Unfortunately, even the nicest ellipses don't prove that there's a difference between natural born citizens and citizens by birth.
Posted on 10/22/2023 11:18:56 PM PDT by CDR Kerchner
(Oct. 22, 2023) — Vivek Ramaswamy Admits in NBC News Interview His Parents Were Not U.S. Citizens When He Was Born. This was deduced and suspected previously but he has finally admitted it.
Vivek Ramaswamy admitted during live interview in Sep 2023 on NBC News that neither of his parents when he was born were citizens of the USA. Also, he admitted that although his mother later became a U.S. citizen his father never did. Watch the interview starting at about 26:08 into the full interview: https://youtu.be/toiiWWFsWOw?si=EMOuYOGT93CmiKP or see the relevant four minute excerpt of the interview at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bM4UpgZ6sQA.
Vivek Ramaswamy is thus NOT a “natural born Citizen” of the United States. To be a “natural born Citizen” of the United States one must be at least a second generation Citizen, i.e., a person born in the USA to parents who were both U.S. Citizens when their child is born in the USA. Vivek’s mother became a U.S. Citizen several years after he was born. Vivek’s father has never become a U.S. Citizen. ... continue reading at: https://www.thepostemail.com/2023/10/22/vivek-ramaswamy-admits-in-nbc-news-interview-his-parents-were-not-u-s-citizens-when-he-was-born/
(Excerpt) Read more at thepostemail.com ...
It factors into so-called Original Meaning jurisprudence.
The first and most important aspect of any treatment the Supreme Court of the United States would give in terms of a majority opinion, were it presented with an on-point case or controversy (either on appeal or as part of its original jurisdiction) involving the question of who may or may not run for, assume, or hold the office of President of the United States, would be to render a cogent and satisfactory definition of the term natural born Citizen of the United States.
Documented usage (that it was used, how it was used, etc.) of that term in the founding era predating its inclusion in 1787 in the proposed Constitution for the United States of America would form an important building block of a sound SCOTUS analysis based on Original Meaning jurisprudence.
John Adams used it in 1783 (not 1782, sorry, my mistake) in a draft form of the Treaty of Paris, and in 1785 as documented in This Guy’s prior comment.
Obviously, John Jay famously used that term in a letter to the presiding member of the Constitutional Convention (Washington) scant weeks before Washington and his colleagues at the Convention voted to include it in the new document’s Presidential Eligibility clause.
All of these instances of usage, and as many others of equal or greater relevance to a proper and comprehensive Original Meaning analysis that exist and can be cited and brought to the attention of SCOTUS, would need to be considered and balanced by the author of the majority opinion, or else the the definition they would publish by means of the majority opinion would suffer (and rightly so) from accusations of illegitimacy, bias, and partisanship.
Now, the only cogent definition of which This Guy is aware that makes sense based on all available valid inputs to this analysis is: Born in the united States (and in an actual State, mind you, not a territory) to parents who, at the time of the birth in question, were full-fledged U.S. citizens (whether U.S NBCs themselves, or U.S. citizens via naturalization, either way, it does not matter).
Your mileage may vary.
But timely usage of the exact term at issue for most of the decade of the 1780s by the most prominent members of the founding generation, and/or the highest or most important officers of the pre-Constitutiinal U.S. Government, seems to suggest that the term in question was not some gauzy, thinly-understood, proto-colonial gobbledygook, but instead a solid, meaningful term, even if relatively new, and therefore capable of fixing and announcing an easily understood and unavoidable Constitutiibal distinction between the POTUS-eligible and the POTUS-ineligible.
By the way, and for what it’s worth, the term “naturel” in French (used by Vattel in his now-famous Section 212 expounding on “Naturels” and “Indigines”) was translated in 1781 in a different context by the Secretary of the Continental Congress as “Natural Born”:
__________
From:
The below French and its translation to English was found in the Library of Congress Website. If you look at [page 794] Article III in the body of the 1781 source text below, you will see in French,
“Les consuls et vice consuls respectifs ne pourront être pris que parmi les sujets naturels de la puissance qui les nommera. Tous seront appointés par leur souverain respectif, et ils ne pourront en conséquence faire aucun trafic ou commerce quelconque ni pour leur propre compte, ni pour le compte d’autrui.”
Going down further to the end you will find the translation to English [by the Secretary of the Continental Congress]. See [page 804, Article XVIII ,] paragraph number 3 in the 1781 English translation,
The respective Consuls and Vice Consuls shall only be taken from among the natural born subjects of the power nominating them. They shall all be appointed by their respective Sovereign, and in Consequence of such appointment they shall not exercise any traffic or commerce whatsoever either on their own account, or on account of any other
Translation by Charles Thomson secretary of the Continental Congress
Unfortunately, even the nicest ellipses don't prove that there's a difference between natural born citizens and citizens by birth.
If people believe Vattel’s definition of indigenous or native IS THE definition of NBC, they ought to be able to explain why. That the cannot may be why birthers have had ZERO impact on law or elections. At this point, I cannot imagine a less significant discussion...but it ought to at least be an honest one.
“Naturels” (French) was translated as “Natural Born” in 1781 by the Secretary of our Continental Congress.
How big a leap would one need to make to accord to the same term used by Vattel in his Section 212 (admittedly prior to a published English Language edition being available) the meaning of “Natural Born Citizen”?
John Adams used the specific term “Natural Born Citizen” in 1783, in a draft treaty provision, and again in 1785 in a letter to Jefferson in a similar context. Must we be married to British Blackstone’s cobbled-together definition of the judge-controlled common law term “Natural Born Subject” when construing a distinct term of positive law as set forth in the U.S. Constitution in the New World, given to us by the equivalent of elected representatives (not judges)?
