Free Republic
Browse · Search
General/Chat
Topics · Post Article

To: r9etb; PzLdr; dfwgator; Paisan; From many - one.; rockinqsranch; GRRRRR; 2banana; henkster; ...

Were U.S. Forces in the Philippines Caught Offguard on 12/8/1941?

A commonly held perception is that on Dec 8, 1941, U.S forces in the Philippines were as unalert or less alert than U.S. forces were at Pearl Harbor on Dec 7.

Many skillful people from many different angles over a considerable period of time have effectively crafted this perception.

Movies portray FDR giving MacArthur a Medal of Honor rather than court marshal purely to boost domestic morale.

Authors and commentators claim U.S. men in the Philippines on Dec 8, 1941 were sleeping off hangovers and their aircraft were sitting on the ground, unarmed with engines every bit as cold as they were in Pearl Harbor on Dec 7.

It's not unlike the perception created by the left that the unliateralist cowboy George Bush had no authorization to invade Iraq whereas both Clinton and Obama had U.S. Congressional and U.N. authorization for what they did.

Armchair pundits blast commanders for not having the clairvoyance only possible through hindsight to have deployed men differently or to have issued orders an hour earlier, etc.

From so many angles over such a period of time have these claims been made that it has become part of a collective understanding that commanders in the Philippines were every bit if not more offguard as those at Pearl Harbor.

So relentless and convincing have these stories been that people don't bother to examine first hand accounts of the men in the Philippines at the time. If they did, they would recognize the history they always heard was in fact a revised, alternate one.

For certain, tactical errors were made in the Philippines but tactical errors will always be made. Yes, a lot of records were destroyed and after the fact accounts must be relied upon in large part.

However, when reading the first hand accounts, no where does one find substantial differences or contradictions.

All accounts agree that Philippine forces had been on high alert prior to and on Dec 8, 1941. They all agreed that first line fighters were on combat patrols on Dec 8. They all agree that the B-17's at Clark Field had taken to the air on the morning of Dec 8.

The following snippets were taken from the war time diary of General Lewis H. Brereton, commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philippines. Yes, it's possible that he "modified" his diary entries and refined his recollection. For that reason, one must examine his account side-by-side with that of his peers.

These recollections must then be examined against the accounts of their subordinates and commander (MacArthur).

One must consider all these accounts in light of the poor electronic communications and that most orders on Dec 8 were being issued verbally.

Testimony of eyewitnesses will always differ here and there. However, nowhere in reading survivor accounts from the Philippines on Dec 8, 1941 will one find a major disagreement such as someone claiming American forces were under no alert or that front line aircraft were sitting on the ground unarmed with cold engines while their crews were sleeping off hangovers elsewhere.

If someone reading this and following posts has contradictory information, please post it in order that we all benefit and come to a better understanding of events in the Philippines in 1941-1942.

The following are snippets and their citations I extracted from the diary of General Brereton from the time he received orders to go to the Philippines in Oct 1941 until Dec 8, 1941. In some cases, I edited snippets to aid readability.

In light of War Plan Orange (created before an understanding of air power) which I will address in a later post, notice the instructions given Brereton on Oct 7, 1941 stressing the change in strategic importance of the Philippines.


Washington, 5 Oct 1941, Gen. Brereton informed by Hap Arnold that he is being reassigned to the Philippines to assume command of the Far East Air Forces.
Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp5). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Washington, 7 Oct 1941. Gen George Marshall gave to Gen. Brereton detailed instructions about the Philippine situation, stressing the change in the strategic importance of the islands.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp8). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Washington, 7 Oct 1941. "I repeated to Gen. Marshall my opinion that if the situation in the Far east was critical, or was expected to be so, the presence of a strong and unproteccted bombardment units might easily be a decisive factor to incite an aggressive enemy to air attack. The enemy would have everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before arrival of units necessary for their protection. I was told by Gen. Marshall as I had been told by Gen. Arnold that the hazards were recognized. Both were aware it was a calculated risk.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp8). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Washington, 8-9-10 Oct 1941. "In any event it was the opinion of the War Department that hostilities, if and when they came, would not begin before 1 April 1942. Our plans for defense of the Philippines contemplated that by April 1942, the complete air reinforcements would be in place, and in addition that very considerable land reinforcements requested by General MacArthur would be in the Philippines.It was the hope of our Government that the presence of a powerful air force in the Philippines, in addition to a well trained Army, would serve as a strong argument to enforce the American viewpoint on Japan.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp10). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Tampa, 12 Oct 1941. "While I did not feel that I was being sent out on anything like a hopeless task, I was made to understand that it was of the utmost urgency to be prepared to act at any time with the equipment at hand"

