In Search of Zarathustra [Pre-Islamic Iran once again making a strong come back]

Boston Review ^ | 9/5/04 | Jehangir Pocha

[freedom44]

Despite the tendency to see Iran as an Islamic monolith and the attempts of the ruling clerics in Tehran to cast it as such, the full complexity of Iranian identity is little understood and almost never discussed—even by Iranians themselves. Long before it was absorbed into the Islamic empire by Arab armies under Caliphs Umar and Uthman in the mid-seventh century, Persia had been the birthplace of Zarathustianism, or Zoroastrianism, the world’s first monotheistic religion.The religion was forged some 3,500 years ago around the philosopher-prophet Zarathustra’s teachings, which emphasized personal morality and a conscious choice between good and evil. From a vision he had while wandering the hills of Iran, Zarathustra Spitama preached that there was only one universal god of good, whom he called Ahura Mazda. In opposition stood the power of Ahriman, the “un-good”—an ancient forerunner to Satan.

Zarathustra taught that the challenge of life is to develop a “good mind,” (Spenta Manyu), reject the “un-good mind” (Angre Manyu), and embrace a life of good thought, good words and good deeds (Humata, Hukta, Havarsta), which locates the individual’s ethical choices at the center of spirituality.

Listen to the best things with your ears Reflect upon them with clear thought. And choose between the two ways of thinking. At the world’s end He, of holier spirit, that chooses the Right . . . And shall inherit the Best existence. He that follows the Lie and chooses the worst Shall inherit the worst existence . . . If you choose wrongly and rush to violence You enfeeble the world of men. If the right choice is made Then, in the hereafter, all shall be well. [Free translation from the Gathas, or Songs of Zarathustra, section 3:2]

In his comparative study of world religions, Max Weber claimed that the Zoroastrian dualism of good and evil represents one of three coherent solutions to the problem of evil, the others being the Indian doctrine of karma and the Calvinist idea of predestination. And theologians generally agree that Zarathusti notions of monotheism, heaven and hell, and the messiah and the apocalypse spread quickly and profoundly influenced Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

When Paul Kriwaczek writes in his new book In Search of Zarathustra that in Iran, “in spite of everything, Zarathustra still lives,” he is not simply referring to the 60,000-odd surviving Zarathustis in Iran, who have nurtured the religion through 13 centuries of Islamic persecution. (There are also about 60,000 Zarathusti Parsees in India and about 35,000 Zarathustis worldwide, of which about 25,000 are in North America, including the conductor Zubin Mehta and the novelist Rohinton Mistry.) Kriwaczek is interested in something less visible. Part history, part travelogue, the book is an exploration of an ancient religion and its persistent influence in the modern world. With a remarkable blend of intellectual insight and respect for both faiths, Kriwaczek examines how the Zarathusti Persian ethos was transmuted into Islamic Iranian life.

* * *

When the Arabs conquered Zarathusti Persia in 641 C.E., it had been one of the world’s military and cultural superpowers for more than a millennium. Playing off Herodotus’s colorful accounts of Persian history, Kriwaczek tells how in 559 B.C.E. a shepherd named Cyrus united the Persian tribes to overthrow Babylon and establish the Persian Empire, the largest the world had known until that time. It stretched from the Indus in India to the Nile in Egypt. But Cyrus’s empire entered into the historical realm as much for its new, humanistic conception of the world as for its military prowess.

From Cyrus the Great’s tranquil tomb in his now abandoned capital at Pasargad and the magnificent ruins of Persepolis, Kriwaczek narrates how Cyrus’s coming had been foretold by the Jewish priests who saw him as a messianic figure. In the Old Testament the Jewish prophets called Cyrus “God’s chosen . . . the Anointed One,” the one who would free the people from slavery.

The young shepherd kept that promise. After defeating the Babylonians, Cyrus freed the Jews they had enslaved and rebuilt the first temple in Judah. He proclaimed his subjects free to worship their own gods and ruled his lands with a secular and liberal code, perhaps the world’s first universal declaration of human rights. A replica of the cylinder on which this was inscribed is kept at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York.