_________
From:
The below French and its translation to English was found in the Library of Congress Website. If you look at [page 794] Article III in the body of the 1781 source text below, you will see in French,
“Les consuls et vice consuls respectifs ne pourront être pris que parmi les sujets naturels de la puissance qui les nommera. Tous seront appointés par leur souverain respectif, et ils ne pourront en conséquence faire aucun trafic ou commerce quelconque ni pour leur propre compte, ni pour le compte d’autrui.”
Going down further to the end you will find the translation to English [by the Secretary of the Continental Congress]. See [page 804, Article XVIII ,] paragraph number 3 in the 1781 English translation,
The respective Consuls and Vice Consuls shall only be taken from among the natural born subjects of the power nominating them. They shall all be appointed by their respective Sovereign, and in Consequence of such appointment they shall not exercise any traffic or commerce whatsoever either on their own account, or on account of any other
Translation by Charles Thomson secretary of the Continental Congress
Perhaps you've missed this. I've only posted it a dozen or so times over the years.
It flat out says it came from Vattel, and it has an excellent pedigree when you look at who was behind it.
The real question is how people came to believe that citizenship law of a Republic was derived from the subject law of a monarchy?
And I know the answer to that too. William Rawle deliberately misled everyone and his book was so successful that he polluted most of the subsequent legal minds into believing his claims.
It’s the only definition that actually excludes!
All other definitions leak like sieves.
Ssshhhhhh. I didn’t read a word of that ramble.
Good for you! Why let undesireable thoughts play across your mind?
I remember the argument was that Bathhouse Barry was a citizen, because he was born to a citizen, that was the final nail in that argument. Now if someone is born to people who were not citizens, he is a citizen. How many thousand or million Chinese are citizens, because their parents purposely flew into the US to have their baby, then flew back home? The same for Canada.
This way lies madness.
Now, the only cogent definition of which This Guy is aware that makes sense based on all available valid inputs to this analysis is: Born in the united States (and in an actual State, mind you, not a territory) to parents who, at the time of the birth in question, were full-fledged U.S. citizens (whether U.S NBCs themselves, or U.S. citizens via naturalization, either way, it does not matter).Your mileage may vary.
And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens:
That is the first naturalization act, 1 Stat. 102 (March 26, 1790). As one of the first Acts of the Constitutional congress, it seemed to hold a very different opinion.
As it stands it will take a constitutional amendment to shake birthright citizenship from all persons born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. Bear in mind that a country cannot deport somebody unless another country is willing to accept them. I would support changing 14A to children of persons lawfully present in the country. For aliens, we may define lawfully present to mean only those who have entered through regular authorized means and have been given a valid entry visa, or those given a green card - resident visa. An Amendment can say anything we choose to adopt.
I doubt anything regarding domestic births can be done without an amendment. 14A was adopted when immigration was a priority need. We were in the process of throwing Indians off their land and needed to repopulate the areas to keep them off. Times have changed, 14A has not. It says what it says, which is what it was intended to say.
At an international airport, between the debarcation area and the immigration area is a no man's land. Not until one passes through immigration control has one entered the country. They are there, but legally they are not. Like Edward Snowden for a while when his passport was cancelled while in the airport in Moscow. He couldn't enter Russia and he couldn't leave either. That could be the status of illegal aliens. For legal purposes they are not here.
Without lawful entry there should be no lawful pathway to citizenship, which means no entry visa, no work permit, no benefits, and timely deportation. There is no reason to treat illegal aliens better than veterans. The Dreamers is a fiction. The bill for the Dream Act was put up numerous times and always failed. There is no Dream Act; just a failed bill. There should be no mass amnesty to reward those who broke the law entering.
For people born outside the territory of the United States, their status is determined by whatever Federal statute is in effect at the time of birth. Congress can change that to whatever they want, whenever they want.
For natural born citizen it might be easiest to just adopt an amendment defining NBC in whatever manner is desired.
I suppose making failure to enforce the current immigration law could be made a crime carrying a 20 year minimum sentence at a suupermax with no chance of parole. If it were prosecuted.
sujets naturels
natural born citizen is a quite creative translation, or not a translation at all.
sujet is subject in a monarchy, as distinguished from subject of discussion, et al. sujets is plural.
naturels in context is natives.
It was impossible for the original to have contemplated American citizenship as France had not had its revolution and there were no citizen sovereigns to contemplate.
It is the monarchical term for the nearest equivalent of a term unknown to monarchy. The term citizen applied to subjects of a monarch does not aptly describe citizen sovereigns either. The American system of sovereign citizens was something new that did not grow out of French law, or French anything.
The American legal system is so grafted from the English system that English common law before colonial independence is American common law. The entirety of Vattel is meaningless to American domestic citizenship law. It does not matter if it is in French or English translation, International Law does not bind the United States, or any other nation, when it comes to domestic citizenship law. Each country decides for itself and the Hague has nothing to say about it.
A body of law regulating the relations between two or more nation states is uncitable as the law regulating domestic citizenship determinations of any single state.
...considered as...
Of what import, or use, or need, are such words?
Think about it.
Had Congress never included those words, wouldn’t we have been the better for it? Wouldn’t the statute have been clearer?
But no. The words were included. Why?
Because only in Bizarro World are such individuals ever ACTUALLY natural born Citizens. The purpose of the statute, enacted, This Guy might add, only under Congress’ Constitutional Power of Naturalization, was to naturalize such individuals as fall within the new statute’s ambit.
After which they would be recognized as naturalized citizens.
