Free Republic

3SEP2025 Досье Шпиона

Emergency of strategic aviation.

Yesterday, on the night of 02-09/03/2025, during the performance of a combat mission to fire at targets on the territory of Ukraine, a number of descent vehicle aircraft had technical problems.

The Tu-160 strategic bomber (Ivan Yarygin, tail number - “04”) did not launch missiles due to the failure of the launcher mechanism. The Tu-160 strategic bomber (Alexei Plokhov, tail number - “16”) was struck by lightning, in connection with which it was forced to stop the combat mission and return to the airfield. The cockpit glazing was damaged.

Also, one of the planes, intended for a combat mission, could not take off from Engels. The cause is unknown

https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/691

Blackjack
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_Tu-160

Foreign peacekeepers ‘unacceptable’ in Ukraine, Russia says as Europe plans security guarantees

Russia is not open to foreign peacekeeping troops securing a ceasefire or peace deal in Ukraine, Russian state media reported on Sept. 4, citing Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova. “Russia does not intend to discuss foreign intervention in Ukraine, which is fundamentally unacceptable and undermines all security, in any form or format,” she said in response to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announcing that a postwar plan to send troops to Ukraine is being discussed.

Moscow has already rejected the deployment of any NATO-linked peacekeepers, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov calling it a “foreign military intervention.” The Kremlin has repeatedly issued maximalist demands to Ukraine and has refused to engage in leader-level talks as Ukraine and its allies work towards ending Russia's war against Ukraine.

https://kyivindependent.com/foreign-peacekeepers-unacceptable-in-ukraine-russia-says-as-europe-plans-security-guarantees/

On the other hand, Russia is open to losing the war against Ukraine through economic collapse and disintegration similar to what happened in the 1990s.

Day 1,287 of the Muscovian invasion. 840 [average is 843/day], i.e. more than 35 Russians and Norks/h. Vehicles and fuel tanks more than 95% and artillery more than 70% above average

How China is secretly arming Russia

The Telegraph has found Chinese companies supplying Russian firms sanctioned over drone production for Moscow's war machine

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/09/03/how-china-is-secretly-arming-russia/

Hot mic picks up Putin and Xi discussing organ transplants and immortality

When Russian President Vladimir Putin walked shoulder to shoulder with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Wednesday, a hot mic caught them discussing organ transplants and the possibility that humans could live to 150 years old. The moment came as Putin and Xi walked with North Korea's Kim Jong Un at the head of a delegation of more than two dozen foreign leaders to view a military parade in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two.

The moment was carried on the livestream provided by state broadcaster CCTV to other media, including AP and Reuters. China's radio and TV administration said CCTV’s coverage of the event was viewed 1.9 billion times online and by more than 400 million on TV.

As Putin and Xi walked toward the Tiananmen rostrum where they viewed the parade with Kim, Putin's translator could be heard saying in Chinese: “Biotechnology is continuously developing.” The translator added, after an inaudible passage: “Human organs can be continuously transplanted. The longer you live, the younger you become, and (you can) even achieve immortality.” In response, Xi, who was off camera, can be heard responding in Chinese: “Some predict that in this century humans may live to 150 years old.”

Kim was smiling and looking in the direction of Putin and Xi, but it was not clear if the conversation was being translated for him. Putin cannot be heard speaking clearly in Russian in the CCTV clip. Putin confirmed later that he and Xi had discussed the subject on Wednesday.

“I think when we went to the parade, the chairman talked about it,” Putin told reporters in Beijing when asked about the leaked conversation. “Modern means of health improvement, medical means, even surgical ones related to organ replacement, they allow humanity to hope that active life will continue differently than it does today,” he said.

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CCTV did not immediately respond to requests from Reuters for comment.

https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/hot-mic-picks-up-putin-xi-discussing-organ-transplants-immortality-2025-09-03/

Killing prisoners for transplants: Forced organ harvesting in China
https://theconversation.com/killing-prisoners-for-transplants-forced-organ-harvesting-in-china-161999

The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations Against Europe's Critical Infrastructure

This IISS paper assesses Russia's unconventional war on Europe, focusing on sabotage of critical infrastructure, from military sites and energy grids to communications and undersea cables, testing the resilience of European governments and societies and challenging NATO/EU deterrence.

