Gregg's 2nd Calvary Division had 4,000 troopers were positioned to the rear and east of his position. He had the Union I, XI, XII Corps in his front. The Stonewall Brigade was removed from the line and to check the Calvary advance. Early sent one brigade to help the Stonewall Brigade also. This weakened Ewell...whose orders were to wait for the main attack from Longstreet. Johnson's Division was to attack Culp's Hill. Early was to follow. Rhodes was to attack west toward Cemetery Hill. These three divisions were to attack against the Union salient at Cemetery Hill.
An attack was made by Ewell on Cemetery Hill. Early's division made to to the top of Cemetery Hill but without support, they had to withdraw. General Anderson of Hill's corps was in the proper place and managed to pierce Cemetery Ridge only a couple hundred yards from the southwestern slope of Cemetery Hill. The attack had not gone off as planned...and yet, even momentarily, the Army of Northern Virginia pierced the salient. July 3rd brought another try. The II Corps did use their artillery to fire upon Cemetery Hill and Ridge.
Pender wasn't an artillery officer. He commanded a infantry brigade of brave North Carolinians. Do you mean Pendleton?
Porter Alexander was in charge of the placement of the artillery on July 3rd. But, the Federals said that the Confederates always overshot.
In his terrific book on Lee, Douglas Southall Freeman wrote that after the death of Stonewall Jackson, Lee placed Ewell and A.P. Hill in charge of the II and III Corps. What Lee did not understand, at the time, (he understood it perfectly after Gettysburg) was that Ewell and Hill never operated independently under Jackson. Jackson told them where to be, when to be there, and how long it should take. Jackson had trained Ewell and Hill never to go outside the letter of the order. No independence. Before, Lee would write to Jackson "if practicable" and Jackson would do it. He wrote "if practicable" to Ewell, and the order wasn't firm enough. Ewell had a council of war with his commanders, who all served under the exacting Jackson... This misunderstanding of the nature of his commanders would cost Lee greatly.
Are you saying that Ewell's position was exposed on his left, and that if Porter Alexander had positioned his artillery east of town, he'd have been vulnerable to attack by Gregg? What was Stuart doing? I thought he was on the east flank, too. At least after he came in -- on the second day, wasn't it? Or was it the evening of the first? I'll have to go look it up. But I still don't see why Porter Alexander couldn't foresee his geometry problem and redeploy his batteries from Seminary Ridge to Gettysburg, massing them to the north of Cemetery Hill.
The II Corps did use their artillery to fire upon Cemetery Hill and Ridge.
But most of Pendleton's (thank you for the correction) resources were not available to support Ewell's Corps.
If Lee were going to mount a pair of pincer or wedge-and-trap assaults on the Second and Third Days, you would think he would try to stack all his arty chips on one or the other pincer, in order to maximize his chances of carrying one or the other position, either of which would be sufficient to force Meade to change his front on top of the ridge at a minimum, and probably force him to withdraw.
Which, by the way, was still third prize. What Lee really needed was to provoke Meade into a replay of Fredericksburg, and for that, as Longstreet correctly predicted, Lee would have to get between Meade and something Lincoln couldn't afford to have occupied or destroyed -- like Philadelphia.
Porter Alexander was in charge of the placement of the artillery on July 3rd. But, the Federals said that the Confederates always overshot.
A problem he wouldn't have had, had he positioned his pieces at either end of Cemetery Ridge, to enfilade it. I've seen the field, and the southern end of the ridge was complicated by woods, the Round Tops, the Devil's Den, and other impediments to setting up big batteries. That would suggest Cemetery Hill at the other end of the ridge as the position to work on. Although I understand from the article, that Lee did see the imporance of enfilade, and sent Hood to get him the advantageous position in the Peach Orchard.
Jackson had trained Ewell and Hill never to go outside the letter of the order. No independence. ....[Lee] wrote "if practicable" to Ewell, and the order wasn't firm enough.
Thanks, I had never understood Ewell's failure on the First Day before. Bonekemper says something similar about Lee's habits in cutting orders in another context. His orders to the cavalry columns under Wheeler and Imboden on his left flank, who were supposed to match his pace of advance, weren't firm enough or explicit enough during the Pennsylvania campaign, and so whenever they came to a stopping point suggested by their orders, they bivouacked -- and did not send for new orders, and Lee didn't check up on them. Thus Lee lost contact with them in his rear and left flank, just as he lost contact with Stuart. This was a problem with the Confederate cavalry all during the war -- they were too independent, and didn't have the habits either of riding to the sounds of battle, or of sending to infantry generals for fresh orders.