Iran Update, May 28, 2025
A US journalist reported on May 29 that Iran and the United States are trying to reach a “political framework text” before the next International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10.[1] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, although Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, which expires in October 2025, allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[2] The IAEA releases a quarterly verification and monitoring report on Iran’s nuclear program.[3] The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the IAEA’s next quarterly report at the June Board of Governors meeting. The IAEA previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” about Iranian nuclear activities in addition to the IAEA’s regular verification and monitoring reports.[4] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on May 28 that the IAEA will release the comprehensive report “soon.”[5] The IAEA’s next quarterly report and the comprehensive report will both almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA, which will lay the foundation for the E3 to impose snapback sanctions. The E3 recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if Iran and the United States do not reach a “substantial deal” by then.[6] Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions by demonstrating Iran’s willingness to resolve the nuclear issue.[7]
IAEA Deputy Director General and head of the IAEA Safeguards Department Massimo Aparo inspected two undeclared Iranian nuclear sites in Tehran Province on May 28 as part of the March 2023 IAEA-Iran Joint Statement.[8] The joint statement identified three locations in Iran that contain undeclared nuclear material and equipment: Turquzabad, Varamin, and Marivan.[9] The IAEA reported in May 2023 that Marivan is “no longer an outstanding issue,” which suggests that Aparo visited the Turquzabad and Varamin sites during his visit to Iran.[10] The most recent IAEA Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement report from February 2025 stated that there was no progress toward implementing the March 2023 Joint Statement between November 2024 to February 2025.[11]
Hezbollah appears to be cooperating with the Lebanese state to disarm itself in southern Lebanon while likely attempting to regenerate its forces north of the Litani River. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told the Wall Street Journal on May 28 that the Lebanese state has achieved about 80 percent of its objectives to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[19] Unspecified senior Arab officials said that the United States has provided Israeli intelligence to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) about Hezbollah’s remaining stockpiles and positions in southern Lebanon.[20] An unspecified Israeli military official said that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is “pleased by” the LAF’s success in disarming Hezbollah.[21] Hezbollah has reportedly cooperated with the LAF to reassert state control over southern Lebanon since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, including by reportedly ordering its fighters who are not from southern Lebanon to vacate positions and allowing the LAF to take control of the area.[22] Unspecified senior Lebanese security officials confirmed on May 28 that Hezbollah has cooperated with the LAF to disarm it in southern Lebanon.[23] Hezbollah’s cooperation with the LAF in the south likely reflects its degraded state and its prioritization of “sheltering and rebuilding” its forces.[24] Hezbollah also likely seeks to focus its near-term efforts on recalibrating its domestic political strategy and resecuring its political future in Lebanon.
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini expressed concern about Iran’s response to perceived “cognitive warfare.”[40] Iranian officials use the term “cognitive warfare” to describe Iran’s enemies’ alleged efforts to conduct psychological operations and instill feelings of distrust and hopeless among the Iranian population in order to facilitate regime collapse. Naeini stated that Iran faces “serious challenges” confronting “cognitive warfare,” particularly “cognitive warfare” that is directed at Iranian youth. Naeini claimed that Iran’s enemies seek to undermine Iran’s national and cultural identity through narrative manipulation, media distortion, and perception warfare. Naeini urged structural reforms to strengthen the regime’s narrative control and cultural resilience. Naeini also called for intensifying “explanation jihad” efforts to counter cognitive threats. “Explanation jihad” is an Iranian regime theory that indoctrinating and ideologizing the population, especially Iranian youth, will increase public support for the regime and reduce anti-regime sentiment.[41] Iranian officials have historically sought to expand ideologization efforts to confront anti-regime sentiment rather than address the core issues and grievances that generate this sentiment.[42] Iran’s proposed 2025–2026 budget significantly increases funding for religious and ideological institutions, which highlights the regime’s efforts to expand ideologization efforts.[43] The IRGC Baghiyatollah al Azam Sociocultural Headquarters and Islamic Propaganda Organization are set to receive a 233 percent and 177 percent funding increase, respectively, in the current .[44]
more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-29-2025
Gulf leaders are reportedly urging Iran and the United States to conclude a nuclear deal. Gulf countries likely support a US-Iran nuclear agreement because they are concerned that the collapse of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations could trigger a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran, which could in turn prompt an Iranian retaliation against Gulf states or oil trade routes. Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders reportedly urged US President Donald Trump to prioritize a nuclear agreement with Iran and prevent military escalation during Trump's recent Gulf visit in mid-May, according to three sources speaking to Axios on May 29.[11] An unspecified source told Axios that Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari leaders warned Trump that a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities may threaten Gulf states that host US bases. Unspecified sources similarly told Reuters on May 30 that Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman told Iranian leaders in April 2025 to “seriously” consider Trump's proposal for a nuclear deal.[12]
Gulf countries may be concerned that Iran would attack US bases or energy infrastructure in the Gulf or close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for a US or Israeli strike on Iran. Senior Iranian military commanders, including Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have repeatedly threatened in recent months to strike US bases in the Middle East in response to a strike.[13] Senior Iranian military officials have also recently threatened to disrupt international shipping. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would respond to an attack by disrupting international commercial shipping.[14] Gulf leaders likely support a US-Iran nuclear agreement because they seek to avoid disruptions to international shipping and oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, given that such disruptions would cause an economic downturn.
Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear and economic issues, which illustrates cooperation between major US adversaries. Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations by supporting Iran's “right” to enrich uranium. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, stated on May 30 that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations may “require” another round of trilateral deputy-level consultations between Iran, China, and Russia.[17] Iran, China, and Russia previously met in March and April 2025 in Beijing to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[18] Ulyanov stated in early March 2025 that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk.”[19] China has separately defended “Iran's right to” peaceful nuclear energy and criticized sanctions on Iran.[20] International Atomic Energy Agency Director (IAEA) Rafael Grossi stated in March 2025 that Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[21] The Iranian, Chinese, and Russian permanent representatives to the United Nations reportedly also met on May 29 to coordinate positions on the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[22] Ulyanov emphasized the importance of trilateral coordination before the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. Ulyanov’s timeline is notable given that Iran and the United States are reportedly trying to reach a “political framework text” before the June Board of Governors meeting.[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States before the meeting would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.[24] Iran, China, and Russia previously issued a joint statement in March 2025, effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[25]
Iran and China continue to cooperate to undermine the US “maximum pressure” campaign targeting Iranian oil exports. Bloomberg reported on May 30 that vessels responsible for shipping illicit Iranian oil to China are disabling their transponders to conduct ship-to-ship transfers in order to obfuscate the origin of the shipments.[26] These vessels are disappearing from tracking systems near eastern Malaysia, a hotspot for Iranian ship-to-ship transfers.[27] The unsanctioned San Marino-flagged Vani oil tanker sailed from Shandong Province, China, to the eastern Malaysian coast and “went dark” on May 15 and reappeared on May 20 fully loaded after conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with the US-sanctioned Guyana-flagged oil tanker Nora.[28] The Nora had sailed from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Malaysian coast. Starboard Maritime Intelligence data flagged an “encounter” between the two vessels east of Singapore, which indicates that the two vessels were either less than 50m apart for 10 minutes or less than 200m apart for 30 minutes.[29] Vani is currently headed to Qingdao, China, a hub for illicit Iranian oil exports.[30] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which helps Iran circumvent US sanctions.[31]
The Iranian rial depreciated from 823,000 rials to one US dollar on May 29 to 824,000 rials to one US dollar on May 30.[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-30-2025