Posted on 09/10/2004 3:46:54 AM PDT by carton253
That is just one of many questions that remain unanswered from the Battle of Gettysburg. First the novel, Killer Angels, then the movie, Gettysburg, has currently painted a distorted picture of Lee’s real strategy, as has many of the books written on this subject. The standard story they all tell is one that has General Ewell failing to take Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill the evening of July 1st. On July 2nd, General Lee then attacked both flanks of the Union Army. Ewell again attacking Culp’s Hill, and General Longstreet attacking the Round Tops. When those attacks failed, General Lee abandoned the flank attacks to desperately march 15,000 men against the Federal center on Cemetery Ridge. This telling of the events, over 140 years old, has left many questions about those three days unanswered.
The first of those questions would be General Hood’s order to attack up the Emmittsburg Road. Let’s look at that order and the remarks that were made during the morning of July 2nd. Lee’s strategy was a simple one. He wanted to converge his forces upon Cemetery Hill…the salient of the Federal position. He did not want to attack the Round Tops. He saw no value in them. It is important to note that this was not the first time Lee had used this strategy in battle. He used it during the Seven Days Battles, during the Battle of Second Manassas, and finally at Chancellorsville, where he sent Jackson marching around the Union flank to push the Union Army into the waiting other wing of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Longstreet disagreed with Lee’s pincher strategy. During the morning meeting, when Lee positioned McLaws on the Emmittsburg Road at right angles to the Peach Orchard and ordered him to gain the orchard, Longstreet chose to direct McLaws parallel to the turnpike. Lee replied, “No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road.” McLaws’ Division was to aid Hood in an oblique attack on the left flank of the Federal Line in order to force it toward Gettysburg, toward Cemetery Hill, toward Ewell’s waiting corps, who was to make a demonstration against Cemetery and Culp’s Hills until the opportunity came for an attack.
There were many hindrances to Lee’s attack. Over the course of time, history has turned these hindrances into Lee’s overall strategy. The first hindrance came when General Sickles moved the III Corps away from the Round Tops because the ground was untenable. He understood that the high ground was the ridge where the Peach Orchard was based. General Lee shared Sickles eye for good ground. The Peach Orchard was Hood’s objective. Lee planned to use the Peach Orchard as a artillery base to shell Hancock’s flank on Cemetery Ridge. When Sickles moved forward, he extended his line. Meade had no choice but to reinforce the line with over 20,000 soldiers. Soldiers, who were not there when Lee reconnoitered the line earlier that morning.
Another hindrance was the presence of Gregg’s cavalry to the rear and east of Ewell’s position. What this did was force Ewell to position the Stonewall Brigade on Brinkerhoff Ridge to hold the cavalry in check along the Hanover Road. This was a loss of one of the best fighting brigades in the Army of Northern Virginia.
The last hindrance was the early wounding of Hood. This break in leadership caused the course of the attack to drift right – to the Round Tops rather than up the Emmittsburg Road. Since the entire Confederate Line was dressing off one another, when the lead elements of Hood’s Division drifted right, so did Laws’s division. Colonel Oates of the 15th Alabama was so intent on attacking the Round Tops that he refused General Laws direct order to wheel left and continue up the Emmittsburg Road. Hood’s division could not attack Little Round Top and remain attached to the Emmittsburg Road. Neither could Laws. Lee’s Line was already seven miles long and couldn’t afford this diversion away from the planned attack “up the Emmitsburg Road.” The attack failed.
In his official battle report, General Lee wrote, “The general plan was unchanged.” On July 3rd , he still planned to converge both his wings on Cemetery Hill. He did not abandoned his objectives to wage a rash battle to break through as history teaches today. A careful look at the day shows that Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s, and Trimble’s brigades were not sent on a desperate mission to do the impossible. Cemetary Hill was the key to the battle. Gettysburg was a point of strategic importance. Ten to twelve roads concentrated at Gettysburg. An army could easily converge to or diverge from this point. By being at the heart of the crossroads, Cemetery Hill was the most advantageous ground from the beginning. Both Lee, Reynolds, and Hancock recognized the importance of Cemetery Hill.
