Posted on 10/20/2003 6:22:43 PM PDT by ATOMIC_PUNK
Officer: Saddam trained al-Qaida pre-9-11
Iraqi paper says Fedayeen supervised hijack drills in summer 2001
Saddam Hussein ordered the training of al-Qaida members two months before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, according to an independent Iraqi weekly.
The Fedayeen, under the command of Saddam's late son Uday, directly supervised 100 al-Qaida fighters who were split into two groups, reported Al-Yawm Al-Aakher, citing an Iraqi officer identified by the initial L.
One group went to Al-Nahrawan and the second to Salman Pak, near Baghdad, where they were trained to hijack airplanes, the officer said in an article translated by the Washington, D.C.-based Middle East Media Research Institute.
According to the testimony of Iraqi military defector Sabah Khalifa Khodada Alami, Iraqi intelligence had a Boeing 707 fuselage at Salman Pak used to train groups how to hijack planes without weapons. His claims were consistent with commercial satellite photos showing the fuselage. Saddam's regime insisted to U.N. inspectors Salman Pak was an anti-terror training camp for Iraqi special forces.
The Iraqi weekly, quoting the anonymous officer, said senior Fedayeen officers visited the al-Qaida fighters almost daily, "especially during the final days when they transferred them, late at night in two red trucks that belonged to the Ministry of Transportation, to an undisclosed destination."
"I witnessed that with my own eyes because on that day I was the duty officer," he said.
The officer recalled one day a Land Cruiser belonging to Saddam's personal security force, Al-Amn Al-Khass, arrived, and a senior officer, one of Saddam's personal bodyguards, stepped out.
After a two-hour meeting with a select group of officers at the Special Forces school, the officer said "we were informed that we would have dear guests, and that we should train them very well in a high level of secrecy – not to allow anyone to approach them or to talk to them in any way, shape or form."
About 100 trainees arrived a few days later, he said, a mixture of Arabs, Arabs from the Saudi peninsula, Muslim Afghans and other Muslims from various parts of the world.
The training, he said, was under direct supervision of a major general he identified only by his initials, M. DH. L, who he said now serves as a police commander in one of the provinces.
Most left Iraq after completion of their training, but others stayed through the last battle in Baghdad against coalition forces earlier this year.
The officer said he remembers the leader of the group was a Saudi cleric named Muhammad "who was a fervent and audacious individual and did not require much training."
"He was highly skilled, and could fire accurately at a target while riding a motorcycle," the Iraqi officer said. "Additionally, he used to deliver fiery sermons calling for jihad and for fighting the Americans anywhere in the world."
Surprisingly, he continued, "this man's picture, alongside the commander of the Special Forces school, was televised several times before the beginning of the war and the fall of the former regime."
At the beginning of the Iraq war this year, the officer said, "we were surprised to see the same people whom we had trained return to the Special Forces school and with them 100 additional individuals. The high command asked us to retrain them and to divide them into several groups to be deployed in various areas in Iraq."
"Truth be told," he said, "most of these individuals competed to go to war and to the front lines. Therefore, under pressure they participated immediately in extremely fierce battles that astonished the Iraqis and the Americans."
On April 5, about 100 of the foreign trainees were sent to the 11th company division on the front lines in Nasiriya.
"And for the sake of history," he said, "I will say that this division's endurance was due to some formidable fighters, the commanding officer and members of al-Qaida who fought with intensity and brutality that are seldom matched, while they were praising Allah: Allahu Akbar [Allah is great] … Allahu Akbar. …"
These battled, which took place for 17 days, forced coalition troops to withdraw and re-enter from the industrial areas of Nasiriya, he noted.
Others went to al-Kifl, he said, and participated in "extremely brutal battles."
"Not many of them retreated and they sacrificed their lives to Apache [helicopter] fire, amid the admiration of the Iraqis and the Americans themselves," he said. "The proof is that some of them blew themselves up in the midst of American forces."
I am sorry for any of my behavior that you have considered rude.
Someone want to explain that? I agree that the media slants and distorts a lot of things, but the relative silence about Salman back even from the Administration suggests to me that perhaps its importance is being overblown. How, I can't imagine, because it seems like a huge piece of evidence. But there must be some explanation for the relative silence.
bin Laden's fund raising was an ongoing enterprise as was his interest in chemical and biological weapons. Iraq had diplomatic standing around the world, something the Taliban did not. Afghanistan, while offering bin Laden cover, did not have the scientific or technical resources of Iraq.
bin Laden accepted the funding of the United States in Afghanistan to drive the USSR from their country, even as his hatred of the United States took root. I wouldn't attribute any kind of honorable basis for the unions and alliances either Saddam or bin Laden made. They were based on expedience and the enemy. Saddam was known to appeal to religious symbolism as it suited his objectives and bin Laden was known to accept the support of infidels as it suited him.
Marines find site of terror training
Non-Iraqis tell troops of camp
Marines overran a suspected terrorist training camp Sunday, complete with an old airliner and a rappelling tower, after picking up information from non-Iraqi fighters captured in the war.
