Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, May 22, 2025

Recent Iranian statements suggest that key Iranian leaders are considering moving nuclear material to unspecified “secure” locations to protect nuclear material from a strike after recent leaks about a potential Israeli strike. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser and former Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani suggested on April 10 that that Iran could transfer enriched uranium to “secure locations” if the United States and Israel continue to make military threats.”[7] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened on May 22 that Iran will take “special measures” to preemptively protect its nuclear facilities amid recent Israeli threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.[8] Araghchi and Shamkhani‘s statements indicate that Iran is considering moving enriched uranium specifically. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently able to monitor Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles stored in declared sites. Iran appears to be responding to widespread leaks about a potential impending Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.[9]

The Iranian Defense Ministry showcased Iranian defense equipment at the 12th International Exhibition of Arms and Military Machinery (MILEX-2025) in Minsk, Belarus, on May 22, likely as part of an Iranian effort to promote and sell its weapons systems.[10] The exhibition included 150 companies from Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India. Iranian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Brigadier General Reza Talaei Nik met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko on the sidelines of the exhibition. Senior Iranian officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, have repeatedly stated that Iran aims to export military capabilities to ”friendly” countries.[11] The Iranian Defense Ministry is responsible for foreign arms sales and defense agreements.[12] Iran's efforts to increase its military and defense exports come amid the US ”maximum pressure” campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero.[13] Iran may seek to increase its military exports to offset the effects of US sanctions, though these exports cannot replace the loss of oil revenue. The Iranian Defense Ministry reportedly showcased more than 50 military systems at the MILEX-25, including drones, rockets, and loitering munitions.[14] Iran separately has begun efforts to establish a military drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[15]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-22-2025

Iran Update, May 23, 2025

Iran may try to secure an interim nuclear deal before negotiating a comprehensive nuclear agreement to delay or prevent a US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[1] The Wall Street Journal reported on May 23 that the United States and Iran are considering negotiating a framework deal, citing unspecified individuals familiar with the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[2] An unspecified senior official familiar with the negotiations told the WSJ that the goal would be “to establish an understanding on the key points that would constitute a final agreement.”[3]

Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[4] Iran agreed to eliminate its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight measures in the 2013 interim deal.[5] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.

The United States and Iran held their fifth round of nuclear talks in Rome on May 23.[6] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi led the US and Iranian delegations, respectively.[7] Omani Foreign Minister and lead mediator Badr Albusaidi said the latest round of nuclear talks ended with “some but not conclusive progress.”[8] Two unspecified Iranian sources separately told CNN that Iran is participating in the fifth round of talks to gauge the Trump administration's position, likely referring to the US demand for zero uranium enrichment, which continues to be the main sticking point in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[9] Araghchi posted on X (Twitter) on May 22 that zero enrichment means ”we do not have a deal.”[10] Technical teams accompanied both the US and Iranian delegations, which suggests the talks covered technical issues such as Iranian uranium enrichment levels.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that disagreements between Iran and the United States about the issue of zero uranium enrichment may stall the negotiations or delay a deal.[12] Iran and the United States could agree to an interim or framework deal that does not explicitly include the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.

The Artesh Ground Forces deputy commander unveiled new tactical drones on May 22 in Sistan and Baluchistan.[13] The new drones, which were developed by the Artesh, may reflect some lessons observed from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. The new drones will probably contribute to the development or implementation of new tactics to counter anti-regime militant groups, including the Baloch Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl that regularly attacks Iranian security forces and infrastructure in southeastern Iran.

Deputy Commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Deputy Commander Brigadier General Nozar Nemati, unveiled three new drones: the Didban, Shahin-1, and Homa.[14] All three drones have vertical take-off and landing capability.[15] Nemati stated that the drones will be integrated into regional combat units stationed in Sistan and Baluchistan Province to “confront any [security] threat“, which is an implicit reference to Jaish al Adl.[16] The Didban is a reconnaissance drone that can reportedly fly at 6,000 feet.[17] The Shahin-1 is a high-speed first-person view (FPV) drone that is reportedly capable of striking stationary and mobile targets. The Homa can reportedly fly above 12,000 feet and operate at night. Iranian media claimed the Homa can conduct reconnaissance missions “in electronic warfare (EW) situations,” suggesting it is hardened to EW disruptions.[18] The proliferation of EW capabilities on both sides has been a predominant characteristic of the war in Ukraine.[19] Both sides use EW capabilities to disrupt FPV and other drones, which have been critical for both sides in the war. Iran's development of these capabilities may reflect lessons learned in the war in Ukraine.

The newly unveiled drones may be part of a broader Iranian effort to leverage drone warfare to confront insurgent threats in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. These drones, which are small and man-portable, could increase the amount of tactical-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms available to Iranian security forces operating in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The FPV drones can provide small Iranian units with an organic precision strike capability that they currently lack. Iranian units could use the recon drones to provide targeting intelligence that can then be exploited by FPV drones without the need to coordinate with larger formations to use higher-end assets. Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari recently emphasized the importance of expanding drone capabilities in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[20] Heydari stated on May 22 that Iran has recently established three new drone bases in Sistan and Baluchistan Province as part of a broader effort to secure southeastern Iran.[21]

The Syrian government expelled pro-Iran Palestinian groups from Syria, which underscores the challenges that Iran will face in rebuilding its networks in Syria. Palestinian faction leaders told Agence France-Presse on May 23 that the Syrian transitional government pressured Palestinian militia leaders in Syria to flee the country and disarm their forces.[32] Many Palestinian militias maintained a presence in Syria under Assad. The government previously formed a committee to monitor Palestinian faction activities in Syria and has detained several Palestinian militia members since April 2025.[33] The transitional government reportedly did not issue formal requests for the leaders to leave Syrian territory, but pressured them with restrictions and property confiscation.[34] A Palestinian faction leader told AFP that Palestinian leaders have evacuated to Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon after their expulsion from Syria.[35] Palestinian militias like Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have historically maintained envoys in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and conduct fundraising activities there to generate funds for the October 7 War.[36] This history makes the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen a welcome place for these Palestinian militia leaders.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-23-2025

25MAY2025 Hezbollah victory in several villages in southern Lebanon

The municipal elections concluded on Saturday in the governorates of South Lebanon and Nabatieh, after four rounds of voting across the country. By the end of the day, the participation rate was 37 percent, compared to 48 percent in the 2016 municipal elections, according to the Interior Ministry.