In his memoirs, Longstreet writes, “I was disappointed when Lee came to me on the morning the 3rd and directed that I should renew the attack against Cemetery Hill.” Longstreet still wanted to move to the right around the Federal Army and get between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. Lee said no, “I am going to take them where they are on Cemetery Hill, I want to take Pickett’s Division and make the attack.”
With the arrival of JEB Stuart’s cavalry, Lee was able to relieve the Stonewall Brigade, who returned to the line at Culp’s Hill. Furthermore, JEB Stuart did something that most historians do not understand. He fired two cannon shots and announced his presence on the field. Why? If one understands that Lee was seeking to converge his two wings on Cemetery Hill, one suddenly understands why JEB Stuart seemed to tell the Union Calvary where he was. His job was to clear Ewell’s rear of Union Calvary and allow Ewell to concentrate all his forces on an attack on Culp’s Hill. JEB Stuart summoned. The Union Calvary answered.
Pickett’s charge bears many resemblances to Hood’s attack up the Emmittsburg Road. What Pickett’s charge did different from Hood’s attack was move the thrust of the oblique battle closer to the mark of the Cemetery Hill. Lee also reinforced Ewell's positions by 6,000 men during the early morning of 7/3. This was not by accident. He fully expected both the II and III Corps to join the battle and attack Culp's Hill. It was to be 2nd Manassas all over again.
General Winfield Scott testified to Congress, “When the columns of the enemy appeared, it looked as if they were going to attack the center of our line (Hancock’s line on Cemetery Ridge and on Cemetery Hill) but after marching straight out a little distance they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Cemetery Hill, which I have no doubt was their intention.”
Looking at drawings that appeared in leading Northern periodicals right after the battle, one can clearly see that the Confederate Line oblique movements put them perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road and not parallel. What changed Pickett’s line was the overwhelming flank fire. It forced the line to the left. When the left collapsed, Pettigrew’s division bore to the right to compensate. They were supposed to dress right to assure a connection with Pickett, but that maneuver is far different from the one that actually took place in the assault’s final stages. It was never Lee’s plan to place the weight of the entire charge in front of the copse of trees. The line ended there as the natural result of the terrible flank fire, and Pickett’s Division movement to the left in order to avoid it.
Of course, such analysis does not change what happened those three days in Gettysburg. But it does allow serious students to understand what Lee intended to accomplish. If one could picture how Pickett’s Division was aligned, one would see that the men were marched toward Cemetery Hill and Ridge at a forty-five-degree angle to the Emmittsburg Road rather than parallel to it. It also causes serious students to see that Lee had a strong objective in the battle and not the three difference objectives as modern history tells us.
That said, I wonder why he didn't try to organize his artillery to enfilade Cemetery Hill from Ewell's rear areas just east of the town proper? It would have been closer than the Peach Orchard, and he could have done a lot of damage.
Gen. Pender was generally useless as an artillery officer, but Lee had and used E. A. Porter Alexander. But Lee (or Pender) caused Lee's batteries to be positioned all along Seminary Ridge, so that their fire tended to overshoot the Union positions and did no great damage during the big cannonade of the Third Day.
There was no officer to see the overall position and take charge, as Col. Ruggle had done at Shiloh when he cleared out the Hornet's Nest with his big, 62-gun battery.
The strategic vision was much broader than "completing" Chancellorsville. But you're right that Lee overreached; he did that consistently. Edward Bonekemper III has argued that Lee was overly aggressive on the field, and that he fought out his army in the campaigns of 1862/3. Lee needed to keep the Army of Northern Virginia much more nearly intact for the rubber match of 1864, which his superiors in the CSA government surely had to know was the one for all the marbles.
Sure they could have. It isn't all brute strength, as Lee had just shown at Chancellorsville. Had he shown enough cool in the field, he could have gone for Longstreet's battle of maneuver and driven Meade nuts for weeks before bringing him to battle on ground favorable to Lee, rather than jumping at Meade's good positions on Cemetery Ridge.
Lee needed a C-in-C of the Confederate Army to manage "the vision thing". Edward Bonekemper, whom I just mentioned, shows that Lee was theater-oriented to a fault, which is understandable given the fact that he was a Virginian, but not forgivable in the grand-strategic sense. Longstreet's success at Chickamauga shows what "could" have been, had he been in charge of strategic-level operations directing a campaign of defense on interior lines.