Also, why do you think Congress amended the statute five years later, substantially solely to delete the reference to “natural born”?
Because the language was both unnecessary, and misleading. Hey—it misled woodpusher.
Because only in Bizarro World are such individuals ever ACTUALLY natural born Citizens. The purpose of the statute, enacted, This Guy might add, only under Congress’ Constitutional Power of Naturalization, was to naturalize such individuals as fall within the new statute’s ambit.After which they would be recognized as naturalized citizens.
I think the thrust of what you said was that Congress was only given authority to make a rule of naturalization, not a defiition of citizenship at birth. If I am reading it wrongly, please correct me.
If I read it correctly, your position would be wrong as the power to declare a rule of naturalization inevitably must define those who are citizens. If one defines who is born a citizen, one defines the obverse, who is a born an alien. There are only two possible classifications. Defining who is a member of one group identifies all others as members of the second group.
While it is not stated that Congress may define who is born a citizen, it inevitably follows from the grant of power to make a rule of naturalization.
Also, why do you think Congress amended the statute five years later, substantially solely to delete the reference to “natural born”?Because the language was both unnecessary, and misleading.
Constitutional construction abhors surplusage—words that add nothing to the meaning of a provision.
The term "natural born" was eliminated. As a natural born citizen is one who was born a citizen, specifying "natural born" in this context was surplusage and "natural" could be omitted without change of meaning. Everyone born a citizen is a natural born citizen.
The provision was defining citizenship with no attempt to address presidential eligibility. The accepted meaning of the term natural born citizen is one who becomes a citizen at birth. On that definition, there is no difference whatever between being born a citizen and being a natural born citizen.
As Scotus stated, there are two classes of citizen, and two only—naturalized and natural born citizens. Any attempt to invent a third class is fruitless.
Congress can pipe up if it wishes, but when it comes to defining Constitutional terms, such as NBC, SCOTUS since 1803’s Marbury v. Madison has the final word.
SCOTUS need not even utter a By Your Leave to Congress when declaring one of its mere statutes unconstitutional, or one of its Constitutional definitions incorrect.
From Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, in which the Court declared it’s superiority over Congress in this regard:
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”
Congress can pipe up if it wishes, but when it comes to defining Constitutional terms, such as NBC, SCOTUS since 1803’s Marbury v. Madison has the final word.
There is no constitutional definition of the term natural born citizen. That implies the meanng was so self-evident to the Framers that there was no need to provide the definition. It is fairly obviously an adaptation of the term natural born subject from English law which existed in all the colonies prior to independence. The term natural born is unchanged. The only change was the prior subjects of the monarch became citizens of a new fangled hybrid republic where the citizens were the repository of sovereignty.
No Presidential eligibility case based on the definition of NBC has ever come to SCOTUS, so they have never had occasion to decide any such case or controversy.
SCOTUS need not even utter a By Your Leave to Congress when declaring one of its mere statutes unconstitutional, or one of its Constitutional definitions incorrect.
It does seem that the highest court would decide if a statute law is constitutional or not. But that is certainly not the final word, as shown by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) and the 11th Amendment (1795).
In Chisholm, the Court found that citizens of states could sue other states in federal court as sovereign immunity did not apply. The People replied in rebuke with the 11th Amendment:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
The most powerful branch, by design, is the Legislative branch. The Legislature created the Judicial branch, and it can severely limit it or cripple it.
Ex parte McCardle 74 U.S. 506 (1868) had already been heard by the Court, but it had not yet ruled, when Congress stepped in and took away the Court's appellate authority to hear the case, leaving it unable to proceed due to lack of jurisdiction. Not only can Congress strip away appellate jurisdiction, it can annihilate the entire Judicial branch with the exception of the Supreme Court. Congress also sets the number of justices; they could reduce it to one. Congress also controls the purse.
The People are the ultimate power. They can hold a constitutional convention and create a whole new Constitution.
From Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, in which the Court declared it’s superiority over Congress in this regard:“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”
I am uncertain what else the province and duty of the Judicial branch could be. They are designed as a check on the Legislative power. Congress is delegated power only to enact laws consistent with the Constitution. I don't think the location of authority is misplaced in the Judicial branch, but it has been abused at times. Lots of times.
At the outset, the President got to appoint SCOTUS justices. All the original appointees just happened to be Federalists. The Court was dominated by Federalists for decades. As these were the first to set precedent interpreting the Constitution, interpretation was deliberately warped toward a big, powerful central government. Consider a Supreme Court today with nine liberal democrat justices, and it being so dominated for thirty or forty years, and you have the nascent constitutional judicial branch. What mischief might they get up to?
The Civil War was used for similar purposes and should probably be considered as another revolution. Look at the government before the war, and what emerged from the war, and it should be clear that the relationship of the States and the Federal government were flipped upside down. 14A dictated to the States who were citizens of the States. After that it is somewhat difficult to say any State is sovereign when it has no say in who its citizens are. The former Confederate states were coerced to ratify as not enough Union states could be persuaded. It is not really clear that 14A was ever actually ratified, but there was a sort of declaration that it was, that was accepted, and that was final, official, and could not be challenged.
One look at the Federal leviathan in Washington makes one wonder how that evolved from anything the Founders had in mind. To sum it up, the Hamiltonians have prevailed. The original intent was to sell something that would be bought, and then to set about molding it into what was truly desired. Now, who knows what emanates from the next penumbra?
Quotable Quotes re Citizenship Kinds, Allegiance, and The Presidential Eligibility Clause in The United States Constitution: https://cdrkerchner.wordpress.com/2023/07/21/quotable-quotes-re-citizenship-kinds-allegiance-and-the-presidential-eligibility-clause-of-united-states/
Vivek Ramaswamy is NOT constitutionally eligible for the office he seeks!
