Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, February 18, 2025

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces conducted the second phase of the “Great Prophet 19” military exercise in southwestern Iran on February 18.[59] The exercise reportedly focused on defending against extra-regional threats. The Saberin Special Forces Brigades carried out a nighttime airborne deployment with IRGC Aerospace Force Ilyushin-76 aircraft and conducted specialized aerial supply drops and rapid helicopter deployments.[60] Iranian officials unveiled and tested new First Person View (FPV) drones and missile systems, including upgraded Fajr-5 ballistic missiles, reportedly capable of penetrating one-meter thick concrete.[61]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah in Tehran on February 18.[62] Khamenei congratulated PIJ on its “victory” and praised the “unity“ of Palestinian resistance groups. Al Nakhalah thanked Khamenei and former Lebanese Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah for their support.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-18-2025

Iran Update, February 19, 2025

Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.[30] Bloomberg reported on February 18 that Iranian oil exports to China increased by 82 percent between January 1 and February 1, citing data from intelligence firm Kpler.[31] Iranian oil exports to China previously peaked just before US President Donald Trump imposed “maximum pressure“ sanctions on Iran for the first time in 2018.[32] Unspecified traders in the oil market told Bloomberg that Iran and China have increasingly used “ship-to-ship transfers” and “alternative receiving terminals” to confront logistical issues caused by US sanctions.[33] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on February 14 that the United States aims to reduce Iranian oil exports by more than 90 percent.[34]

Iran seeks to increase economic cooperation with Russia to mitigate the impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy, but it is unclear whether this cooperation will meaningfully improve Iranian economic conditions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin met with Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on February 18 to discuss monetary and banking cooperation.[35] The officials will discuss exchange rates and the implementation of the second and third phases of the Mir-Shetab banking system.[36] Iran and Russia implemented the first phase of the Mir-Shetab system in November 2024 to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[37] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in Tehran on February 18 to discuss the implementation of the Russo-Iranian comprehensive strategic agreement.[38] Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh and Russian Transport Minister Roman Vladimirovich Starovoyt also signed the 2025 Roadmap for Transport and Transit Cooperation in Tehran on February 18.[39] The agreement includes the completion of the Rasht-Astara Railway, which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[40] Iran and Russia have discussed the construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway for several years, and it is unclear whether this agreement will accelerate the construction of the railway.[41]

The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19.[42] The sources denied Iraqi media reports that the Syrian interim government asked Iran to resume relations. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.[43]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces concluded the second phase of the “Great Prophet 19” military exercise in southwestern Iran on February 19.[67] The IRGC Ground Forces paratroopers conducted a jump from an Antonov-74 aircraft.[68] The IRGC Ground Forces also unveiled a tank protection system that is reportedly equipped with cage armor and an electronic warfare system designed to counter missile and drone attacks.[69] The IRGC Ground Forces have probably observed the use of cage armor in Ukraine, but the Russians could also provide the IRGC Ground Forces with lessons learned to improve these capabilities. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims, and Iranian officials have previously exaggerated Iran’s military capabilities.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-19-2025

Iran Update, February 20, 2025

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Several senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise” attack against Israel.[1] Iran named its previous two direct attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 “True Promise I” and “True Promise II,” respectively.[2] Iranian military officials initially threatened to conduct a third direct attack on Israel after the IDF conducted strikes in Iran in late October 2024.[3] These threats gradually subsided in the weeks following the IDF strikes, however. IRGC commanders have likely resurfaced these threats in recent days to try to deter an Israeli attack on Iran and to reassure the Iranian population that the IRGC would respond to any Israeli attack on Iranian territory.