The Amal-Hezbollah lists were elected unopposed in 102 out of 272 municipalities, according to figures relayed by L’Orient Today's correspondent in southern Lebanon. In villages where voting took place, the lists backed by these two parties emerged victorious, while a few rare breakthroughs by non-affiliated lists were recorded.

Until Saturday at dawn, the Amal-Hezbollah alliance continued its efforts, with the participation of Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri to “encourage” its opponents in Shiite-majority villages to withdraw. As a result, in dozens of these villages, municipal councils loyal to this alliance were elected unopposed. In the towns where the voting took place, the two maintained its dominance, often electing all its candidates.

The low voter turnout, which did not exceed 27 percent of registered voters in Bint Jbeil for example, could indicate a weakening of Hezbollah's ability to mobilize, at a time when the party needed a show of force more than ever. It could also be due to the fact that several lists had already been elected unopposed. It should also be noted that to avoid confrontation at the polls with independents or families, the Hezbollah-Amal alliance made concessions in several villages, by withdrawing some of its candidates in favor of the other camp.

Notably, Israel did not carry out any strikes or attacks during the voting hours, although its army did escalate on the eve of the elections, allowing the election to proceed normally. A victory for the state, which, thanks to diplomacy and the guarantees it secured, was able to protect Hezbollah's voters and all the inhabitants of the South.

https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1461724/hezbollah-victory-in-several-villages-in-southern-lebanon.html

Iran Update, May 26, 2025

Truck drivers across Iran have launched a nationwide strike over rising insurance and maintenance costs and worsening economic conditions.[1] The truck drivers are protesting the government’s plan to cut the amount of subsidized diesel allocated to truckers.[2] Strikers also cited unaffordable insurance premiums, stagnant freight rates, and deteriorating road infrastructure.[3] The government-subsidized insurance premium for truck drivers increased by approximately 45 percent earlier this year.[4] The strike began in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, which is Iran’s primary shipping hub, on May 18 and has since spread to other major Iranian cities.[5] Economic-related protests and strikes have the potential to escalate into anti-regime protests similar to how demonstrations against increasing gas prices morphed into anti-regime protests in 2017 and 2018.[6]

The ongoing strikes will likely worsen Iranian freight transport issues, especially after a recent explosion at a major port in Bandar Abbas. The Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas, which handles 85 percent of Iran’s container traffic and a significant share of oil exports, suffered a major explosion on April 26 that has disrupted container traffic and cost Iran an estimated 25 million US dollars per day.[7] The ongoing strike has reportedly strained domestic freight transport, particularly agricultural distribution during the harvest season.[8] Iranian officials rejected claims that fruit and vegetable prices increased by 50 percent and stated that only a few staples saw “temporary” increases due to recent transport issues.[9] An Iranian judiciary official reported on May 26 that Fars Province security forces arrested and prosecuted individuals who blocked the movement of freight trucks on roads.[10] Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) forces separately clashed with strikers in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, on May 25 with pepper spray.[11]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-26-2025

Iran Update, May 27, 2025

Iran is continuing to strengthen ties with revisionist actors such as Russia and North Korea. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian arrived in Moscow on May 27 for the three-day 13th Moscow International Security Conference.[50] Russian state media reported that the conference will focus on strengthening global security cooperation and feature a Russian defense exhibition.[51] Delegates from over 150 countries will reportedly attend the conference, including delegations from BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. North Korean media reported that a delegation led by North Korea’s Minister of State Security will attend the conference.[52] Iran’s engagement with BRICS and the SCO is part of a broader Iranian effort to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance.”[53] Ahmadian emphasized the importance of developing BRICS and the SCO upon his arrival in Moscow.[54] Ahmadian also stated that he will meet with officials on the sidelines of the summit and discuss progress on the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with unspecified Russian officials.[55] Iran and Russia have continued to expand ties since they signed the agreement, which covers military, economic, energy, and nuclear cooperation.[56] Iran has provided significant support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by providing Fateh-360 ballistic missiles and launchers and Shahed drones. Iran also reportedly purchased Russian Su-35 fighter jets in January 2025, which illustrates Iran and Russia’s mutual defense cooperation, though Russia has not yet delivered the Su-35s.[57] Russia has also coordinated with Iran on the latter’s nuclear program during US-Iran negotiations.[58]

The Iranian Parliament re-elected hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf for a sixth term on May 27.[70] The Parliament Speaker serves a one-year term.[71] Ghalibaf is a longtime member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and maintains close personal and political relations with the highest echelons of the IRGC that date to the Iran-Iraq War.[72] Ghalibaf also served as Iran’s police chief between 2000 and 2005.[73] The Parliament also elected Ali Nikzad as First Deputy Speaker and Hamidreza Haj Babaei as Second Deputy Speaker.[74] Nikzad previously served as the Second Deputy Speaker, and Babaei served as the First Deputy Speaker in 2024.[75] Ghalibaf previously appointed Nikzad as his campaign manager in June 2024, during Ghalibaf’s most recent unsuccessful presidential campaign, indicating that Nikzad is close to Ghalibaf.[76]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 821,500 rial to one US dollar on May 26 to 827,500 rial to one US dollar on May 27.[86]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-27-2025