“The Legislature created the Judicial branch”
Not so.
The members of the Constitutional Convention promulgated the proposed Constitution. In doing so, they went beyond the mandate set for them by the Articles of Confederation Congress.
To paraphrase Ben Kenobi, that was no mere legislature.
“The Legislature created the Judicial branch”Not so.
The members of the Constitutional Convention promulgated the proposed Constitution.
So. Very much so. The Constitution tasked the Congress with creating one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as they might choose. The Constitution stated what original and what appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court would be limited to, but said nothing about the makeup of the Court. Congress settled upon one Chief Justice and five associate justices; and created thirteen judicial districts in the eleven states then in the Union. And the Congress chose to create circuit courts and district courts.
[Art. 3, §1] The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
[Art. 1, §8] The Congress shall have power … To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
[Art. 3, §2] In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
When Washington was elected by the votes of ten states and was inaugurated, and when the first legislature met, the Judicial branch did not exist. There was no Supreme Court, no Justices, and no lower courts or judges. And then Congress legislated them into existence.
Judiciary Act of 1789 [footnotes and sidenotes omitted]The Judiciary Act of 1789, or An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
[footnotes and sidenotes omitted]
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llsl//llsl-c1/llsl-c1.pdf
FIRST CONGRESS, Sess. I, Ch. 20. 1789
Chap. XX.—An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States (a)
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the supreme court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and five associate justices,(b) any four of whom shall be a quorum, and shall hold annually at the seat of government two sessions, the one commencing the first Monday of February, and the other the first Monday of August. That the associate justices shall have precedence according to the date of their commissions, or when the commissions of two or more of them bear date on the same day, according to their respective ages.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That the United States shall be, and they hereby are divided into thirteen districts, to be limited and called as follows, to wit: one to consist of that part of the State of Massachusetts which lies easterly of the State of New Hampshire, and to be called Maine District; one to consist of the State of New Hampshire, and to be called New Hampshire District;(c) one to consist of the remaining part of the State of Massachusetts, and to be called Massachusetts district; one to consist of the State of Connecticut, and to be called Connecticut District; one to consist of the State of New York, and to be called New York District; one to consist of the State of New Jersey, and to be called New Jersey District; one to consist of the State of Pennsylvania, and to be called Pennsylvania District; one to consist of the State of Delaware, and to be called Delaware District; one to consist of the State of Maryland, and to be called Maryland District; one to consist of the State of Virginia, except that part called the District of Kentucky, and to be called Virginia District; one to consist of the remaining part of the State of Virginia, and to be called Kentucky District; one to consist of the State of South Carolina, and to be called South Carolina District; and one to consist of the State of Georgia, and to be called Georgia District.
Section 3. And be it further enacted, That there be a court called a District Court, in each of the afore mentioned districts, to consist of one judge, who shall reside in the district for which he is appointed, and shall be called a District Judge, and shall hold annually four sessions, the first of which to commence as follows, to wit: in the districts of New York and of New Jersey on the first, in the district of Pennsylvania on the second, in the district of Connecticut on the third, and in the district of Delaware on the fourth, Tuesdays of November next; in the districts of Massachusetts, of Maine, and of Maryland, on the first, in the district of Georgia on the second, and in the districts of New Hampshire, of Virginia, and of Kentucky, on the third Tuesdays of December next; and the other three sessions progressively in the respective districts on the like Tuesdays of every third calendar month afterwards, and in the district of South Carolina, on the third Monday in March and September, the first Monday in July, and the second Monday in December of each and every year, commencing in December next; and that the District Judge shall have power to hold special courts at his discretion. That the stated District Court shall be held at the places following, to wit: in the district of Maine, at Portland and Pownalsborough alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of New Hampshire, at Exeter and Portsmouth alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Massachusetts, at Boston and Salem alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Connecticut, alternately at Hartford and New Haven, beginning at the first; in the district of New York, at New York; in the district of New Jersey, alternately at New Brunswick and Burlington, beginning at the first; in the district of Pennsylvania, at Philadelphia and York Town alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Delaware, alternately at Newcastle and Dover, beginning at the first; in the district of Maryland, alternately at Baltimore and Easton, beginning at the first; in the district of Virginia, alternately at Richmond and Williamsburgh, beginning at the first; in the district of Kentucky, at Harrodsburgh; in the district of South Carolina, at Charleston; and in the district of Georgia, alternately at Savannah and Augusta, beginning at the first; and that the special courts shall be held at the same place in each district as the stated courts, or in districts that have two, at either of them, in the discretion of the judge, or at such other place in the district, as the nature of the business and his discretion shall direct. And that in the districts that have but one place for holding the District Court, the records thereof shall be kept at that place; and in districts that have two, at that place in each district which the judge shall appoint.
Section 4. And be it further enacted, That the before mentioned districts, except those of Maine and Kentucky, shall be divided into three circuits, and be called the eastern, the middle, and the southern circuit. That the eastern circuit shall consist of the districts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York; that the middle circuit shall consist of the districts of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia; and that the southern circuit shall consist of the districts of South Carolina and Georgia, and that there shall be held annually in each district of said circuits, two courts, which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any two justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judge of such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum: Provided, That no district judge shall give a vote in any case of appeal or error from his own decision; but may assign the reasons of such his decision.