IISS has created the most comprehensive open-source database of suspected and confirmed Russian sabotage operations targeting Europe. The data reveals Russian sabotage has been aimed at Europe's critical infrastructure, is decentralised and, despite European security and intelligence officials raising the alarm, is largely unaffected by NATO, EU and member state responses to date. Russia has exploited gaps in legal systems through its ‘gig economy’ approach, enabling it to avoid attribution and responsibility. Since 2022 and the expulsion of hundreds of its intelligence officers from European capitals, Russia has been highly effective in its online recruitment of third-country nationals to circumvent European counter-intelligence measures. While the tactic has proven successful in terms of reach and volume, enabling operations at scale, the key challenge facing the Russian intelligence services has been the quality of the proxies, who are often poorly trained or ill-equipped, making their activities prone to detection, disruption or failure.

https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/08/the-scale-of-russian—sabotage-operations—against-europes-critical—infrastructure/

Ukraine destroys Russian speedboat as it attempts to land troops, Navy says, shares footage

The Ukrainian Navy destroyed a speedboat of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, killing seven Russian soldiers and injuring four more, the military branch reported on Sept. 3. The Russian vessel attempted to land airborne troops on the Tendra Spit, a narrow island stretching some 65 kilometers (40 miles) in the northern Black Sea off Ukraine's southern coast.Ukrainian forces detected the operation and struck the boat.

The incident marks the latest in a series of Ukrainian attacks against Russian naval assets.

https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-navy-destroys-russian-speedboat-kills-7-in-black-sea/

39 s video

3SEP2025 Кремлевская табакерка

Nabiullina wrote an appeal to Putin about mobilization and scares with a disaster.

Opinions in the Kremlin are divided. The head of the Central Bank handed over an appeal to Vladimir Putin, in which she urges not to start a new large-scale mobilization in any case. According to our source in the Central Bank, the document sent to the president consists of 34 pages, contains a large number of figures and graphs with which Elvira Nabiullina justifies her call.

“Mobilization will mean that the NWO [war in Ukraine] will drag on, most likely, for several years. This will lead to catastrophic consequences that Russia will overcome for a long time. I ask you to listen to this opinion and not allow a negative scenario,” the channel's interlocutor quoted part of the address of the head of the Central Bank. Recall that Valery Gerasimov calls on the president to mobilize 350-400 thousand people in September. From time to time, there are proposals to begin the total mobilization of several million new soldiers.

Opinions in the Kremlin and in the Russian elites as a whole are divided on this issue. About 60% of the people to whom Vladimir Vladimirovich listens are in favor of mobilization. About 40% are against. Among the opponents of mobilization, for example, remains Yuri Kovalchuk. At the same time, all our sources in the same Presidential Administration note that the special military operation will not end soon. And they are surprised that Nabiullina does not understand this and “continues to draw her useless figures.”

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6128

Yury Kovalchuk is a Russian billionaire businessman and financier who is "reputed to be Vladimir Putin's personal banker".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yury_Kovalchuk

“It's the economy, stupid”

Day 1,286 of the Muscovian invasion. 780 [average is 843/day], i.e. more than 32 Russians and Norks/h. Vehicles and fuel tanks more than 135% and artillery more than 60% above average

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2025

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, who was present at the Alaska Summit, claimed on September 2 that the United States and Russia have planned another round of consultations and that many issues remained unresolved.[3] Ushakov claimed that the ongoing US-Russian dialogue is primarily related to the “Ukrainian conflict” and that it is too early to discuss bilateral relations. Ushakov denied on September 1 that the United States and Russia agreed on a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[4] Ushakov’s statements reflect the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to organize a bilateral meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and reject US President Donald Trump's August 18 statements that officials were planning a bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Putin with a subsequent meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[5]

Russia continues to feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries. Bloomberg reported on September 2 that sources who received offers from Russian crude oil exporters stated that Russian exporters are offering Urals crude to Indian importers at a discount of $3 to $4 per barrel, compared to Brent, on a delivered basis for cargo shipments in late September to October 2025.[6] Bloomberg reported that sources stated that Russian exporters were offering Indian importers a discount of around $2.50 a barrel during the week of August 24 to 30 and a discount of $1 in July 2025. Russia is likely offering Indian importers discounted crude oil to ensure that India continues to purchase crude from Russia despite Western secondary sanctions against India, including a 50 percent US tariff against Indian exports to the United States.[7] Russia is currently selling crude oil below market price, which will decrease the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and deplete Russia's primary source of wealth unless Russia significantly increases its export of crude oil.

