Iran Update, March 6, 2025
The United States is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters on March 6.[22] Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf. The plan is part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero and thereby coerce Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal.[23] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent emphasized on March 6 that the United States seeks to “shut down” Iran’s oil sector and drone manufacturing capabilities.[24] Iran has developed several ways to evade US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers in Malaysia to obfuscate the origin of Iranian oil shipments to China.[25] Under the plan that Reuters reported on March 6, the United States would ask allies to inspect Iranian tankers transiting chokepoints, such as the Malacca Strait off the coast of Malaysia, to prevent illicit Iranian oil exports.[26] Iran has previously seized commercial tankers in response to Western seizures of Iranian tankers. Iran seized a tanker carrying Chevron oil in the Strait of Hormuz in April 2023 in response to the United States confiscating Iranian oil shipments, for example.[27] This incident resulted in a steep increase in crude oil prices.[28]
Syria has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations between the Syrian interim government and Russia over Russian basing rights in Syria. A US-sanctioned, Barbados-flagged tanker arrived at the coast of Baniyas, Tartous Province, Syria, on March 6.[29] The United States sanctioned the vessel in January 2025 for transporting Russian oil.[30] Reuters reported that the vessel departed from the Russian port of Primorsk for Syria on February 8 carrying 37,000 metric tons of ultra-low sulphur diesel.[31] It is unclear whether the vessel has offloaded the diesel fuel at the time of this writing. The Syrian interim government has sought to obtain oil since Iran halted oil exports to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian government recently reached a deal with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in February 2025 to transport oil from SDF-controlled oil wells to government territory for refinement and use.[32] Russian oil exports to Syria would suggest that Russia seeks to reestablish its economic relationship with Syria, possibly to gain favor with the interim government and try to secure military basing rights in Syria.
Russian oil exports to Syria come as Syrian officials have expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia in recent weeks. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 following a call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[33] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 5 that Syrian officials have sought to renegotiate the terms of several contracts that the Assad regime signed with Russia. These contracts cover Russian investments in phosphate mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert, a fertilizer plant in Homs, and the port of Tartous.[34] A security force would be needed to protect Russian assets at mines and oil fields in the central Syrian desert given that ISIS regularly attacks facilities in this area. It is unclear whether the Syrian interim government would commit to protecting Russian assets or allow some Russian security presence at these sites. Russo-Syrian economic cooperation can take place without an agreement between the interim government and Russia about Russian basing rights in Syria. Russia could try to use its economic support for Syria as leverage to secure a “reduced” military presence in Syria, however.
The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) issued a statement condemning Iranian noncompliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 5.[75] UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell said that the United States and the E3 do not have “unlimited patience” and warned that the “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities could show that Iran is “in non-compliance with its safeguards agreements.” The IAEA passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[76] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025.[77] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[78] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025
US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.[41] Trump told reporters in Washington, DC, on March 7 that he would prefer to pursue a nuclear deal, but that ”the other option will solve the problem.”[42] Trump is presumably referring to a military strike targeting Iran‘s nuclear facilities.[43] Trump warned that ”something is going to happen very soon” regarding Iran.
Iranian political and religious officials rejected negotiations with the United States in the immediate hours following the announcement of Trump's letter. It is unclear how the Supreme Leader will respond in the days and weeks ahead. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Western media on March 7 that Iran will not resume negotiations with the United States while the United States continues to impose its ”maximum pressure” policy.[44] Several Friday prayer leaders across Iran rejected negotiations with the United States in sermons on March 7.[45] Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader, which indicates that their comments are a coordinated messaging campaign. Khamenei previously categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States during a speech on February 7.[46] Khamenei may choose to negotiate with the United States indirectly through European, Russian, or Qatari intermediaries, for example. Khamenei is scheduled to meet with senior military officials and civil servants for Ramadan on March 8 where they will likely discuss the letter.[47]
Iran's refusal to negotiate with the United States will further deteriorate Iran's economic situation, which could trigger internal unrest. Iran is facing dire economic conditions, with inflation reaching approximately 35 percent in February 2025 and the Iranian rial regularly reaching record-low exchange rates.[48] Trump re-instituted ”maximum pressure“ sanctions, which target Iranian oil exports to discourage Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, on February 4.[49] The United States is also considering a plan under which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers, which will help impose the “maximum pressure“ policy at sea.[50] Iranian officials are insisting that Iran should increase its ideologization efforts, such as countering alleged US-instituted soft war and psychological operations, rather than addressing economic concerns.[51] Increased maximum pressure sanctions, combined with ideologization efforts, could stoke unrest and lead to protests in Iran.
Senior Iranian military advisors, IRGC officials, and parliamentarians are increasingly lobbying the Supreme Leader to pursue a nuclear weapon.[52] Iranian officials continue to suggest that Iran could change its nuclear strategy to address growing external security threats as Iran continues to increase its enriched uranium stockpile.[53] It is unclear at this time whether the Supreme Leader has decided to pursue a nuclear weapon or a nuclear deal. Khamenei’s decision will likely depend on whether Iran calculates that the greatest threat to regime survival is internal or external.
Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk.”[54] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Raphael Grossi said on March 3 that Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[55] Western media reported on March 4 that Russia offered to mediate talks between the United States and Iran.[56] Ulyanov’s statement further demonstrates that Russia would not help secure US interests as a mediator between the United States and Iran in nuclear negotiations.[57]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2025