Iran Update, May 28, 2025

Iran is increasingly taking steps to facilitate its removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. The FATF blacklisted Iran in 2020.[58] Iran’s blacklist designation requires the 40 FATF member countries to sanction and limit economic engagement with Iran.[59] The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council reviewed the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) laws on May 28, but did not reach a consensus and decided to continue discussing the CFT measures in a future meeting.[60] The CFT is a set of laws that aim to restricting state funding for terrorist organizations.[61] Iran must approve and implement both the CFT and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, also known as the Palermo Convention, for the FATF to remove Iran from its blacklist.[62] The Expediency Discernment Council approved the Palermo Convention on May 14.[63] An Iranian delegation separately discussed Iranian efforts to rejoin the FATF with representatives of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) on in Moscow on May 26.[64] The EAG is an associate member of the FATF that is comprised of nine countries, including China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[65]

The recent Iranian efforts to rejoin the FATF are notable given that Iran’s FATF membership has historically been a controversial issue within the Iranian regime.[66] The FATF will decide whether to suspend countermeasures imposed on Iran, such as sanctions, if Iran ratifies and implements the Palermo Convention and CFT in line with FATF standards.[67] It is very unlikely that Iran would cease financial support for US-designated terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, even if the Expediency Discernment Council approved the CFT.

Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite military setbacks that Israel imposed on the Axis of Resistance throughout the October 7 War. Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) representative to Iran Nasser Abu Sharif and Hamas representative to Iran Khaled Qaddoumi in Tehran on May 28.[68] Velayati reiterated Iran’s longstanding objective to destroy the state of Israel by using proxy groups.[69] Sharif stated on May 14 that Iran has continued to fund PIJ.[70] Velayati also praised the Houthis for their continued attacks targeting Israel.[71]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 827,500 rials to one US dollar on May 27 to 828,800 rials to one US dollar on May 28.[78]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-28-2025

Iran Update, May 28, 2025

A US journalist reported on May 29 that Iran and the United States are trying to reach a “political framework text” before the next International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10.[1] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, although Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, which expires in October 2025, allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[2] The IAEA releases a quarterly verification and monitoring report on Iran’s nuclear program.[3] The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the IAEA’s next quarterly report at the June Board of Governors meeting. The IAEA previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” about Iranian nuclear activities in addition to the IAEA’s regular verification and monitoring reports.[4] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on May 28 that the IAEA will release the comprehensive report “soon.”[5] The IAEA’s next quarterly report and the comprehensive report will both almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA, which will lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. The E3 recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[6] Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions by demonstrating Iran’s willingness to resolve the nuclear issue.[7]

IAEA Deputy Director General and head of the IAEA Safeguards Department Massimo Aparo inspected two undeclared Iranian nuclear sites in Tehran Province on May 28 as part of the March 2023 IAEA-Iran Joint Statement.[8] The joint statement identified three locations in Iran that contain undeclared nuclear material and equipment: Turquzabad, Varamin, and Marivan.[9] The IAEA reported in May 2023 that Marivan is “no longer an outstanding issue,” which suggests that Aparo visited the Turquzabad and Varamin sites during his visit to Iran.[10] The most recent IAEA Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement report from February 2025 stated that there was no progress toward implementing the March 2023 Joint Statement between November 2024 to February 2025.[11]

Hezbollah appears to be cooperating with the Lebanese state to disarm itself in southern Lebanon while likely attempting to regenerate its forces north of the Litani River. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told the Wall Street Journal on May 28 that the Lebanese state has achieved about 80 percent of its objectives to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[19] Unspecified senior Arab officials said that the United States has provided Israeli intelligence to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) about Hezbollah’s remaining stockpiles and positions in southern Lebanon.[20] An unspecified Israeli military official said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is “pleased by” the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah.[21] Hezbollah has reportedly cooperated with the LAF to reassert state control over southern Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, including by reportedly ordering its fighters who are not from southern Lebanon to vacate positions and allowing the LAF to take control of the area.[22] Unspecified senior Lebanese security officials confirmed on May 28 that Hezbollah has cooperated with the LAF to disarm it in southern Lebanon.[23] Hezbollah’s cooperation with the LAF in the south likely reflects its degraded state and its prioritization of “sheltering and rebuilding” its forces.[24] Hezbollah also likely seeks to focus its near-term efforts on recalibrating its domestic political strategy and resecuring its political future in Lebanon.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini expressed concern about Iran’s response to perceived “cognitive warfare.”[40] Iranian officials use the term “cognitive warfare” to describe Iran’s enemies’ alleged efforts to conduct psychological operations and instill feelings of distrust and hopeless among the Iranian population in order to facilitate regime collapse. Naeini stated that Iran faces “serious challenges” confronting “cognitive warfare,” particularly “cognitive warfare” that is directed at Iranian youth. Naeini claimed that Iran’s enemies seek to undermine Iran’s national and cultural identity through narrative manipulation, media distortion, and perception warfare. Naeini urged structural reforms to strengthen the regime’s narrative control and cultural resilience. Naeini also called for intensifying “explanation jihad” efforts to counter cognitive threats. “Explanation jihad” is an Iranian regime theory that indoctrinating and ideologizing the population, especially Iranian youth, will increase public support for the regime and reduce anti-regime sentiment.[41] Iranian officials have historically sought to expand ideologization efforts to confront anti-regime sentiment rather than address the core issues and grievances that generate this sentiment.[42] Iran’s proposed 2025–2026 budget significantly increases funding for religious and ideological institutions, which highlights the regime’s efforts to expand ideologization efforts.[43] The IRGC Baghiyatollah al Azam Sociocultural Headquarters and Islamic Propaganda Organization are set to receive a 233 percent and 177 percent funding increase, respectively, in the current .[44]

more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-29-2025

Iran Update, May 30, 2025

Gulf leaders are reportedly urging Iran and the United States to conclude a nuclear deal. Gulf countries likely support a US-Iran nuclear agreement because they are concerned that the collapse of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations could trigger a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran, which could in turn prompt an Iranian retaliation against Gulf states or oil trade routes. Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders reportedly urged US President Donald Trump to prioritize a nuclear agreement with Iran and prevent military escalation during Trump's recent Gulf visit in mid-May, according to three sources speaking to Axios on May 29.[11] An unspecified source told Axios that Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders warned Trump that a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities may threaten Gulf states that host US bases. Unspecified sources similarly told Reuters on May 30 that Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman told Iranian leaders in April 2025 to “seriously” consider Trump's proposal for a nuclear deal.[12]