Russia and occupied Ukraine are also facing acute gasoline shortages due to Ukrainian strikes.[8] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed on September 2 that some gas stations in occupied Kherson Oblast are experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 (premium) gasoline and that gasoline prices are increasing due to shortages.[9] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported that occupied Luhansk Oblast is also experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline and that the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration claimed that the shortage is due to a reduction in gasoline supply and a simultaneous increase in demand.[10] Kurilsky Municipal Okrug Head Konstantin Istomin reported on August 25 that Russian authorities suspended the sale of A-92 gasoline to residents in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Oblast.[11] The Kremlin extended on August 14 a temporary ban on processed gasoline exports for all exporters through September 2025 and for non-producers through October 2025, a move that seeks to blunt a domestic price surge for gasoline due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.[12]

North Korea is reportedly planning to send about 6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on September 2 that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed to the South Korean Parliamentary Intelligence Committee that North Korea is planning to send roughly 6,000 additional soldiers to Russia and that roughly 1,000 North Korean military engineers have already arrived in Russia in the “rear front as reserve forces.”[13] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced on June 16 that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[14] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on August 12 that North Korea had agreed to send additional troops to Russia to support reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[15] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 31 that North Korean sappers will soon operate in the Sudzha and Guyevo areas in Kursk Oblast and that Russian commanders received orders to prepare subordinates for the upcoming North Korean deployments to prevent friendly fire incidents or other “misunderstandings.”[16] The milblogger assessed that North Korean forces are unlikely to conduct combat operations against Ukraine and will likely conduct tasks in the rear, including serving as cooks and cleaners, to free up other Russian personnel for infantry assaults. ISW continues to assess that it is unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy to Ukrainian territory, which would mark a significant inflection, but that North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would still allow more Russian forces to be deployed to the battlefield in Ukraine.[17]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2025

Iran Update, September 2, 2025

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development.[1] The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024.[2] The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024.[3] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports. Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran‘s nuclear program.[4] The Financial Times reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research.[5] Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[6]

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China.[7] Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue.[8] Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement.[9] Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Iran’s nuclear rights and emphasized China’s commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[10]

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China’s efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions.[11] Pezeshkian‘s interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3’s position. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback ”ambiguous.“[12] Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran.[13] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil.[15] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Samarrai as well as nine vessels and seven entities, tied to Samarrai as part of a broader US effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[16] Samarrai’s network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before marketing it to international buyers and generated millions of dollars in revenue for Samarrai and the Iranian regime.[17] Samarrai used a fleet of oil tankers operated by one of his UAE-based companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with US-sanctioned Iranian vessels.[18] The Iraqi Navy seized one of Samarrai’s tankers in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Basra Province, Iraq, on August 6, for lacking proper documentation.[19] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[20]

he Institute for Science and International Security (The Institute) reported on September 2 that Iran has moved almost all the chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at the Natanz Enrichment Complex to more secured areas based on satellite imagery.[31] The Institute assessed that Iran has likely moved the chillers to make the chillers less vulnerable to future airstrikes. Satellite imagery from August 30 shows that Iran has dispersed 19 of the 24 total chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the FEP.[32] Chillers help an HVAC system maintain certain temperatures within a facility to protect critical equipment and personnel at the facility and enable optimal functioning. The Institute reported that the chillers are currently not in use because the centrifuges at FEP are still inoperable, and there is no electric power.[33] Israeli airstrikes damaged electrical substations and support buildings critical to the power supply at Natanz.[34] US and Israeli airstrikes rendered the underground centrifuges at Natanz inoperable due to the “sudden loss of external power,” according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi.[35]

Senior Iranian officials met with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan to discuss Iranian concerns about the Zangezur Corridor. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani and his newly appointed Deputy for International Affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss the recent US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor in the southern Caucasus.[36] Grigoryan stated that Armenia is ”ready to provide guarantees to Iran“ in order to preserve Iran-Armenia relations.”[37] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss Iran’s opposition to the presence of US soldiers along the new corridor and emphasized Iran’s commitment to deepening bilateral military relations.[38] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 and stated that Iran’s concerns about the presence of foreign forces in the southern Caucasus have been ”largely resolved” following Larijani and Grigoryan’s meeting.[39] Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence while increasing US influence.[40]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-2-2025

1SEP2025 Кремлевская табакерка "Everything can be sudden. Millions will shed holy blood."