Cyrus’s Achaemenian dynasty (550–330 B.C.E.) also allowed local kings and nobles to govern their original realms, albeit under Persian suzerainty. All this was unprecedented; centuries later Hegel would proclaim Cyrus’s realm “the world’s first real empire . . . where one race encompasses many peoples but these people preserve their individuality in the light of the unifying rule.” (Americans might be surprised to learn that the seven-pointed halo which guilds the Statue of Liberty is linked to Mithra, a Zarathusti archangel of good governance.)

When the dynasty finally succumbed, most Zarathusti Persians converted to Islam. A few went underground, and some, including my ancestors, fled to India, where they maintained their original faith against overwhelming odds. (The community came to be known as the Parsees, or ones from Pars, the Persian name for the fabled capital Persepolis.)

The broad swath of modern history generally sees the collapse of the Persian Empire as the classical demise of one civilization at the hands of another, more powerful aggressor. Yet, as Kriwaczek suggests, a more nuanced reading of history and the reality of modern Iran reveals something else—something that my friend the sculptor was acting out as he crafted a Zarathusti Farohar in that narrow alley. “In our hearts we are still Zarathusti,” a number of Iranians quietly said to me as I traveled through the ancient cities and historical sites Kriwaczek describes in his book.

Iranians’ obvious and immutable connection to their past sits uneasily with the orthodox Islamists who rule them. “The absolutist nature of political Islam has always found it unacceptable to accede that even a trace of Zarathustianism remains in Iran,” an academic in Shiraz said to me. Like all others with whom I spoke, he requested anonymity.

Kriwaczek speculates on how Zoroastrianism survived thirteen centuries: “New converts don’t just give up their former spiritual and ethical world-view; they usually bring them along, transferring the old wine into the new bottle.” The Persians accepted the simple purity of Islam as their new faith but nevertheless found ways to preserve their heritage. “Just as in Europe the Holy Roman Empire—‘neither holy, nor Roman, nor or an empire,’ as Voltaire said—was actually a way for baptized German warlords to repackage their pagan traditions in Christian wrapping, so Iranian Islam came to incorporate Iranian national consciousness, Iranian national pride and, yes, Iranian Zoroastrian beliefs.”

Kriwaczek illustrates this point with examples drawn from Persian architecture and poetry. To show, for example, how Persian arts, culture, and science quickly infused Iranian Islam, he compares two pairs of religious buildings—the first and earlier pair a staid and pious structure (Orthodox Islam holds that it is a sin to depict any living thing), the second a structure of perfect geometry resplendent with animal and bird carvings. Kriwaczek also shows that Iranian literary traditions, as personified first by the 12th-century poet Ferdowsi—author of the Shah-nameh, or Book of Kings, the national epic of Iran—and later by the mystic poets Hafez, Sa’adi, and Rumi, are unabashedly pre-Islamic, both in treatment and content. In Shah-nameh Ferdowsi writes that

Zardosht (Zarathustra), the prophet of the Most High, appeared in the land . . . And showed the people a new faith . . . He reared throughout the realm a tree with beautiful foliage. Men rested beneath its branches . . . (and) became perfect in wisdom and faith. Islamists still struggle to understand how a good Muslim like Ferdowsi could say that another prophet than Muhammad could make men “perfect” in faith.

The poems of the mystics were so influential that they helped to initiate an entirely new branch of Islam, Sufism, which added to the earlier split between Iranians and Arabs into Shi‘ite and Sunni Islam. Expectedly, many Sunnis saw Sufism as heresy and to this day it remains banned in Saudi Arabia.

* * *

Unfortunately, while Kriwaczek artfully reveals the Zarathustian hinges of Iranian culture, his lack of concrete evidence is a major shortcoming. He also fails to mention the growing interest of many Iranians in their ancient past and faith and the possible repercussions for the country.

Modern Iran has consistently wobbled between the dual and sometimes conflicting pillars that define it: Islam, and what is now euphemistically called Iran’s “pre-Islamic heritage.” As Iran struggles to emerge from the oppressive failures of its Islamic revolution, it has grown increasingly conscious of its roots.

