Posted on 09/10/2004 3:46:54 AM PDT by carton253
That is just one of many questions that remain unanswered from the Battle of Gettysburg. First the novel, Killer Angels, then the movie, Gettysburg, has currently painted a distorted picture of Lees real strategy, as has many of the books written on this subject. The standard story they all tell is one that has General Ewell failing to take Culps Hill and Cemetery Hill the evening of July 1st. On July 2nd, General Lee then attacked both flanks of the Union Army. Ewell again attacking Culps Hill, and General Longstreet attacking the Round Tops. When those attacks failed, General Lee abandoned the flank attacks to desperately march 15,000 men against the Federal center on Cemetery Ridge. This telling of the events, over 140 years old, has left many questions about those three days unanswered.
The first of those questions would be General Hoods order to attack up the Emmittsburg Road. Lets look at that order and the remarks that were made during the morning of July 2nd. Lees strategy was a simple one. He wanted to converge his forces upon Cemetery Hill the salient of the Federal position. He did not want to attack the Round Tops. He saw no value in them. It is important to note that this was not the first time Lee had used this strategy in battle. He used it during the Seven Days Battles, during the Battle of Second Manassas, and finally at Chancellorsville, where he sent Jackson marching around the Union flank to push the Union Army into the waiting other wing of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Longstreet disagreed with Lees pincher strategy. During the morning meeting, when Lee positioned McLaws on the Emmittsburg Road at right angles to the Peach Orchard and ordered him to gain the orchard, Longstreet chose to direct McLaws parallel to the turnpike. Lee replied, No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road. McLaws Division was to aid Hood in an oblique attack on the left flank of the Federal Line in order to force it toward Gettysburg, toward Cemetery Hill, toward Ewells waiting corps, who was to make a demonstration against Cemetery and Culps Hills until the opportunity came for an attack.
There were many hindrances to Lees attack. Over the course of time, history has turned these hindrances into Lees overall strategy. The first hindrance came when General Sickles moved the III Corps away from the Round Tops because the ground was untenable. He understood that the high ground was the ridge where the Peach Orchard was based. General Lee shared Sickles eye for good ground. The Peach Orchard was Hoods objective. Lee planned to use the Peach Orchard as a artillery base to shell Hancocks flank on Cemetery Ridge. When Sickles moved forward, he extended his line. Meade had no choice but to reinforce the line with over 20,000 soldiers. Soldiers, who were not there when Lee reconnoitered the line earlier that morning.
Another hindrance was the presence of Greggs cavalry to the rear and east of Ewells position. What this did was force Ewell to position the Stonewall Brigade on Brinkerhoff Ridge to hold the cavalry in check along the Hanover Road. This was a loss of one of the best fighting brigades in the Army of Northern Virginia.
The last hindrance was the early wounding of Hood. This break in leadership caused the course of the attack to drift right to the Round Tops rather than up the Emmittsburg Road. Since the entire Confederate Line was dressing off one another, when the lead elements of Hoods Division drifted right, so did Lawss division. Colonel Oates of the 15th Alabama was so intent on attacking the Round Tops that he refused General Laws direct order to wheel left and continue up the Emmittsburg Road. Hoods division could not attack Little Round Top and remain attached to the Emmittsburg Road. Neither could Laws. Lees Line was already seven miles long and couldnt afford this diversion away from the planned attack up the Emmitsburg Road. The attack failed.
In his official battle report, General Lee wrote, The general plan was unchanged. On July 3rd , he still planned to converge both his wings on Cemetery Hill. He did not abandoned his objectives to wage a rash battle to break through as history teaches today. A careful look at the day shows that Picketts, Pettigrews, and Trimbles brigades were not sent on a desperate mission to do the impossible. Cemetary Hill was the key to the battle. Gettysburg was a point of strategic importance. Ten to twelve roads concentrated at Gettysburg. An army could easily converge to or diverge from this point. By being at the heart of the crossroads, Cemetery Hill was the most advantageous ground from the beginning. Both Lee, Reynolds, and Hancock recognized the importance of Cemetery Hill.
In his memoirs, Longstreet writes, I was disappointed when Lee came to me on the morning the 3rd and directed that I should renew the attack against Cemetery Hill. Longstreet still wanted to move to the right around the Federal Army and get between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. Lee said no, I am going to take them where they are on Cemetery Hill, I want to take Picketts Division and make the attack.