U.S. forces earlier had captured Syrians, Egyptians and Sudanese who said they had trained in the Salman Pak camp southeast of Baghdad.
"We believe that this camp had been used to train these foreign fighters in terror tactics," U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks said during a briefing. "It is now destroyed."
The Bush administration is looking for ties between Iraq and terrorism as it bolsters support for the war with Iraq. Several days after the war began March 20, the military began using the word terrorists to describe Iraq's military and paramilitaries.
The administration has also talked about possible links between al-Qaida, the terrorism group headed by Osama bin Laden, and Iraq, but so far has not uncovered evidence.
A Central Command spokesman said the U.S. military has not ruled out links between the possible terrorism camp at Salman Pak and al-Qaida.
There is evidence, however, that Iraq used the camp to train Iraqis and non-Iraqis in terror tactics.
An Iraqi military officer who defected to Turkey in 1999 described training missions at the site, about 21 miles from Baghdad, according to the London-based Iraqi National Congress.
Sabah Khailifa Khodada Alami, who now lives in Fort Worth, said Salman Pak was used for testing weapons, including chemical and biological, and for paramilitary covert action training.
Alami helped train the Fedayeen Saddam -- who have been prominent in efforts to disrupt U.S. supply lines -- in airline hijacking and sabotage. The camp had courses in kidnapping and assassination.
He said they used a Boeing aircraft to practice hijacking a plane or a bus without weapons. Alami said the Iraqi intelligence service, the Mukhabarat, trained a group of non-Iraqis separately.
The Associated Press reported that the Marines found an abandoned, weathered passenger plane, its tail broken off, and a bus and fire engine at the camp. They also found a full obstacle course, with wooden walls and barriers to be climbed over, and a three-story concrete tower draped with ropes, apparently for rappelling.
A former Iraqi intelligence officer who defected in 2001 described "Islamicists" training on a Boeing 707 from about 1995 to 2000.
Middle East expert Dale R. Davis said the non-Iraqi fighters encountered by U.S. forces were most likely working in Iraq when the war began and either volunteered or were conscripted.
Recent arrivals flocking to the Iraqi cause probably would not have had the training to fight in cohesive units as the captured non-Iraqis were apparently doing, said Davis, who heads the international program at Virginia Military Institute.
The Salman Pak base was deserted when the Marines got to it Sunday morning after bombing and shelling it through the night.
And I certianly don't have it but, knowing Karl Rove, it is VERY likely that the administration's silence has a purpose which will only become apparent when ALL the pieces are in place and the trigger is pulled.
To me, that shouldn't matter. If they're training terrorists to hijack airplanes, it shouldn't matter if they're Al Qaeda/9-11 related or not.
Patronage??? Patronage??? What do you think this is - the US Postal Service?
He did not use coercion to keep the population under control - he utilized fear and terror, as few others in the history of the world have done.
What you call "patronage" was in fact nothing more than the ruthless Baathist party, and the equally bloodthirsty Fedayeen, running roughshod over a completely cowed and fearful populace. Their reward, and it was ample, was a payment in kind for institutionalizing thuggery at all levels of his "state".
A dictator as ruthless as Saddam, who already controlled, and exercised that control over, a well-furnished military, has no need whatsoever to implement a "patronage" system.
Please!
CA....
Patronage has nothing to do with the US Postal Service and everything to do with providing rewards (i.e., jobs, government contracts,...) to loyal supporters of the regime
He did not use coercion to keep the population under control - he utilized fear and terror, as few others in the history of the world have done.
Coercion is "the act of compelling by force of authority" and typically involves the use of force or the threat to use force (i.e., terror and fear).
I have heard the same argument about the missing WMD for months.
Patronage has nothing to do with the US Postal Service and everything to do with providing rewards (i.e., jobs, government contracts,...) to loyal supporters of the regime
In pre-Civil Service days, patronage jobs were given out by the party in power willy-nilly, with the juiciest plums often being the Post Office "jobs". It was largely because of this abuse that Civil Service was brought into being.
He did not use coercion to keep the population under control - he utilized fear and terror, as few others in the history of the world have done.
Coercion is "the act of compelling by force of authority" and typically involves the use of force or the threat to use force (i.e., terror and fear).
I really don't want to get into a semantic squabble with you here. You're correct - as far as it goes. There are lots of other methodologies that can be used to enforce "coercion". Perhaps it would have been a bit better to modify the term "coercion" in my post with "mere". As in, "He did not use mere coercion...".
Well, anyway, putting it like you did is a bit like saying Saddam was a dictator - and letting it go at that. That's 100% true, as far as it goes. However, it misses the point.
Unfortunately, it seems, so does your post.
CA....
Would I have been more correct if I said that Saddam was REALLY EVIL dictator?
Unfortunately, it seems, so does your post.
How so?
You have way too much time on your hands if you are willing to quibble about this point.
Go back to the original post - you're absurd declaration that patronage and coercion ("mere coercion"?) kept him in power.