Hajji Zadeh highlighted Iran's vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran's “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”[4] Hajji Zadeh was likely referring to the S-300 air defense systems that the IDF struck in October 2024. The October 2024 IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[5] Hajji Zadeh added that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “first follow-up” during meetings with Hajji Zadeh, Salami, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri is about the issue of “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems.[6] Khamenei’s prioritization of this issue highlights his concern about a potential external attack on Iran. Hajji Zadeh claimed that Iran will install “anti-ballistic [missile] defense systems” in Tehran and other major Iranian cities in the next Persian calendar year, which begins in late March 2025.[7]

Senior Iranian officials met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah in Tehran on February 19 and 20. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met separately with Nakhalah on February 19.[70] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami separately met with Nakhalah on February 20.[71]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf discussed developing economic relations between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia during a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart on the sidelines of the Asian Parliamentary Assembly in Baku, Azerbaijan, on February 20.[72] Ghalibaf emphasized that Iran seeks to develop transportation routes, including the International North-South Transport Corridor, to increase regional trade.[73] Iran opposes Turkish and Azerbaijani efforts to construct the Zangezur corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[74] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Ghalibaf also emphasized that Iran and Azerbaijan must prioritize diplomacy given “new conditions” in the South Caucasus.[75] It is possible that Ghalibaf was referring to the Armenian parliament's recent adoption of a bill to initiate Armenia's application to join the European Union.[76] Senior Iranian officials have previously expressed concern about growing NATO and Turkish influence in the Caucasus.[77]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2025

Iran Update, February 21, 2025

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah in Tehran on February 20.[48] Bagheri said that Iran has never stopped supporting Palestine and the Axis of Resistance and will continue to do so.

Brigadier General Ebrahim Jabbari—adviser to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander—threatened to attack “all [US] bases and ships in the region” during a speech at the Great Prophet 19 military exercise on February 20.[49] Jabbari said that Iran would conduct a third True Promise attack against Israel and “destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa.”[50] Jabbari’s statements echo recent statements from senior IRGC commanders threatening to conduct another missile attack on Israel.[51] CTP-ISW previously assessed that IRGC commanders have likely resurfaced these threats in recent days to try to deter an Israeli attack on Iran and to reassure the Iranian population that the IRGC would respond to any attack on Iran.

Senior Iranian officials have continued to reiterate their desire for “resistance” militias to form in Syria and oppose the interim government. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian stated on February 21 that Israel occupied Syria as the result of a failed campaign in the Gaza Strip, and the “occupation” of Syria would lead to the emergence of a new resistance.[52] Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, suggested in recent months that Syrian youth should arm and mobilize against the interim government.[53] Khamenei said in December 2024 that zealous Syrian youth would liberate “occupied areas” of Syria, drawing a parallel to Iraqi youth who, with support and direction from the IRGC Quds Force, attacked and killed hundreds of US service members between 2003 and 2011.[54]

The Iranian rial remained valued at 930,700 rials to one US dollar on February 21.[55]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-21-2025

Iranian economist blames US for plunging rial under ‘economic ‘war’

Iran’s national currency has plummeted further as the economic crisis continues, with the exchange rate hitting 950,000 rials per US dollar on Saturday, dropping 14% since last month and 86% year on year.

The rial’s steep decline has fueled inflation expectations, which have risen sharply since late December, when the dollar was still around 760,000 rials. Market concerns have intensified following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s recent speech rejecting negotiations with the United States.

With the Iranian New Year (March 20) approaching, demand for imported goods—requiring foreign currency—is likely to push rates even higher. The price of gold has surged alongside the dollar, as Iranians seek refuge in hard assets. Over the past five years, wages have failed to keep pace with surging costs, with the average worker’s monthly income now equivalent to just $125—far below the estimated $500 needed to cover basic living expenses, forcing at least one third of the nation below the poverty line.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502226714

Iran Update, February 24, 2025

Iranian Artesh Coordination Deputy Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari announced the beginning of the Artesh military exercise “Zolfaghar 1403” on February 22 across the Makran coast, Sea of Oman, and northern Indian Ocean.[104] The Ground Force Aviation Cobra attack and Bell 212 helicopters flew from Artesh Navy vessels off the Makran Coast during the exercise.[105] The Artesh tested torpedoes in the Sea of Oman.[106] An Iranian MiG-29 fighter jet reportedly intercepted a Karrar drone during the exercise and F-4 Phantoms conducted air-to-air refueling and destroyed predetermined targets using 250-pound Ghaem-5 bombs.[107]

