hezbollah is rebuilding infrastructure, including a headquarters and weapons depots.[36] The IDF said on November 19 that it had referred some of the Hezbollah infrastructure in Beit Lif to the ceasefire monitoring committee but that the LAF had not acted on this information.[37] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel warned the LAF through the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[38] Israel stated in a message that it will continue and increase attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[39] The LAF is bound by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River.[40]
Hezbollah is likely smuggling weapons from Syria to southern Lebanon that the group could use to defend against a possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon or to attack Israel. The IDF strikes on Hezbollah rocket storage facilities in southern Lebanon occurred as Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles.[41] Syrian and Lebanese authorities have thwarted numerous weapons smuggling attempts along the Lebanon-Syria border since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which indicates that Hezbollah and/or Hezbollah-aligned actors are continuing to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[42] Syrian forces seized anti-personnel fragmentation mines, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenade warheads, mortar rounds, and Grad rockets in three distinct seizures near al Qusayr, Homs Province, Syria, in September.[43] Hezbollah has historically used these types of munitions to target Israeli ground forces in Lebanon and to fire into Israeli territory. Hezbollah fired thousands of Grad rockets into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024, for example.[44] Hezbollah also launched ATGMs and mortars targeting the IDF and Israeli positions in Lebanon in late fall 2024.[45] Recent IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah fighters smuggling munitions into southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10 suggest that at least some smuggling routes between southern Lebanon and other parts of the country and Syria are active.[46]
Iran released the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker on November 19 after confiscating its cargo.[56] Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[57] Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on November 19 that the Talara is not an oil tanker and that the vessel was transporting unspecified cargo from the Persian Gulf.[58] He added that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel because the owner of the cargo failed to pay the Iranian Industry and Mine Bank for the shipment. IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed on November 15 that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel to “return [Iran's] property.”[59] CTP-ISW cannot verify the claims made by Paknejad and Fars News.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-19-2025/