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Terri Schiavo and our Moral Confusion
MARS HILL AUDIO Journal ^ | April 01, 2005 | Ken Myer

Posted on 04/03/2005 8:37:17 AM PDT by tacomonkey2002

Terri Schiavo and our Moral Confusion

In thinking about the meaning of the tragedy of Terri Schiavo's life and the decisions it has generated, I spent much of Good Friday reading a number of articles by bioethicists, theologians, and various columnists. The entire time, I was haunted by the title of an essay by Stanley Hauerwas, who has written a lot about the moral nature of our care for the severely mentally retarded and more generally of those whose lives are incomprehensible and (thus?) burdensome to us. In "Must a Patient Be a Person To Be a Patient? Or, My Uncle Charlie Is Not Much of a Person But He Is Still My Uncle Charlie," Hauerwas challenged the conventional framework that guides many debates in bioethics: the definition of what constitutes personhood. According to this framework, to be alive and to be human is not sufficient to make a moral claim for care and protection. One must also be a "person," a status (in both beginning-of-life and end-of-life settings) that is usually defined in terms of capacities for reason and volition. Leon Kass, in Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (Encounter, 2002), observes that the Western tradition of conferring dignity and respect on persons, on "rational beings" capable of "genuine moral agency," has preserved the unique value of human life by distinguishing it from beasts and machines. But, as we are painfully discovering on many issues addressed by bioethicists, it is an inadequate framework, appropriate perhaps for the Hellenistic view of human nature, but not rich enough for the account preserved by Jews and Christians in the account of Creation, and extended by Christians in reflection on the reality of the Incarnation. As Kass notes, "Precisely because it dualistically sets up the concept of 'personhood' in opposition to nature and the body, [this view of human dignity] fails to do justice to the concrete reality of our embodied lives—lives of begetting and belonging no less than of willing and thinking. . . . Precisely because 'personhood' is distinct from our lives as embodied, rooted, connected and aspiring beings, the dignity of rational choice pays no respect at all to the dignity we have through our loves and longings—central aspects of human life understood as a grown togetherness of body and soul. Not all of human dignity consists in reason or freedom." [page 17] Reason and freedom are valued in the Biblical account of human nature. But in the modern, Enlightenment account that has shaped our political institutions and much of our thinking about the contours of caring for one another, reason and freedom are pretty much all there is to a person rightly so called. The modern picture of the human cannot account for our nature as embodied spirits created for and constituted by relationships of love. In his book Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Eerdmans, 2nd edition 2005), Gilbert Meilaender reflects on how Christian thinking should challenge the common assumptions of our culture about "personhood": "[O]ur personal histories—precisely as histories of embodied spirits—do not require the presence of 'personal' capacities throughout. Our personal histories begin in dependence—first within our mother's womb and then as newborns. Often our life ends in the dependence of old age and the loss of capacities we once had. Personhood is not something we 'have' at some point in this history. Rather, as embodied spirits or inspirited bodies, we are persons throughout the whole of that life. One whom we might baptize, one for whom we might still pray, one for whom the Spirit of Christ may still intercede 'with sighs too deep for words' (Rom. 8:26)—such a one cannot be for us less than a person. Dependence is part of the story of a person's life." [2nd edition, page 6] Meilaender concludes this section of his book with an observation that applies to Terri Schiavo's situation most particularly: "Those human beings who permanently lack certain empowering cognitive capacities—as well as all human beings in stages of life where those powers are absent—are simply the weakest and most needy members of our community. We can care for them and about them only by acknowledging the living bodily presence that they have among us—seeking to discern in their faces the hidden spirit, the call to community that their bodily presence constitutes, and the face of Christ." [ibid.] In an article written for The Weekly Standard and posted online on Good Friday, Eric Cohen, the editor of The New Atlantis, also reflects on moral framework questions. "For all the attention we have paid to the Schiavo case," Cohen insists, "we have asked many of the wrong questions, living as we do on the playing field of modern liberalism." Like Kass and Meilaender, Cohen is unhappy with the liberal idea that volition is the defining characteristic of the human: "[T]he real lesson of the Schiavo case is not that we all need living wills; it is that our dignity does not reside in our will alone, and that it is foolish to believe that the competent person I am now can establish, in advance, how I should be cared for if I become incapacitated and incompetent. The real lesson is that we are not mere creatures of the will: We still possess dignity and rights even when our capacity to make free choices is gone; and we do not possess the right to demand that others treat us as less worthy of care than we really are." Cohen observes that liberalism's celebration of liberty as autonomy, as independence, distorts the meaning of the human and establishes "a set of assumptions about what makes life worth living and thus worth protecting" according to which we regard "incompetence itself as reasonable grounds for assuming that life is not worth living." Cohen thinks that medical ethics organized around the single theme of autonomy is flawed. "[T]he autonomy regime, at its best, prevents the worst abuses—like involuntary euthanasia, where doctors or public officials decide whose life is worth living. But the autonomy regime, even at its best, is deeply inadequate. It is based on a failure to recognize that the human condition involves both giving and needing care, and not always being morally free to decide our own fate." The article is posted online here. In watching and reading the news coverage of Terri Schiavo's case, I can't remember hearing the word "euthanasia" once. And yet it should be clear that by withdrawing food and water from her, she is euthanized, not simply being "allowed to die." I doubt that a parent who withheld food and water from their children, or