Gulf countries may be concerned that Iran would attack US bases or energy infrastructure in the Gulf or close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for a US or Israeli strike on Iran. Senior Iranian military commanders, including Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have repeatedly threatened in recent months to strike US bases in the Middle East in response to a strike.[13] Senior Iranian military officials have also recently threatened to disrupt international shipping. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would respond to an attack by disrupting international commercial shipping.[14] Gulf leaders likely support a US-Iran nuclear agreement because they seek to avoid disruptions to international shipping and oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, given that such disruptions would cause an economic downturn.

Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear and economic issues, which illustrates cooperation between major US adversaries. Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations by supporting Iran's “right” to enrich uranium. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, stated on May 30 that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations may “require” another round of trilateral deputy-level consultations between Iran, China, and Russia.[17] Iran, China, and Russia previously met in March and April 2025 in Beijing to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[18] Ulyanov stated in early March 2025 that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk.”[19] China has separately defended “Iran's right to” peaceful nuclear energy and criticized sanctions on Iran.[20] International Atomic Energy Agency Director (IAEA) Rafael Grossi stated in March 2025 that Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[21] The Iranian, Chinese, and Russian permanent representatives to the United Nations reportedly also met on May 29 to coordinate positions on the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[22] Ulyanov emphasized the importance of trilateral coordination before the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. Ulyanov’s timeline is notable given that Iran and the United States are reportedly trying to reach a “political framework text” before the June Board of Governors meeting.[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.[24] Iran, China, and Russia previously issued a joint statement in March 2025, effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[25]

Iran and China continue to cooperate to undermine the US “maximum pressure” campaign targeting Iranian oil exports. Bloomberg reported on May 30 that vessels responsible for shipping illicit Iranian oil to China are disabling their transponders to conduct ship-to-ship transfers in order to obfuscate the origin of the shipments.[26] These vessels are disappearing from tracking systems near eastern Malaysia, a hotspot for Iranian ship-to-ship transfers.[27] The unsanctioned San Marino-flagged Vani oil tanker sailed from Shandong Province, China, to the eastern Malaysian coast and “went dark” on May 15 and reappeared on May 20 fully loaded after conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with the US-sanctioned Guyana-flagged oil tanker Nora.[28] The Nora had sailed from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Malaysian coast. Starboard Maritime Intelligence data flagged an “encounter” between the two vessels east of Singapore, which indicates that the two vessels were either less than 50m apart for 10 minutes or less than 200m apart for 30 minutes.[29] Vani is currently headed to Qingdao, China, a hub for illicit Iranian oil exports.[30] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which helps Iran circumvent US sanctions.[31]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 823,000 rials to one US dollar on May 29 to 824,000 rials to one US dollar on May 30.[34]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-30-2025

Iran Update, June 2, 2025

Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 133.8 kilograms, or 3.2 significant quantities, since February 2025, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[1] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons. The Associated Press reported on May 31 that Iran possesses 408.6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 9.8 significant quantities, as of May 17.[2] A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[3] Iran had 274.8 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 6.6 significant quantities, in February 2025, by comparison. The IAEA report added that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,247.6 kilograms, which marks a 953.2-kilogram increase since February 2025.[4] The IAEA report does not provide a month-to-month breakdown of Iran's uranium enrichment activity. It is therefore unclear whether Iranian uranium enrichment increased, decreased, or remained the same following the start of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12. Iran has previously increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to try to gain leverage in negotiations.[5] It is unclear, however, why Iran would pursue rapid enrichment amid the current US-Iran negotiations and potentially increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The IAEA report comes as Iran has taken other measures to expand its nuclear program in recent months. Iran has installed new cascades of advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. Iran has also conducted metallurgical testing and computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[6]

The IAEA separately published a comprehensive report on May 31 that states that Iran's cooperation with the IAEA has been “less than satisfactory” in “a number of respects.”[7] The report noted that Iran has failed to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve concerns about undeclared nuclear sites and material in Iran. The IAEA confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at three locations—Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, and Turquzabad—until the early 2000s.[8] The IAEA published the comprehensive report on May 31 in response to an IAEA censure resolution in November 2024. The censure resolution was proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany).[9] The IAEA’s quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirm Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.

The United States and the E3 are planning to submit a resolution that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to the recent IAEA reports, according to unspecified diplomats.[10] The United States and the E3 will reportedly submit the resolution at the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. The resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[11] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution declaring Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[12] The Board of Governors referred Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006, which led to the imposition of sanctions on Iran.[13] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 30 that Iran would respond to a resolution by “expand[ing] nuclear work.”[14]

Iran is likely trying to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on June 1, during which Araghchi asked Grossi to explain “Iran's cooperation with the [IAEA]” at the Board of Governors meeting and warned that Iran would respond to “any inappropriate move by the European parties,” almost certainly referring to snapback sanctions.[15] Araghchi separately met with Grossi in Cairo, Egypt, on June 2.[16] Araghchi and Grossi’s meeting comes amid rising tensions between Iran and the E3. The E3 has threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025. An Iranian hardline outlet described a recent meeting between Iran and the E3 on May 16 as “tense.”[17] The same outlet claimed that the E3 demanded that any future agreement include a JCPOA-style snapback clause—a demand that Iranian officials have condemned as “illegal.”[18] Iranian officials have previously threatened a “serious response” if the E3 triggers snapback sanctions.[19] Iran could increase its near weapons-grade uranium stockpile or further expand its nuclear program in other ways in response to snapback sanctions.