That Longstreet showed deficiencies in independent command and even as a corps commander (being consistently slow to "get up") does not detract from his grasp of possibilities. Too, he had experience as a supply officer (his last prewar billet out West), and could have done a lot at HQ to curb the excessive hoarding tendencies of the Confederate commissary system.
Lee needed Longstreet as CSA chief of staff to curb Lee's own excessive bias toward aggression, to provide a broad vision, and to untangle the GHQ mess. So saying is not to say he would ever have overcome the favoritism, backbiting, and prima-donna politics engaged in ad nauseam and to the considerable detriment of the cause by e.g. Braxton Bragg.
Meanwhile, if Lee had taken Longstreet's advice on the evening of the First Day, he'd have had a much more successful campaign in Pennsylvania. After all, it was Longstreet who'd told him where Meade was -- thanks to Pete's man Harrison.
Revisionist historian Bonekemper (a Southerner, btw, as if one couldn't guess by the juleps-and-magnolias name) says that Lee and other CW generals got the bad habit of assaulting prepared positions over open ground during the Mexican War, when their opponents were regulars, but equipped with Napoleonic smoothbore muskets. The Mexican artillery's rate of fire, too, was much slower than was common in the ACW.
While I concur with much of your post, you are in greivous error on both points here.
1. Lee's battle at Chancellorsville was a masterpiece for the ages. But don't take my word for it: ask them at West Point, where they still teach it. His fame as a general, while overdone in some respects, is secure. His renown as a man still has a ways to go to maturity, IMHO. People outside the South have no inkling of what a good man he was.
2. The question "was Lee a traitor?" has been abundantly debated, with the infamous Whiskey Papa arguing the affirmative. After a long and exhaustive debate during the course of which Wlat was completely crushed by, among others, yours truly, even he conceded that the odious label of "traitor" should not attach to General Robert E. Lee. Take a note, write it down, and don't forget it.
and you can't bait me into it, either. Although that was a good try.
Ok, ok, we are not communicating. I'm saying BARRING an acceptance of Longies' arguments for a war of maneuver. But then that wouldn't have been "winning at G-burg." It may have been winning elsewhere, but not there.
Gregg's 2nd Calvary Division had 4,000 troopers were positioned to the rear and east of his position. He had the Union I, XI, XII Corps in his front. The Stonewall Brigade was removed from the line and to check the Calvary advance. Early sent one brigade to help the Stonewall Brigade also. This weakened Ewell...whose orders were to wait for the main attack from Longstreet. Johnson's Division was to attack Culp's Hill. Early was to follow. Rhodes was to attack west toward Cemetery Hill. These three divisions were to attack against the Union salient at Cemetery Hill.
An attack was made by Ewell on Cemetery Hill. Early's division made to to the top of Cemetery Hill but without support, they had to withdraw. General Anderson of Hill's corps was in the proper place and managed to pierce Cemetery Ridge only a couple hundred yards from the southwestern slope of Cemetery Hill. The attack had not gone off as planned...and yet, even momentarily, the Army of Northern Virginia pierced the salient. July 3rd brought another try. The II Corps did use their artillery to fire upon Cemetery Hill and Ridge.
Pender wasn't an artillery officer. He commanded a infantry brigade of brave North Carolinians. Do you mean Pendleton?
Porter Alexander was in charge of the placement of the artillery on July 3rd. But, the Federals said that the Confederates always overshot.
In his terrific book on Lee, Douglas Southall Freeman wrote that after the death of Stonewall Jackson, Lee placed Ewell and A.P. Hill in charge of the II and III Corps. What Lee did not understand, at the time, (he understood it perfectly after Gettysburg) was that Ewell and Hill never operated independently under Jackson. Jackson told them where to be, when to be there, and how long it should take. Jackson had trained Ewell and Hill never to go outside the letter of the order. No independence. Before, Lee would write to Jackson "if practicable" and Jackson would do it. He wrote "if practicable" to Ewell, and the order wasn't firm enough. Ewell had a council of war with his commanders, who all served under the exacting Jackson... This misunderstanding of the nature of his commanders would cost Lee greatly.
You are so right. If everyone would ignore non-sequeer, he would go away.
Wrong again. But where is that any surprise coming from you?
