IIRC
LFBC
$$$
BC back to DC...
Posted on 04/05/2013 9:15:38 AM PDT by butterdezillion
Three events that made no sense at the time now make sense. I'll C&P the substance in the first comment so the HTML will (hopefully) transfer.
.
You’re welcome, butterdezillion.
Lucy, thanks for the ping.
Butter, thanks so much for that intrepid investigator that lives within you.
IIRC, Abercrombie is a far-left progressive closely aligned with Pelosi. To me, Evans appears to have spent several days showing up on radio programs reading a script all over the country acting on direct instructions from Abercrombie.
Abercrombie’s motive in sending Evans out to do this could be blackmail, perhaps to force Barry to shower some $$$ on Hawaii or on some of Abercrombie or Pelosi’s backers that Barry was holding back on.
Suddenly Evans changes his story. That would be after Barry gives in.
The conclusion of the blackmail agreement could also include getting Barry’s cooperation in forging the LFBC and inserting the forged BC in the HI DOH archive so as to give cover to Hawaii’s complicity in providing the minimal verification of Barry’s vital records prior to the crisis that winter. At that time, even Chris Matthews got two progressives, David Corn and the black Chicago columnist to all agree that Barry “should just show the BC.”
Abercrombie’s and Barry’s attorneys would likely have negotiated mutually supporting defenses against future discovery that might be ordered in lawsuits to keep Barry off the ballot.
Layers of legal defense that would permit “plausible deniability” were built into the “release” of the LFBC image. These layers would included flying Barry’s personal lawyer to HI to witness the copying and certification and then personally transporting the BC back to DC...where Barry would NEVER be allowed to actually be seen holding the “original” copy.
I don’t personally believe that HI DOH forged the BC. That would be left to operatives that both Abercrombie and Barry would deny any association with. Even Okubo didn’t actually sign the BC but rather a signature stamp was used. “Plausible deniability” and another legal layer of defense.
They only had to tie up the legal process first until after the 2012 election and then until after Barry leaves office.
I’m not the least bit dense. It’s the posters job to observe the standard rules of style. I’m sure that’s news to you.
And I knew that but needed to be reminded. It doesn’t have to be burdensome; I just need to remember to put the full meaning the first time and say what abbreviation I’ll be using for it in the rest of the article. I apologize and thank you for the heads-up. Any input that helps me make the content more understandable is earnestly desired, so thank you for letting me know.
I did initially think it was weird that you didn’t recognize those acronyms but I’ve been so close to this issue for so long that I don’t even realize what terms might not be familiar to normal people.
Brown Deer, you’re not normal. You’re extraordinary. =)
The HDOH does have a stamp with a certifying statement showing TXE instead of THE. And we do know that they forged Sunahara’s death certificate and Johanna Ah Nee’s birth certificate - and put in blatant red flags. So we know somebody at the HDOH is putting in red flags to protest having to make these forgeries. The TXE in the certifying statement and the smiley face in the signature are red flags in everything that had to do with Onaka’s certification of the document. It looks to me like they gave Obama’s BC the same treatment as they had given the Ah Nee and Sunahara forgeries.
And it even seems like the red flags in Obama’s BC were carried out to more extremes in the later forgeries. For instance, the Obama people had to use a different layer for the last digit of Obama’s BC#. Possibly because the HDOH did something goofy to that digit. Later on they did something goofy with Ah Nee’s BC# digits - made them overlapping. They also screwed up Onaka’s signature in the Ah Nee forgery - sort of like Onaka’s signature had the smiley face added in the Obama BC. Obama’s BC had the BC# and Onaka signature screwed up; so did Ah Nee’s.
At first I thought maybe they gave the HDOH a copy of the forgery that they had inserted into the passport file. And maybe they did, so that the passport BC would match the HDOH BC, in case anybody got discovery. And maybe they did. But if so, some things were either added or changed by the HDOH, or else they would not have needed to do the layers, use non-HDOH security paper, put an indistinct seal on it, or any of the other stuff.
I don’t think Abercrombie would tell Mike Evans to say the things he did. Abercrombie looks like a fool and a liar, for saying he only saw Obama when he was T-ball age after having claimed so emphatically that he may be the only one who could say that he saw Ann and Barack with the baby in Hawaii. I think what happened was Abercrombie assumed that his friend Evans would realize that what he said was not for public consumption, but Evans is an honest soul who never dreamed that his friend would try to cover up an illegal usurpation and so saw no reason to hide what was said. He acted like this would just be “egg on his (Abercrombie’s) face” - not that it would be a life-and-death thing that the HDOH and everybody else in the system would commit crimes to cover up.