Despite Iran’s reputation as the harbinger of Islamic revolution, the simple fact is that Iranians never wanted an Islamic state in the way Ayatollahs Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei have forged it. Many Iranians welcomed the re-emergence of religion in Iran after the Shah’s relentless modernism, but few wanted or expected the clerics to grab control over people’s daily lives and government.

While in most Sunni Arab countries matters of religion and state have always been inextricable, Iran’s Shi‘ite society sought to separate them. Shi‘ite clerics traditionally belonged to three schools of political thought—“loyalists” who believed in cooperation with the state, “opposers” who exercised moral suasion on the political process from the outside, and “quietists” who advocated outright withdrawal from politics. Before Khomeini, the latter were the largest group.

Khomeini introduced a radically new principle into Shi‘ite Islam: velayat-e faqih (or direct rule by the most senior cleric, i.e., himself). This novel doctrine progressively alienated Iranians and created deep divisions within the clergy, as in the current rift between the hard-line clerics led by Iran’s current Supreme Leader Khamenei (the new beneficiary of velayat-e faqih) and the reformers led by President Hojjatoleslam (the rank just below Ayatollah) Mohammad Khatami.

It is this Shi‘ite tradition of interpretive Islam and political freedom that is causing Iranians to chafe under Khamenei’s velayat-e faqih and giving rise to political changes that could produce the first and most sustainable democracy in the Middle East.

“A loss of faith with the mullahs [in government] has led to a loss of faith in the religion,” says Azar Bharami, a lawyer and women’s rights activist in Tehran. “When the government does not respect the [line] between religion and state how can people?” Numerous surveys, including one by the magazine Asr-e Ma (“Our Era”), have shown that most Iranians under the age of 25—who make up 50 percent of the overall population—consider themselves agnostic. Many young Iranians are cynical, even derisive, about their religion. Epithets like “mad mullahs” and “this thing Islam” are not uncommon.

At a time when many Iranians feel violated by the religious and political extremism inflicted upon them, but remain powerless to act against it, romantic allusions to ancient Persia offer hope. Evidence of popular fascination with Iran’s Persian heritage is everywhere. Stone carvings, paintings, and pictures of Persepolis adorn the walls of many homes, office buildings, and restaurants. In dusty bus stations across Iran’s desert towns, transport companies have painted Farohars on the sides of their sandblasted buses. Savvy marketers have also begun to tap into the trend. The newest model of the locally made Peugeot sedan in Iran has been branded Pars (Persepolis) and consumer products with names like Parsian line the shelves of Iran’s tiny street stores.

“Iranians are trying to discover who they really are,” Bharami said. “They feel shamed by their government and let down by their religion . . . they want something to believe in.” What remains mostly unsaid—not least because saying it could invite a death sentence—is that the increasing interest in Iran’s pre-Islamic past is also fueling an interest in its ancient Zarathusti religion.

“If we were allowed to convert religions, millions would convert [back] to Zarathusti,” a middle-aged Muslim man in Tehran told me. “I challenge the government to allow conversion out of Islam for even one day.”

But he is unlikely to see that day. While Islam is aggressive in proselytizing itself, it bans, by punishment of death, the conversion of Muslims into other faiths. Making matters more complex for those Iranians looking to return to their “original faith” is that the faith itself does not seem to want them. “There can be no conversion into our religion,” says Sohrab Yazdani, a leading member of the Zarathusti community in the city of Yazd, home to most of Iran’s surviving Zarathustis and their religion’s sacred sites.

Having lived as a persecuted minority for more than 1,300 years, Iran’s Zarathustis have formed a tightly knit and closed community. Few want to risk incurring the Iranian government’s wrath at a time when President Khatami has eased many of the serious discriminations their community has endured for centuries. Complicating the theological landscape is the notion that being Zarathusti, like being Jewish, is a matter of birth, not conversion. Any challenge to this closed community of faith is fiercely rejected by most Zarathustis in both Iran and India. The one movement to convert Iranians and others into Zoroastrianism, started by an Iranian named Ali Jaffery, has run afoul of both the Islamic authorities in Iran and the mainstream Zarathusti community.

Caught between their current religion, which won’t let them out, and their desired religion, which won’t let them in, some Iranians are believed to practice Zoroastrianism in secret. But if some take this risk, virtually none are willing to talk about it. However, there is growing evidence that at least one disenfranchised group in the region has indeed been turning towards Zoroastrianism—the Kurds.