The Artesh Navy Dena destroyer and the IRGC Navy Shahid Mahdavi forward base ship arrived at Port Klang, Malaysia, on February 21.[108] This marks the first Iranian naval visit to the Malacca Strait.[109] Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani confirmed the Navy’s presence across the Indian Ocean, with five operational and training flotillas deployed simultaneously, including at the Malacca Strait and near the Gulf of Aden.[110]

The United States sanctioned 5 individuals and 17 entities and vessels and identified 13 vessels as blocked property on February 24 as part of US “maximum pressure” sanctions targeting illicit Iranian oil and petrochemical exports.[113] The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list and designated five Iranian individuals for their roles in the Iranian petroleum industry, including senior officials from the Iranian Oil Terminals Company.[114] OFAC sanctioned 17 entities across the UAE, India, Malaysia, Seychelles, Liberia, and China. OFAC also identified 13 vessels as blocked property due to their involvement in illicit oil transport. US President Donald Trump re-enforced “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to deny all paths to nuclear weapons, curtail the Iranian ballistic missile program, and halt its support for terrorist groups.[115]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025

Iran Update, February 25, 2025

The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations.[1] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The JCPOA itself will also effectively expire in October 2025, which means that Iran and the E3 would essentially have to draft a new agreement from scratch. It is very unlikely that Iran, the E3, and the United States would be able to draft such an agreement by June 2025 given that the negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA lasted for years. A new deal would also require Iran to completely change its stance on negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7.[2] Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations.[3] The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations, which he is unlikely to do.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[4] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the IAEA report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025.[5] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on February 14 that the IAEA Board of Governors will not discuss the “comprehensive report” in its March 2025 meeting, however.[6]

The Iranian Artesh and IRGC conducted a joint exercise in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean between February 22 and February 25 that was likely part of Iran’s efforts to project power ahead of a potential Israeli strike on Iran. The Artesh and IRGC concluded the “Zolfaghar 1403” military exercise on February 25.[15] The Artesh Navy and IRGC Aerospace Force conducted their first joint missile operation in which cruise and ballistic missiles ”fully sank” a simulated target in the northern Indian Ocean.[16] This joint effort could help Iran improve its coordination in the event it needs to conduct real-world military operations as part of a retaliation for an Israeli strike. The Artesh reportedly tested the long-range Iranian-made ”Arash” drone, which Iranian officials claim has a range of 1,200 kilometers.[17] The Artesh Navy also displayed its surface and submarine fleet, including destroyers, missile-launching vessels, troop carriers, and Fateh- and Ghadir-class submarines.[18] The focus on missile strikes in this exercise suggests that Iran may have sought to use the exercise to signal that it might respond forcefully to an attack on Iran.

The Iranian rial depreciated from 912,900 rials to one US dollar on February 24 to 918,300 rials to one US dollar on February 25. [68]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-25-2025

Iran Update, February 26, 2025

Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 92.5 kilograms (kg), or 2.2 significant quantities, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[1] A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[2] The Associated Press reported on February 26 that Iran possesses 274.8 kilograms (kg) of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 6.6 significant quantities, as of February 8, citing an unreleased IAEA report. This amount marks a 92.5 kg increase in Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium and a 2.2 increase in significant quantities since the IAEA published its last report in November 2024.[3] The IAEA report stated that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is at 8,294.4 kgs, marking a 1,690 kg increase since November 2024.[4] The IAEA report also noted that Iranian officials continued to prevent four additional experienced IAEA inspectors from monitoring the Iranian nuclear program.