Are you saying that Ewell's position was exposed on his left, and that if Porter Alexander had positioned his artillery east of town, he'd have been vulnerable to attack by Gregg? What was Stuart doing? I thought he was on the east flank, too. At least after he came in -- on the second day, wasn't it? Or was it the evening of the first? I'll have to go look it up. But I still don't see why Porter Alexander couldn't foresee his geometry problem and redeploy his batteries from Seminary Ridge to Gettysburg, massing them to the north of Cemetery Hill.
The II Corps did use their artillery to fire upon Cemetery Hill and Ridge.
But most of Pendleton's (thank you for the correction) resources were not available to support Ewell's Corps.
If Lee were going to mount a pair of pincer or wedge-and-trap assaults on the Second and Third Days, you would think he would try to stack all his arty chips on one or the other pincer, in order to maximize his chances of carrying one or the other position, either of which would be sufficient to force Meade to change his front on top of the ridge at a minimum, and probably force him to withdraw.
Which, by the way, was still third prize. What Lee really needed was to provoke Meade into a replay of Fredericksburg, and for that, as Longstreet correctly predicted, Lee would have to get between Meade and something Lincoln couldn't afford to have occupied or destroyed -- like Philadelphia.
Porter Alexander was in charge of the placement of the artillery on July 3rd. But, the Federals said that the Confederates always overshot.
A problem he wouldn't have had, had he positioned his pieces at either end of Cemetery Ridge, to enfilade it. I've seen the field, and the southern end of the ridge was complicated by woods, the Round Tops, the Devil's Den, and other impediments to setting up big batteries. That would suggest Cemetery Hill at the other end of the ridge as the position to work on. Although I understand from the article, that Lee did see the imporance of enfilade, and sent Hood to get him the advantageous position in the Peach Orchard.
Jackson had trained Ewell and Hill never to go outside the letter of the order. No independence. ....[Lee] wrote "if practicable" to Ewell, and the order wasn't firm enough.
Thanks, I had never understood Ewell's failure on the First Day before. Bonekemper says something similar about Lee's habits in cutting orders in another context. His orders to the cavalry columns under Wheeler and Imboden on his left flank, who were supposed to match his pace of advance, weren't firm enough or explicit enough during the Pennsylvania campaign, and so whenever they came to a stopping point suggested by their orders, they bivouacked -- and did not send for new orders, and Lee didn't check up on them. Thus Lee lost contact with them in his rear and left flank, just as he lost contact with Stuart. This was a problem with the Confederate cavalry all during the war -- they were too independent, and didn't have the habits either of riding to the sounds of battle, or of sending to infantry generals for fresh orders.
Porter was with the I Corps. On July 2nd, Porter was responsible for aiding the advance of Longstreet up the Emmittsburg Road. The II Corps was firing on Cemetery Hill and waiting for Longstreet's advance. Lee's objective was to roll the Union flank up into Ewell's waiting arms...like at Chancellorsville or during the 7 Days...
What was Stuart doing?
On July 2nd, Stuart had not arrived from Carlisle/Hanover. On July 3rd, he initiated a battle between Gregg's Calvary and his troopers. The battle ended with a small victory for Stuart.
But I still don't see why Porter Alexander couldn't foresee his geometry problem and redeploy his batteries from Seminary Ridge to Gettysburg, massing them to the north of Cemetery Hill.
Go back to the article and see Lee's overall general plan, which on July 3rd, had not changed from July 2nd. He still intended to roll up the Union Flank into the waiting II and III Corps. Alexander was assigned to this task. The artillery was to move out and assist the advance, which was oblique and not a straight frontal attack as depicted... Alexander extended too much ammunition in the cannonade, which under Lee's orders was to last approximately 25-30 minutes...and then the attack would happen.
Furthermore, Longstreet should have attacked early in the morning...as did Ewell and Hill... But, he delayed. So, if the attacks were coordinated... you would have converging fire on both Cemetery Ridge and Hill from the three Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.
in order to maximize his chances of carrying one or the other position,
For there to be victory, Lee would have to carry both positions. He would have to route the Union army and drive them from the field. That was his intention when he left Virginia. To destroy the Army of the Potomac in the North and assist the Peace Party, who, if they won the election, might sue for peace. Lee knew before the war began, he could not win a war of attrition... Grant knew it, and Lee knew it.