Kurdish religious practices bear close resemblance in ritual style to the Zarathusti faith. The original religion of the Kurds was Yezidism, a religion greatly influenced by Zoroastrianism, and many Kurds were also Zoroastrian until the Islamic conversions that began in the seventh century. Today, about 25 percent of Kurds still practice Yezidism, which is centered around the town of Lalish in northern Iraq.

According to Dr. Pir Mamou Othman, an expert on Kurdish religious practices, “the Yezidis pray in a way which resembles the prayer-rituals of the Zoroastrians, something especially noticeable in the morning-prayer where the face is turned towards the sun. Their cycle of five prayers also stems from Zoroastrianism, and not from Islam, as is often stated.” Though 70 percent of Kurds are nominally Islamic (the remaining 5 percent are Jewish and Christian), they hold their Islam lightly, practicing a syncretic articulation of the faith that reflects their pre-Islamic past.

There are reports, mostly unconfirmed, that in the face of persecution from both Shias and Sunnis and their growing political independence, some Kurdish tribes have begun to embrace Zoroastrianism. In a rare interview on the subject, Mahir Welat—representative of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to the Russian Federation—said that “For a time the Kurds forgot about their Zoroastrianism roots but now it is our intention to return and to educate ourselves.”

It is not completely coincidental that it took a person in Welat’s position to make these comments. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many people in southern Russia and the newly independent Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, historically part of the Persian Empire, have openly embraced Zoroastrianism.

As these republics struggle to reimagine themselves as sovereign states, they are drawn to their ancient ethnic roots. Leaders of the republics, especially President Imomali Rahmonov of Tajikistan, support the resurgent interest in Zoroastrianism, which they hope might counter the radical Islam that the Saudis and others are trying to export into the region.

[F14 Pilot]

You are wrong

[Ptarmigan]

Interesting. I know Lebanon and Syria is where Phoenicia was. Egypt is where Ancient Egypt existed. Iraq is present day Mesopotamia. Iran is Persia. Palestinian Arabs I read are actually not full bled Arab, but have some Turkish ancestry.

[Clemenza]

Re #49: Great pictures.

Ms. Bakhtiar is the ONLY reason to tolerate CNN.

[Cronos]

Not just their hair --- if they go out in public they have to put an ugly brown chador over their stylish western clothes.

Sorry pal, you're wrong -- and the pictures are proof of that. That may be the case in the villages and when the Islamimic revolution first hit, but it's not that way now.

Persian women are gorgeous and terribly fashionable.

[freedom44]

I always enjoy your posts. Thanks again for an intellectual analysis of history.

I agree that Syria, Egypt and Iraq weren't historically Arabs, but frankly they're three of the most nationalistic Arab nations in the Mid-East. Pan-Arab Nationalism was fronted and advocated by Nasser, and to a lesser degree Sadat and Mubarak. Saddam was another Arab nationalist, his defense minister claimed that ethnic minorities in the region must be crushed. This mentality has also been embraced by the Assads in Syria.

Iranians were never Arabs and inspite of the loose cultural spin by the reigning Mullahs, Iranians have never become Arabs. In fact, pre-1979 Iranians consistently prided themselves on their ethnical divide with those in the region. Even after '79 during the Iran-Iraq wars every single Arab country joined their Arab brothers in Iraq to crush the enemy Persians.

The prejudice between Arabs and Iranians is strong and deep. Persian Satellite TV lambasts Arabs on a regular basis. There are popular political commentators like Shahram Homayoun, and Zia Atabay who talk of Arabs like they're the dirt of the earth. These comments not only accepted within the community, but often times praised.

The vast Persian-Arab divide is something majority of Americans do not understand. I was talking to someone who's father was a mid-east analyst. Even he kept saying "Muslims" will never get along there will always be a geebeho and jeebeeho ethnic divide, the level of understanding of the historical aspects of the region is astonishing.. to say the least.