The significant expansion in Iran's enriched uranium stockpile coupled with Iran's categorical rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States makes it very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States ahead of June 2025. The E3 reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[5] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6]

Iran is continuing its preparations for a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Head Mohammad Eslami stated that Iran will hold nuclear defense exercises at nuclear facilities in Iran on February 26 and 27.[7] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force and the Artesh previously conducted air defense exercises around Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Arak in January 2025.[8] Two unspecified senior Iranian officials recently stated that Iran is bolstering its air defenses ahead of a potential Israeli strike on Iran.[9]

Senior Iranian military commanders continued to threaten on February 26 that Iran could attack the United States and Israel in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami stated that the United States and Israel should “expect humiliation.”[10] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi similarly stated that Iran will “attack [US and Israeli] security without hesitation” if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[11] These statements come after senior Iranian military commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct direct attacks on US and Israeli interests in the region, likely to deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.[12] Iran still retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East if it chooses to do so. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh recently warned that Iran could attack US bases with short-range missiles in response to an Israeli attack.[13]

The United States sanctioned six Hong Kong and China-based entities that supply the Iranian drone and ballistic missile program. These sanctions are part of the US ”maximum pressure” policy.[54] Iranian supply firm Pishtazan Kavosh Gostar Boshra (PKGB) and its subsidiary Narin Sepehr Mobin Isatis (NSMI) have used the following six front companies to procure the following items after the United States sanctioned a Hong Kong-based PKGB network last year:[55]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-26-2025

Iran Update, February 27, 2025

Iran is likely pressuring the Iraqi federal government to avoid normalizing ties with the Syrian interim government. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media on February 27 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian interim government due to Iranian opposition.[11] Turkey maintains close ties to the Syrian interim government and has closely coordinated its pressure campaign on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria with the interim government.[12] Iran views Turkey's influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. The fall of Assad marked the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer resources to reconstitute Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.[13] Iran previously relied on ground lines of communication in Syria to transfer funds and materiel to Hezbollah. The fall of Assad disrupted these routes. Iranian officials have also expressed concern in recent weeks that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[14] Iranian officials have also previously expressed concern about Turkey's alleged pan-Turkic aspirations and the spread of Turkish and NATO influence in the region.[15]

Some Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors oppose normalization between Iraq and Syria and Turkish influence in Syria for their own reasons. Some of these reasons align with Iranian interests. Iraqi media reported on February 27 that State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri view the fall of the Assad regime in Syria as a “Turkish conspiracy.”[16] This report comes after Iraqi Sunni political parties have increasingly vocalized long-standing political demands in recent weeks, including by calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution.[17] Maliki and Ameri may be concerned that Turkey could work with these Sunni parties to challenge Shia power in Iraq, just as Maliki and Ameri believe Turkey worked with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) to overthrow Assad. Turkey has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its own influence in Iraq, often at Iran's expense..[18] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, also view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists“ and a threat to stability..[19] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, fought al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s and presumably view Shara as an al Qaeda in Iraq ideologue.

The Iranian Artesh Navy 100th Naval Fleet, which includes the IRIS Bushehr replenishment ship and IRIS Lavan landing ship, docked in Mumbai, India, on February 27.[51] Iranian and Indian naval commanders will hold high-level meetings and visit educational centers.

The Iranian rial appreciated from 926,900 rials to one US dollar on February 26 to 925,200 rials to one US dollar on February 27.[52]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025

Iran Update, February 28, 2025

Iran and China continue to cooperate to circumvent US sanctions. At least eight tankers have participated in ship-to-ship transfers to move Iranian oil to China in recent weeks.[1] These transfers reflect the “dark fleet” of vessels that Iran uses to move oil through Malaysian waters to China.[2] Iran was reportedly holding around 16.82 million barrels of oil in floating storage facilities in December 2024, with two-thirds of these barrels based off the eastern Malaysian coast.[3] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with the Malaysian foreign minister in Tehran on February 25.[4] Iran depends heavily on revenues from energy sales to support its economy. China continues to import Iranian oil because of its cheap cost, despite China signaling that it is adhering to US sanctions by banning sanctioned tankers from Shandong Province ports.[5] China wants low energy costs to maintain competitiveness in its manufacturing industry.

