Iran Update, August 29, 2025
Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[1] The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2] The Iranian parliament recently passed a law on June 25 that suspended Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, which makes the last clause largely performative.[3] The E3 triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28.[4] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of Iran’s “significant non-compliance” of JCPOA commitments.[5] The process to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran lasts 30 days, and Iran likely seeks for the E3 to reverse its decision to reimpose these sanctions during the 30-day period.
The introduction of this bill may reflect differences between various regime institutions about how the regime should respond to the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote a letter to the European Union on August 29 in which he stated that Iran “remains committed” to diplomacy and is willing to resume negotiations to reach a “fair and balanced” agreement.[6] This statement contrasts with the three-part bill, which would suspend all negotiations between Iran and the United States and the E3. The difference between parliament and the executive branch’s views comes after hardline parliamentarians recently criticized the Iranian government for allowing IAEA inspectors to return to Iran. Parliamentarians claimed that the decision violated the law that parliament passed on June 25.[7] IAEA inspectors returned to Iran on August 27 to supervise a fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA inspectors do not have access to other Iranian nuclear facilities, such as Natanz or Fordow.
Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until at least April 18, 2026.[8] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. Iran’s Mission to the UN said on August 28 that UNSC members face a “decisive” choice between backing the Russian–Chinese resolution and preserving diplomacy or reimposing UNSC sanctions, which it claimed would cause “grave consequences.”[9] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months, arguing that extending the snapback deadline gives the E3 more time to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran.[10] The E3 offered to extend the snapback deadline in return for Iran resuming full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[11] The Russian-Chinese resolution does not appear to include these conditions and simply urges all parties to resume negotiations, which makes this resolution much more favorable for Iran than the E3 proposal.[12] The Russian-Chinese resolution also reportedly bans the E3 from reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran during the six-month extension period.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2025
Iran Update, September 1, 2025
An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[7] Representatives from China and Russia, among other countries, attended the summit. Iran, China, and Russia jointly seek to counter Western influence, bypass international sanctions, and undermine US interests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated prior to departing for China that the SCO aims to “confront unilateralism and totalitarianism.” Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh similarly stated that organizations such as the SCO and BRICS can help Iran confront “unilateralism.”[8]
Iran seeks to deepen its ties with SCO member states to undermine international sanctions. Pezeshkian proposed the formation of a “shared digital infrastructure” using central bank digital currencies to circumnavigate financial sanctions during his speech at the summit.[9] Pezeshkian met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. Pezeshkian and Putin discussed economic cooperation and political alignment on Iran’s nuclear program.[10] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the sidelines of the summit.[11]
Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards’ cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on August 30.[12] Israel used the cellphone location of Iranian officials’ bodyguards to attack a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting on June 16. The SNSC is Iran’s highest foreign policy and national security decision-making body and includes the heads of Iran’s three branches of government and senior military commanders, among other officials.[13] Israeli and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iranian bodyguards’ “careless” use of cellphones played a “central role” in Israel’s ability to kill Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war.[14] Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah’s operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie-talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.[15]
The Iranian regime has continued to crack down on Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War. Three senior Iranian officials and a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times that Iranian authorities have arrested or placed under house arrest dozens of military, intelligence, and government officials, including high-ranking officials, for spying for Israel.[16] The Iranian regime has also arrested hundreds of civilians since the end of the war for allegedly spying for Israel.[17] The IRGC Intelligence Organization recently announced on August 30 that it arrested eight individuals linked to Mossad in Iran’s northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province.[18] The IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that the individuals had provided Mossad with coordinates for “vital and sensitive” Iranian sites and information about Iranian military officials during the war. The IRGC Intelligence Organization added that the individuals planned to conduct attacks targeting unspecified important sites in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-1-2025