Posted on 10/22/2023 11:18:56 PM PDT by CDR Kerchner
My point is that the three branches of the Federal government are, as they say, co-equal. None is superior to or subservient to either of the two others. The Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison arrogated to itself the power to say what terms in the Constitution mean. Neither of the other two branches has fought that result/holding in the 220 years since. So when the time finally comes for us U.S. Americans to have a “definitive” definition for the Constitutional term Natural born Citizen, it will much more than likely come to us by way of a SCOTUS majority decision in a case or controversy involving, at its heart, a dispute between two POTUS candidates, one or both of which will be suffering under an accusation of not being a natural born Citizen. If and when that happens, the Supreme Court Justice writing the majority opinion will certainly undertake an comprehensive analysis geared toward determining the “Original Meaning” of the term in question. In doing so, the court and the justices will defer to absolutely noone. As such, your essay on legislative superiority to, or domination of, the Federal judicial branch, is of no moment.
Please see #201.
The idea is, there are only two forms of citizenship, natural born and naturalized.
That is directly supported by the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in the leading precedential case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 702 (28 March 1898)
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,"
contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) has no precedential value whatever regarding citizenship. Citizenship was not an issue before the Court and the Court issued no holding regarding citizenship. The natural born citizenship of Virginia Minor was stipulated in an agreed State of facts. The Chief Justice noted that doubts had been expressed about the status of some people, but that it was not necessary for the Court to resolve those doubts. The only issue before the Court was whether a woman had a right to vote for President. She did not. The subsequent 19th Amendment did not give women the right to vote either. As observed in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) nobody has the right to vote for President. No state has an obligation to engage in a popular vote for President, and early election had none, with Legislatures choosing the delegates to the Electoral College. The 19th established that women must be given the same right to vote as men. If men are afforded the right to vote, so too must women be afforded the right to vote.
In Dred Scott, the actual decision was find that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. A Mandate was sent to the lower court directing that court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction in that court. The Opinion of CJ Taney, while captioned as the Opinion of the Court, is filled with dicta, statements made in passing, responding to statements made by Justice Curtis in his dissenting opinion. Only statements of law supported by a majority of the justices are holdings. There is very little in Scott that was a holding. Every justice wrote an opinion, and all nine must be read to determine what majority agreed upon any specific legal point.
In any case, United States v. Wong Kim Ark is the leading precedent. When two Supreme Court opinions disagree upon a point of law, the most recent statement of the Court shall prevail. Wong Kim Ark has stood as precedent for well over a century.
For Ramaswamy and Harris, their parents were not here illegally, on short term visas, or long term resident aliens maintaining legal citizenship of their home countries. They were on the legal pathway to become naturalized US citizens when their children were born. That changes how they and their children are treated under the law and in the courts.
This is plainly incorrect on the point about children being treated differently depending upon the status of their parents. A child who is born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is born a citizen of the United States.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 662-63:
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030101.html#M301_1_1
[State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual]
8 FAM 301.1-1 INTRODUCTION
c. Naturalization – Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship Subsequent to Birth: Naturalization is “the conferring of nationality of a State upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever” (INA 101(a)(23) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(23)) or conferring of citizenship upon a person (see INA 310, 8 U.S.C. 1421 and INA 311, 8 U.S.C. 1422). Naturalization can be granted automatically or pursuant to an application. (See 7 FAM 1140.)d. “Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States”: All children born in and subject, at the time of birth, to the jurisdiction of the United States acquire U.S. citizenship at birth even if their parents were in the United States illegally at the time of birth:
(1) The U.S. Supreme Court examined at length the theories and legal precedents on which the U.S. citizenship laws are based in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In particular, the Court discussed the types of persons who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that a child born in the United States to Chinese parents acquired U.S. citizenship even though the parents were, at the time, racially ineligible for naturalization;
(2) The Court also concluded that: “The 14th Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.” Pursuant to this ruling:
(a) Acquisition of U.S. citizenship generally is not affected by the fact that the parents may be in the United States temporarily or illegally; and that; and
(b) A child born in an immigration detention center physically located in the United States is considered to have been born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. This is so even if the child’s parents have not been legally admitted to the United States and, for immigration purposes, may be viewed as not being in the United States.
Both Harris and Ramaswamy were born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. Both were born citizens of the United States.
There are two types of citizens under our current systems of laws and court rulings. A person is either a natural born citizen or naturalized citizen. There are no other choices.
That creates three or more types of US citizenship when there are only two.
They are however, not “Natural Born” citizens as defined..and therefore not eligible to assume the office of V/POTUS.
Each was born in the United States. Each was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States when born. Each is a natural born citizen. Just like Vice President Chester Arthur, President Chester Arthur, or President Barack Obama.
Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 662-63:
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."
Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. 583 (1844), as published in New York Legal Observer, Volume III, 1845
It is an indisputable proposition, that by the rule of the common law of England, if applied to these facts, Julia Lynch was a natural born citizen of the United States. And this rule was established and inflexible in the common law, long anterior to the first settlement of the United States, and, indeed, before the discovery of America by Columbus. By the common law, all persons born within the ligeance of the crown of England, were natural born subjects, without reference to the status or condition of their parents.[...]
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030101.html#M301_1_1
[State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual]
8 FAM 301.1-1 INTRODUCTION
(a) Acquisition of U.S. citizenship generally is not affected by the fact that the parents may be in the United States temporarily or illegally; and,(b) A child born in an immigration detention center physically located in the United States is considered to have been born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. This is so even if the child’s parents have not been legally admitted to the United States and, for immigration purposes, may be viewed as not being in the United States.