The United States presented a written nuclear proposal to Iran via Oman on May 31.[20] Unspecified officials told the New York Times on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium comprised of Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Axios similarly reported on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Axios reported that the United States and IAEA would oversee the consortium and that the United States wants the consortium's enrichment facilities to be located outside of Iran, citing an unspecified source. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson emphasized on June 2 that a regional consortium “cannot in any way replace enrichment inside Iran.”

It is unclear if the United States would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil if it agreed to join a regional consortium. The New York Times reported that the US nuclear proposal calls on Iran to completely cease uranium enrichment. Axios reported on June 2 that the proposal would allow “low-level uranium enrichment on Iranian soil” for an unspecified period of time.[21] Axios reported that Iran would reduce uranium enrichment to 3 percent, which is below the 3.67 percent limit in the JCPOA. The proposal also reportedly bars Iran from building new enrichment facilities conducting centrifuge research and development, and enriching uranium at underground facilities for an unspecified period of time. Under the proposal, Iran would limit enrichment activity at above-ground facilities and “dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium.”

Iran is reportedly planning to reject the US nuclear proposal, which would likely further stall the US-Iran negotiations.[22] An unspecified Iranian diplomat close to the Iranian negotiating team told Reuters on June 2 that Iran is drafting a negative response to the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” due to its failure to address Iranian interests or soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.[23] The source added that Iran's nuclear negotiations committee, which is under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, assessed that the US proposal is “completely one-sided” and does not serve Iran's interests.[24] An Iranian expert close to the regime similarly stated on June 1 that the contents of the US nuclear proposal decrease the chances of Iran and the United States reaching a new deal.[25]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office called on the international community to “act now” against Iran following the release of the IAEA reports on May 31. Netanyahu's office described the reports as “a clear warning sign” that Iran is “totally determined to complete its nuclear weapons program.”[26] These statements come amid reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear negotiations collapse..[27] US President Donald Trump recently called on Netanyahu to avoid taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. [28]

The Iranian armed forces are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The Financial Times reported on June 1 that Western intelligence and satellite imagery indicate that Iran has repositioned surface-to-air missile launchers, including S-300 air defense systems, near nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow.[29] Israeli airstrikes into Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran's four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable, and it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems. The IDF rendered an Iranian S-300 inoperable in April 2024 by striking the S-300’s tomb stone engagement radar.[30] Iran displayed an S-300 with a “new, Iranian-designed” radar in February 2025.[31] The Artesh Air Defense Force conducted air defense exercises in northern and western Iran in January 2025, including near Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor.[32]

Iranian commanders also continue to inspect air defense sites ahead of a potential Israeli or US strike on Iran. Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and his deputy, Brigadier General Ali Akbar Talebzadeh, inspected the 10th Tactical Air Base in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on June 2.[33] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard recently inspected Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and May 30.[34] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi conducted an inspection at the same air defense zone on May 16.[35]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-2-2025

Iran Update, June 3, 2025

Iran is likely continuing to try to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on June 2 that the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a resolution at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to recent IAEA reports.[11] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with 17 ambassadors from IAEA Board of Governors member states and separately with the E3 ambassadors to the United Nations (UN) on June 3.[12] Gharibabadi warned them against implementing “any politically motivated action” against Iran. Gharibabadi likely sought to convince the IAEA Board of Governors member states to vote against a non-compliance resolution at the upcoming meeting. A non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism. The E3 has recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025.[13]

Gharibabadi held a separate meeting with the Chinese and Russian ambassadors to the UN on June 3, likely to encourage them to challenge efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[14] Any JCPOA signatory (the United States, the E3, China, and Russia) can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[15] China and Russia, therefore, have limited ability to block the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran. China and Russia are also members of the IAEA Board of Governors and could vote against a non-compliance resolution. There are, however, 35 members in the Board of Governors, and an IAEA resolution requires a two-thirds majority to be approved.[16]

Artesh Ideological and Political Organization head Abbas Mohammad Hassani threatened on June 3 that Iran would target US ships in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in “the event of [US] mischief,” likely referring to potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[17] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.[18] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Strait of Hormuz in early May 2025.[19] Senior Iranian military officials have also inspected defense and combat capabilities at military bases and air defense sites across southeastern Iran in recent weeks.[20] This activity is likely part of a broader Iranian effort to simultaneously deter and prepare for a potential strike on Iran. Hassani’s threat to attack US ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean is consistent with Iranian aspirations to develop a naval presence beyond the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[21]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025

Iran Update, June 4, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected the recent US nuclear proposal because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[1] Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse. Axios reported on June 2 that the US proposal would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil during the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[2] The United States reportedly seeks to establish the consortium outside of Iran. Iran would be required to halt all enrichment after the establishment of the consortium. Khamenei delivered a speech on June 4 in which he stated that enrichment in Iran “is a red line.”[3] Khamenei claimed that a nuclear industry without enrichment is “practically worthless” and emphasized that Iran would not become “dependent” on foreign countries for uranium.[4] Under the US proposal, Iran would receive uranium for civilian nuclear purposes as part of the regional consortium but would not be allowed to independently enrich uranium on Iranian soil after the consortium is formed.