Lebanese airport authorities seized 2.5 million US dollars in cash on February 28 that a man attempted to smuggle from Turkey to Lebanon for Hezbollah, likely on Iran’s behalf.[6] This incident follows an uptick in Iranian money smuggling efforts to Hezbollah via air routes in recent months. Israel reported in January 2025 that Turkish citizens have been involved in efforts to smuggle cash from Istanbul to Beirut for Hezbollah.[7] Lebanon reportedly indefinitely suspended landing rights for Iranian airlines flying to Beirut on February 13.[8] Commercially available flight tracking data revealed only two instances of Iranian flights landing in Beirut since February 11. The suspension of Iranian landing rights to Lebanon could explain why Iran may now rely on money smuggling routes from Turkey.

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders continued to threaten another direct attack on Israel, likely to deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. The IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli announced on February 27 that Iran will conduct operation “True Promise 3,” the third missile strikes against Israel, “as scheduled.”[50] Several IRGC commanders have recently threatened to conduct “True Promise 3” and hit US bases and interests in the region.[51]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2025

Iran Update, March 3, 2025

Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024. Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard, who commands the Artesh Air Defense Force and Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters, said on March 1 that the armed forces plan to change their air defense “tactics” in response to “current threats.”[1] Sabahi Fard was likely referring to the possibility of a conventional strike on Iran. Iranian officials have conducted a flurry of activities in recent months that further reflect their concern about a potential strike on Iran. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters in early February 2025.[2] This headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Sabahi Fard’s appointment highlights the regime focus on strengthening Iran’s air defense capabilities and improving air defense coordination between the Artesh and IRGC. The Artesh Air Defense Force and IRGC Aerospace Force have also conducted a series of exercises, particularly around Iranian nuclear infrastructure, in recent weeks.[3] These exercises have tested indigenous Iranian air defense systems, such as the Bavar 373.[4] Iran may recognize that Russia’s constrained manufacturing capacity and demand for ground-based air defense systems will likely prevent Iran from acquiring new S-300s in the near future, and Iran may therefore prioritize the development of its indigenous systems. Sabahi Fard announced on March 2 that Iran will soon unveil a new version of the Bavar 373.[5]

Iranian leaders are responding to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted strikes into Iran in its April and October 2024 that neutralized the S-300s.[6] These Russian-sourced S-300s were the most advanced Iranian air defense capability to this point. The loss of the S-300s has forced Tehran to develop new ways to counter aerial threats, though it is far from clear that it will develop any seriously viable solutions.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025

Iran Update, March 4, 2025

Russian weapons experts traveled to Iran at least twice in 2024 likely to discuss their growing military cooperation. Reuters reported on March 4 that seven senior Russian weapons experts, including one with a background in advanced weapons development and one with a background in missile testing, traveled to Iran in April and September 2024.[6] A senior Iranian defense ministry official stated that unspecified Russian missile experts conducted multiple visits to Iranian missile production sites, including at least two underground missile facilities, in 2024. The September 2024 visit notably occurred days after Iran began sending short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[7] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iranian mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles in October 2024, which could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile shipments to Russia in the near future.[8]

The Russian weapons experts may have traveled to Iran in April 2024 to assess damage to Russian-made air defenses following an exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel. The visit occurred five days after the IDF struck the tombstone engagement radar of a Russian-made S-300 air defense system in Iran. The strike rendered the S-300 inoperable by destroying its ability to track and engage targets.[9]

Iran and China are continuing to find ways to circumvent US sanctions on Iranian oil exports. Iran has started using smaller and more agile vessels instead of very large crude carriers (VLCC) to transport Iranian oil to China since February 2025, according to ship-tracking data.[66] Bloomberg reported on March 4 that Iran has likely switched to smaller vessels because they can offload oil barrels in shallower waters.[67] Bloomberg added that large terminals are less likely to allow sanctioned vessels to dock. China's Shandong Port Group banned sanctioned tankers from docking at ports in Shandong Province, a hotspot for Iranian oil exports, in early January 2025.[68]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2025

