An Iranian Defense Ministry-affiliated delegation covertly traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[1] This report corroborates CTP-ISW’s assessment from November 2024 that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons research program. CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War. The Financial Times reported on November 19 that the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) used a front company, DamavandTec, to organize a trip for Iranian laser specialists to go to St. Petersburg, Russia, in November 2024.[2] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[3] The United States sanctioned DamavandTec in October 2025 for procuring “items applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices from foreign suppliers.”[4] The Iranian laser specialists visited the US-sanctioned Russian military technology company Laser Systems. Iran has previously sought assistance from Russia to develop its nuclear program.[5] The Financial Times previously reported that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes that specialize in dual-use technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development.[6] Iranian nuclear scientists’ visits to Russia in August and November 2024 came amid other indications, such as reports that Iran had begun running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons, that Iran had resumed its nuclear weapons research program.[7] CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War.
Iran is continuing to develop parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the Iranian regime seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, however. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on November 18 that Iran is constructing a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at the Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[8] The Institute noted that high-explosive containment vessels are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons but that they can also be used for “many other conventional weapons development processes.”[9] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[10] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi stated on November 19 that there is nothing that currently necessitates an IAEA inspection at Taleghan 2 when asked about the construction of a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the site.[11]
Iranian officials continue to express openness to resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the regime has not conceded on its previous stance against zero uranium enrichment. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that Iran would be open to nuclear negotiations based on “mutual respect” with the United States in an interview with CNN on November 19. Kharrazi said that Iran would maintain its right to enrich uranium domestically for peaceful purposes, however.[12] Kharrazi stated that potential negotiations with the United States would focus on the “degree of enrichment” that Iran is allowed. Senior Iranian officials have continuously emphasized both before and after the Israel-Iran War that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium.[13] Kharrazi said that Iran has experienced difficulty in convincing the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.[14] The United States has maintained that Iran must accept zero enrichment.[15] Kharrazi stated that the United States must “make the first move” if Iran is to return to the negotiating table.[16] Kharrazi added that Iran's nuclear program cannot be eliminated with “force.”[17] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also told Iranian media on November 19 that Iran will not accept zero enrichment because enrichment has become “a matter of national pride.”[18]
Iran is continuing to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting damaged and other Iranian nuclear facilities. An unspecified European Union (EU) source told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that Iran continues to block the IAEA from inspecting nuclear sites, including sites that the United States and Israel struck in June 2025, as well as the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility near Natanz.[19] Kharrazi claimed that Iran cannot yet assess the damage at nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow in his November 19 CNN interview.[20] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stressed the urgent need for Iran to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect nuclear facilities on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 19. Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its damaged nuclear sites and highly enriched uranium stockpile to the IAEA.[21] The E3 also submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18 that demands that Iran allow IAEA inspectors to access nuclear sites.[22] The IAEA Board of Governors will vote on the resolution in the coming days.[23]
Infighting and paranoia among Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian regime officials have reportedly increased since the Israel-Iran War, which could hamper the regime's ability to make cohesive decisions. Unspecified Iranian regime officials told the Telegraph on November 19 that there is “turmoil” within the regime after the Israel-Iran War.[24] Regime officials are reportedly engaged in infighting due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[25] The regime has arrested hundreds of individuals on espionage charges since the Israel-Iran War and has executed several Iranians for allegedly spying for Israel.[26] The Iranian officials added that there is growing concern among regime officials and security services that officials who collaborate with Israel may falsely accuse loyal regime officials of treason.[27] These heightened concerns have prompted Iranian officials, particularly within the IRGC, to actively demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[28] Israeli infiltration enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to kill numerous senior Iranian military commanders and prominent nuclear scientists during the war.[29] Iranian officials’ concerns about Israeli infiltration are not new, but the Israel-Iran War exacerbated these concerns. The current environment of suspicion within the regime and lack of trust between officials could hinder the regime from being able to make cohesive decisions because trust and cooperation are critical for effective decision-making.[30]