What Lee really needed was to provoke Meade into a replay of Fredericksburg, and for that, as Longstreet correctly predicted, Lee would have to get between Meade and something Lincoln couldn't afford to have occupied or destroyed -- like Philadelphia.
I don't believe that... A victory like Chancellorsville would have worked just as well... It did not have to be Fredericksburg all over. It didn't have to be Chancellorsville either. It had to be a victory. That's what Lee was gunning for.
A problem he wouldn't have had, had he positioned his pieces at either end of Cemetery Ridge, to enfilade it.
If you've seen the ground, then you've seen the artillery markers... the artillery was positioned to enfilade both Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge... the attacks were not coordinated... Alexander did not support Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble. Union flank fire broke down the attack forcing Pickett to the left.
just as he lost contact with Stuart.
Lee didn't loose contact with Stuart. He knew where Stuart was... Stuart's June 23, 1963 orders, signed by both Lee and Longstreet sent Stuart around the Union Flank... Stuart's order had a stipulation... he was only to attempt the flanking move if Stuart found the Union Army on the move, which Stuart did.
If that happened, Stuart was to go to Carlisle and place his troopers on Ewell's flanks. But, Ewell was recalled, and he didn't leave word for Stuart as to where he had gone.
After the war, Early was on record saying that the II Corps knew where Stuart was... as did Lee.
This was a problem with the Confederate cavalry all during the war -- they were too independent, and didn't have the habits either of riding to the sounds of battle, or of sending to infantry generals for fresh orders.
I've studied the Army of Northern Virginia and your description does not sound like anything I've read. Stuart marched to the sound of the battle. Stuart was a warrior...and the greatest Calvary leader this nation has known (though some will disagree and say it is Nathan Bedford Forrest)...
Comments?
Furthermore, Longstreet should have attacked early in the morning...as did Ewell and Hill... But, he delayed. So, if the attacks were coordinated... you would have converging fire on both Cemetery Ridge and Hill from the three Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.
There is a huge argument about Longstreet's performance on the Third Day, as you're aware. But Lee gave Longstreet his initial orders at dawn, in person, in Longstreet's headquarters, as Longstreet tells us in his memoir, From Manassas to Appomattox, cancelling orders Longstreet had drawn for a movement of the corps to the right, and an attempt to gain the Union rear.
Lee and Longstreet heard the sound of artillery fire from the far left end of their line even before their conversation ended, the battle being opened not by Ewell, as Lee intended, but by the Federal troops counterattacking Ewell's forward positions. Ruger had been ordered to regain the trenches near the crest of the ridge that Ewell had taken the evening before, while Meade kept six full corps in readiness to receive Lee's assault that he fully expected would fall on Gibbon in his center, rather than the battle of maneuver that Longstreet had advised and Newton warned Meade against the night before -- Newton having succeeded the late General Reynolds in command of the First Division. Longstreet says cryptically that Meade knew where Lee's assault would come, from the presence of Ewell's troops on Meade's left, and their activity.
There were actually two separate complaints about Longstreet's timing at Gettysburg, both of the same form: "Longstreet should have attacked earlier than he did". Lee said it afterward about Longstreet's attack on the third day, that, in Longstreet's paraphrase, "the attack of his right was not made as early as expected", which Longstreet characterized as disingenuousness on Lee's part, or a mistake of unreasonableness, given that the order was given at dawn. Preparation for this major assault would require movements, briefings, a review by all officers of the ground and a briefing by them of their troops, to prepare them for what they would see when they broke cover (mostly, that mile-long slope with Union artillery at the top of it), as well as an artillery preparation. You said 30 minutes or so for artillery bombardment; in the outcome it was 90 minutes, partly because Longstreet stipulated that terminating the barrage and giving the order for the attack was contingent on results (the suppression of Union counterbattery), which Porter Alexander never achieved. In the end, Porter Alexander sent Longstreet the famous note, "If you are coming at all, come at once....but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all."
Lee knew before the war began, he could not win a war of attrition... Grant knew it, and Lee knew it.
Which was what made it imperative for Lee to keep his command unattrited, and the enemy off balance, by operations of maneuver, frustrating Lincoln's need for favorable returns from the front, until the critical election year of 1864. Chancellorsville, Second Manassas, and Gettysburg should all have been fought in the summer of 1864, when the Confederate sacrifice would have meant more in practical, political outcomes.