Well done, butterdezillion. I admire you for your tenacious research and unwavering dedication to finding the truth. May God continue to give you strength and courage, and may all that has been hidden be revealed.
Wow, you really work hard on digging deep and I love your posts. If you have a ping list would appreciate being added. TIA (Thanks in advance) (to avoid any acronym confusion). ;)
Amen.
And thank you.
lol. If I would Google TIA I might think you were trying to give me a transient ischemic (mini) stroke. At least judging from the PSA (public service announcements) on the radio about TIA mini-strokes.
My kids still can’t believe I know what LOL means. lol. My son was beside me one time and said, “Mom! You actually DID laugh out loud when you typed lol!” They didn’t know what ROFLMAO meant. (They think I’m ancient, which is probably OK because at least they might go easy on me if they think I’m an antique. lol)
You’re on my ping list now. As long as my computer doesn’t go belly-up again we’re good to go. =)
“When I think at how devastating and huge an EMP attack would be”
If Russia or China mounted an attack, I would agree. I do not believe that N.Korea nor Iran are much of a threat yet.
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1549/2
The EMP threat: fact, fiction, and response (part 1)
by Yousaf M. Butt
Monday, January 25, 2010
Dependence of EMP on weapon yield and detonation height
The EMP commission’s executive report expresses the concern that “terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that… they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack.” Given that scenario, such a warhead would likely be launched by one of the Scud/No-dong/Shahab family of missiles. Since the payload of such missiles is limited to ~1000 kilograms, and only relatively crude technologies are available to such actors, we can safely assume that the yield would be on the order of ~1 kiloton [22]. By comparison, the gun-type U-based Little Boy (15 kilotons) weighed 4 metric tons (4,000 kilograms), and the Fat Man (21 kilotons) was an implosion Pu-based device and weighed 4.6 metric tons.
The EMP effects of a crude one-kiloton device , though still substantial, will be dramatically less than that of a one-megaton device. Firstly, a megaton-range EMP weapon is not very sensitive to the detonation altitude: any altitude between roughly 40 and 400 kilometers will yield a very strong E1 EMP pulse at ground level. On the other hand, the EMP effects of a smaller, one-kiloton warhead, is quite sensitive to the detonation altitude [16]. To boost the EMP lethality of a simple one-kiloton fission weapon, it must be detonated much lower than the hundreds of km that would expose the entire continental US to harmful electric fields. In fact, the “sweet spot” for maximizing the EMP lethality of such weapons would be a detonation altitude of about 40 kilometers—significantly higher, or lower, and the peak fields at ground level will decrease.
This lower altitude implies a smaller region on the ground will exposed to high E-fields, as the “horizon” (the farthest extent on the ground with direct view of the detonation) is closer to ground-zero. For 40 kilometers altitude, the maximum extent of the induced EMP E1-fields is within a 725-kilometer radius. In reality, this is an overestimate because the EMP far from the peak field region is inherently limited in strength by the lower initial gamma-ray yield for a small device, and the distant pulse also has a wider (and, thus, less threatening) pulse time-profile. Although in standard texts it is shown that the E-fields expected at the periphery of the exposed ground regions are roughly half the peak fields, this applies to large (>100 kilotons) devices [5]. For smaller devices the peripheral fields will be expected to be significantly below half the peak field. A reasonable estimate for the extent for the destructive EMP E1 fields from a one-kiloton burst at 40 kilometers is about 10 times the altitude, or ~400 kilometers radius [Fig. 1].
Thus, a standard “crude” one-kiloton device will not expose a very large area of the US to high E-fields, both because it will have to be detonated lower in the atmosphere to boost its EMP, and also because its EMP is inherently limited in strength.
Secondly, although a one-kiloton weapon could have a substantial peak E1 component in a limited region of the country, this component does not couple well to long-lines, and would not induce large currents in long cable runs. At the same time, a small weapon would have a significantly smaller E3 component (which is driven by the size of electrically charged fireball) than a megaton-range weapon, which, again, means that long-lasting country-wide power outages would not be expected.
Serious long-lasting consequences of a one-kiloton EMP strike would likely be limited to a state-sized region of the country. Although grid outages in this region may have cascading knock-on effects in more distant parts of the country, the electronic devices in those further regions would not have suffered direct damage, and the associated power systems far from the EMP exposed region could be re-started.