Section 5. And be it further enacted, That the first session of the said circuit court in the several districts shall commence at the times following, to wit: in New Jersey on the second, in New York on the fourth, in Pennsylvania on the eleventh, in Connecticut on the twenty-second, and in Delaware on the twenty-seventh, days of April next; in Massachusetts on the third, in Maryland on the seventh, in South Carolina on the twelfth, in New Hampshire on the twentieth, in Virginia on the twenty-second, and in Georgia on the twenty-eighth, days of May next, and the subsequent sessions in the respective districts on the like days of every sixth calendar month afterwards, except in South Carolina, where the session of the said court shall commence on the first, and in Georgia where it shall commence on the seventeenth day of October, and except when any of those days shall happen on a Sunday, and then the session shall commence on the next day following. And the sessions of the said circuit court shall be held in the district of New Hampshire, at Portsmouth and Exeter alternately, beginning at the first; in the district of Massachusetts, at Boston; in the district of Connecticut, alternately at Hartford and New Haven, beginning at the last; in the district of New York, alternately at New York and Albany, beginning at the first; in the district of New Jersey, at Trenton; in the district of Pennsylvania, alternately at Philadelphia and Yorktown, beginning at the first; in the district of Delaware, alternately at New Castle and Dover, beginning at the first; in the district of Maryland, alternately at Annapolis and Easton, beginning at the first; in the district of Virginia, alternately at Charlottesville and Williamsburgh, beginning at the first; in the district of South Carolina, alternately at Columbia and Charleston, beginning at the first; and in the district of Georgia, alternately at Savannah and Augusta, beginning at the first. And the circuit courts shall have power to hold special sessions for the trial of criminal causes at any other time at their discretion, or at the discretion of the Supreme Court.
Section 6. And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court may, by any one or more of its justices being present, be adjourned from day to day until a quorum be convened;(a) and that a circuit court may also be adjourned from day to day by any one of its judges, or if none are present, by the marshal of the district until a quorum be convened; and that a district court, in case of the inability of the judge to attend at the commencement of a session, may by virtue of a written order from the said judge, directed to the marshal of the district, be adjourned by the said marshal to such day, antecedent to the next stated session of the said court, as in the said order shall be appointed; and in case of the death of the said judge, and his vacancy not being supplied, all process, pleadings and proceedings of what nature so ever, pending before the said court, shall be continued of course until the next stated session after the appointment and acceptance of the office by his successor.
Section 7. And be it [further] enacted, That the Supreme Court, and the district courts shall have power to appoint clerks for their respective courts,(b) and that the clerk for each district court shall be clerk also of the circuit court in such district, and each of the said clerks shall, before he enters upon the execution of his office, take the following oath or affirmation, to wit: "I, A. B., being appointed clerk of , do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I will truly and faithfully enter and record all the orders, decrees, judgments and proceedings of the said court, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties of my said office, according to the best of my abilities and understanding. So help me God." Which words, so help me God, shall be omitted in all cases where an affirmation is admitted instead of an oath. And the said clerks shall also severally give bond, with sufficient sureties, (to be approved of by the Supreme and district courts respectively) to the United States, in the sum of two thousand dollars, faithfully to discharge the duties of his office, and seasonably to record the decrees, judgments and determinations of the court of which he is clerk.
Section 8. And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit: "I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me as , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution, and laws of the United States. So help me God."
Section 9. And be it further enacted, That the district courts(c) shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the high seas; where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it; and shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid, made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States. And shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. And shall also have cognizance, concurrent as last mentioned, of all suits at common law where the United States sue, and the matter in dispute amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars. And shall also have jurisdiction exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for offences above the description aforesaid.(d) And the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.
Section 10. And be it further enacted, That the district court in Kentucky district shall, besides the jurisdiction aforesaid, have jurisdiction of all other causes, except of appeals and writs of error, hereinafter made cognizable in a circuit court, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court, and writs of error and appeals shall lie from decisions therein to the Supreme Court in the same causes, as from a circuit court to the Supreme Court, and under the same regulations.a And the district court in Maine district shall, besides the jurisdiction herein before granted, have jurisdiction of all causes, except of appeals and writs of error herein after made cognizable in a circuit court, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court: And writs of error shall lie from decisions therein to the circuit court in the district of Massachusetts in the same manner as from other district courts to their respective circuit courts.
Section 11. And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.(b) And shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the United States shall otherwise direct, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein. But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action before a circuit or district court.(b) And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ, nor shall any district or circuit court have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.(c) And the circuit courts shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the district courts under the regulations and restrictions herein after provided.(d)
Section 12. And be it further enacted, That if a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court; and the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such state court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit court, to be held in the district where the suit is pending, or if in the district of Maine to the district court next to be held therein, or if in Kentucky district to the district court next to be held therein, and offer good and sufficient surety for his entering in such court, on the first day of its session, copies of said process against him, and also for his there appearing and entering special bail in the cause, if special bail was originally requisite therein, it shall then be the duty of the state court to accept the surety, and proceed no further in the cause, and any bail that may have been originally taken shall be discharged, and the said copies being entered as aforesaid, in such court of the United States, the cause shall there proceed in the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process.(e) And any attachment of the goods or estate of the defendant by the original process, shall hold the goods or estate so attached, to answer the final judgment in the same manner as by the laws of such state they would have been held to answer final judgment, had it been rendered by the court in which the suit commenced. And if in any action commenced in a state court, the title of land be concerned, and the parties are citizens of the same state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, the sum or value being made to appear to the satisfaction of the court, either party, before the trial, shall state to the court and make affidavit if they require it, that he claims and shall rely upon a right or title to the land, under a grant from a state other than that in which the suit is pending, and produce the original grant or an exemplification of it, except where the loss of public records shall put it out of his power, and shall move that the adverse party inform the court, whether he claims a right or title to the land under a grant from the state in which the suit is pending; the said adverse [party] shall give such information, or otherwise not be allowed to plead such grant, or give it in evidence upon the trial, and if he informs that he does claim under such grant, the party claiming under the grant first mentioned may then, on motion, remove the cause for trial to the next circuit court to be held in such district, or if in the district of Maine, to the court next to be held therein; or if in Kentucky district, to the district court next to be held therein; but if he is the defendant, shall do it under the same regulations as in the before-mentioned case of the removal of a cause into such court by an alien; and neither party removing the cause, shall be allowed to plead or give evidence of any other title than that by him stated as aforesaid, as the ground of his claim; and the trial of issues in fact in the circuit courts shall, in all suits, except those of equity, and of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, be by jury.(a)
Section 13. And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.(b) And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party.(a) And the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for;(b) and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition(c) to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus,(d) in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
Section 14. And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus,(e) and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Section 15. And be it further enacted, That all the said courts of the United States, shall have power in the trial of actions at law, on motion and due notice thereof being given, to require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery; and if a plaintiff shall fail to comply with such order, to produce books or writings, it shall be lawful for the courts respectively, on motion, to give the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit; and if a defendant shall fail to comply with such order, to produce books or writings, it shall be lawful for the courts respectively on motion as aforesaid, to give judgment against him or her by default.(a)
Section 16. And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.(b)
Section 17. And be it further enacted, That all the said courts of the United States shall have power to grant new trials, in cases where there has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law;(a) and shall have power to impose and administer all necessary oaths or affirmations, and to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempt of authority in any cause or hearing before the same;(b) and to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.