If you've seen the ground, then you've seen the artillery markers... the artillery was positioned to enfilade both Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge... the attacks were not coordinated... Alexander did not support Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble. Porter Alexander made a mistake -- he didn't realize his wagon train had been sent to the rear, so he began to run low on ammunition just as the assault went in.
But the Second Corps artillery didn't fire on the north end of Cemetery Ridge during Pickett's assault, and Porter Alexander's, which did, wasn't well positioned for the task at hand. Lee didn't loose contact with Stuart. He knew where Stuart was...
I was unaware of that. I'd read that Stuart's whereabouts on the 30th and the 1st were a mystery. Perhaps I had bad information.
I've studied the Army of Northern Virginia and your description does not sound like anything I've read.
Apparently we read different books and articles. The article I read stated that there was a structural and organic problem with organization of the Confederate cavalry, that they were too detached and didn't coordinate closely enough with infantry columns. Stuart marched to the sound of the battle. Stuart was a warrior...and the greatest Calvary leader this nation has known...
My purpose wasn't to impugn Stuart, who had many fine qualities, which made him all the more sorely missed on the evening of the First Day. But he showed up. The greater onus, as I was trying to point out, fell on Imboden and the left-flank cavalry columns, who bivouacked on completion of their latest orders and were thereafter unavailable to Lee until after the crisis.
Longstreet never had orders to move his corps to the right... Lee was explicit... His general plan had not changed from July 2nd to July 3rd. So, if Longstreet disputes Lee, then let's see if any of Longstreet's staff knew when the attack would happen. Porter Alexander writes, "During the evening of July 2nd, I found my way to General Longstreet's bivouac, a little ways in the rear... I was told that we would renew the attack early in the morning. That Pickett's division would arrive and would assault the enemy's line." So, on the evening of July 2nd, Longstreet knew when and who. Did Longstreet know where? Alexander writes, "My impression is the exact point for it (the attack) was not designated, but I was told it would be to our left of the Peach Orchard."
So, Longstreet knew that Lee wanted to renew the attack against Cemetery Hill and that Pickett's division had to be placed on the left of his corps to achieve this. Why wasn't he ready before 4:00 pm?
Meade kept six full corps in readiness to receive Lee's assault that he fully expected would fall on Gibbon in his center...
Hancock testified before Congress that the center was not Lee's objective during that final day. I think I have the exact quote in the article. He testified that at first he thought Pickett was coming straight at them, but then Pickett's division turned 45 degrees. Hancock realized that Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble were heading toward the Salient on Cemetery Hill at Ziegler's Grove, which Hancock testified was the weak point of his line.
The real shame of Alexander's using all his ammunition was that he did not support Pickett's advance leaving Kemper open to devastating fire which changed the whole attack. The whole line adjusted to the crowding done by Pickett's drift to the left.
Unfortunately Lee did not think that he could just maneuver for a year in enemy territory. He needed that victory. He needed to destroy the Army of the Potomac on Northern ground. Don't forget what was going on in the West. Besides the Army of Northern Virginia's victories, the rest of the war was going badly. He needed the victory. Looking over the whole history of the Army of Northern Virginia...besides Gettysburg and Antietam...this army did not lose. Even when Grant took charge... Lee outgeneralled him. He arrived at Spotsylvania Courthouse, Cold Harbor, Petersburg before Grant. He managed to disappear for 24 hours from the Petersburg trenches before Grant knew he was gone. If the food had arrived at Farmville, Lee might have just gotten away and joined up with Johnston. Of course, once Grant caught him...the war was over. Lee didn't have the means to carry on...he was truly outmanned and outgunned. So... why not think that in 1863 that you could win when you whipped "those people" every time you faced them.
I was unaware of that. I'd read that Stuart's whereabouts on the 30th and the 1st were a mystery. Perhaps I had bad information.
I don't know if it is bad information as much as Stuart was missing in action has become part and parcel of the Gettysburg saga as history retells it. Trying to separate the "urban legends" from the facts can be a rather good time. One of those would be Harry Heth going to Gettysburg to look for shoes and ran into Buford. AP Hill knew there were no shoes in Gettysburg. Early had beaten him to them, and Early had told Hill so.