Iran may accept the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium if it operates on Iranian soil. An unspecified senior Iranian official told Axios on June 3 that Iran is open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium’s enrichment facility is located in Iran.[5] Two unspecified Iranian officials separately told the New York Times on June 4 that Iran is planning to “bargain” for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands in the Persian Gulf to maintain its right to enrichment on Iranian soil.[6] An unspecified Arab diplomatic source told Israeli media on June 3 that the United States may propose placing the consortium on one of the disputed islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, or Lesser Tunb.[7] Iran seeks for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands, rather than the disputed islands, given that the former are internationally recognized as Iranian territory while the latter are claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

The Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times added that Iran is open to the consortium idea because Iran “does not want talks to fail.”[8] It is in Iran’s interest to prolong the nuclear talks, given that it likely calculates that prolonging the talks will delay or prevent snapback sanctions and a potential US or Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump accused Iran of “slow-walking [its] decision” after Khamenei rejected the US proposal on June 4. Iran has not yet submitted a formal response to the US proposal, which could reflect internal debates in Iran about how to reject the US zero enrichment demand in the proposal while also ensuring that the negotiations do not collapse.

Likely Iranian-aligned militants launched a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[9] This attack marks the first time that militants have attacked Israel from Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[10] Militants launched two rockets from Tasil, Daraa Province, into the southern Golan Heights.[11] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) briefly operated in Tasil in April 2025.[12] Israeli media reported on June 3 that the rockets landed in open areas and did not cause any casualties.[13] The IDF launched several retaliatory air and artillery strikes targeting Syrian military sites and towns in southwestern Syria on June 3.[14] The targeted military sites included the new Syrian army’s 121st Brigade base near Kanaker, Rif Dimashq Province, and the 175th Brigade base near Izraa, Daraa Province.[15]

Two likely Iranian-aligned groups separately claimed responsibility for the June 3 rocket attack.[16] Neither group has previously conducted any attacks targeting Israel. The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack and released a video that reportedly showed the rockets landing in the Golan Heights.[17] The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades is a Hamas-aligned Palestinian resistance group that announced its formation on June 3.[18] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave also claimed responsibility for the attack and published a video of the alleged rockets in their launching positions on June 3.[19] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave is an anti-Israel militia formed in January 2025 that uses iconography widely associated with or inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.[20] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave Spokesperson Abu al Qasim gave a speech on June 4 in which he stated that the Syrian government has become a “defeatist project demanding normalization” with Israel to gain “some personal and moral privileges.”[21] Qasim stated that this attack was a “clear warning” and that the group will conduct additional attacks targeting Israel in the future.[22] Qasim also noted that the group will attack “whoever tries to strip Syria of its resistance identity.”[23]

This attack may have been an attempt to fuel tension between Israel and Syria in order to undermine recent deconfliction and diplomatic efforts between the two countries. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz posted on X on June 3 that Israel holds Syrian President Ahmed al Shara “directly responsible for every threat” and attack on Israel from Syrian territory.[24] The IDF also stated on June 3 that the Syrian transitional government will continue to bear consequences “as long as hostile activity continues from its territory.”[25] The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement that reaffirmed that Syria “has not and will not” pose a threat to any country in the region.[26] The ministry added that some external actors are seeking to destabilize the region to advance their own interests.[27] Israel has repeatedly expressed concern regarding threats to Israel from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[28] The IDF has conducted ground and air operations in southern Syria since December 2024 with the aim of eliminating these threats, including Iranian-backed networks in Syria.[29] The Syrian transitional government has repeatedly called on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory to the 1974 deconfliction line.[30] Israel and Syria have taken steps in recent weeks to ease tensions. Several unspecified sources told Western media on May 27 that Israeli and Syrian officials are holding direct talks on joint security and “broader political understandings” to calm tensions and prevent further conflict.[31] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara also reportedly expressed willingness to normalize relations with Israel during meetings with US officials in April 2025.[32] Renewed tension between Israel and Syria could undermine the countries’ recent efforts to prevent military escalation and reach a political and diplomatic understanding.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025

Iran Update, June 5, 2025

Russia continues to position itself as a mediator in the US–Iran nuclear negotiations. Russia’s mediation of the US–Iran talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests given Russia’s alignment with Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on June 4 that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to “participate” in the US–Iran nuclear negotiations.[1] Russia’s offer to mediate the negotiations comes after Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly rejected a recent US nuclear proposal to Iran because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[2] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US–Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse.[3] Iran and Russia have held several meetings since March 2025 to discuss the dispute between Iran and the United States over Iran’s nuclear program.[4] Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations and the recent US proposal by supporting Iran’s right to enrich uranium.[5] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov claimed in early March 2025 that Iran’s production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk.”[6] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.[7] Russia’s support for Iran’s domestic uranium enrichment is inconsistent with the stated US position against uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium.[8]

Iran and Russia have deepened political and military cooperation in recent years, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Iran has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by providing Russia with Fateh-360 ballistic missiles and launchers and Shahed drones.[9] Iran reportedly purchased Russian Su-35 fighter jets in January 2025, though Russia has not yet delivered the Su-35s to Iran.[10] Russia has also supported and cooperated with Iran’s Axis of Resistance in recent years. This cooperation has included working with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces in the Middle East.[11] Russia also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel during the October 7 War, including by providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on international shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[12] Iran and Russia signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2025, which further illustrates their close collaboration and alignment in working to erode US global influence.[13]

Senior Iranian military commanders continue to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran’s Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran Province on June 5 to evaluate military units and defense capabilities at the site.[19] Sabahi Fard also inspected air defense positions near former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran. Sabahi Fard may have inspected the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site in October 2024.[20] The brigade is located roughly 8 miles from Khomeini’s mausoleum and about 7 miles from the Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport. Sabahi Fard has inspected at least 12 Iranian air defense sites across Iran since April 2025.[21]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-5-2025

Iran Update, June 5, 2025

Iran is continuing to cooperate with China to replenish its solid-fuel ballistic missile stockpile after Israel destroyed Iranian solid-fuel production sites in October 2024.[1] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[2] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on June 5 that Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months.[3] Ammonium perchlorate comprises around 70 percent of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles.[4] The sources stated that an Iranian firm, Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Company, ordered the material from a Hong Kong-based company. This report follows several sodium perchlorate transfers from China to Iran in recent months.[5] Sodium perchlorate can be converted into ammonium perchlorate. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels, Golbon and Jairan, delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[6] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which oversees part of Iran's missile research and development, took delivery of the cargo.[7] Iran also previously engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire ammonium perchlorate from China.[8]

The sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the new ammonium perchlorate shipments could support the production of up to 800 ballistic missiles. Western sources previously estimated that 1,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can fuel up to 260 medium-range ballistic missiles.[9] If the 800 ballistic missiles that the Wall Street Journal referred to are medium-range missiles, this would suggest that Iran purchased around 3,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate from China.[10] Iran may have purchased this amount of ammonium perchlorate to compensate for the loss of some sodium perchlorate that China recently shipped to Iran. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that the explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26 destroyed some of the sodium perchlorate that China shipped to Iran in early 2025.[11]

Iran could provide its proxies and partners, including the Houthis and Russia, with new ballistic missiles that it produces or materials that are needed to build ballistic missiles. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that Iran plans to send part of the ammonium perchlorate to Iranian-backed militias, including the Houthis in Yemen.[12] Iran has previously exported ammonium perchlorate to members of the Axis of Resistance. The US Navy intercepted a vessel in the Gulf of Oman that was carrying around 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate from Iran to Yemen in November 2024, for example.[13] The recent shipments may also improve Iran's ability to provide ballistic missiles to Russia for its war with Ukraine. Iran began sending Fateh-360 ballistic missiles, which are solid-fuel missiles, to Russia in September 2023.[14]

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9. The resolution will reportedly give Iran time to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared nuclear sites.[15] The IAEA’s recent quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirmed Iran's non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.[16] An unspecified senior Western diplomat told the Associated Press on June 5 that the goal of the planned non-compliance resolution is to “resolve the [Iranian nuclear] issue.”[17] The diplomat stated that the Board of Governors will not immediately refer the non-compliance resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that Iran will have an unspecified amount of time to fulfill its safeguards obligations. The Board of Governors will reportedly hold an extraordinary meeting in the summer to pass a resolution to refer Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC if Iran fails to cooperate with the IAEA by that time. The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution that declared Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[18] The Board of Governors later referred Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[19]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on X on June 6 that Iran would respond “forcefully” to any IAEA Board of Governors resolution.[20] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors’ November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[21] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions.

Israeli officials informed the United States that Israel will not strike Iran unless US President Donald Trump signals that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations have failed, according to two unspecified Israeli sources.[22] An unspecified Israeli source told Axios on June 5 that Israeli officials said that Israel will not “surprise” the United States with a military strike on Iran. A separate Israeli source added that Israeli officials said that there is “no logic” in attacking Iran if a “good diplomatic solution” is reached. Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22.[23] US officials told Axios that the next round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations is not expected to take place this weekend.[24]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-6-2025

Iran Update, June 9, 2025

Iran continues to signal that it will reject the recent US nuclear proposal. The United States recently sent a proposal to Iran that would require Iran to halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil after the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[1] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei criticized the US proposal on June 9 and stated that Iran will soon present a counter-proposal via Oman.[2] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 8 that “no rational mind would accept” the US proposal.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran's continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran negotiations to collapse.[4] US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call on June 9 amid growing indications from Iranian officials that Iran is planning to reject the US proposal.[5] Trump stated after the phone call that Iran and the United States will meet on June 12, which corresponds with the reported US deadline for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[6] Netanyahu reportedly convened a security cabinet meeting to discuss Iran following the phone call.[7]

The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement following Trump and Netanyahu's phone call on June 9 in which it threatened to attack Israel's “covert nuclear facilities” in response to a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[8] The SNSC claimed that Iran would attack Israeli nuclear facilities using a “treasure trove” of sensitive information about Israeli nuclear facilities that Iran reportedly recently obtained and exfiltrated to Iran.[9] Iranian officials announced Iran's alleged acquisition of this sensitive information on June 7.[10] Iran's claim that it obtained intelligence about Israeli nuclear facilities is likely an information operation that seeks to advance several objectives. A US journalist reported on June 4 that Iran may include a demand for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East in its counter-proposal to the United States, citing two experts in contact with Iranian negotiators.[11] Iran may calculate that it can use its alleged acquisition of “sensitive information” about Israeli nuclear facilities to bolster its argument for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Iran may also use this information operation to reinforce its threat to attack Israeli nuclear facilities in retaliation for a potential Israeli strike on Iran in order to try to deter such a strike.[12]

Iran threatened to expand its nuclear program if the International Atomic Energy Agency passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors is meeting between June 9 and 13, during which the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) intend to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran.[13] The United States and E3 drafted a non-compliance resolution in response to the May 31 IAEA comprehensive report that unscored Iran's “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on June 8 that Iran has prepared “a list of countermeasures,” including “technical” countermeasures, if the IAEA passes the non-compliance resolution.[14] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors’ November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[15] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[16]

Iran is conducting an information operation to undermine the recent IAEA comprehensive report, likely to deter diplomatic and military action against Iran. The IAEA’s recent comprehensive report confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at four locations—Turquzabad, Marivan, Varamin, and Lavizan-Shian—until the early 2000s.[17] The Institute for Science and International Security published an analysis of the IAEA’s comprehensive report on June 6 and highlighted that Iran conducted several implosion tests essential to building a nuclear weapon at Marivan in 2003.[18] The IAEA stated that Iran conducted these tests as part of its broader plan to conduct a cold test, which is typically the final test of a nuclear weapon implosion development program. The release of the IAEA’s comprehensive report follows reports that a “secret team” of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is “exploring” a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a “matter of months.”[19] Iran responded to the comprehensive report by claiming on June 7 that Israel sabotaged and contaminated its nuclear facilities at these four sites.[20] Iran likely accused Israel of sabotage to obfuscate Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA and to try to deter a non-compliance resolution, potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran, and snapback sanctions.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-9-2025