Section 18. And be it further enacted, That when in a circuit court, judgment upon a verdict in a civil action shall be entered, execution may on motion of either party, at the discretion of the court, and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as they may judge proper, be stayed forty-two days from the time of entering judgment, to give time to file in the clerk’s office of said court, a petition for a new trial. And if such petition be there filed within said term of forty-two days, with a certificate thereon from either of the judges of such court, that he allows the same to be filed, which certificate he may make or refuse at his discretion, execution shall of course be further stayed to the next session of said court.(c) And if a new trial be granted, the former judgment shall be thereby rendered void.
Section 19. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of circuit courts, in causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to cause the facts on which they found their sentence or decree, fully to appear upon the record either from the pleadings and decree itself, or a state of the case agreed by the parties, or their counsel, or if they disagree by a stating of the case by the court.
Section 20. And be it further enacted, That where in a circuit court, a plaintiff in an action, originally brought there, or a petitioner in equity, other than the United States, recovers less than the sum or value of five hundred dollars, or a libellant, upon his own appeal, less than the sum or value of three hundred dollars, he shall not be allowed, but at the discretion of the court, may be adjudged to pay costs.
Section 21. And be it further enacted, That from final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed to the next circuit court, to be held in such district. Provided nevertheless, That all such appeals from final decrees as aforesaid, from the district court of Maine, shall be made to the circuit court, next to be held after each appeal in the district of Massachusetts.
Section 22. And be it further enacted, That final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive of costs, may be reexamined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court, held in the same district, upon a writ of error, whereto shall be annexed and returned therewith at the day and place therein mentioned, an authenticated transcript of the record, an assignment of errors, and prayer for reversal, with a citation to the adverse party, signed by the judge of such district court, or a justice of the Supreme Court, the adverse party having at least twenty days’ notice.(a) And upon a like process, may final judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court, brought there by original process, or removed there from courts of the several States, or removed there by appeal from a district court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court, the citation being in such case signed by a judge of such circuit court, or justice of the Supreme Court, and the adverse party having at least thirty days’ notice.(b) But there shall be no reversal in either court on such writ of error for error in ruling any plea in abatement, other than a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, or such plea to a petition or bill in equity, as is in the nature of a demurrer, or for any error in fact. And writs of error shall not be brought but within five years after rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or in case the person entitled to such writ of error be an infant, feme covert, non compos mentis, or imprisoned, then within five years as aforesaid, exclusive of the time of such disability.(a) And every justice or judge signing a citation on any writ of error as aforesaid, shall take good and sufficient security, that the plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he fail to make his plea good.(b)
Section 23. And be it further enacted, That a writ of error as aforesaid shall be a supersedeas and stay execution in cases only where the writ of error is served, by a copy thereof being lodged for the adverse party in the clerk’s office where the record remains, within ten days, Sundays exclusive, after rendering the judgment or passing the decree complained of. Until the expiration of which term of ten days, executions shall not issue in any case where a writ of error may be a supersedeas; and whereupon such writ of error the Supreme or a circuit court shall affirm a judgment or decree, they shall adjudge or decree to the respondent in error just damages for his delay, and single or double costs at their discretion.
Section 24. And be it further enacted, That when a judgment or decree shall be reversed in a circuit court, such court shall proceed to render such judgment or pass such decree as the district court should have rendered or passed; and the Supreme Court shall do the same on reversals therein, except where the reversal is in favor of the plaintiff, or petitioner in the original suit, and the damages to be assessed, or matter to be decreed, are uncertain, in which case they shall remand the cause for a final decision. And the Supreme Court shall not issue execution in causes that are removed before them by writs of error, but shall send a special mandate to the circuit court to award execution thereupon.
Section 25. And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity;(d) or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge or chancellor of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect, as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a circuit court, and the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision as before provided, may at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution. But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.(a)
Section 26. And be it further enacted, That in all causes brought before either of the courts of the United States to recover the forfeiture annexed to any articles of agreement, covenant, bond, or other specialty, where the forfeiture, breach or non-performance shall appear, by the default or confession of the defendant, or upon demurrer, the court before whom the action is, shall render judgment therein for the plaintiff to recover so much as is due according to equity. And when the sum for which judgment should be rendered is uncertain, the same shall, if either of the parties request it, be assessed by a jury.