Iran Update, March 5, 2025

Iran and Turkey continue to cooperate over energy trade in central Asia, but it is unclear if Turkey is looking for alternative regional partners for energy imports. Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad confirmed on March 5 that Iran’s National Iranian Gas Company signed a contract permitting Turkmenistan to export gas to Turkey through Iranian territory.[52] Iranian media also circulated Turkish officials’ announcement of the plan on March 4 and included Turkish comments about the cheap price of Turkmen gas.[53] Iranian media added that it is unclear whether Turkey is replacing Iranian gas exports to Turkey with Turkmen gas exports.

The Iranian rial appreciated from 906,800 rials to one US dollar on March 4 to 887,900 rials to one US dollar on March 5.[49]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025

https://www.tgju.org/currency

Iran Update, March 6, 2025

The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6.[22] Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf. The plan is part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero and thereby coerce Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal.[23] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized on March 6 that the United States seeks to “shut down” Iran’s oil sector and drone manufacturing capabilities.[24] Iran has developed several ways to evade US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers in Malaysia to obfuscate the origin of Iranian oil shipments to China.[25] Under the plan that Reuters reported on March 6, the United States would ask allies to inspect Iranian tankers transiting chokepoints, such as the Malacca Strait off the coast of Malaysia, to prevent illicit Iranian oil exports.[26] Iran has previously seized commercial tankers in response to Western seizures of Iranian tankers. Iran seized a tanker carrying Chevron oil in the Strait of Hormuz in April 2023 in response to the United States confiscating Iranian oil shipments, for example.[27] This incident resulted in a steep increase in crude oil prices.[28]

Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. A US-sanctioned, Barbados-flagged tanker arrived at the coast of Baniyas, Tartous Province, Syria, on March 6.[29] The United States sanctioned the vessel in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[30] Reuters reported that the vessel departed from the Russian port of Primorsk for Syria on February 8 carrying 37,000 metric tons of ultra-low sulphur diesel.[31] It is unclear whether the vessel has offloaded the diesel fuel at the time of this writing. The Syrian interim government has sought to obtain oil since Iran halted oil exports to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian government recently reached a deal with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in February 2025 to transport oil from SDF-controlled oil wells to government territory for refinement and use.[32] Russian oil exports to Syria would suggest that Russia seeks to reestablish its economic relationship with Syria, possibly to gain favor with the interim government and try to secure military basing rights in Syria.

Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[33] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 5 that Syrian officials have sought to renegotiate the terms of several contracts that the Assad regime signed with Russia. These contracts cover Russian investments in phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert, a fertilizer plant in Homs, and the port of Tartous.[34] A security force would be needed to protect Russian assets at mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert given that ISIS regularly attacks facilities in this area. It is unclear whether the Syrian interim government would commit to protecting Russian assets or allow some Russian security presence at these sites. Russo-Syrian economic cooperation can take place without an agreement between the interim government and Russia about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia could try to use its economic support for Syria as leverage to secure a “reduced” military presence in Syria, however.

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) issued a statement condemning Iranian noncompliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 5.[75] UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell said that the United States and the E3 do not have “unlimited patience” and warned that the “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities could show that Iran is “in non-compliance with its safeguards agreements.” The IAEA passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[76] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025.[77] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[78] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025

Iran Update, March 7, 2025

US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.[41] Trump told reporters in Washington, DC, on March 7 that he would prefer to pursue a nuclear deal, but that ”the other option will solve the problem.”[42] Trump is presumably referring to a military strike targeting Iran‘s nuclear facilities.[43] Trump warned that ”something is going to happen very soon” regarding Iran.

