Iranian Passive Defense Organization (PDO) head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali sought to shift blame for Iran's defensive failures during the Israel-Iran War onto government institutions in an interview on November 8. Jalali gave an interview to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ reflections on the Israel–Iran War.[24] Jalali noted that Iran is vulnerable to infiltration and that Iran's adversaries can track Iranian officials using traffic cameras and communication networks, among other means. Jalali claimed that government agencies have failed to address these security weaknesses despite years of PDO warnings.[25] Israel killed numerous senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war, highlighting the degree of Israeli infiltration in Iran. Jalali stated that Iran has prioritized rapid development over security considerations in recent years, which has exacerbated security vulnerabilities.[26] The PDO operates under the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and is responsible for developing and coordinating policies to defend Iranian civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[27] Jalali emphasized that the PDO is not responsible for the implementation of passive defense policies, however.[28]
Jalali also discussed Iran's preparations for a potential attack on its nuclear facilities before the war. Jalali stated that the PDO prepared a plan after Iran's missile strike on Israel in October 2024 to prepare for a potential attack on its nuclear sites and potential radioactive or chemical contamination.[29] Jalali stated that former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the plan, but that President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration resisted its implementation because it did not believe that war was imminent and did not want to “worry” the Iranian public.[30] Jalali stated that Iran preemptively emptied large ammonia and chlorine tanks in Esfahan Province to prevent chemical leaks and civilian harm if Iran's nuclear facilities were attacked.[31] Jalali added that the nuclear sector significantly reduced its activity and “relocated equipment” before the war. It is unclear what “equipment” Jalali was referring to.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-11-2025/
Iran Update, November 12, 2025
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors travelled to Iran on November 12 to inspect the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), according to a confidential IAEA report obtained by the Associated Press.[28] It is unclear the extent of access that the IAEA or Iran has to the facility, given that Israeli airstrikes severely damaged the facility during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, however.[29] The IAEA has not been able to verify the status of Iran’s weapons-grade uranium stockpile since the war. The IAEA report stated that Iran notified the IAEA of a new enrichment facility at the ENTC on June 12, and the IAEA immediately requested access to the facility. Iran agreed to the IAEA’s request, but the IAEA cancelled the visitation due to the onset of the war.[30] The IAEA does not currently know the precise location of the new facility or the status of its enriched uranium, which the report described as seriously concerning.[31] A previous IAEA report claimed that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium before the war, which is enough for Iran to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons if enriched to 90 percent.[32] The recent IAEA report, which was shared with all member states of the IAEA Board of Governors, precedes the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 19 to 21, during which members will discuss Iran’s nuclear program.[33]
Iran is developing regional trade routes with neighboring countries, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. Iran’s Railway Organization’s Deputy Commerce Director stated on November 8 that Iran intends to become a regional trade “hub” after the first Russian freight train arrived at Aprin Dry Cargo Terminal, which is located about 20 kilometers southwest of Tehran City, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.[34] Iran’s Railway Organization opened Aprin Dry Port in June 2025, and 30 trains from unspecified locations have stopped there so far, according to the organization’s Deputy Commerce Director.[35] The train previously transited a border checkpoint at Incheh Borun economic free zone in northeastern Iran on November 8.[36] More than 60 companies have reportedly invested in the 4,000-hectare Incheh Borun economic free zone between Iran and Turkmenistan to cut trade and transportation costs, according to Iran’s Golestan Province Governor in October 2025.[37]
Iran is developing trade routes with all its neighbors. Iran reportedly transported some of the cargo from the Russian freight train, which included paper pulp, onwards to Iraq.[38] Iran and Iraq have been cooperating to revive the Shalamcheh-Basra railway between southwestern Iran and Basra Port, Iraq, since 2023 after years of planning, but have made little progress.[39] Iran has also held several meetings with officials in neighboring countries since August 2025 to propose trade facilitation projects, including two railways with Turkmenistan near the Sarakhs Border Point in Razavi Khorsan Province, a port-sea consortium with Russia in the Caspian Sea, an economic free zone in Chabahar Port, southeastern Iran, with Pakistan, railways with Tajikistan, and the Rasht-Astara Railway project with Azerbaijan.[40] Most of these projects are part of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which Iran, Russia, and India established in 2002.[41] The corridor connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[42]
Iranian officials continue to inspect naval units in the Persian Gulf to secure Iran’s control over the Gulf, likely as part of Iran’s effort to prepare for any potential conflict with the United States or Israel. These inspections suggest that Iranian officials continue to believe renewed war with the United States or Israel is imminent. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi inspected Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval units deployed on the Nazeat Islands on November 11.[43] The Nazeat Islands, including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island, are key positions for Iran’s ability to control maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[44] Abdollahi stated that the IRGC Navy has recently increased its capabilities.[45] Abdollahi’s inspection comes amid other key Iranian military commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour, IRGC Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General (AFGS) Abdol Rahim Mousavi, and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, inspections of southern Iranian naval units in recent weeks.[46]
Former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of additional Iranian military forces to the Nazeat Islands near the Strait of Hormuz in May 2025. These deployments could have enabled Iran to harass shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in the event of war. Bagheri said that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states that host US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.”[47] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[48]
The United States sanctioned 32 individuals and entities on November 12 for operating multiple weapon procurement networks that support Iran’s ballistic missile and drone production.[49] The sanctioned individuals and entities are based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine. The sanctions targeted a multinational network of individuals and companies that coordinated Iran’s procurement of missile propellant ingredients, including sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid, from the PRC. Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[50] European intelligence sources told CNN on October 29 that Iran received several shipments from the PRC that contained a total of 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate.[51] Iran previously received about 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China in February and May 2025.[52] Iran‘s recent, larger shipment from the PRC comes amid Iran’s efforts to rebuild its missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran sees its ballistic missile program as its main deterrent against future attacks.[53]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2025/