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp11). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Wake Island, 27 Oct 1941. Gen Brereton arrives aboard a Pan Am Clipper a few minutes ahead of a flight of B-17's enroute to the Philippines. This flight was one of several 3,6, or 9 plane groups totaling the 35 B-17's Gen Brereton will command in the Philippines. Due to small size of Pacific island airfields, larger flights could not be acomodated. Gen Brereton has dinner with Lt. Col Eubank, the B-17 flight leader.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp15). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 3 Nov 1941. We arrived in Manila at 3:00am

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp17). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 4 Nov 1941. I spent the next morning with Gen MacArthur and gave him the letter from Gen. Marshall marked "For the Eyes of Gen MacArthur Only". After he read it and another communication I had for him, he acted like a small boy who has been told he is going to get a holiday from school. He turned to his chief of staff and said "Dick, they are going to give us everything we have asked for". After discussing with Sunderland the contents of the letter, he then gave me the most concise and clear-cut estimate of the situation I had yet received. In his opinion, which was the same as that of most informed men, it seemed likely that nothing would happen before 1 April 1942.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp19). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 6 Nov 1941. I issued orders that one squadron of fighters and one squadron of bombers must be kept on constant readiness. Flightworthy aircraft were not to be placed out of commission during flying hours four routine checks and inspections.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp23). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 9 Nov 1941. Information was correct that there were only two Philippine airfields from which heavy bombers could operate. One was Clark Field, adjoining Fort Stotsenberg, where all heavy bombers that had arrived were stationed., and where adequate housing facilities existed. The other was at Del Monte on Mindanao, where there was an adequate airfield but no facilities whatsoever.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp21). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 9 Nov 1941. Half of the Philippine fighter force was stationed at Nichols Field, the remainder at Clark Field. As additional fields at Iba and Del Carmen were completed, the disposition of the fighters would be changed in order to provide better cover for Clark Field and the Manila Bay area. There were not AA defenses available at either of these fields or at any other airfield in the Philippines. The available AAA in the islands was concentrated on Corregidor. The air depot at Nichols field had no spare parts of any kind for P-40s, nor was there so much as an extra washer or nut for a Flying Fortress.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp22). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 10 Nov 1941. In talks with MacArthur prior to my departure for Australia, I got the impression that his belief in 1 April as the earliest probable date when hostilities might commence had been severely shaken since my earlier coinferences with him.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp24). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 28 Nov 1941. Brerenton returned to Clark Field from Australia and met with Gen. MacArthur and owing to the gravity of the situation with Japan, Brereton recommended to MacArthur that all the Air Force be placed on a war footing. MacArthur agreed and it was done at once. Blackouts were established at all fields and the depot. A 24-hour alert was established for half the bombardment force and fighter force. All air troops were kept on their stations, except the 15 percent permitted weekend leave.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp31). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 29 Nov 1941. On of the major problems confronting us was location and dispersal of our aircraft. I anticipated that the Japanese would delay any landings until they had neutralized our Air Force, so we were much concerned over the location and overcrowing of our planes at Clark Field.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp31). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 30 Nov 1941. Two messages from the War department, one on Nov 28 and the other on Nov 30 alerted us to the possibility of an attack by Japan at any hour.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp33 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 1 Dec 1941. The Navy informed Gen Macarthur that their Catalinas could not continue air reconnaissance north to Formosa and at the same time give adequate attention to the areas west of Luzon. As a result, it was agreed that the Far East Air Force would take over reconnaissance towards Formosa, freeing the navy patrol wing to concentrate their reconnaissance to the west to Kamranh Bay and the southeast passage. I requested permission to conduct high-altitude photo missions of southern Formosa, particularly in the region of Takao. Gen. MacArthur directed that in view of the War Department instructions to avoid any overt act, he did not consider it advisable to conduct photo missions over Formosa.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp34-35 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 4 Dec 1941. Throughout the hours of darkness for the past four nights, the Interceptor Command picked up and traced forces of strange aircraft estimated at from 9 to 27 bombers, which came from Formosa down to within 20 miles of the shores of Lingayen Gulf. There is little doubt that these formations were Japanese. Presumably, they were making trial navigation flights. With my chief of staff, Colonel Brady, and other staff members, I discussed the disperal and employment of our aircraft. The overcrowding at Clark Field invited an attack. I directed that steps be taken immediately to move two squadrons of Flying Fortresses, 16 aircraft, and a limited number of B-18's to be used for air transport to Del Monte. Approval for the movement of the 16 Flying Fortresses to Del Monte was obtained from the General Sutherland only with the understanding that they would be returned to airfields to be constructed on Cebu and Luzon as soon as the necessary operating facilities could be prepared.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp35 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 5 Dec 1941. Sixteen Flying Fortresses of the 93rd and 14th Bomb Squadrons departed after dark according to plan from Clark Field for del Monte. In the event of hostilities it was planned to have them fly to Clark Field, refuel and carry out missions from there. Colonel Eubank, commander of the 19th bomb group advised against moving more than two squadrons to Del Monte because another group of B-17's, the 7th Bomb Group was to depart from the States for the Philippines the first week of December, and would also be based at Del Monte. The 7th Bomb Group never arrived in the Philippines. The first squadron from the 7th Bomb Group arrived at Honolulu the day Pearl Harbor was hit.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp36 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