Iranian political and religious officials rejected negotiations with the United States in the immediate hours following the announcement of Trump's letter. It is unclear how the Supreme Leader will respond in the days and weeks ahead. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Western media on March 7 that Iran will not resume negotiations with the United States while the United States continues to impose its ”maximum pressure” policy.[44] Several Friday prayer leaders across Iran rejected negotiations with the United States in sermons on March 7.[45] Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader, which indicates that their comments are a coordinated messaging campaign. Khamenei previously categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States during a speech on February 7.[46] Khamenei may choose to negotiate with the United States indirectly through European, Russian, or Qatari intermediaries, for example. Khamenei is scheduled to meet with senior military officials and civil servants for Ramadan on March 8 where they will likely discuss the letter.[47]

Iran's refusal to negotiate with the United States will further deteriorate Iran's economic situation, which could trigger internal unrest. Iran is facing dire economic conditions, with inflation reaching approximately 35 percent in February 2025 and the Iranian rial regularly reaching record-low exchange rates.[48] Trump re-instituted ”maximum pressure“ sanctions, which target Iranian oil exports to discourage Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, on February 4.[49] The United States is also considering a plan under which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, which will help impose the “maximum pressure“ policy at sea.[50] Iranian officials are insisting that Iran should increase its ideologization efforts, such as countering alleged US-instituted soft war and psychological operations, rather than addressing economic concerns.[51] Increased maximum pressure sanctions, combined with ideologization efforts, could stoke unrest and lead to protests in Iran.

Senior Iranian military advisors, IRGC officials, and parliamentarians are increasingly lobbying the Supreme Leader to pursue a nuclear weapon.[52] Iranian officials continue to suggest that Iran could change its nuclear strategy to address growing external security threats as Iran continues to increase its enriched uranium stockpile.[53] It is unclear at this time whether the Supreme Leader has decided to pursue a nuclear weapon or a nuclear deal. Khamenei’s decision will likely depend on whether Iran calculates that the greatest threat to regime survival is internal or external.

Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk.”[54] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Raphael Grossi said on March 3 that Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[55] Western media reported on March 4 that Russia offered to mediate talks between the United States and Iran.[56] Ulyanov’s statement further demonstrates that Russia would not help secure US interests as a mediator between the United States and Iran in nuclear negotiations.[57]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2025

Canada is imposing new sanctions under the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations against 3 Iranian individuals and 4 entities that have engaged in destabilizing activities in the Middle East region and globally that undermine international peace, security or stability in a manner that is consistent with the policies of Iran.

The individuals and entities targeted are Iranian business people and companies connected to procurement networks that acquire and supply sophisticated technology that supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC’s) weapons production and sales, including to Russia for use in its illegal war against Ukraine.

In light of Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East region and globally, the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations have been amended to enable Canada to impose sanctions in response to the evolving peace and security threat that Iran poses to the region and globally. In addition to nuclear activities and human rights violations, the Iran regulations can now capture the broad scope of malign activities carried out by, or consistent with, the policies of Iran. This amendment also enables Canada to designate any current or former senior government officials beyond senior IRGC officials.

https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/03/backgrounder-additional-sanctions-against-iran.html

Iran Update, March 10, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated his rejection of negotiations with the United States. Khamenei rejected negotiations with Western powers during a speech to senior Iranian officials in Tehran on March 8.[17] Khamenei dismissed talks as a ”tool for imposing new restrictions” on Iran’s defense capabilities, missile range, and international partnerships. Khamenei framed Western insistence on negotiations as a ”pressure tactic” and emphasized that ”Iran will not accept any new demands.” Khamenei’s remarks come after US President Donald Trump sent a letter on March 5 proposing nuclear talks.[18] Khamenei’s remarks reinforced his speech on February 7, where he categorically rejected nuclear talks and called negotiations with the United States, “unwise, unintelligent, and dishonorable.”[19] Senior Iranian military officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, have echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations since his speech on March 8.[20]