Section 27. And be it further enacted, That a marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of four years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure, whose duty it shall be to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the Supreme Court in the District in which that court shall sit.(b) And to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States, and he shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty, and to appoint as there shall be occasion, one or more deputies,(c) who shall be removable from office by the judge of the district court, or the circuit court sitting within the district, at the pleasure of either; and before he enters on the duties of his office, he shall become bound for the faithful performance of the same, by himself and by his deputies before the judge of the district court to the United States, jointly and severally, with two good and sufficient sureties, inhabitants and freeholders of such district, to be approved by the district judge, in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, and shall take before said judge, as shall also his deputies, before they enter on the duties of their appointment, the following oath of office: "I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to the marshal of the district of _____ under the authority of the United States, and true returns make, and in all things well and truly, and without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the office of marshal (or marshal’s deputy, as the case may be) of the district of _____, during my continuance in said office, and take only my lawful fees. So help me God."
Section 28. And be it further enacted, That in all causes wherein the marshal or his deputy shall be a party, the writs and precepts therein shall be directed to such disinterested person as the court, or any justice or judge thereof may appoint, and the person so appointed, is hereby authorized to execute and return the same. And in case of the death of any marshal, his deputy or deputies shall continue in office, unless otherwise specially removed; and shall execute the same in the name of the deceased, until another marshal shall be appointed and sworn: And the defaults or misfeasances in office of such deputy or deputies in the mean time, as well as before, shall be adjudged a breach of the condition of the bond given, as before directed, by the marshal who appointed them; and the executor or administrator of the deceased marshal shall have like remedy for the defaults and misfeasances in office of such deputy or deputies during such interval, as they would be entitled to if the marshal had continued in life and in the exercise of his said office, until his successor was appointed, and sworn or affirmed: And every marshal or his deputy when removed from office, or when the term for which the marshal is appointed shall expire, shall have power notwithstanding to execute all such precepts as may be in their hands respectively at the time of such removal or expiration of office; and the marshal shall be held answerable for the delivery to his successor of all prisoners which may be in his custody at the time of his removal, or when the term for which he is appointed shall expire, and for that purpose may retain such prisoners in his custody until his successor shall be appointed and qualified as the law directs.(a)
Section 29. And be it further enacted, That in cases punishable with death, the trial shall be had in the county where the offence was committed, or where that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence.(b) And jurors in all cases to serve in the courts of the United States shall be designated by lot or otherwise in each State respectively according to the mode of forming juries therein now practiced, so far as the laws of the same shall render such designation practicable by the courts or marshals of the United States; and the jurors shall have the same qualifications as are requisite for jurors by the laws of the State of which they are citizens, to serve in the highest courts of law of such State, and shall be returned as there shall be occasion for them, from such parts of the district from time to time as the court shall direct, so as shall be most favorable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur an unnecessary expense, or unduly to burthen the citizens of any part of the district with such services. And writs of venire facias when directed by the court shall issue from the clerk’s office, and shall be served and returned by the marshal in his proper person, or by his deputy, or in case the marshal or his deputy is not an indifferent person, or is interested in the event of the cause, by such fit person as the court shall specially appoint for that purpose, to whom they shall administer an oath or affirmation that he will truly and impartially serve and return such writ. And when from challenges or otherwise there shall not be a jury to determine any civil or criminal cause, the marshal or his deputy shall, by order of the court where such defect of jurors shall happen, return jurymen de talibus circumstantibus sufficient to complete the panel; and when the marshal or his deputy are disqualified as aforesaid, jurors may be returned by such disinterested person as the court shall appoint.
Section 30. And be it further enacted, That the mode of proof by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court shall be the same in all the courts of the United States, as well in the trial of causes in equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as of actions at common law. And when the testimony of any person shall be necessary in any civil cause depending in any district in any court of the United States, who shall live at a greater distance from the place of trial than one hundred miles, or is bound on a voyage to sea, or is about to go out of the United States, or out of such district, and to a greater distance from the place of trial than as aforesaid, before the time of trial, or is ancient or very infirm, the deposition of such person may be taken de bene esse before any justice or judge of any of the courts of the United States, or before any chancellor, justice or judge of a supreme or superior court, mayor or chief magistrate of a city, or judge of a county court or court of common pleas of any of the United States, not being of counsel or attorney to either of the parties, or interested in the event of the cause, provided that a notification from the magistrate before whom the deposition is to be taken to the adverse party, to be present at the taking of the same, and to put interrogatories, if he think fit, be first made out and served on the adverse party or his attorney as either may be nearest, if either is within one hundred miles of the place of such caption, allowing time for their attendance after notified, not less than at the rate of one day, Sundays exclusive, for every twenty miles travel.(a) And in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, or other cases of seizure when a libel shall be filed, in which an adverse party is not named, and depositions of persons circumstanced as aforesaid shall be taken before a claim be put in, the like notification as aforesaid shall be given to the person having the agency or possession of the property libeled at the time of the capture or seizure of the same, if known to the libellant. And every person deposing as aforesaid shall be carefully examined and cautioned, and sworn or affirmed to testify the whole truth, and shall subscribe the testimony by him or her given after the same shall be reduced to writing, which shall be done only by the magistrate taking the deposition, or by the deponent in his presence. And the depositions so taken shall be retained by such magistrate until he deliver the same with his own hand into the court for which they are taken, or shall, together with a certificate of the reasons as aforesaid of their being taken, and of the notice if any given to the adverse party, be by him the said magistrate sealed up and directed to such court, and remain under his seal until opened in court.(b) And any person may be compelled to appear and depose as aforesaid in the same manner as to appear and testify in court. And in the trial of any cause of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction in a district court, the decree in which may be appealed from, if either party shall suggest to and satisfy the court that probably it will not be in his power to produce the witnesses there testifying before the circuit court should an appeal be had, and shall move that their testimony be taken down in writing, it shall be so done by the clerk of the court.(c) And if an appeal be had, such testimony may be used on the trial of the same, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court which shall try the appeal, that the witnesses are then dead or gone out of the United States, or to a greater distance than as aforesaid from the place where the court is sitting, or that by reason of age, sickness, bodily infirmity or imprisonment, they are unable to travel and appear at court, but not otherwise. And unless the same shall be made to appear on the trial of any cause, with respect to witnesses whose depositions may have been taken therein, such depositions shall not be admitted or used in the cause. Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to prevent any court of the United States from granting a dedimus potestatem to take depositions according to common usage, when it may be necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice,(a) which power they shall severally possess, nor to extend to depositions taken in perpetuam rei memoriam, which if they relate to matters that may be cognizable in any court of the United States, a circuit court on application thereto made as a court of equity, may, according to the usages in chancery direct to be taken.
