Iran Update, February 19, 2025
Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.[30] Bloomberg reported on February 18 that Iranian oil exports to China increased by 82 percent between January 1 and February 1, citing data from intelligence firm Kpler.[31] Iranian oil exports to China previously peaked just before US President Donald Trump imposed “maximum pressure“ sanctions on Iran for the first time in 2018.[32] Unspecified traders in the oil market told Bloomberg that Iran and China have increasingly used “ship-to-ship transfers” and “alternative receiving terminals” to confront logistical issues caused by US sanctions.[33] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on February 14 that the United States aims to reduce Iranian oil exports by more than 90 percent.[34]
Iran seeks to increase economic cooperation with Russia to mitigate the impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy, but it is unclear whether this cooperation will meaningfully improve Iranian economic conditions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin met with Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on February 18 to discuss monetary and banking cooperation.[35] The officials will discuss exchange rates and the implementation of the second and third phases of the Mir-Shetab banking system.[36] Iran and Russia implemented the first phase of the Mir-Shetab system in November 2024 to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[37] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in Tehran on February 18 to discuss the implementation of the Russo-Iranian comprehensive strategic agreement.[38] Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh and Russian Transport Minister Roman Vladimirovich Starovoyt also signed the 2025 Roadmap for Transport and Transit Cooperation in Tehran on February 18.[39] The agreement includes the completion of the Rasht-Astara Railway, which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[40] Iran and Russia have discussed the construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway for several years, and it is unclear whether this agreement will accelerate the construction of the railway.[41]
The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19.[42] The sources denied Iraqi media reports that the Syrian interim government asked Iran to resume relations. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.[43]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces concluded the second phase of the “Great Prophet 19” military exercise in southwestern Iran on February 19.[67] The IRGC Ground Forces paratroopers conducted a jump from an Antonov-74 aircraft.[68] The IRGC Ground Forces also unveiled a tank protection system that is reportedly equipped with cage armor and an electronic warfare system designed to counter missile and drone attacks.[69] The IRGC Ground Forces have probably observed the use of cage armor in Ukraine, but the Russians could also provide the IRGC Ground Forces with lessons learned to improve these capabilities. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims, and Iranian officials have previously exaggerated Iran’s military capabilities.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-19-2025
Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Several senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise” attack against Israel.[1] Iran named its previous two direct attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 “True Promise I” and “True Promise II,” respectively.[2] Iranian military officials initially threatened to conduct a third direct attack on Israel after the IDF conducted strikes in Iran in late October 2024.[3] These threats gradually subsided in the weeks following the IDF strikes, however. IRGC commanders have likely resurfaced these threats in recent days to try to deter an Israeli attack on Iran and to reassure the Iranian population that the IRGC would respond to any Israeli attack on Iranian territory.
Hajji Zadeh highlighted Iran's vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran's “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”[4] Hajji Zadeh was likely referring to the S-300 air defense systems that the IDF struck in October 2024. The October 2024 IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[5] Hajji Zadeh added that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “first follow-up” during meetings with Hajji Zadeh, Salami, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri is about the issue of “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems.[6] Khamenei’s prioritization of this issue highlights his concern about a potential external attack on Iran. Hajji Zadeh claimed that Iran will install “anti-ballistic [missile] defense systems” in Tehran and other major Iranian cities in the next Persian calendar year, which begins in late March 2025.[7]
Senior Iranian officials met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah in Tehran on February 19 and 20. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met separately with Nakhalah on February 19.[70] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami separately met with Nakhalah on February 20.[71]
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf discussed developing economic relations between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia during a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart on the sidelines of the Asian Parliamentary Assembly in Baku, Azerbaijan, on February 20.[72] Ghalibaf emphasized that Iran seeks to develop transportation routes, including the International North-South Transport Corridor, to increase regional trade.[73] Iran opposes Turkish and Azerbaijani efforts to construct the Zangezur corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[74] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Ghalibaf also emphasized that Iran and Azerbaijan must prioritize diplomacy given “new conditions” in the South Caucasus.[75] It is possible that Ghalibaf was referring to the Armenian parliament's recent adoption of a bill to initiate Armenia's application to join the European Union.[76] Senior Iranian officials have previously expressed concern about growing NATO and Turkish influence in the Caucasus.[77]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2025