Here: Saddam used patronage to maintain the support of the Sunni community and coercion to keep the rest of the Iraqi population under control. (Post 78)
Why would this guy utilize a patronage system in an environment he totally controlled? There was undoubtedly a segment of the Sunni population that supported Saddam in whatever he did. Most all of those supporters, however, were Baathists and Fedayeen. They gave support to the guy, and he in turn let them loose to work their magic! He also let them live, provided they did nothing to piss him off. Should something like that come to pass, he'd have absolutely no compunction about wasting any one of them on a moments notice.
I mean, sure, they also got a paycheck, but how favorably can one look upon a "patronage" system where one mistake, no matter how small, could, and probably would, be your last?
He did not draw support from the Sunnis in exchange for "jobs" and "favors". He did not have need of, and indeed did not have, a political patronage system.
He put people into positions because he thought it was good for him.
All power was derived, in the classic Maoist sense, from the barrel of a gun. There was nothing else. Nothing.
He was as ruthless as Pol Pot, as cunning as Lenin, as brutal as Stalin. A political nicety like patronage was doubtless viewed as a waste of time, effort and money. Plus, it wasn't needed.
The point is, Gopher, that ascribing Western-like thought processes to this sociopathic megalomaniac does not begin to describe this man. This was not a Western nation steeped in democratically corrupt institutions. This was the man that headed up the fifth largest standing army in the world, and he made every effort to insure that's where he'd stay.
Patronage was not one of his weapons of choice, as it were.
Weren't you the one who questioned someone's grasp on Iraqi politics a few posts back?
CA....
Absurd? Right...
Why would this guy utilize a patronage system in an environment he totally controlled?
Do you think that Saddam terrorized the country by himself? Of course not. Saddam relied on his secret police and military to keep the population in line. The secret police and military could have easily overthrown Saddam. However, the patronage system left them satisfied with the satus quo. A good example of the patronage system would be the elite Republican Guard units tasked with keeping Saddam in power.
The point is, Gopher, that ascribing Western-like thought processes to this sociopathic megalomaniac does not begin to describe this man. This was not a Western nation steeped in democratically corrupt institutions.
Patronage is not a distinctly Western phenomenon. In fact, you are more likely to find patronage in non-democratic or newly democratic countries.
Weren't you the one who questioned someone's grasp on Iraqi politics a few posts back?
I would suggest that you do a little more reading in this area.
MOSUL, Iraq—For a glimpse of one of Saddam Hussein’s oldest weapons, look at a sign along the desolate highway that leads to this city: Territory of the Al Dulaimi Tribe—Sword in the Hands of the Leader. Or look in a nearby suburb at a ranch house with an SUV out front, or across the border in Damascus, Syria, where plots are hatching against Saddam Hussein.
These are all modern manifestations of the tribes of Iraq. When loyal, they refer to themselves as the leader’s sword and provide a guide to how Saddam Hussein clings to power. When rebellious, the tribes suggest that his grip is slipping. They also are one possible lever that Western officials have largely ignored in their long campaign to unseat the Iraqi dictator.
At least three-quarters of the Iraqi people are members of one of the nation’s 150 tribes, which originated in the Arabian peninsula and moved north in search of water. They are bound more by family ties and a strict honor code than by ethnic background or religion. All of Iraq’s rulers—the Ottoman Turks, the British and then a British-backed monarchy—had to win their cooperation.
Decline and Recovery
But tribes grew weaker when nomads settled into towns and cities, and as the state took responsibility for schools, roads and power. By the 1960s, Iraq was a modern state, with an educated elite. Who cared about the sheiks now?
The answer was Saddam Hussein, who seized control of Iraq after a 1968 military coup. Most of his co-conspirators came from cities, but he grew up surrounded by tribes near his birthplace in the poor town of Tikrit. He identified the sheiks as good friends to have in a fight, and he later called on them to battle Iran.
Over the years, he has helped to restore a tribal identity that had been ebbing in Iraq for generations. Saddam Hussein regularly dons traditional Arab dress and makes televised visits to tribal elders, sipping thick coffee and negotiating what amount to power-sharing agreements with the sheiks.
Source of Power
The result is that the tribes have become his prime source of power outside Baghdad -- a combination of mercenary army, local government and loyalty club, paid and patronized for maintaining order and fealty. Favored tribes get better roads and schools, welcome bounty in a country withered by sanctions for the past decade. (The United Nations is debating a plan that would revive a weapons-inspection regime in Iraq and could pave the way for at least a partial lifting of sanctions over the next several months. But U.N. officials say there is little hope for a breakthrough soon.)
“The only way to get a job for many Iraqis today is by returning to the tribe,” says Falath Abdul Jabar, a writer and sociologist in London. “Sanctions created a vacuum, and the tribes filled it.”
Bassem Abed Al Shammari is a typical urban sheik, living in a comfortable ranch house in a Mosul suburb—with about 30 members of his extended family. Cooperation with the Iraqi regime earns him perks that seem modest but go far under sanctions. He drives a 1999 GMC Suburban and receives $2,000 a month to distribute among the Shammar tribe’s 500 families. The tribe recently got a new garbage truck from Baghdad. The 49-year-old Mr. Shammari also acts as mayor, judge and social worker for the tribe.
Source: http://www.iraqcmm.org/cmm/WSJ-20000523.html
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