[Cronos]

Thanks for that. When I sayIslam IS radicalism, I meant that trueIslam as preached by the prophet when he moved to Mecca IS highly violent. you can counter that by pulling out tracts from the OT. However, the OT in those tracts treats them as history -- the Israelites were told to DO that (past tense), we are not told to DO those acts (present tense).

InIslam, people are told to DO them (present and past tense combined), the injunctions to not make friends with infidels and to attack them are continuous tense and so a uslim doing such acts would think of himself as doing good. That is the difference. You cannot de-radicalise slam without destroyign it.

[Cronos]

Palestinian Arabs I read are actually not full bled Arab, but have some Turkish ancestry.

Well, that is true -- the area was called Palestine in the 1800s and was mostly desert. THen the jews started moving back there and with their ingenuity they made the desert blossom. ARabs from around the Arab world came to live there -- from Egypt, Syria, Iraq probably some turks too -- drawn by this created paradise. They are hence, as much immigrants as Eastern EuropeanJews.

[Cronos]

I agree that Syria, Egypt and Iraq weren't historically Arabs, but frankly they're three of the most nationalistic Arab nations in the Mid-East. Pan-Arab Nationalism was fronted and advocated by Nasser, and to a lesser degree Sadat and Mubarak. Saddam was another Arab nationalist, his defense minister claimed that ethnic minorities in the region must be crushed. This mentality has also been embraced by the Assads in Syria.

You are very very right about the Pan-Arab nationalism of these three states -- Egypt and Syria were part of the Arab Republic in the 50s and have very similar flags.  And in Iraq's case we had a dilemma -- Saddam promoted religious tolerance -- the Chaldean christians were treated pretty well by him -- example Tariq Aziz, as long as people followed him blindly, he didn't care about their religious affiliations.  But they are ARAB Christians.  SAddam, like most Sunni Arabs strongly dislike Persians (memories of centuries of conquest) and the Shia heresy.  Kurds are related to the Iranis, so hence his paranoia.   in the case of Syria, Christians are treated very very well -- as are the few Jews remaining there (strange, but true).  and there are very few ethnic minorities.

However, in the case of Egypt, christians ARE second class citizens now under Hosni Mubarak's dwindling power

        

Egypt                                                                               Syria

Iraq

Iranians were never Arabs and inspite of the loose cultural spin by the reigning Mullahs, Iranians have never become Arabs.

True, the first thing they did after converting was to set up their own state and to become Shias to distinguish themselves from the Sunni ARabs.  Maybe that was a conscious decision?

In fact, pre-1979 Iranians consistently prided themselves on their ethnical divide with those in the region. Even after '79 during the Iran-Iraq wars every single Arab country joined their Arab brothers in Iraq to crush the enemy Persians.

Correct again-- the Sauds in particular are sh** scared that the Persians will wake up again and reconquer the place -- they evern renamed the Persian gulf to the Arabian gulf.  For the same reason the Arabs dislike the Turks.

The prejudice between Arabs and Iranians is strong and deep. Persian Satellite TV lambasts Arabs on a regular basis. There are popular political commentators like Shahram Homayoun, and Zia Atabay who talk of Arabs like they're the dirt of the earth. These comments not only accepted within the community, but often times praised.

Bud, I lived in Bahrain for some time -- and it's got a huge Irani population.  It's also a pretty liberal society (where else can you see Arab and Irani women in Mini-skirts, and trust me, in beauty they  are far far better than many American women!).  Anyway, there's a causeway built between the Saudi Mainland and Bahrain and every Thursday tons of Saudis come across to enjoy the good life -- booze and women.  And every Thursday the locals grumble that hte saudi savages are coming across.  Saudis are mostly despised in the rest of ARabia -- not only in Bahrain but also in Oman and Jordan.  I don't know about the Egyptian feelings but I'd guess they are the same

The vast Persian-Arab divide is something majority of Americans do not understand. I was talking to someone who's father was a mid-east analyst. Even he kept saying "Muslims" will never get along there will always be a geebeho and jeebeeho ethnic divide, the level of understanding of the historical aspects of the region is astonishing.. to say the least.

Well, there has always been animosity between Semitics and Aryans -- the Iranis are more closely related to both Europeans and Indians than they are related to the Semitic Arabs.