So-called “super-EMP” devices could boost the EMP, even for a low-yield weapon by, for instance, reducing the shielding of the fissile core in a preferential direction—say, downwards—and thereby increase the gamma-rays escaping in that direction. Such weapons would, typically, use non-spherical, e.g. cylindrical or linear, implosion techniques to match the asymmetry of the shielding. However, while these super-EMP devices will boost gamma-rays which can cause a more powerful E1 pulse, they will not induce a powerful E3 signal. Also, due to the fact that the super-EMP weapon will be directional, it is unlikely to affect a large part of the country: it could cause havoc, but, again, only in a small region of the country. To obtain a higher E3 pulse one must have bigger fireball from a larger device.
Iran
Shahab 3 Variants
Originated From:Iran
Possessed By:Iran
Alternate Name:Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Ghadr-1
Class:IRBM
Basing:Road-mobile
Length:17.0 m
Diameter:1.25 or 1.38 m
Launch Weight:18,300-19,000 kg
Payload:800 kg
Warhead:Nuclear, chemical, HE, submunitions
Propulsion:Single-stage liquid propellant
Range:1,500-2,500 kg
Status:Operational
In Service:2007
Iran has developed a number of variants to the original Shahab 3 missile. These have been referred to by various intelligence and media sources as the Shahab 3A, Shahab 3B, Shahab 3D, Shahab 3M, Ghadr-1, and Qadr-1. The Shahab 3 has also been used as the basis for an Iranian space program, and these rockets have been called Kavoshgar-1, IRIS, and Safir.
The lack of reliable information, especially when combined with the confusing list of alternate names, has made the separate specifications for the Shahab 3 variants almost impossible to sort out. The existence of variants has been confirmed by photos and test launches of externally modified Shahab 3 missiles, but which project/missile name belongs to each specific modification is less clear.
Based upon known tests and photographs, the Shahab 3 has undergone the following modifications: 1
• Size reduction of rear fins.
• Material replacement of fuselage (aluminum in place of steel) to reduce weight.
• Overall reduction of warhead mass.
• Lengthening of airframe to allow for longer fuel tanks (and additional fuel).
• Replacement of navigation and guidance systems.
• Redesign of the RV/warhead unit, giving the nose cone a “baby bottle” shape that allows for a higher re-entry velocity and possibly an air-burst detonation (necessary for EMP).
Known and supposed modifications have led experts to suggest that the newer missiles have a range of 1,500 to 1,800 km. 2 Some sources suggest that later versions are capable of reaching 2,500 km. 3 Of course, the additional range bears a heavy cost on payload, and most experts place the maximum payload of Shahab 3 variants around 800 kg. 4 Given RV design requirements, an 800 kg payload could be expected to carry a 500 kg warhead. The combination of reduced fuselage weight and increased fuel capacity provide the Shahab 3 variants with about the same launch weight as the original Shahab 3. The increased fuel may increase overall launch weight by as much as 1,000 kg, but the extra ten seconds or so of burn-time give the missile a significantly increased range. 5
Fact Sheet: North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs
August 2012
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
Claimed Objective: Deter a U.S. invasion and hostile policy against it, such as U.S. sanctions and joint military exercises with South Korea. Pyongyang believes the United States desires regime change.
Apparent Objective: Regime survival and recognition as a nuclear power. The regime believes that its nuclear and ballistic missile programs enhance its security and diplomatic position (1) domestically as a demonstration of strength against hostile Americans and (2) internationally as a bargaining chip and means to be treated as equal to nuclear weapons states. The regime has recently revised its constitution, which now refers to North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, a status that is only granted to the five states that possessed nuclear weapons at the time of the signature of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), China, France, and the United Kingdom. Pyongyang also appears to aim to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a long-range ballistic missile.
Number of nuclear weapons: Unverified but total plutonium production suggests between four to eight nuclear weapons.[1]
Nuclear Programs [2]
Plutonium
• Facility Yongbyon nuclear complex; North Hamgyong Province (Chungjinsi, Kiljugun, Pungyre); Chagangdo Province (Kanggyesi); North Pyongan Provice (Yongbyonsi, Kusungsi, Taechongun); South Pyongan Provice (Pyongsungsi)
• Stockpile: Believed to be around 30 kg. The Six Party Talks aimed at defusing the North’s nuclear programs broke down in December 2008 over ways to verify its stockpile.