There is evidence that total mobilization is possible in Russia A number of our sources consider the map that was shown at the briefing of Valery Gerasimov to be such evidence. There, the Odessa and Mykolaiv regions, now under the control of Ukraine, are included in our country.

According to a source in the Ministry of Defense, our army, in principle, can fulfill the goals of taking control of these regions and including them in Russia. "This requires more than one year and a very serious mobilization. The tasks are very difficult, there will be losses. Therefore, the army will need to recruit from 900 thousand to 2.5-3 million people. Then there is an opportunity to conquer these regions," the source says. He noted that recently there have been more and more supporters of total mobilization in the elites, in which several million new fighters will go to the army. But he did not give predictions about when such mobilization could begin.

Philosopher Alexandr Dugin, who has long advocated large-scale mobilization, noted the following in a conversation with us: "I told you that there would be total mobilization. I expected it in the coming weeks, but the timing seems to be shifting a little. But it doesn't mean anything. The war will be long and will not be limited to Ukraine. Millions will be mobilized and shed holy blood for God and Russia. No options." At the same time, at the moment, as we wrote, the Kremlin is deciding whether to approve Gerasimov's proposal to mobilize 350-400 thousand people this fall. Total mobilization, if there is one, is likely to be the next stage in replenishing the army. No one is ready to say anything about its timing yet. Only Dugin is sure: "Everything can be sudden and fast."

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6122

1SEP2025 Кремлевская табакерка

The NWO [war] in Azerbaijan may have become closer. Where will our troops hit and missiles fly if everything starts?

Journalist Vladimir Solovyov said that it is necessary to conduct a special military operation in Azerbaijan. Thus, he confirmed our insider: back in mid-August, we wrote that the authorities were considering the possibility of conducting such a special operation. “The NWO in Azerbaijan may have become a little closer. But this does not mean that it will definitely happen. Discussions are underway now,” a source in the Kremlin briefly commented on the situation.

And an interlocutor in the Ministry of Defense shared some details of how everything can be. “It is clear that we are using our long-range weapons. In particular, missiles and drones will definitely fly at Baku. Also, our army can take control of several important areas of the territory of the enemy state. Which ones are a military secret. But I do not think that the troops of the Azerbaijani regime will be able to resist for a long time,” the source said. And he clarified: the decision on the NWO in Azerbaijan has not been made at the moment, but “in the place of a potential enemy, he would seriously think.”

When asked whether we would still have enough strength for Azerbaijan, given the intense hostilities in Ukraine, the channel's interlocutor did not answer. He does not want to reveal all his cards.

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6120

Iran Update, September 1, 2025

An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[7] Representatives from China and Russia, among other countries, attended the summit. Iran, China, and Russia jointly seek to counter Western influence, bypass international sanctions, and undermine US interests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated prior to departing for China that the SCO aims to “confront unilateralism and totalitarianism.” Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh similarly stated that organizations such as the SCO and BRICS can help Iran confront “unilateralism.”[8]

Iran seeks to deepen its ties with SCO member states to undermine international sanctions. Pezeshkian proposed the formation of a “shared digital infrastructure” using central bank digital currencies to circumnavigate financial sanctions during his speech at the summit.[9] Pezeshkian met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. Pezeshkian and Putin discussed economic cooperation and political alignment on Iran’s nuclear program.[10] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the sidelines of the summit.[11]

Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards’ cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on August 30.[12] Israel used the cellphone location of Iranian officials’ bodyguards to attack a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting on June 16. The SNSC is Iran’s highest foreign policy and national security decision-making body and includes the heads of Iran’s three branches of government and senior military commanders, among other officials.[13] Israeli and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iranian bodyguards’ “careless” use of cellphones played a “central role” in Israel’s ability to kill Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war.[14] Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah’s operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie-talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.[15]

The Iranian regime has continued to crack down on Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War. Three senior Iranian officials and a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times that Iranian authorities have arrested or placed under house arrest dozens of military, intelligence, and government officials, including high-ranking officials, for spying for Israel.[16] The Iranian regime has also arrested hundreds of civilians since the end of the war for allegedly spying for Israel.[17] The IRGC Intelligence Organization recently announced on August 30 that it arrested eight individuals linked to Mossad in Iran’s northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province.[18] The IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that the individuals had provided Mossad with coordinates for “vital and sensitive” Iranian sites and information about Iranian military officials during the war. The IRGC Intelligence Organization added that the individuals planned to conduct attacks targeting unspecified important sites in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-1-2025