Adjectives mean something. The adjective "natural" before the term "born Citizen" in the constitutional and Natural Law term "natural born Citizen" tells us something. Things that are natural are created by nature and the laws of nature, not man. The "born" adjective tells us when the person became a citizen. The "natural" adjective tells us from what type of law the person gained their citizenship, i.e., Natural Law, and man-made Positive Law such as the various naturalization acts of Congress, statutory laws, treaties, amendments or other man-made law to confer naturalized citizenship by the act of government and man at birth or afterwards.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 662-63:
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."
Frivolous nonsense on the internet has no more merit than frivolous filing in court. United States citizenship determinations are made pursuant to United States law. All births within the United States are controlled by the 14th Amendment.
https://casetext.com/case/kerchner-v-obama-2
Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204 (2010) Third Circuit, July 1, 2010
III.Because we have decided that this appeal is frivolous, we will order counsel for Appellants to show cause why just damages and costs should not be imposed. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides that "[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." "The purpose of an award of attorneys' fees under Rule 38 is to compensate appellees who are forced to defend judgments awarded them in the trial court from appeals that are wholly without merit, and to preserve the appellate court calendar for cases worthy of consideration." Huck v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 52 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Damages [under Rule 38] are awarded by the court in its discretion... as a matter of justice to the appellee." Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted). An "important purpose [of a damages award] is to discourage litigants from unnecessarily wasting their opponents' time and resources." Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993).
"This court employs an objective standard to determine whether or not an appeal is frivolous" which "focuses on the merits of the appeal regardless of good or bad faith." Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'l, 899 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted). We have stated that "an appeal from a frivolous claim is likewise frivolous." Beam, 383 F.3d at 108. Appellants had ample notice that this appeal had no merit. They should have been aware that we rejected almost identical claims in Berg, as have courts in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Barnett v. Obama, No. 09-0082, F. Supp. 2d, 2009 WL 3861788, at *4-*6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (holding that active and former military personnel lack Article III standing requirements to challenge President Obama's eligibility for office); Cohen v. Obama, No. 08-2150, 2008 WL 5191864, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2008) (holding that a federal prisoner who alleged that then-Senator Obama was "an illegal alien impersonating a United States citizen" lacked standing under Article III), aff'd, Cohen v. Obama, 332 F. App'x 640 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Examination of this precedent would have made it "obvious to a reasonable attorney that an appeal from the District Court's order was frivolous, [as no] law or facts... support a conclusion that the District Court judge had erred." Beam, 383 F.3d at 109. Moreover, other courts have imposed sanctions for similar reasons. See Hollister v. Soetero, 258 F.R.D. 1, 2-5 (D.D.C. 2009) (reprimanding an attorney under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) for signing and filing a complaint alleging that President Obama was ineligible to serve as president because he is not a "natural born Citizen"), aff'd, Hollister v. Soetoro, Nos. 09-5080, 09-5161, 2010 WL 1169793 (D.C. Cir. March 22, 2010); see also Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1373 (M.D.Ga. 2009) (imposing monetary sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3) against counsel who filed similar claims on behalf of members of the military), aff'd, Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 09-15418, 2010 WL 892848 (11th Cir. March 15, 2010).
In the past, "we cautioned counsel that a finding by a District Court that a lawsuit is frivolous should serve as notice to the parties and their attorney to exercise caution, pause, and devote additional examination to the legal validity and factual merit of his contentions." Beam, 383 F.3d at 109 (quotation omitted). Although the District Court did not explicitly state that Appellants' claims were frivolous, the finding of other district courts that plaintiffs who filed complaints based on similar legal theories violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 should have served as meaningful notice that the appeal here would be frivolous.5 We therefore will order Appellants' counsel to show cause why he should not pay just damages and costs for having filed a frivolous appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 38.
IV.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court's order of dismissal.
The case of Etheldred Scott was similar. The real owner was a Massachusetts abolitionist congressman. That hit the major newspapers in 1857. While the drawn out lower court and Sureme Court proceedings went on, Scott was rented out for labor and the wages were kept in escrow. After the case, Congressman Calvin Chaffee executed a quitclaim deed re Scott to Taylor Blow, the son of his first owner. Taylor Blow, who played with Scott as a child growing up, manumitted Scott in Missouri. And Elizabeth Irene Sanford Emerson Chaffee, the widow of the Dr. Emerson, former owner of Scott, remarried to Congressman Chaffee, claimed the wages.
In the statement of agreed facts in Scott, they stipulated that John Sanford, the brother of Elizabeth Emerson Chaffee, had purchased Scott directly from Dr. Emerson. Dr. Emerson died in 1843. The decision in Scott v. Emerson 15 Mo. 576 (1852) started, "This action was instituted by Dred Scott against Irene Emerson, the wife and administratrix of Dr. John Emerson...." The fictitous sale must have taken place well after Dr. Emerson was a corpse.
Back in that day under the law of femes covert, married women did not own property. Upon remarriage to Congressman Chaffee, the abolitionist congressman became a slave owner. This has sort of been erased in our history but was a topic in the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Fourth Debate, Charleston, Illinois, September 15, 1858. CW 3:166-67.
A chart which lists and explains the five (5) Citizenship terms used in the U.S. Constitution: http://www.scribd.com/doc/11737124/Citizenship-Terms-Used-in-the-US-Constitution-The-5-Terms-Defined-Some-Legal-Reference-to-Same
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