[31] The IDF issued evacuation orders to residents near targets in Deir Kifa, Chohour, and Tayr Falsay in Tyre District and in Ainatha, Bint Jbeil District, in southern Lebanon.[32] The IDF struck the targets shortly thereafter.[33] The IDF targeted five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities.[34] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah fighter who the IDF said was attempting to re-establish Hezbollah's presence in Tiri, Bint Jbeil District.[35] The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate also identified dozens of locations in the neighboring village of Beit Lif where Hezbollah is rebuilding infrastructure, including a headquarters and weapons depots.[36] The IDF said on November 19 that it had referred some of the Hezbollah infrastructure in Beit Lif to the ceasefire monitoring committee but that the LAF had not acted on this information.[37] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel warned the LAF through the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[38] Israel stated in a message that it will continue and increase attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[39] The LAF is bound by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River.[40]
Hezbollah is likely smuggling weapons from Syria to southern Lebanon that the group could use to defend against a possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon or to attack Israel. The IDF strikes on Hezbollah rocket storage facilities in southern Lebanon occurred as Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles.[41] Syrian and Lebanese authorities have thwarted numerous weapons smuggling attempts along the Lebanon-Syria border since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which indicates that Hezbollah and/or Hezbollah-aligned actors are continuing to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[42] Syrian forces seized anti-personnel fragmentation mines, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenade warheads, mortar rounds, and Grad rockets in three distinct seizures near al Qusayr, Homs Province, Syria, in September.[43] Hezbollah has historically used these types of munitions to target Israeli ground forces in Lebanon and to fire into Israeli territory. Hezbollah fired thousands of Grad rockets into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024, for example.[44] Hezbollah also launched ATGMs and mortars targeting the IDF and Israeli positions in Lebanon in late fall 2024.[45] Recent IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah fighters smuggling munitions into southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10 suggest that at least some smuggling routes between southern Lebanon and other parts of the country and Syria are active.[46]
Iran released the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker on November 19 after confiscating its cargo.[56] Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[57] Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on November 19 that the Talara is not an oil tanker and that the vessel was transporting unspecified cargo from the Persian Gulf.[58] He added that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel because the owner of the cargo failed to pay the Iranian Industry and Mine Bank for the shipment. IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed on November 15 that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel to “return [Iran's] property.”[59] CTP-ISW cannot verify the claims made by Paknejad and Fars News.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-19-2025/
Iran has reportedly signalled its willingness to resume negotiations with the United States if its “rights” — which refers to its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil — are guaranteed.[1] Iran's demand violates the stated US red line that Iran must halt all domestic uranium enrichment to resume negotiations.[2] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian asked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in a letter to convey Iran's openness to negotiations with the United States, “provided its rights are guaranteed,” on his recent visit to Washington, DC, according to two regional sources with knowledge of the matter who spoke to Reuters on November 20.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on November 20 that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium in an interview with The Economist.[4]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed a resolution on November 20 that mandates Iran to immediately inform the IAEA about the status of its enriched uranium and damaged nuclear facilities.[5] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its highly enriched uranium stockpile and nuclear sites. Israel and the United States struck nuclear sites that reportedly held the stockpile in June 2025. Iran continues to block IAEA access to these facilities.[6]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continues to emphasize the urgency of Tehran’s water shortage crisis, likely to create broader support for the evacuation of the city. Pezeshkian stated on November 19 that evacuation from Tehran is necessary due to the city's inability to support the population's water consumption.[7] The successful evacuation of a city as large as Tehran would require large-scale public support to ensure an orderly evacuation, reduce friction, and ultimately, prevent widespread protest against the measure. Some Iranian climatologists and a former official have called Pezeshkian‘s calls to ration Tehran‘s water supply and move the capital infeasible.[8] An unconfirmed report from an Iranian water expert stated on November 14 that the areas of Tehran that consume the most dam water would be evacuated first.[9] The first, second, and third districts in northern Tehran, which are generally considered wealthier areas, reportedly account for 50 percent of the city's water consumption, according to Tehran Provincial Water Company data.[10] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has begun taking steps for evacuation at the time of writing.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-20-2025/