Uranium Enrichment:
• Facility:
Suspected – Pyongyang; Pakchon; Taechon; Chonmasan [3]; Hagap; Yongjori;
Confirmed – Yongbyon (pilot plant). In November 2010, Pyongyang unveiled a pilot uranium enrichment plant to American scientist Siegfried Hecker. It is widely believed to be a cover for its clandestine uranium enrichment programs, and unintended for peaceful nuclear energy generation. Other sites are believed to be hidden.
• Stockpile: Unknown. It is virtually impossible to verify enriched uranium stockpiles from a technical standpoint.
Nuclear Testing
Apparent Objective: To miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount on a long-range missile.
Nuclear tests: Two. A third test is expected though its timing is undetermined.
1. October 2006 – Claimed successful. Deemed unsuccessful.
On October 16, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence confirmed “North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton,” and later said it was apparently more successful. One kiloton is far less than other nuclear states’ first tests of 10-20 kt. The international community has called the North’s test a failure.
2. May 25, 2009 – Claimed successful. Deemed unsuccessful.
On June 15, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence stated, “The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on May 25, 2009. The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons. Analysis of the event continues.” However, there is a lack of conclusive physical evidence in open sources that proves the test was a nuclear one. [4] Official and unofficial reports vary on estimated yield but it is generally regarded as higher than its 2006 test.
Test site: Pungyre (Northeast, 2006 & 2009 test site); Yongdoktong (Northwest; speculated)
Nuclear site: Kumchangri (underground site speculated to house a nuclear facility)
It is unclear how soon Pyongyang will be able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount on a missile.
BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES
Apparent Objective: Improve conventional war capabilities. Develop missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads targeted at regional adversaries and the U.S. continent.
Ballistic Missile Facility: Musudan-ri; Yongjo-ri; Sangnam-ri; Tongchang-ri, Chiha-ri
Delivery Systems (Ballistic Missiles) [5]
• KN-01 – short-range anti-ship cruise missile. Range estimated at 160 km. Believed to be an improved version of the Soviet Termit missile (“Styx”).
• KN-02 – short-range, solid-fueled, highly accurate mobile missile. Modified copy of the Soviet OTR-21; unknown number in service; believed to have been deployed in the late 1990s or early 2000s.
• Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) – short-range, initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile. Estimated range of 300 km (can reach throughout South Korea) and capable of delivering a 1,000 kg payload. Tested successfully. 150-200 believed to have been deployed on mobile launchers. Delivered to Iran for Iraq-Iran war.
• Hwasong-6 (Scud-C) - later Scud modification. Increased range of 500 km and smaller payload of 700-800 kg. Said to be the most widely deployed missile with at least 400 in service.
• Rodong-1/-2 – medium-range missile with an estimated range of 1,000-3,000 km; capable of reaching across Japan; presumed capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
• Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) – three-stage space launch vehicle; incapable of delivering nuclear payload to intercontinental ranges due to poor technical accuracy; estimated range of 2,000-2,500 km; liquid fuel; theoretically capable of delivering small 100-200 kg payloads.
• Taepodong-2 – larger, more capable multi-stage missile; possible strategic capability against continental U.S.; believed to be a potential intercontinental ballistic missile; exact range unknown, various government estimates range from 4,000-15,000 km.
• Taepodong-X – solid fuel under development; estimated range 2,500-4,000 km.
• Musudan-1 – intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM); range 2,500-4,00 km [6] capable of direct strikes on South Korea, Japan, and Guam putting U.S. military bases at risk[7]; variant of Nodong; surface-to-air missile (SAM) system; most advanced missile delivery system; acquired in 2007.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
• A grave concern remains to be the possible development of an inter-continental ballistic missile capable of delivering a chemical, biological, or nuclear warhead that can reach the U.S. continent. Given repeated test failures, most missile experts believe Pyongyang is far from achieving this goal.
• In November 2011, five Republican Congressional members raised concerns about the North’s development of a road-mobile ICBM. In April 2012 Pyongyang showcased a missile that initially appeared to be an ICBM during a military parade commemorating the 100th birthday of the regime’s founder Kim Il-sung. Weapons experts, however, claim the missiles are fake.
Long-Range Rockets (Space Launch Vehicles)
• Unha rocket-KwangMyongSong satellite combo
The North claims its long-range rockets are designed for peaceful scientific purposes to launch a satellite into orbit. However, the UN Security Council and international community view long-range rockets as synonymous with long-range missiles – the technology used in space launchers is essentially the same as ballistic missile technology. Global diplomats and scientists view Pyongyang’s claimed objective as veiled practice rounds to eventually launch a missile tipped with a nuclear warhead.
