Are you saying that Ewell's position was exposed on his left, and that if Porter Alexander had positioned his artillery east of town, he'd have been vulnerable to attack by Gregg? What was Stuart doing? I thought he was on the east flank, too. At least after he came in -- on the second day, wasn't it? Or was it the evening of the first? I'll have to go look it up. But I still don't see why Porter Alexander couldn't foresee his geometry problem and redeploy his batteries from Seminary Ridge to Gettysburg, massing them to the north of Cemetery Hill.
The II Corps did use their artillery to fire upon Cemetery Hill and Ridge.
But most of Pendleton's (thank you for the correction) resources were not available to support Ewell's Corps.
If Lee were going to mount a pair of pincer or wedge-and-trap assaults on the Second and Third Days, you would think he would try to stack all his arty chips on one or the other pincer, in order to maximize his chances of carrying one or the other position, either of which would be sufficient to force Meade to change his front on top of the ridge at a minimum, and probably force him to withdraw.
Which, by the way, was still third prize. What Lee really needed was to provoke Meade into a replay of Fredericksburg, and for that, as Longstreet correctly predicted, Lee would have to get between Meade and something Lincoln couldn't afford to have occupied or destroyed -- like Philadelphia.
Porter Alexander was in charge of the placement of the artillery on July 3rd. But, the Federals said that the Confederates always overshot.
A problem he wouldn't have had, had he positioned his pieces at either end of Cemetery Ridge, to enfilade it. I've seen the field, and the southern end of the ridge was complicated by woods, the Round Tops, the Devil's Den, and other impediments to setting up big batteries. That would suggest Cemetery Hill at the other end of the ridge as the position to work on. Although I understand from the article, that Lee did see the imporance of enfilade, and sent Hood to get him the advantageous position in the Peach Orchard.
Jackson had trained Ewell and Hill never to go outside the letter of the order. No independence. ....[Lee] wrote "if practicable" to Ewell, and the order wasn't firm enough.
Thanks, I had never understood Ewell's failure on the First Day before. Bonekemper says something similar about Lee's habits in cutting orders in another context. His orders to the cavalry columns under Wheeler and Imboden on his left flank, who were supposed to match his pace of advance, weren't firm enough or explicit enough during the Pennsylvania campaign, and so whenever they came to a stopping point suggested by their orders, they bivouacked -- and did not send for new orders, and Lee didn't check up on them. Thus Lee lost contact with them in his rear and left flank, just as he lost contact with Stuart. This was a problem with the Confederate cavalry all during the war -- they were too independent, and didn't have the habits either of riding to the sounds of battle, or of sending to infantry generals for fresh orders.
Porter was with the I Corps. On July 2nd, Porter was responsible for aiding the advance of Longstreet up the Emmittsburg Road. The II Corps was firing on Cemetery Hill and waiting for Longstreet's advance. Lee's objective was to roll the Union flank up into Ewell's waiting arms...like at Chancellorsville or during the 7 Days...
What was Stuart doing?
On July 2nd, Stuart had not arrived from Carlisle/Hanover. On July 3rd, he initiated a battle between Gregg's Calvary and his troopers. The battle ended with a small victory for Stuart.
But I still don't see why Porter Alexander couldn't foresee his geometry problem and redeploy his batteries from Seminary Ridge to Gettysburg, massing them to the north of Cemetery Hill.
Go back to the article and see Lee's overall general plan, which on July 3rd, had not changed from July 2nd. He still intended to roll up the Union Flank into the waiting II and III Corps. Alexander was assigned to this task. The artillery was to move out and assist the advance, which was oblique and not a straight frontal attack as depicted... Alexander extended too much ammunition in the cannonade, which under Lee's orders was to last approximately 25-30 minutes...and then the attack would happen.
Furthermore, Longstreet should have attacked early in the morning...as did Ewell and Hill... But, he delayed. So, if the attacks were coordinated... you would have converging fire on both Cemetery Ridge and Hill from the three Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.
in order to maximize his chances of carrying one or the other position,
For there to be victory, Lee would have to carry both positions. He would have to route the Union army and drive them from the field. That was his intention when he left Virginia. To destroy the Army of the Potomac in the North and assist the Peace Party, who, if they won the election, might sue for peace. Lee knew before the war began, he could not win a war of attrition... Grant knew it, and Lee knew it.
What Lee really needed was to provoke Meade into a replay of Fredericksburg, and for that, as Longstreet correctly predicted, Lee would have to get between Meade and something Lincoln couldn't afford to have occupied or destroyed -- like Philadelphia.
I don't believe that... A victory like Chancellorsville would have worked just as well... It did not have to be Fredericksburg all over. It didn't have to be Chancellorsville either. It had to be a victory. That's what Lee was gunning for.
A problem he wouldn't have had, had he positioned his pieces at either end of Cemetery Ridge, to enfilade it.
If you've seen the ground, then you've seen the artillery markers... the artillery was positioned to enfilade both Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge... the attacks were not coordinated... Alexander did not support Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble. Union flank fire broke down the attack forcing Pickett to the left.
just as he lost contact with Stuart.
Lee didn't loose contact with Stuart. He knew where Stuart was... Stuart's June 23, 1963 orders, signed by both Lee and Longstreet sent Stuart around the Union Flank... Stuart's order had a stipulation... he was only to attempt the flanking move if Stuart found the Union Army on the move, which Stuart did.
If that happened, Stuart was to go to Carlisle and place his troopers on Ewell's flanks. But, Ewell was recalled, and he didn't leave word for Stuart as to where he had gone.
After the war, Early was on record saying that the II Corps knew where Stuart was... as did Lee.
This was a problem with the Confederate cavalry all during the war -- they were too independent, and didn't have the habits either of riding to the sounds of battle, or of sending to infantry generals for fresh orders.
I've studied the Army of Northern Virginia and your description does not sound like anything I've read. Stuart marched to the sound of the battle. Stuart was a warrior...and the greatest Calvary leader this nation has known (though some will disagree and say it is Nathan Bedford Forrest)...