With the arrival of JEB Stuarts cavalry, Lee was able to relieve the Stonewall Brigade, who returned to the line at Culps Hill. Furthermore, JEB Stuart did something that most historians do not understand. He fired two cannon shots and announced his presence on the field. Why? If one understands that Lee was seeking to converge his two wings on Cemetery Hill, one suddenly understands why JEB Stuart seemed to tell the Union Calvary where he was. His job was to clear Ewells rear of Union Calvary and allow Ewell to concentrate all his forces on an attack on Culps Hill. JEB Stuart summoned. The Union Calvary answered.
Picketts charge bears many resemblances to Hoods attack up the Emmittsburg Road. What Picketts charge did different from Hoods attack was move the thrust of the oblique battle closer to the mark of the Cemetery Hill. Lee also reinforced Ewell's positions by 6,000 men during the early morning of 7/3. This was not by accident. He fully expected both the II and III Corps to join the battle and attack Culp's Hill. It was to be 2nd Manassas all over again.
General Winfield Scott testified to Congress, When the columns of the enemy appeared, it looked as if they were going to attack the center of our line (Hancocks line on Cemetery Ridge and on Cemetery Hill) but after marching straight out a little distance they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Cemetery Hill, which I have no doubt was their intention.
Looking at drawings that appeared in leading Northern periodicals right after the battle, one can clearly see that the Confederate Line oblique movements put them perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road and not parallel. What changed Picketts line was the overwhelming flank fire. It forced the line to the left. When the left collapsed, Pettigrews division bore to the right to compensate. They were supposed to dress right to assure a connection with Pickett, but that maneuver is far different from the one that actually took place in the assaults final stages. It was never Lees plan to place the weight of the entire charge in front of the copse of trees. The line ended there as the natural result of the terrible flank fire, and Picketts Division movement to the left in order to avoid it.
Of course, such analysis does not change what happened those three days in Gettysburg. But it does allow serious students to understand what Lee intended to accomplish. If one could picture how Picketts Division was aligned, one would see that the men were marched toward Cemetery Hill and Ridge at a forty-five-degree angle to the Emmittsburg Road rather than parallel to it. It also causes serious students to see that Lee had a strong objective in the battle and not the three difference objectives as modern history tells us.
Very interesting topic but, it is too closely related to the South, and Lincoln and the Confederacy. I am NOT going there again.
I have read Harman's book and agree with him.
There is a considerable body of evidence to indicate that Lee was haunted by his incomplete victory at Chancellorsville a few weeks earlier. He believed that he had had a chance to destroy the Army of the Potomac and the untimely loss of Jackson prevented that. He may have set out to finish the job at Gettysburg and he badly overreached.
Whatever.
Have you read either of the books on Gettysburg that have come out recently by Stephen Sears and Noah Andre Trudeau?
Time Life released a set of 15 volumes of Shelby Foote's multi-volume Narrative with the appropriate Time Life Photos. It is a gorgeous edition and worth looking into; I bought mine through the History Book Club.
I've stood on the hill and wondered what the heck the South thought they were doing in a frontal assault. The road is very close to the crest of the hill. If they were mostly trying to get past further out in the cornfield, it would make a lot more sense.
James Robinson's Jackson biography also suggests that Jackson underperformed during the Seven Days Battles, especially by not linking up with and supporting A.P. Hill near Beaver Dam Creek on the first night. Robinson also suggests that Jackson was simply exhausted and details his recent stress/lack of sleep.
Your posts on this thread have done nothing to change my mind.
So...I'm going to decline to answer your pings because conversations with you go nowhere but into the mud.
But have a nice day.
Absolutely. Sickles was right.
It was written with hope against hope.
I can still hear Jackson's final orders to A.P. Hill: "Do not stop the attack, do not halt until you have taken The United States Ford."
Again...it wasn't a frontal assault. It was an oblique assault. The line was never parallel to the Emmittsburg Road and the Ridge. They were perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road. The objective was the Zeigler Grove...and not the Copse of trees.
Wow, fascinating.
Well, ask a silly question and...you know the rest. Sorry to have bothered you.
If I thought you were the least bit serious, I would gladly answer you...but you aren't, so why pretend. Let's make this the last ping between the two of us. There are plenty of others who will gladly argue with you. I just happen not to be one of them.
Lee was a traitor and that he was a GREAT general is a myth.
He lost the war because he lacked wisdom. At Gettysburg he
should have paid attention to Longstreet. His arrogance did him in.
Iverson's Brigade/5th NC bump!
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