Posted on 12/23/2011 4:35:32 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
Thanks.
Like you noted, the B-17’s had to be in the air to be dispersed because there was only 2 places to land them and one of those had no facilities. So... no place to hide them.
Court martial.
The only way they would've been successful was if they'd caught the Japanese Formosa strike on the ground about to be launched. But my understanding is that even if MacArthur had given the go-ahead when first sought the strike wouldn't have arrived in time to hit the Japanese before takeoff.
On the bright side the B17s would've been spared to humiliation of being destroyed on the ground, most would likely have been destroyed by Japanese CAP over Formosa.
Thanks.
Agreed. Based on my understanding that it was bad weather over Formosa that delayed the initial Japanese attack, a B-17 strike force leaving Clark Field about dawn against Formosa would likely have been unable to identify any targets due to the same bad weather and return to Clark Field. The returning B-17s would then have likely found themselves on the ground at Clark being refueled and serviced about the time the Japanese attack ultimately occurred.
On the bright side the B17s would've been spared to humiliation of being destroyed on the ground, most would likely have been destroyed by Japanese CAP over Formosa.
Ultimately, it was hopeless, Japanese bombers could fly much higher than the American fighters, thereby enabling Clark Field and other fields to be bombed daily with impunity.
The Plan Orange defense plan for the Phillipines was still in effect up until Pearl Harbor, the belief being the Asiatic Fleet could harass the landings until Submarines and tenders arrived from Hawaii, which would then take over, followed shortly after by fast Cruisers and destroyers.
This would be followed up within a couple of weeks by The Pacific fleet pushing through a giant relief convoy of troops and supplies, leading to the “Great Decisive Battle” between US and Japanese Battlewagons.
The realization that AIRCRAFT, not battlewagons ruled the seas was a rude shock to the Navy. That, along with the fall of Guam, putting Japanese land based air across the intended route, pretty much finished any hope of a relief convoy
Technically speaking, Orange was still in effect and was quite an old plan. Meanwhile, military technology and tactics were rapidly advancing. One can surmise by Washington's decision to suddenly boost the Air Force in the Philippines that they no longer viewed WPO-3 as an entirely realistic plan. Otherwise, why send so many air force resources based on a plan (WPO-3) that called for consolidation of forces in the 25 mile x 15 mile Bataan Peninsula?
Washington, 5 Oct 1941. I spent some time with General Arnold talking over the situation. The ultimate air force contemplated for the defense of the Philippines was approximately four Bombardment Groups, four Fighter Groups, the necessary air warning installations, and various associated air and ground units such as reconnaissance squadrons, mobile air depots, and other services.Brereton Diaries: The war in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 - 8 May 1945 (pp6 ). New York, NY: William Morrow & Co.
Nothing is forgotten...
Oh God,what memories.
I was 9 when the war broke out,13 when it ended.
Wanted to touch base real quick. I haven’t gotten to read this yet, but I am very interested in all you have researched here and I will. I’m in the Christmas crunch right now with family and the kids. I will read this and give you my impressions on it, but I may have to wait until after the holidays. I still haven’t begun the year in review article which I have to have ready by the New Years Eve at midnight so that is the current priority anytime I’m at the computer aside from the quick posting of the days notes.
Where did you live during that period, if you don't mind my asking?
Since we all do this as a free time activity, back and forth exchanges are not necessarily going to be rapid.
I’m in the Christmas crunch right now with family and the kids.
Understood. I've been able to take advantage of everyone overeating to slip off while the house is full of people napping and get to the OSU library... but not for the blocks of time I would have preferred.
I will read this and give you my impressions on it, but I may have to wait until after the holidays.
Great! I really hope others will do it as well. I would have begun with Macarthur's notes but so many people's minds are made up regarding him that I decided to begin with someone less controversial.
Brerenton's diary provided a good timeline from his assignment to the Philippines in Oct 1941 through Dec 8, 1941. For those whose understanding of events significantly differs from that described by Gen. Brerenton, I would invite them to address the specifics and I will then research and report back on what peer commanders accounts were. If that is inconclusive we will then look to subordinate accounts.
Because most official records in the Philippines were destroyed, survivor accounts have to be relied on to a greater extent than is probably the preference of professional historians. Understanding that survivor diaries and recollections can later... ahem, "be clarified", we really to step back and examine the body of survivor accounts for consistency on the essential criticisms of Philippine commanders having been caught napping, etc.
"Many skillful people from many different angles over a considerable period of time have effectively crafted this perception."
Thanks for a great post. Hugely interesting and informative.
I am no expert on this subject, but have taken many posts here, posts saying just what you report above, I've taken them to heart and assumed they must be valid -- despite the fact I'm a huge admirer of MacAuthur, while many here are not.
For one thing, MacArthur was my Dad's commanding general, both in the Pacific and Korea.
So I'm delighted to see you make the case in Mac's defense.
Will be interested to see how well it stands up to "cross examination"... ;-)
fso301 quoting Brereton: "I repeated to Gen. Marshall my opinion that if the situation in the Far east was critical, or was expected to be so, the presence of a strong and unprotected bombardment units might easily be a decisive factor to incite an aggressive enemy to air attack.
"The enemy would have everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before arrival of units necessary for their protection.
"I was told by Gen. Marshall as I had been told by Gen. Arnold that the hazards were recognized. Both were aware it was a calculated risk."
You realize, I'm certain, that this quote reflects the very heart and soul of all "FDR knew" conspiracy theories.
The question is, did either Brereton or Marshall really understand what Brereton said?
I do to and I really welcome posts by anyone whose understanding of events differs.
I don't pretend to possess all information related to events in the Philippines but I have over the years read and listened to many first hand accounts, and they are significantly at odds with the popularly held belief of gross negligence on the commanders part.
Perhaps my perception is the one that has been flawed all these years and someone will help me come to a better understanding.
fso301 quoting Brereton: "I repeated to Gen. Marshall my opinion that if the situation in the Far east was critical, or was expected to be so, the presence of a strong and unprotected bombardment units might easily be a decisive factor to incite an aggressive enemy to air attack. "The enemy would have everything to gain by neutralizing our bomber force before arrival of units necessary for their protection. "I was told by Gen. Marshall as I had been told by Gen. Arnold that the hazards were recognized. Both were aware it was a calculated risk."
You realize, I'm certain, that this quote reflects the very heart and soul of all "FDR knew" conspiracy theories. The question is, did either Brereton or Marshall really understand what Brereton said?
Indeed. It would be very interesting if a written record exists of that discussion.
That having been said, I think it obvious that after FDR issued the embargo against Japan and it became evident that in face of the embargo, Japan would still not disengage from China, Manchuria, etc, Japan would have to seize sources of raw materials in SE Asia and doing so would place her on a collision course with the U.S.
I lived in a Boston neighborhood.
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