Iran Update, June 10, 2025

Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi told Iranian state media on June 10 that Iran is still preparing its response to the recent US nuclear proposal but described the counter-proposal as offering a “framework for an agreement.”[13] Ravanchi stated that Iran is not currently interested in presenting a “very long...comprehensive” proposal. Ravanchi added that Iran and the United States can engage in “more detailed negotiations” after they agree on a framework agreement. A senior US official told Axios on June 10 that the United States has received indications that Iran will reject the recent US proposal while signaling interest in continuing the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[14] Iran likely wants to continue negotiations in order to delay snapback sanctions or strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, which may give Iran an incentive to prolong negotiations. Iran’s push for a framework agreement and continued negotiations also comes ahead of US President Donald Trump’s 60-day deadline, which expires on June 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[15] The United States and Iran will reportedly hold a sixth round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations this week. Axios reported on June 10 that the United States and Iran will hold the sixth round of nuclear talks in Oslo on June 13 or in Muscat on June 15.[16]

Iran continues to emphasize air defense modernization amid potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Northwest Air Defense Region Deputy Commander Brigadier General Jafar Saleh inspected the Shahid Tohidi radar station in Bileh Savar, Ardabil Province, on June 10, to evaluate defense capabilities at the site.[37] Advisor to the Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Abazar Jokar separately highlighted the domestic development of the Iranian-made Bavar-373 system. Jokar confirmed that Iran developed Bavar-373 after Russia failed to deliver S-300s.[38] Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable. CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that Russia can supply Iran with new S-300 components, given Russia’s need for S-300s for its war with Ukraine.[39]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 825,000 rials to one US dollar on June 9 to 820,500 rials to one US dollar on June 10.[40]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-10-2025

Iran Update, June 11, 2025

Some reports suggest that Iran is opposed to several provisions of a recent US nuclear negotiations proposal. The time and date of the sixth round of nuclear talks have not yet been announced. The United States hopes the sixth round of negotiations will occur on June 12, while Iran insists on June 14.[9] An Iranian expert close to the Iranian regime claimed on June 11 that several provisions of the US nuclear proposal were so “maximalist, excessive, and even humiliating” that they compelled Iran to issue a firm and proportional response. The “proportional response” may refer to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s categorical rejection of the recent US nuclear proposal, which would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on its own soil.[10] This Iranian response may have influenced Trump's remarks about the decreasing likelihood of a deal.[11] Trump separately told Fox News on June 11 that Iran has become “much more aggressive” in the negotiations.[12] Unspecified senior US officials told Fox News that Iran appears to be delaying the process while it advances its nuclear program.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), which monitors maritime security issues, also reacted on June 11 to increased tensions in the region. UKMTO published an advisory on June 11 that warned mariners about a rise in military activity in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman due “to heightened tensions in the region.”[13] UKMTO advised vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Strait of Hormuz to exercise caution and report any incidents or suspicious activity.[14] The advisory comes amid previous alert reports and Iranian threats to international commercial shipping since May 2025. UKMTO previously reported on May 18 that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours.[15] Iran has historically conducted GPS jamming to create conditions to seize ships that inadvertently enter its territorial waters.[16] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would respond to any attack by disrupting international commercial shipping.[17] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami also inspected IRGC naval units in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf islands on June 11 to evaluate units’ readiness.[18] Salami stated that the IRGC Navy is “fully equipped and operationally ready” to respond to any threat and that it has prepared specific responses for all scenarios. Any Iranian response to any military action taken against Iran would likely include operations in the Persian Gulf.

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a non-compliance resolution that declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 11.[24] The IAEA Board of Governors has not yet voted on the resolution and will resume its meeting on June 12.[25] The non-compliance resolution will reportedly give Iran an unspecified period to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared Iranian nuclear sites.[26] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar non-compliance resolution against Iran in September 2005.[27] The Board of Governors later referred Iran's non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[28] The Board of Governors could similarly refer the new non-compliance resolution to the UNSC, assuming the Board of Governors passes the resolution. Such an action could lead to the imposition of further UN sanctions on Iran. The E3 could separately use the non-compliance resolution in future efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[29]

Iran has threatened to expand its nuclear program if the IAEA passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. A UK-based outlet reported on June 11 that it has “learned” that Iran will “likely” open a new uranium enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution.[30] This report is consistent with statements from Iranian officials threatening to take “technical” counter-measures in response to an IAEA non-compliance resolution.[31] Iran has previously announced it would take steps to expand its nuclear program in retaliation for IAEA resolutions.[32] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program at this time would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[33]

Russia offered to accept Iran's “excess” enriched uranium stockpile as part of a potential US-Iran nuclear agreement.[34] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on June 11 that Russia is “ready to provide assistance” to the United States and Iran regarding the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[35] Ryabkov added that Russia could remove Iran's “excess nuclear material” and downblend it.[36] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium. Iran previously sent 25,000 pounds of its 20 percent enriched uranium to Russia in December 2015 as part of the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal.[37] Russia's offer comes amid recent Russian efforts to acquire a more influential role within US-Iran negotiations, including repeated offers to mediate the talks.[38] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia's involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia's alignment with Iran.[39] Russia has opposed the stated US demands in the negotiations by supporting Iran's right to enrich uranium and has tried to interfere with US-E3 attempts to declare Iran non-compliant with IAEA standards.[40] A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on June 11 that Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov delivered an “extremely long statement” at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 11, likely to delay a vote on the non-compliance resolution against Iran.[41] It is notable that Russia is simultaneously offering to support the US-Iran nuclear negotiations while trying to help Iran delay the vote on a non-compliance resolution and avoid further sanctions.

The Iranian rial depreciated from 820,500 rials to one US dollar on June 10 to 824,500 rials to one US dollar on June 11.[53]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-11-2025

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