Iran is likely pressuring the Iraqi federal government to avoid normalizing ties with the Syrian interim government. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media on February 27 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian interim government due to Iranian opposition.[11] Turkey maintains close ties to the Syrian interim government and has closely coordinated its pressure campaign on the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria with the interim government.[12] Iran views Turkey's influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. The fall of Assad marked the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer resources to reconstitute Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.[13] Iran previously relied on ground lines of communication in Syria to transfer funds and materiel to Hezbollah. The fall of Assad disrupted these routes. Iranian officials have also expressed concern in recent weeks that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[14] Iranian officials have also previously expressed concern about Turkey's alleged pan-Turkic aspirations and the spread of Turkish and NATO influence in the region.[15]
Some Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors oppose normalization between Iraq and Syria and Turkish influence in Syria for their own reasons. Some of these reasons align with Iranian interests. Iraqi media reported on February 27 that State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri view the fall of the Assad regime in Syria as a “Turkish conspiracy.”[16] This report comes after Iraqi Sunni political parties have increasingly vocalized long-standing political demands in recent weeks, including by calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution.[17] Maliki and Ameri may be concerned that Turkey could work with these Sunni parties to challenge Shia power in Iraq, just as Maliki and Ameri believe Turkey worked with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) to overthrow Assad. Turkey has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its own influence in Iraq, often at Iran's expense..[18] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, also view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and its leader, Ahmed al Shara, as “terrorists“ and a threat to stability..[19] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, fought al Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s and presumably view Shara as an al Qaeda in Iraq ideologue.
The Iranian Artesh Navy 100th Naval Fleet, which includes the IRIS Bushehr replenishment ship and IRIS Lavan landing ship, docked in Mumbai, India, on February 27.[51] Iranian and Indian naval commanders will hold high-level meetings and visit educational centers.
The Iranian rial appreciated from 926,900 rials to one US dollar on February 26 to 925,200 rials to one US dollar on February 27.[52]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2025
Iran Update, February 28, 2025
Iran and China continue to cooperate to circumvent US sanctions. At least eight tankers have participated in ship-to-ship transfers to move Iranian oil to China in recent weeks.[1] These transfers reflect the “dark fleet” of vessels that Iran uses to move oil through Malaysian waters to China.[2] Iran was reportedly holding around 16.82 million barrels of oil in floating storage facilities in December 2024, with two-thirds of these barrels based off the eastern Malaysian coast.[3] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with the Malaysian foreign minister in Tehran on February 25.[4] Iran depends heavily on revenues from energy sales to support its economy. China continues to import Iranian oil because of its cheap cost, despite China signaling that it is adhering to US sanctions by banning sanctioned tankers from Shandong Province ports.[5] China wants low energy costs to maintain competitiveness in its manufacturing industry.
Lebanese airport authorities seized 2.5 million US dollars in cash on February 28 that a man attempted to smuggle from Turkey to Lebanon for Hezbollah, likely on Iran’s behalf.[6] This incident follows an uptick in Iranian money smuggling efforts to Hezbollah via air routes in recent months. Israel reported in January 2025 that Turkish citizens have been involved in efforts to smuggle cash from Istanbul to Beirut for Hezbollah.[7] Lebanon reportedly indefinitely suspended landing rights for Iranian airlines flying to Beirut on February 13.[8] Commercially available flight tracking data revealed only two instances of Iranian flights landing in Beirut since February 11. The suspension of Iranian landing rights to Lebanon could explain why Iran may now rely on money smuggling routes from Turkey.
Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders continued to threaten another direct attack on Israel, likely to deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. The IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli announced on February 27 that Iran will conduct operation “True Promise 3,” the third missile strikes against Israel, “as scheduled.”[50] Several IRGC commanders have recently threatened to conduct “True Promise 3” and hit US bases and interests in the region.[51]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2025
Iran Update, March 3, 2025
Iran appears to be revising its air defense concepts since Israel neutralized the Iranian S-300s in 2024. Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard, who commands the Artesh Air Defense Force and Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters, said on March 1 that the armed forces plan to change their air defense “tactics” in response to “current threats.”[1] Sabahi Fard was likely referring to the possibility of a conventional strike on Iran. Iranian officials have conducted a flurry of activities in recent months that further reflect their concern about a potential strike on Iran. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters in early February 2025.[2] This headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Sabahi Fard’s appointment highlights the regime focus on strengthening Iran’s air defense capabilities and improving air defense coordination between the Artesh and IRGC. The Artesh Air Defense Force and IRGC Aerospace Force have also conducted a series of exercises, particularly around Iranian nuclear infrastructure, in recent weeks.[3] These exercises have tested indigenous Iranian air defense systems, such as the Bavar 373.[4] Iran may recognize that Russia’s constrained manufacturing capacity and demand for ground-based air defense systems will likely prevent Iran from acquiring new S-300s in the near future, and Iran may therefore prioritize the development of its indigenous systems. Sabahi Fard announced on March 2 that Iran will soon unveil a new version of the Bavar 373.[5]
Iranian leaders are responding to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted strikes into Iran in its April and October 2024 that neutralized the S-300s.[6] These Russian-sourced S-300s were the most advanced Iranian air defense capability to this point. The loss of the S-300s has forced Tehran to develop new ways to counter aerial threats, though it is far from clear that it will develop any seriously viable solutions.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2025