Missile Testing (Launch Site) [8]
• April 1984 – Hwasong-5 Scud-B type
• May 1986 – Scud-C
• 1993 – Rodong
• August 31, 1998 – Taepodong-1 missile (Musudan-ri); successful, fired over Japan
• May 1990 – Rodong-1
• June 1990 – Hwasong-6
• June 1991 – Scud-C
• May 1993 – Rodong
• August 1998 – Taepodong-1 (Musudan-ri); third-stage failed; claimed Kwangmyongsong-1 satellite launch
• March 2003 – Likely KN-01 (Singsang-ri); deemed failure exploding in mid-air.
• March 2003 – Likely KN-01 (Singsang-ri); flew for 110 km before falling into East Sea (Sea of Japan).
• May 2005 – KN-02 launch (East Sea)
• July 2006 – Taepodong-2 missile and Rodong-Scud (Musudan-ri); failed
• April 2009 – Taepodong-2 (Musudan-ri); claimed Kwangmyongsong-2 Rocket and Unha-2 satellite; failed
• July 2009 – Rodong-Scud missile
• April 2012 – Kwangmyongsong-3 Rocket and Unha-3 satellite (Tongchang-ri); failed
China Test-detonates Kiloton Neutron Bomb
U.S. likely knew about surface explosion
By David M. Bresnahan
© 1999 WorldNetDaily.com
China has detonated at least one neutron bomb above ground with the knowledge and perhaps even the co-operation of the U.S.
Photographs of the secret test in late 1995 or 1996 have been provided to WorldNetDaily through a U.S. intelligence source who cannot be identified. The photographs have been tested and evaluated by several sources who have concluded they are genuine.
The pictures show what is alleged to be the detonation of a neutron bomb above what appears to be an orchard, somewhere in China. The photos were most likely taken from an airplane, although some sources believe they could have been taken by satellite. The possibility that they were taken by a U.S. spy satellite was not ruled out.
The disclosure of the secret test, made possible through U.S. technology, comes at a sensitive time because China Premier Zhu Rongji is currently visiting the U.S. in efforts to ease concerns about the U.S. relationship with communist China.
“Attached are two deliberately degraded, but still very good imagery of a possible/probable atmospheric or open air, above ground, test of an Enhanced Radiation Device (neutron bomb) (EHRD) in the PRC (People’s Republic of China), supposedly in the late 1995 or 1996 time frame,” detailed the description that came with the photos. The source has access to satellite high resolution, multi-spectral imagery and other intelligence photos.
The source who provided the pictures is known to WorldNetDaily and has proven to be reliable. His background has been checked independently and has been verified. He is who he claims to be. To protect him and his viability as a continual source for information, his name and location cannot be revealed.
The first photograph was taken less than a microsecond after the detonation, and the second was taken within a millisecond or two of the first.
“These images are very rich in the IR (infrared) spectrum, both reflected and absorbed, so some things appear very dark and some seem very light — both unnaturally so in the normal visible spectra. Please note also that to have taken these images one must have had considerable foreknowledge, or intelligence, of the planned event well beforehand,” commented the source.
He believes there is a likelihood that the pictures were taken by a U.S. spy satellite of the KH type. This would mean that the U.S. knew in advance that the test would take place and the location of that test.
WorldNetDaily sent copies of the pictures to the man who originated the idea of the neutron bomb, retired nuclear physicist Sam Cohen. He confirmed that he believes the photographs to be genuine.
Cohen said the photographs appear just as they should, and that it would take someone with very sophisticated knowledge of nuclear physics to fake such a photograph. Other military experts were also consulted and they too confirmed that there is no reason to suspect that the photos are not real.
Additional copies were also sent to high-ranking members of the intelligence community with requests for comments. Absolutely no comment has been received. The request was made by the intelligence source who provided the pictures.
Cohen said it is likely that the device was a low yield neutron bomb of approximately one-kiloton in size. It would have been dropped from a plane at an altitude of approximately 10,000 feet. The explosion should have taken place in the area of 3,000 feet above the ground to have the optimum effect of destroying life without damaging property.
“There would have been zero effect on the pilot or crew,” Cohen told WorldNetDaily. “I don’t even think the airplane would have felt a shudder at that low yield and at that especially low yield regarding blast that comes out of a neutron bomb.”
Cohen, and a different military source familiar with such tests both agreed that one test above ground is not enough. It is expected that this was one of at least two tests. A previous underground test by China was dismissed by U.S. officials as improperly conducted.
