Porter was with the I Corps. On July 2nd, Porter was responsible for aiding the advance of Longstreet up the Emmittsburg Road. The II Corps was firing on Cemetery Hill and waiting for Longstreet's advance. Lee's objective was to roll the Union flank up into Ewell's waiting arms...like at Chancellorsville or during the 7 Days...
What was Stuart doing?
On July 2nd, Stuart had not arrived from Carlisle/Hanover. On July 3rd, he initiated a battle between Gregg's Calvary and his troopers. The battle ended with a small victory for Stuart.
But I still don't see why Porter Alexander couldn't foresee his geometry problem and redeploy his batteries from Seminary Ridge to Gettysburg, massing them to the north of Cemetery Hill.
Go back to the article and see Lee's overall general plan, which on July 3rd, had not changed from July 2nd. He still intended to roll up the Union Flank into the waiting II and III Corps. Alexander was assigned to this task. The artillery was to move out and assist the advance, which was oblique and not a straight frontal attack as depicted... Alexander extended too much ammunition in the cannonade, which under Lee's orders was to last approximately 25-30 minutes...and then the attack would happen.
Furthermore, Longstreet should have attacked early in the morning...as did Ewell and Hill... But, he delayed. So, if the attacks were coordinated... you would have converging fire on both Cemetery Ridge and Hill from the three Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.
in order to maximize his chances of carrying one or the other position,
For there to be victory, Lee would have to carry both positions. He would have to route the Union army and drive them from the field. That was his intention when he left Virginia. To destroy the Army of the Potomac in the North and assist the Peace Party, who, if they won the election, might sue for peace. Lee knew before the war began, he could not win a war of attrition... Grant knew it, and Lee knew it.
What Lee really needed was to provoke Meade into a replay of Fredericksburg, and for that, as Longstreet correctly predicted, Lee would have to get between Meade and something Lincoln couldn't afford to have occupied or destroyed -- like Philadelphia.
I don't believe that... A victory like Chancellorsville would have worked just as well... It did not have to be Fredericksburg all over. It didn't have to be Chancellorsville either. It had to be a victory. That's what Lee was gunning for.
A problem he wouldn't have had, had he positioned his pieces at either end of Cemetery Ridge, to enfilade it.
If you've seen the ground, then you've seen the artillery markers... the artillery was positioned to enfilade both Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge... the attacks were not coordinated... Alexander did not support Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble. Union flank fire broke down the attack forcing Pickett to the left.
just as he lost contact with Stuart.
Lee didn't loose contact with Stuart. He knew where Stuart was... Stuart's June 23, 1963 orders, signed by both Lee and Longstreet sent Stuart around the Union Flank... Stuart's order had a stipulation... he was only to attempt the flanking move if Stuart found the Union Army on the move, which Stuart did.
If that happened, Stuart was to go to Carlisle and place his troopers on Ewell's flanks. But, Ewell was recalled, and he didn't leave word for Stuart as to where he had gone.
After the war, Early was on record saying that the II Corps knew where Stuart was... as did Lee.
This was a problem with the Confederate cavalry all during the war -- they were too independent, and didn't have the habits either of riding to the sounds of battle, or of sending to infantry generals for fresh orders.
I've studied the Army of Northern Virginia and your description does not sound like anything I've read. Stuart marched to the sound of the battle. Stuart was a warrior...and the greatest Calvary leader this nation has known (though some will disagree and say it is Nathan Bedford Forrest)...
Furthermore, Longstreet should have attacked early in the morning...as did Ewell and Hill... But, he delayed. So, if the attacks were coordinated... you would have converging fire on both Cemetery Ridge and Hill from the three Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.
There is a huge argument about Longstreet's performance on the Third Day, as you're aware. But Lee gave Longstreet his initial orders at dawn, in person, in Longstreet's headquarters, as Longstreet tells us in his memoir, From Manassas to Appomattox, cancelling orders Longstreet had drawn for a movement of the corps to the right, and an attempt to gain the Union rear.
Lee and Longstreet heard the sound of artillery fire from the far left end of their line even before their conversation ended, the battle being opened not by Ewell, as Lee intended, but by the Federal troops counterattacking Ewell's forward positions. Ruger had been ordered to regain the trenches near the crest of the ridge that Ewell had taken the evening before, while Meade kept six full corps in readiness to receive Lee's assault that he fully expected would fall on Gibbon in his center, rather than the battle of maneuver that Longstreet had advised and Newton warned Meade against the night before -- Newton having succeeded the late General Reynolds in command of the First Division. Longstreet says cryptically that Meade knew where Lee's assault would come, from the presence of Ewell's troops on Meade's left, and their activity.
There were actually two separate complaints about Longstreet's timing at Gettysburg, both of the same form: "Longstreet should have attacked earlier than he did". Lee said it afterward about Longstreet's attack on the third day, that, in Longstreet's paraphrase, "the attack of his right was not made as early as expected", which Longstreet characterized as disingenuousness on Lee's part, or a mistake of unreasonableness, given that the order was given at dawn. Preparation for this major assault would require movements, briefings, a review by all officers of the ground and a briefing by them of their troops, to prepare them for what they would see when they broke cover (mostly, that mile-long slope with Union artillery at the top of it), as well as an artillery preparation. You said 30 minutes or so for artillery bombardment; in the outcome it was 90 minutes, partly because Longstreet stipulated that terminating the barrage and giving the order for the attack was contingent on results (the suppression of Union counterbattery), which Porter Alexander never achieved. In the end, Porter Alexander sent Longstreet the famous note, "If you are coming at all, come at once....but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all."
Lee knew before the war began, he could not win a war of attrition... Grant knew it, and Lee knew it.
Which was what made it imperative for Lee to keep his command unattrited, and the enemy off balance, by operations of maneuver, frustrating Lincoln's need for favorable returns from the front, until the critical election year of 1864. Chancellorsville, Second Manassas, and Gettysburg should all have been fought in the summer of 1864, when the Confederate sacrifice would have meant more in practical, political outcomes.
If you've seen the ground, then you've seen the artillery markers... the artillery was positioned to enfilade both Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge... the attacks were not coordinated... Alexander did not support Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble. Porter Alexander made a mistake -- he didn't realize his wagon train had been sent to the rear, so he began to run low on ammunition just as the assault went in.
But the Second Corps artillery didn't fire on the north end of Cemetery Ridge during Pickett's assault, and Porter Alexander's, which did, wasn't well positioned for the task at hand. Lee didn't loose contact with Stuart. He knew where Stuart was...
I was unaware of that. I'd read that Stuart's whereabouts on the 30th and the 1st were a mystery. Perhaps I had bad information.
I've studied the Army of Northern Virginia and your description does not sound like anything I've read.
Apparently we read different books and articles. The article I read stated that there was a structural and organic problem with organization of the Confederate cavalry, that they were too detached and didn't coordinate closely enough with infantry columns. Stuart marched to the sound of the battle. Stuart was a warrior...and the greatest Calvary leader this nation has known...
My purpose wasn't to impugn Stuart, who had many fine qualities, which made him all the more sorely missed on the evening of the First Day. But he showed up. The greater onus, as I was trying to point out, fell on Imboden and the left-flank cavalry columns, who bivouacked on completion of their latest orders and were thereafter unavailable to Lee until after the crisis.