Most Americans don't even get the ethnic and religious diversity in the entire swathe of land from Greece to the phillipines.  Take the Caucasus for example -- Ossetians are related to the Persians, as are the Azerbaijanis and Kurds.  But the Ossetians are Orthodox Christians.  The Chechens, Ingush and Dagestanis are a distinct people, unrealted to others.  The ABhkhazians are also a distinct people.  THe Georgians and Armenians have common history at many points but are subtly different. 

Iraq has Aryan Kurds to the north (in the former Turkish province of Mosul), Arab Sunnis around Baghdad (Turkish province of BAghdad) and Shia Arabs to the South (Turkish province of Basra), all put together in an unwieldy group by the Brit who wanted the oil fields int he north and south united.

The Iranis, have a large Azeri population to the north-west, they have ARabs to the south-west, Persians in the centre, Turks to the north and Baluchis to the south east

The Baluchis again, are NOT Iranis, but more an Indic people.  If you move further to the north, you'll see the mixture of ethnic and religious groups in AFghanistan: The Tajiks are Irani, the Uzbeks, Turkmen, etc. are Turkic, the Hazaras are Mongol, descendents of Genghiz Khan's Golden Horde while the Pashtuns and Baluchis are Indic people

And then you get to an even more complicated, ethnic, religious, secatrian, linguistic etc. etc. mix-- India.  I can't even fathom the mixture they have there, so, I'll just post the linguistic map -- or at least for the officially recongnised 15 odd languages (with a few hundred other non-recognized languages not depicted)

And the religious split:

[Cronos]

And to post a sign of the Hindu swastik:
Hitler truly did debase German culture. I think he damaged the German people as much as he damaged the non-Jewish others. What a madman.

[F14 Pilot]

The colors of those flags represent the symbols and ideas.

If I am right, black stands for their Pan Arabism, Red stands for the Baath party, Green stands for Islamic heritage and so on.

[dennisw]

Good news....anything beats wacko Mohammedanism. And if the smelly Ayatollahs aren't wacko Mohammedans then no one is.

[dennisw]

Normal good looking women trapped in Muslim costumes and hijabs. What a waste of womanhood. Show the power of Muhammadan brainwashing and idiotic Ayatollah driven conformity.....

[Cronos]

something like that -- plus the Egyptian flag features the eagle of the Caliph Saladin, the Syrian flag is a remnant of the Arab Republic which was a union of Egypt and Syria while the IRaqi flag is similar to the Syrian only with Allahu Akbar written between the stars and 3 stars to represent the 3 provinces

[freedom44]

Hardly "normal" looking. Persian females are far superior to the majority of fat pigs we have to look at in their skimpy outfits here in the US.

To counter we need laws banning females of certain weight limits from wearing skimpy outfits. It's scary to say the least.

[F14 Pilot]

Sure and these 3 colors are common among many Arab state flags.

Allhu akbar on the Iraqi flag written By saddam in 1991.

[freedom44]

Same written by Islamic Republic of Iran.

[F14 Pilot]

You forgot that ONION thing on the center of their flag.

LOL

[7.62 x 51mm]

Bookmarking for later.

[dennisw]

Broward county Florida has so many obese women. You couild get trampled by this herd of elephants if you go to Wal Mart.

The Black women have it worse than the white ones. Especailly the Haitian ladies. It seems no one goes hungry or misses a meal down here. I think lack of cold winter temperatures makes it worse.

[Cronos]

Regarding the "onion thing":

The symbol consists of four crescents and a sword. The four crescents are meant to stand for the word Allah (there is indeed some resemblence to the Arabic writing of it). The five parts of the emblem symbolize the five principles of Islam. Above the sword (central part) is a "tashdid" (looks a bit like a W). In Arabic writing this is used to double a letter, here it doubles the strength of the sword.

The flag's centrepiece formerly comprised a lion with a sword standing before a reising sun, with a crown above, but all traditional flags and banners were abolished after the abdication of the shah in 1979.

There are Arabic writings in the border line of the stripes. These are 22 copies of the main Islamic phrase Allahu Akbar meaning "God is greater (than everything)".

It IS a sign of Arab domination -- what with the Arabic writing. The flag under the Shah was