The only way Stuart could be "awol" is if Gettysburg was Lee's objective when Stuart left for his ride on June 23rd. But Gettysburg was not Lee's objective. The two armies ran into each other at Gettysburg. Stuart was to contact Ewell and Early at York. (I had written Carlisle earlier...sorry about that) No word was left for Stuart as to where the II Corps had gone. Stuart left Robertson and Imboden to perform reconnaissance. You are right...they served Lee badly. Once Stuart knew where the army had concentrated, he sent Fitzhugh Lee's brigade immediately to Gettysburg. Once he rested his horses, Stuart came straight to Gettysburg.
I do believe that Ewell's and Hill's artillery did fire on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill on July 3rd. It just wasn't I Corps firing alone. Let me do some research on this point, and I'll get back with you.
Longstreet says in his memoir, explicitly, that he received no order from Lee on the evening of the 2nd, and that he didn't go to Lee's HQ, four miles away, but sent his returns for the 2nd by courier. He did not see Lee or receive an order until after sunrise on the 3rd, when Lee came to see him as he was planning, having sent scouts to reconnoiter during the night "in the absence of orders", to move the 1st Corps against Meade's extreme left "and push it down towards his centre."
When Lee gave Longstreet his orders, there was a fundamental disagreement about the mission, followed by a negotiation about the security of Longstreet's right, which was, he says, facing 20,000 federals through the trees and across the Kern Farm to the south (where Farnsworth was, with his cavalry) and Plum Run in front of the Round Tops, to the SE, both of whose crests were now strongly occupied by federal troops of the VI Corps.
Lee responded by putting together a paper composite force from Longstreet's and Hill's Corps, and together they worked out which brigade or division ought to be stationed in each section of the line and what its objective and orders would be. It took them time to discuss all this, after which Lee rode off at what, eight o'clock? Seven? in the morning. Then Longstreet and A.P. Hill had to give orders and begin to get their troops up and find their places in the composite assault force.
Porter Alexander had to pull together his batteries and provide for a separate battery of nine pieces to go with the assault force and provide covering fire during the attack. When all this was done, and Porter Alexander was ready, Longstreet ordered him to begin, taking care to note the effects of his fire (easier said than done) and take care not to send word to Pickett to begin until a slackening of the Union batteries' return fire would indicate a better chance for success.
Longstreet did move off before 4 p.m. -- Porter Alexander started his artillery battle at 1:07 precisely, which lasted according to one source 90 minutes, according to another nearly two hours. The assault went forward between 2 p.m. and 3 p.m. Bonekemper gives the time as 3 p.m. exactly when the Confederate assault crested Seminary Ridge and came into open view of the Union defenders waiting for them on Cemetery Ridge.
Close enough, though, to give Meade credit for correctly anticipating that the assault would be directed toward the middle of his position, rather than a flanking, turning movement such as Newton warned him about and which, even as Newton spoke, Longstreet's scouts were exploring.
Interesting point, and Longstreet concurs in the conclusion, that there was nothing left for the Confederates to do on the 4th but withdraw, beaten and low on supplies, back to Virginia. However, I've seen another quote, I think from Porter Alexander, to the effect that far from lacking the ability to forage, and ANV was able to forage easily for a week in its quickly-prepared positions overlooking the Potomac crossing, while it faced Sedgwick's pursuing VI Corps and did not encounter such difficulties in supply or movement as would seem to compel the army to withdraw.
That running short would seem to point to an unremarked weakness in Longstreet's orders to Porter Alexander. He ordered the artillery to fire until the Union counterbattery slackened -- not allowing for the possibility that Porter Alexander's targeting problem, lack of visibility, and poor geometry with respect to his target might result in a prodigious expenditure of ammunition, and the expenditure of two hours, without the desired result.
Too, the prolonged bombardment will have given notice to anyone within (almost a legend, like those others you nominated) 140 statute miles that strong battle was toward. IIRC, one Union corps heard that thunderous exchange underway and quickened its steps furiously in order to make it to the battle -- a good example of "marching to the guns".
Longstreet's orders caused Porter Alexander to play out Longstreet's only trump suit without a corresponding gain in the assault commanders' chances of success.
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