Adjectives mean something. The adjective "natural" before the term "born Citizen" in the constitutional and Natural Law term "natural born Citizen" tells us something. Things that are natural are created by nature and the laws of nature, not man. The "born" adjective tells us when the person became a citizen. The "natural" adjective tells us from what type of law the person gained their citizenship, i.e., Natural Law, and man-made Positive Law such as the various naturalization acts of Congress, statutory laws, treaties, amendments or other man-made law to confer naturalized citizenship by the act of government and man at birth or afterwards.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 662-63:
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."
Frivolous nonsense on the internet has no more merit than frivolous filing in court. United States citizenship determinations are made pursuant to United States law. All births within the United States are controlled by the 14th Amendment.
https://casetext.com/case/kerchner-v-obama-2
Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204 (2010) Third Circuit, July 1, 2010
III.Because we have decided that this appeal is frivolous, we will order counsel for Appellants to show cause why just damages and costs should not be imposed. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides that "[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." "The purpose of an award of attorneys' fees under Rule 38 is to compensate appellees who are forced to defend judgments awarded them in the trial court from appeals that are wholly without merit, and to preserve the appellate court calendar for cases worthy of consideration." Huck v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 52 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "Damages [under Rule 38] are awarded by the court in its discretion... as a matter of justice to the appellee." Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted). An "important purpose [of a damages award] is to discourage litigants from unnecessarily wasting their opponents' time and resources." Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993).
"This court employs an objective standard to determine whether or not an appeal is frivolous" which "focuses on the merits of the appeal regardless of good or bad faith." Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'l, 899 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted). We have stated that "an appeal from a frivolous claim is likewise frivolous." Beam, 383 F.3d at 108. Appellants had ample notice that this appeal had no merit. They should have been aware that we rejected almost identical claims in Berg, as have courts in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Barnett v. Obama, No. 09-0082, F. Supp. 2d, 2009 WL 3861788, at *4-*6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (holding that active and former military personnel lack Article III standing requirements to challenge President Obama's eligibility for office); Cohen v. Obama, No. 08-2150, 2008 WL 5191864, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2008) (holding that a federal prisoner who alleged that then-Senator Obama was "an illegal alien impersonating a United States citizen" lacked standing under Article III), aff'd, Cohen v. Obama, 332 F. App'x 640 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Examination of this precedent would have made it "obvious to a reasonable attorney that an appeal from the District Court's order was frivolous, [as no] law or facts... support a conclusion that the District Court judge had erred." Beam, 383 F.3d at 109. Moreover, other courts have imposed sanctions for similar reasons. See Hollister v. Soetero, 258 F.R.D. 1, 2-5 (D.D.C. 2009) (reprimanding an attorney under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) for signing and filing a complaint alleging that President Obama was ineligible to serve as president because he is not a "natural born Citizen"), aff'd, Hollister v. Soetoro, Nos. 09-5080, 09-5161, 2010 WL 1169793 (D.C. Cir. March 22, 2010); see also Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1373 (M.D.Ga. 2009) (imposing monetary sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3) against counsel who filed similar claims on behalf of members of the military), aff'd, Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 09-15418, 2010 WL 892848 (11th Cir. March 15, 2010).
In the past, "we cautioned counsel that a finding by a District Court that a lawsuit is frivolous should serve as notice to the parties and their attorney to exercise caution, pause, and devote additional examination to the legal validity and factual merit of his contentions." Beam, 383 F.3d at 109 (quotation omitted). Although the District Court did not explicitly state that Appellants' claims were frivolous, the finding of other district courts that plaintiffs who filed complaints based on similar legal theories violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 should have served as meaningful notice that the appeal here would be frivolous.5 We therefore will order Appellants' counsel to show cause why he should not pay just damages and costs for having filed a frivolous appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 38.
IV.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court's order of dismissal.