Iran Update, August 29, 2025

Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[1] The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2] The Iranian parliament recently passed a law on June 25 that suspended Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, which makes the last clause largely performative.[3] The E3 triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28.[4] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of Iran’s “significant non-compliance” of JCPOA commitments.[5] The process to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran lasts 30 days, and Iran likely seeks for the E3 to reverse its decision to reimpose these sanctions during the 30-day period.

The introduction of this bill may reflect differences between various regime institutions about how the regime should respond to the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote a letter to the European Union on August 29 in which he stated that Iran “remains committed” to diplomacy and is willing to resume negotiations to reach a “fair and balanced” agreement.[6] This statement contrasts with the three-part bill, which would suspend all negotiations between Iran and the United States and the E3. The difference between parliament and the executive branch’s views comes after hardline parliamentarians recently criticized the Iranian government for allowing IAEA inspectors to return to Iran. Parliamentarians claimed that the decision violated the law that parliament passed on June 25.[7] IAEA inspectors returned to Iran on August 27 to supervise a fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA inspectors do not have access to other Iranian nuclear facilities, such as Natanz or Fordow.

Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until at least April 18, 2026.[8] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. Iran’s Mission to the UN said on August 28 that UNSC members face a “decisive” choice between backing the Russian–Chinese resolution and preserving diplomacy or reimposing UNSC sanctions, which it claimed would cause “grave consequences.”[9] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months, arguing that extending the snapback deadline gives the E3 more time to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran.[10] The E3 offered to extend the snapback deadline in return for Iran resuming full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[11] The Russian-Chinese resolution does not appear to include these conditions and simply urges all parties to resume negotiations, which makes this resolution much more favorable for Iran than the E3 proposal.[12] The Russian-Chinese resolution also reportedly bans the E3 from reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran during the six-month extension period.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2025

Day 1,285 of the Muscovian invasion. 800 [average is 843/day], i.e. more than 33 Russians and Norks/h. Vehicles and fuel tanks more than 85% and artillery more than 105% above average

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2025

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on September 1 that “there was no agreement” on a bilateral meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin, or a trilateral meeting between US President Donald Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[1] Ushakov stated on August 16, after the US-Russian Alaska summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the leaders had not discussed the prospect of a trilateral meeting.[2] US President Donald Trump stated on August 18, however, that he was planning a bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Putin with a subsequent meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[3] Ushakov’s reiteration of Russia's refusal to commit to Trump's desired bilateral and trilateral meetings undermines Trump's ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate his unwillingness to compromise on his unwavering demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin claimed on September 1 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, People's Republic of China (PRC), that the “crisis” in Ukraine arose from the Western-provoked “coup” in Ukraine in 2014 (referring to Ukraine's democratically organized Revolution of Dignity), not “as a result of Russia's attack on Ukraine.”[4] Putin also claimed that the war in Ukraine stemmed from the West's constant attempts to bring Ukraine into NATO, which Putin claimed would pose a direct threat to Russian security. Putin claimed that the 2014 “coup” eliminated the political leadership of Ukraine that did not support Ukrainian membership in NATO. Putin claimed that peace in Ukraine can only be sustainable and long-term if the settlement eliminates the ”root causes” of the war, which Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined as Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO expansion.[5] The Kremlin has often used this “root causes” narrative to call for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian puppet government, Ukraine's commitment to neutrality, and the revocation of NATO's Open Door Policy.[6] Putin's claim that the 2014 “coup” “eliminated” Ukrainian leaders is also a reference to the Kremlin's repeated narrative that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and should not be in power.[7] Putin is reiterating these Kremlin narratives in his own voice, indicating that Putin maintains his original war goals.

