The Plan Orange defense plan for the Phillipines was still in effect up until Pearl Harbor, the belief being the Asiatic Fleet could harass the landings until Submarines and tenders arrived from Hawaii, which would then take over, followed shortly after by fast Cruisers and destroyers.
This would be followed up within a couple of weeks by The Pacific fleet pushing through a giant relief convoy of troops and supplies, leading to the “Great Decisive Battle” between US and Japanese Battlewagons.
The realization that AIRCRAFT, not battlewagons ruled the seas was a rude shock to the Navy. That, along with the fall of Guam, putting Japanese land based air across the intended route, pretty much finished any hope of a relief convoy
Technically speaking, Orange was still in effect and was quite an old plan. Meanwhile, military technology and tactics were rapidly advancing. One can surmise by Washington's decision to suddenly boost the Air Force in the Philippines that they no longer viewed WPO-3 as an entirely realistic plan. Otherwise, why send so many air force resources based on a plan (WPO-3) that called for consolidation of forces in the 25 mile x 15 mile Bataan Peninsula?
Washington, 5 Oct 1941. I spent some time with General Arnold talking over the situation. The ultimate air force contemplated for the defense of the Philippines was approximately four Bombardment Groups, four Fighter Groups, the necessary air warning installations, and various associated air and ground units such as reconnaissance squadrons, mobile air depots, and other services.Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp6 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.