MacArthur to Agwar, 6 Dec 1941. All air corps stations here on alert status. Airplanes dispersed and each under guard. All airdrome defense stations manned.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp36 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 6 Dec 1941. I talked to Colonel Eubank at Clark Field and went over the plans for the alerting, briefing and entire procedure for a mission of hostilities broke out. There was no information as to the location of the main enemy forces, but we were certain that they must come from either the west or north. If west, the Navy would give us first information. If north, our reconnaissance planes would be the first to locate the enemy. Our photographs of Formosa were obsolete, so in view of this fact we selected Takao Harbor as the juciest target to bomb immediately on the outbreak of war.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp37 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 8 Dec 1941. The telephone call from Gen. Sutherland notifying me that Pearl Harbor had been bombed woke me up. Around 4:00am while dressing, I notified my G-3, Col Caldwell to notify all air units of the Pearl Harbor attack and to have them prepared for action. I reported to Gen. MAcArthur's Hqs. at Ft. Santiago, Manila at about 5:00am.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp38 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila, 8 Dec 1941. I requested permission to carry out offensive action imediately after daylight. I told Sutherland I wished to mount all available B-17s at Clark Field for missions previously assigned and to prepare B-17's at Del Monte for movement, refueling and bomb loading at Clark field for operations against the enemy on Formosa. General Sutherland told me to go ahead with preparations; in the meantime, he would obtain General MacArthur's authority for the daylight attacks.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp39). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. I told Colonel Eubank, who had flown down from Clark Field to plan to mount an operation against targets in Takaeo Harbor, Formosa, first objective enemy transports and warships, and to prepare three planes for a reconnaissance of air-fields on Formosa. At about 8:00am, Maj David Gibbs, operations officer of the 19th Bombardment Group, senior officer at Clark Field in Col. eubanks abscence, prdered all B-17's into the air when he received information that Jap planes were approaching. All B-17s able to fly took off until they were recalled through the group radio channel.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp39-40 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. At the same time, 18 P-40's of the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field and 18 P-40s of the 18th Pursuit Squadron at Nicholas field were dispatched to attempt interception. At 9:00am when no word was received of any contact with the enemy, I ordered Col. George to undertake fighter cover of Clark and Nichols Fields. About 9:10 he reported that he had 54 aircraft in the air and 36 in reserve. Within 15 minutes information was received that twin motored Jap bombers had attacked Tuguegatao, Tarlac, and Baguio on northern Luzon. The fighters were recalled for refueling.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp40 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. Col Eubank left for Clark Field at 10:10am and just before he departed Gen. Sutherland advised that Gen MacArthur decided that a reconnaissance mission could be sent to Formosa.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp40 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. At approximately 10:20am, the Air Warning Service again reported a force of enemy aircraft over Lingayen Gulf headed for Clark Field and Manila. Fighters were ordered to scramble and 18 P-40s each from the 17th squadron at Clark Field and the 21st squadron at Nichols Field took off to cover the Manila area. Eighteen P-40's of the 3rd squadron from Ilba took off and headed north to attempt interception. Another 18 P-35's of the 34th squadron took off from Del Carmen to cover Clark Field. The 20th squadron at Clark Field was kept in reserve.