Khamenei also addressed Iran’s economic challenges during his speech and tried to downplay the impact of sanctions.[21] Khamenei demanded currency system reforms, increased investment in domestic industries, and stronger action against smuggling to stabilize the economy. It is unlikely that any of these policies would outweigh the effects of US sanctions on the Iranian economy or solve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues include corruption, nepotism, and the outsized role of the IRGC and parastatal organizations in the economy. Khamenei warned that Western powers aim to weaken Iran by targeting public livelihoods and claimed that Iran’s adversaries want to make Iran’s economy fail. Khamenei framed economic reforms as essential to resist Western pressure. Khamenei remarks reflected the regime’s concern over economic instability, rising inflation, national currency devaluation, and the impact of renewed US ”maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran.[22]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

Iran Update, March 11, 2025

Iran likely seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria to try to destabilize the Syrian interim government. Iranian media has accused the Syrian interim government of committing acts of sectarian violence. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed that the interim government has targeted innocent Alawite civilians with “no political affiliation,” for example.[10] An outlet linked to the Islamic Propaganda Organization separately argued on March 8 that Kurdish, Druze, and Christian groups in Syria must coordinate to ensure the success of the “Alawite uprising.” This statement may seek to encourage minority groups in Syria to band together to resist the interim government.[11] The same outlet also claimed that the possibility of “disintegration and civil war in Syria is very high.”[12] These reports focus on Syrian interim government crimes against Alawites but do not acknowledge that the recent flare-up of sectarian violence in Syria has also included sectarian killings and other extrajudicial killings perpetrated by Alawite, Assadist insurgents.[13] Former Assad regime members initiated the violence on March 6 by attacking interim government forces in Latakia Province.[14]

Iran appears to be growing increasingly frustrated with Turkey's influence in Syria and Turkish regional policy. Iranian media circulated reports that claimed that Turkey interfered in Syrian affairs and condoned the killing of Alawites. An outlet linked to the Islamic Propaganda Organization claimed that the Syrian interim government is a Turkish proxy.[15] Iran views Turkey's influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic regional objectives. Iran and Turkey's opposing interests and policies in Syria and other parts of the region could increase fissures in the Iran-Turkey relationship.

The Artesh Navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy started a three-day joint military exercise with China and Russia in the northern Indian Ocean on March 11.[59] Iran, China, and Russia annually conduct a joint naval exercise and last conducted such an exercise in March 202.[60]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025

Iran Update, March 12, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the United States on March 12, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.[31] Khamenei accused the United States of trying to deceive and weaken Iran.[32] Khamenei asserted that Iran cannot secure sanctions relief through talks in response to unspecified domestic calls for engagement with the United States. That Khamenei has reiterated this rejection of negotiations frequently in recent weeks may indicate that he is specifically responding to pro-negotiations elements in the regime. His comments come as senior UAE official Anwar Gargash delivered a message from US President Donald Trump to Iran on March 12.[33] The message called for negotiations, according to Trump.[34]

The Iranian defense minister paid an official visit to Belarus, highlighting the burgeoning strategic relationship between the two countries. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Victor Khrenin in Minsk on March 12.[35] Nasir Zadeh lauded Tehran-Minsk cooperation against “unilateralism” and signed a defense memorandum of understanding. This memorandum likely related to defense industrial cooperation, given that is one of the primary responsibilities of the Iranian defense ministry.[36] This visit follows other recent meetings between senior Iranian and Belarusian officials held multiple in late 2024.[37] These meetings come as Iran and Belarus signed a strategic cooperation agreement and Iran began working to build a military drone factory in Belarus in order to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[38]

Iran, Russia, and China concluded the trilateral “Maritime Security Belt 2025” exercise in the Indian Ocean on March 12.[57] Iranian Artesh Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy vessels participated in a parade along the Russian and Chinese vessels. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese special operations forces practiced recapturing a hijacked vessel during the exercise.[58]

The Iranian rial depreciated from 923,300 rials to one US dollar on March 11 to 926,800 rials to one US dollar on March 12.[59]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025

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