Replies

fso301: "A commonly held perception is that on Dec 8, 1941, U.S forces in the Philippines were as unalert or less alert than U.S. forces were at Pearl Harbor on Dec 7.
"Many skillful people from many different angles over a considerable period of time have effectively crafted this perception."

Thanks for a great post. Hugely interesting and informative.

I am no expert on this subject, but have taken many posts here, posts saying just what you report above, I've taken them to heart and assumed they must be valid -- despite the fact I'm a huge admirer of MacAuthur, while many here are not.

For one thing, MacArthur was my Dad's commanding general, both in the Pacific and Korea.

So I'm delighted to see you make the case in Mac's defense.

Will be interested to see how well it stands up to "cross examination"... ;-)

"The enemy would have everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before arrival of units necessary for their protection.

"I was told by Gen. Marshall as I had been told by Gen. Arnold that the hazards were recognized. Both were aware it was a calculated risk."

You realize, I'm certain, that this quote reflects the very heart and soul of all "FDR knew" conspiracy theories.
The question is, did either Brereton or Marshall really understand what Brereton said?

Will be interested to see how well it stands up to "cross examination"... ;-)

I do to and I really welcome posts by anyone whose understanding of events differs.

I don't pretend to possess all information related to events in the Philippines but I have over the years read and listened to many first hand accounts, and they are significantly at odds with the popularly held belief of gross negligence on the commanders part.

Perhaps my perception is the one that has been flawed all these years and someone will help me come to a better understanding.

fso301 quoting Brereton: "I repeated to Gen. Marshall my opinion that if the situation in the Far east was critical, or was expected to be so, the presence of a strong and unprotected bombardment units might easily be a decisive factor to incite an aggressive enemy to air attack. "The enemy would have everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before arrival of units necessary for their protection. "I was told by Gen. Marshall as I had been told by Gen. Arnold that the hazards were recognized. Both were aware it was a calculated risk."

You realize, I'm certain, that this quote reflects the very heart and soul of all "FDR knew" conspiracy theories. The question is, did either Brereton or Marshall really understand what Brereton said?

Indeed. It would be very interesting if a written record exists of that discussion.

That having been said, I think it obvious that after FDR issued the embargo against Japan and it became evident that in face of the embargo, Japan would still not disengage from China, Manchuria, etc, Japan would have to seize sources of raw materials in SE Asia and doing so would place her on a collision course with the U.S.