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp40 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. Col Eubank, on arrival at Clark Field sent a coded radio message recalling the bombers. The bombers trickled back to Clark Field, refueled and prepared to execute the orders-three planes to go on a reconnaissance to Formosa and the rest to be briefed for an attack.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp41 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. About 11:00am, I received a call from Gen Sutherland informing me that bombing missions could be executed. I directed Col. Eubank at Clark Field to load all available B-17s with 100lb and 300-lb bombs and brief his crews to attack known airfields in southwest Formosa.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp41 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. About 12:30pm, an estimated 54 Japanese bombers flying in two waves attacked Clark Field from high altitude. The three reconnaissance B-17s which were being taxied into position for takeoff by the crews were hit and destroyed. Three planes of the 20th pursuit squadron led by Lt. Joe Moore were able to get off but several other P-40s were hit and destroyed on the runway. The high altitude bombing was followed by a series of attacks by about 30 dive bombers and strafers covered by about 40 fighters. The attack on Clark Field came without warning.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp41 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. About 10:30am, the 3rd pursuit squadron at Ilb took off to intercept a formation of Jap planes which were plotted on the radar approaching over the China Sea. The 3rd squadron failed to intercept the Japs and were coming in to refuel when the Jap fighters attacked Ilba. Approximately 16 P-40's were lost at Ilba and in addition, the one radar air warning set in operation along with other ground installations was destroyed. Loss of the radar set at Ilba proved to be fatal, permitting a following formation of bombers and fighters to get to Clark Field without warning.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp42 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. All during the Clark Field attack there were 36 P-40s and 18 P-35s airborne and covering Nichols Field, Cavite and Manila, 55 miles south of Clark Field. Efforts to get orders to this fighter force to proceed to Clark Field were unavailing because the one radio set available had been hit in the initial attack. All during the day communications were conducted under the most difficult circumstances owing to the shortage of radio and telephone equipment. All phone calls were made over the Philippine Commonwealth lines except to Gen MacArthur's Hqs., where we had a field telephone; this line we suspected was tapped by enemy agents.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp43 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941. Col Eubank reported that 17 B-17s had been destroyed or put out of commission on Clark Field. (leter repair and salvage reduced the number to 12 B-17s). The only B-17 at Clark field not hit was the aircraft flown by Lt. John W. Carpenter III, unable to take off until after 10:00am due to generator trouble. Carpenter was 200 miles northeast of Clark Field when ordered by radio to return. All during the Clark Field attack there were 36 P-40s and 18 P-35s airborne and covering Nichols Field, Cavite and Manila, 55 miles south of Clark Field. Efforts to get orders to this fighter force to proceed to Clark Field were unavailing because the one radio set available had been hit in the initial attack. All during the day communications were conducted under the most difficult circumstances owing to the shortage of radio and telephone equipment. All phone calls were made over the Philippine Commonwealth lines except to Gen MacArthur's Hqs., where we had a field telephone; this line we suspected was tapped by enemy agents.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp43-44 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