Section 31. And be it [further] enacted, That where any suit shall be depending in any court of the United States, and either of the parties shall die before final judgment, the executor or administrator of such deceased party who was plaintiff, petitioner, or defendant, in case the cause of action doth by law survive, shall have full power to prosecute or defend any such suit or action until final judgment; and the defendant or defendants are hereby obliged to answer thereto accordingly; and the court before whom such cause may be depending, is hereby empowered and directed to hear and determine the same, and to render judgment for or against the executor or administrator, as the case may require. And if such executor or administrator having been duly served with a scire facias from the office of the clerk of the court where such suit is depending, twenty days beforehand, shall neglect or refuse to become a party to the suit, the court may render judgment against the estate of the deceased party, in the same manner as if the executor or administrator had voluntarily made himself a party to the suit.(b) And the executor or administrator who shall become a party as aforesaid, shall, upon motion to the court where the suit is depending, be entitled to a continuance of the same until the next term of the said court. And if there be two or more plaintiffs or defendants, and one or more of them shall die, if the cause of action shall survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants, the writ or action shall not be thereby abated; but such death being suggested upon the record, the action shall proceed at the suit of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs against the surviving defendant or defendants.(c)
Section 32. And be it further enacted, That no summons, writ, declaration, return, process, judgment, or other proceedings in civil causes in any of the courts of the United States, shall be abated, arrested, quashed or reversed, for any defect or want of form, but the said courts respectively shall proceed and give judgment according as the right of the cause and matter in law shall appear unto them, without regarding any imperfections, defects, or want of form in such writ, declaration, or other pleading, return, process, judgment, or course of proceeding whatsoever, except those only in cases of demurrer, which the party demurring shall specially sit down and express together with his demurrer as the cause thereof. And the said courts respectively shall and may, by virtue of this act, from time to time, amend all and every such imperfections, defects and wants of form, other than those only which the party demurring shall express as aforesaid, and may at any time permit either of the parties to amend any defect in the process or pleadings, upon such conditions as the said courts respectively shall in their discretion, and by their rules prescribe.(a)
Section 33. And be it further enacted, That for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of any of the United States where he may be found agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested, and imprisoned or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by this act has cognizance of the offence.(b) And copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the clerk’s office of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case; which recognizances the magistrate before whom the examination shall be, may require on pain of imprisonment. And if such commitment of the offender, or the witnesses shall be in a district other than that in which the offence is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge of that district where the delinquent is imprisoned, seasonably to issue, and of the marshal of the same district to execute, a warrant for the removal of the offender, and the witnesses, or either of them, as the case may be, to the district in which the trial is to be had. And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law. And if a person committed by a justice of the supreme or a judge of a district court for an offence not punishable with death, shall afterwards procure bail, and there be no judge of the United States in the district to take the same, it may be taken by any judge of the supreme or superior court of law of such state.
Section 34. And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.(a)
Section 35. And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein. And there shall be appointed in each district a meet person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned, except before the supreme court in the district in which that court shall be held. And he shall receive as compensation for his services such fees as shall be taxed therefor in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be. And there shall also be appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall be sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments, and shall receive such compensation for his services as shall by law be provided.
Approved, September 24, 1789.
And the Congress said "Let there be a Judicial Branch!" And lo and behold, there was a Judicial Branch. Well, after the President signed it into law.
Washington was inaugurated on March 4, 1789, Congress first met that same day, and the Judicial Act did not pass until September.
No.
And how is that a rebuttal?
The idea is, there are only two forms of citizenship, natural born and naturalized. There are no other categories or exceptions. Current US law and standing court decisions do not allow for this. By current and standing I mean no going back to superseded laws and court decisions and pretending they are still the law. No cherry picking bits and pieces out of Minor v. Happersett or Dred Scott v. Sandford as if they still apply today. Second, aside from left/right politics, the relationship between Federal law and the courts on citizenship is not perfect. There are conditions the law has not covered that are filled in by the courts.
For Ramaswamy and Harris, their parents were not here illegally, on short term visas, or long term resident aliens maintaining legal citizenship of their home countries. They were on the legal pathway to become naturalized US citizens when their children were born. That changes how they and their children are treated under the law and in the courts. What the USSC has stated. even if indirectly or inferred, is that children born under this circumstance are NBCs.
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