The Kremlin likely timed the publication of a video address by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to coincide with Putin's SCO speech in order to lend legitimacy to Putin's demand for regime change in Ukraine. Russian state media published a video message on September 1 of Yanukovych claiming that he worked to bring Ukraine closer to the EU during his presidency and that his ultimate goal was Ukraine's EU accession.[8] Yanukovych blamed Ukraine's EU partners for behaving “incorrectly” during Ukrainian-EU negotiations and criticized the EU for not understanding the difficulties of Ukraine's economic situation. Yanukovych also claimed that he has always opposed Ukraine's membership in NATO, which he alleged would have been a “catastrophe” and “a direct road to civil war.” Yanukovych’s last public media appearance was in July 2022, when he called on Ukrainians to surrender to Russia.[9] The timing of the filming of Yanukovych’s video address is unknown, but he opened by stating that Putin “is absolutely correct” – seemingly in response to Putin's remarks about Ukraine at the SCO summit, indicating this was likely a choreographed information effort. The publication of Yanukovych’s video on Russian state media was likely intentionally timed to coincide with Putin's remarks. The Kremlin may be setting conditions to claim that Yanukovych is the legitimate leader of Ukraine – not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Such claims are false, however, as Yanukovych fled Ukraine on his own accord after the Revolution of Dignity, and Ukraine has held several democratic elections since.

Putin's demands for regime change in his SCO speech are not new, but rather the reiteration of his pre-war demands that he has been pursuing throughout the war. Putin referenced the alleged “coup” in both his 2021 “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” essay and his speech launching the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.[10] Yanukovych was also notably in Belarus in March 2022, possibly as part of Kremlin efforts to reestablish him as the president of Ukraine.[11] Putin's reiteration of this same demand demonstrates how Putin's unwillingness to pull back from his original war aims is the key contributor to the lack of progress toward peace since the US-Russian summit in Alaska in August 2025.

Likely Russian GPS jamming affected a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1. The Associated Press (AP) reported on September 1 that European Commission spokesperson Adrianna Podestà confirmed that a plane carrying von der Leyen suffered problems from GPS jamming while flying to Bulgaria and noted that Bulgarian authorities suspect “blatant” Russian interference.[22] Podestà stated that von der Leyen’s plane landed safely at Plovdiv Airport in central Bulgaria after flying from Warsaw, Poland. The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 1 that the pilot flying von der Leyen’s plane landed the plane using paper maps, and a knowledgeable official source confirmed that GPS in the airport's vicinity “went dark.”[23] Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority stated that there has been a notable increase in GPS jamming since February 2022 and that there have been issues with spoofing more recently. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in response to a question from FT that their “information is incorrect.”[24] ISW previously observed reports that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference significantly impacted flights in the Baltics, Poland, and Finland, particularly in early 2024.[25] Russia notably likely jammed the satellite signal of a Royal Air Force (RAF) jet transporting then-UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, his staff, and select journalists back to the UK from Poland in March 2024.[26] The latest reports of likely Russian GPS jamming indicate that Russia is continuing its hybrid operations in Europe, and Russia could continue to target Western political and military officials as part of these operations. Von der Leyen has notably been leading discussions with European and US officials about possible European troop deployments as part of security guarantees for Ukraine after the war.[27]

Ukraine reportedly conducted its first strike with its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile on August 30 against occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted a Neptune missile strike against a Russian border post near occupied Voloshyne, Crimea, on August 30.[28] Sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi on August 31 that Ukrainian forces used a Flamingo cruise missile – not a Neptune missile – to strike the Russian border post.[29] ISW previously reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted this strike with a Neptune missile based on available evidence at the time.[30] Astra amplified Militarnyi’s reporting on September 1.[31] The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 21 that Ukraine launched mass production of its new Flamingo cruise missiles, which have a range of up to three thousand kilometers and can carry warheads up to 1,150 kilograms.[32]

Ukrainian authorities reportedly collected new evidence of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov endorsing war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on September 1 that Kadyrov stated in a speech that he ordered Chechen military commanders to shoot Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield instead of taking them prisoner.[33] The SBU added that Kadyrov also ordered Chechen soldiers to place Ukrainian POWs on the roofs of military facilities in Grozny, Republic of Chechnya, to act as human shields against Ukrainian drone strikes. Kadyrov’s statements endorsing war crimes are in line with March 2025 claims by Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov that Russian forces used the same color of identification tape as Ukrainian forces during a covert attack behind Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast, which may constitute acts of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[34] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[35]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025

Day 1,284 of the Muscovian invasion. 850 [average is 843/day], i.e. more than 35 Russians and Norks/h. Vehicles and fuel tanks more than 95% and artillery as well more than 95% above average.