Manila. 8 Dec 1941.Fighter losses for the day were approximately 45 with many others damaged. The events of the day as I have outlined them were as I saw them from my command post at Nielson Field, on the edge of Manila, 60 miles south of Clark Field.

Brereton, Lewis H. , (1946). Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp43-44 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.

16 posted on 12/23/2011 1:16:26 PM PST by fso301
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies ]


To: fso301

great post.

A very interesting addition to the story. So he claims that they launched the B-17’s against the Japanese in Formosa but they were later recalled?

A quick retaliatory strike would have gotten great press I bet.


17 posted on 12/23/2011 1:29:17 PM PST by GeronL (The Right to Life came before the Right to Pursue Happiness)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 16 | View Replies ]

To: fso301

Damn!

That is one LOOOONNNGGGGG ping!


18 posted on 12/23/2011 1:35:30 PM PST by BenLurkin (This is not a statement of fact. It is either opinion or satire; or both)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 16 | View Replies ]

To: fso301
Medal of Honor rather than court marshal

Court martial.

22 posted on 12/23/2011 2:48:42 PM PST by iowamark
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 16 | View Replies ]

To: fso301

The Plan Orange defense plan for the Phillipines was still in effect up until Pearl Harbor, the belief being the Asiatic Fleet could harass the landings until Submarines and tenders arrived from Hawaii, which would then take over, followed shortly after by fast Cruisers and destroyers.

This would be followed up within a couple of weeks by The Pacific fleet pushing through a giant relief convoy of troops and supplies, leading to the “Great Decisive Battle” between US and Japanese Battlewagons.

The realization that AIRCRAFT, not battlewagons ruled the seas was a rude shock to the Navy. That, along with the fall of Guam, putting Japanese land based air across the intended route, pretty much finished any hope of a relief convoy


26 posted on 12/23/2011 3:33:29 PM PST by tcrlaf (Election 2012: THE RAPTURE OF THE DEMOCRATS)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 16 | View Replies ]

To: fso301

Wanted to touch base real quick. I haven’t gotten to read this yet, but I am very interested in all you have researched here and I will. I’m in the Christmas crunch right now with family and the kids. I will read this and give you my impressions on it, but I may have to wait until after the holidays. I still haven’t begun the year in review article which I have to have ready by the New Years Eve at midnight so that is the current priority anytime I’m at the computer aside from the quick posting of the days notes.


31 posted on 12/24/2011 12:27:51 AM PST by CougarGA7 ("History is politics projected into the past" - Michael Pokrovski)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 16 | View Replies ]

To: fso301; CougarGA7; Homer_J_Simpson
fso301: "A commonly held perception is that on Dec 8, 1941, U.S forces in the Philippines were as unalert or less alert than U.S. forces were at Pearl Harbor on Dec 7.

"Many skillful people from many different angles over a considerable period of time have effectively crafted this perception."

Thanks for a great post. Hugely interesting and informative.

I am no expert on this subject, but have taken many posts here, posts saying just what you report above, I've taken them to heart and assumed they must be valid -- despite the fact I'm a huge admirer of MacAuthur, while many here are not.

For one thing, MacArthur was my Dad's commanding general, both in the Pacific and Korea.

So I'm delighted to see you make the case in Mac's defense.

Will be interested to see how well it stands up to "cross examination"... ;-)

fso301 quoting Brereton: "I repeated to Gen. Marshall my opinion that if the situation in the Far east was critical, or was expected to be so, the presence of a strong and unprotected bombardment units might easily be a decisive factor to incite an aggressive enemy to air attack.

"The enemy would have everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before arrival of units necessary for their protection.

"I was told by Gen. Marshall as I had been told by Gen. Arnold that the hazards were recognized. Both were aware it was a calculated risk."

You realize, I'm certain, that this quote reflects the very heart and soul of all "FDR knew" conspiracy theories.
The question is, did either Brereton or Marshall really understand what Brereton said?

34 posted on 12/24/2011 1:14:43 PM PST by BroJoeK (a little historical perspective....)
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 16 | View Replies ]

Free Republic
Browse · Search
General/Chat
Topics · Post Article


FreeRepublic, LLC, PO BOX 9771, FRESNO, CA 93794
FreeRepublic.com is powered by software copyright 2000-2008 John Robinson