Cohen and others agreed that U.S. technology has enabled China to develop their nuclear capabilities, and that technology was not stolen from the U.S. It was cooperatively provided they all agreed.
What appears to be a defect in the fireball in the pictures is actually purposely created to tailor the effect of the bomb. Cohen said he first proposed this very technology 35 years ago.
Cohen put together a study group of other nuclear physicists working with him for the government and determined that a neutron bomb could be tailored to produce a pattern. His group found that advanced, discriminate, tailored effects of battlefield nuclear warheads with a very low yield could be designed.
Because of lingering requirements related to top secret information, Cohen was unable to provide the details of how such bombs can be tailor-made, but he said it is possible. He said the photographs show just such a possibility.
“What you’re seeing in this picture [Photo 1] is a fireball. It’s pretty hot,” Cohen told WorldNetDaily. “Initially when the fireball is formed it is white hot. It is not in the infrared region. It’s at the far end of the visible region approaching ultraviolet. I say this having witnessed many a test, and, boy, are things bright.
“If you were to look at it with the naked eye from the very beginning, you would be flash blinded, but good. You’d be out of commission for a long time, and you would suffer a little bit of eye damage, but not enough to blind you.
“The area around a nuclear shock turns extremely white. It’s like a thousand suns were beaming down. The whole landscape become eerie (as seen in the second photo It lasts a number of seconds and fades in intensity as time goes on. That fireball just glows and glows. At the beginning it’s the hottest, then it gradually begins to cool down. Then it starts rising and we get the mushroom cloud and all that sort of stuff,” explained Cohen.
Photo 1
This photo was taken within a few hundredths of a microsecond of the detonation of the device. It was most likely taken from an airplane, but it could have been shot from a satellite. The fireball can be seen at its brightest, and a uniquely designed pattern is also very easily seen.
Photo 2
This second photograph was taken approximately a millisecond after the first. The dome of the fireball can be seen, along with the specially created pattern of neutrons impacting the ground.
Above ground tests of neutron bombs are not only useful but necessary. Without such tests, military leaders will not know exactly what to expect from such a weapon until it is used. The size of the bomb and the ideal height for detonation can only be determined from a test.
Cohen said he estimates the size of the fireball in the pictures to be about 200 to 300 feet across. He believes it is a good example of what to expect from a one-kiloton, low yield neutron bomb. The photos came without technical information, so Cohen and others who evaluated the pictures were unable to provide conclusive details.
“We have the fireball and off to one side we have this haze,” Cohen continued to describe. “There’s very little doubt in my mind that this haze was caused by radiation escaping from the bomb. Neutron bombs emphasize radiation, prompt radiation.” He said it would take a specially designed bomb to direct radiation more to one side than to another.
“You’ve got to think multi-spectral across the entire spectrum, so you’re looking at everything from UV, visible, to infrared as you look at these pictures,” explained one military source who declined to be named.
“What we’re seeing here (in the second photo) as the fireball is rapidly cooling down, we’re seeing secondary atmospheric effects that just haven’t been observed before,” the source suggested.
“The first photograph is probably in the hundreds of microseconds region of the event. Therefore you’re seeing it before the actual effects have hit the ground. That may be a stretch, I don’t know,” he added to explain the dark shadow area in the first photograph, which then becomes extremely white in the second picture.
“We understand how they work, but we’ve never had a good understanding of their effect,” commented Cohen about the frustration of the U.S. scientific community. “We were never allowed to test these things in the atmosphere. All the neutron bomb tests that we did were underground. The military was dying to know just exactly what these effects might be. I think that’s exactly what happened over in France, that the military wanted to know what these effects were, so they snuck off to the south Indian Ocean and detonated this thing.
The military source believes the U.S. has full knowledge of the above ground test conducted by France in 1979, and that the U.S. cooperated in that test. Cohen was in France at the time and suggested that French scientists find a way to conduct an open air test.
The U.S. government has known about the Chinese test and most likely has the data from that test. All sources agreed that is why no mention has been made.
Thanks for the pings.
Continuing to pray.
PFYC = Praying For Your Computer haha Look forward to seeing your posts!
Have you seen what was recently written by one of the advisors on President Clinton’s North Korea Commission? It’s at http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/understanding-north-korea-and-iran?f=must_reads#ixzz2MBnGqAqR
lol. Thanks!
Problem is the “Super-EMP has had no actual high altitude tests performed. Did the Russians sell N.Korea a line of goods?
Would a high-altitude test be essential? The author notes that Hiroshima was the “test run” for the atomic bomb.
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