a warden who withheld food and water from a prisoner, could be excused from culpability on the grounds that they were simply allowing someone to die. In none of these cases, including Terri Schiavo's, is there a dying person, just a dependent one. Two articles from First Things help sort through the issues involved in distinguishing killing from allowing to die. The first, "Always to Care, Never to Kill: A Declaration on Euthanasia," was produced by the Ramsey Colloquium, a group of Jewish and Christian theologians, ethicists, philosophers, and scholars that met periodically to consider questions of ethics, religion, and public life. The statement was prepared at a time when many states were considering laws liberalizing the practice of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, and its principal theme was declared quite concisely: "In relating to the sick, the suffering, the incompetent, the disabled, and the dying, we must learn again the wisdom that teaches us always to care, never to kill. Although it may sometimes appear to be an act of compassion, killing is never a means of caring." Later in the declaration, a warning that has relevance to Terri Schiavo's case was offered: "Once we cross the boundary between killing and allowing to die, there will be no turning back. Current proposals would legalize euthanasia only for the terminally ill. But the logic of the argument—and its practical consequences—will inevitably push us further. Arguments for euthanasia usually appeal to our supposed right of self-determination and to the desirability of relieving suffering. If a right to euthanasia is grounded in self-determination, it cannot reasonably be limited to the terminally ill. If people have a right to die, why must they wait until they are actually dying before they are permitted to exercise that right? Similarly, if the warrant for euthanasia is to relieve suffering, why should we be able to relieve the suffering only of those who are self-determining and competent to give their consent? Why not euthanasia for the suffering who can no longer speak for themselves? To ask such questions is to expose the logical incoherence and the fragile arbitrariness of suggested 'limits' in proposals for legalized euthanasia." The article is available online here. Finally, the August/September 2004 issue of First Things featured an exchange between Robert D. Orr (director of Ethics for Fletcher Allen Health Care and Professor of Family Medicine at the University of Vermont College of Medicine) and Gilbert Meilaender. The exchange dealt explicitly with the question of the use of feeding tubes for patients in a "permanent vegetative state." Orr and Meilaender both agree that such patients (like Terri Schiavo) are not dying. Given that fact, Meilaender discusses this question: "Under what circumstances may we rightly refuse a life-prolonging treatment without supposing that, in making this decision, we are doing the forbidden deed of choosing or aiming at death?" "The answer of our medical-moral tradition has been the following: we may refuse treatments that are either useless or excessively burdensome. In doing so, we choose not death, but one among several possible lives open to us. We do not choose to die, but, rather, how to live, even if while dying, even if a shorter life than some other lives that are still available for our choosing. What we take aim at then, what we refuse, is not life but treatment—treatment that is either useless for a particular patient or excessively burdensome for that patient. Especially for patients who are irretrievably into the dying process, almost all treatments will have become useless. In refusing them, one is not choosing death but choosing life without a now useless form of treatment. But even for patients who are not near death, who might live for a considerably longer time, excessively burdensome treatments may also be refused. Here again, one takes aim at the burdensome treatment, not at life. One person may choose a life that is longer but carries with it considerable burden of treatment. Another may choose a life that is shorter but carries with it less burden of treatment. Each, however, chooses life. Neither aims at death. "It is essential to emphasize that these criteria refer to treatments, not to lives. We may rightly reject a treatment that is useless. But if I decide not to treat because I think a person's life is useless, then I am taking aim not at the treatment but at the life. Rather than asking, 'What if anything can I do that will benefit the life this patient has?' I am asking, 'Is it a benefit to have such a life?' If the latter is my question, and if I decide not to treat, it should be clear that it is the life at which I take aim. Likewise, we may reject a treatment on grounds of excessive burden. But if I decide not to treat because it seems a burden just to have the life this person has, then I am taking aim not at the burdensome treatment but at the life. Hence, in deciding whether it is appropriate and permissible to withhold or withdraw treatment—whether, even if life is thereby shortened, we are aiming only at the treatment and not at the life—we have to ask ourselves whether the treatment under consideration is, for this patient, either useless or excessively burdensome. "Is the treatment useless? Not, let us be clear, is the life a useless one to have, but is the treatment useless? As Dr. Orr notes—quite rightly, I think—patients 'can live in this permanent vegetative state for many years.' So feeding may preserve for years the life of this living human being. Are we certain we want to call that useless? We are, of course, tempted to say that, in deciding not to feed, we are simply withdrawing treatment and letting these patients die. Yet, as Dr. Orr also notes, these patients 'are not clearly dying.' And, despite the sloppy way we sometimes talk about these matters, you cannot 'let die' a person who is not dying. It is hard, therefore, to make the case for treatment withdrawal in these cases on the ground of uselessness. We may use those words, but it is more likely that our target is a (supposed) useless life and not a useless treatment. And if that is our aim, we had better rethink it promptly."


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KEYWORDS: bioethics; blackthursday331; disabledrights; euthanasia; terrischiavo
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1 posted on 04/03/2005 8:37:17 AM PDT by tacomonkey2002
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To: tacomonkey2002

Formatting!




thoughts on

Terri Schiavo and our Moral Confusion

In thinking about the meaning of the tragedy of Terri Schiavo's life and the decisions it has generated, I spent much of Good Friday reading a number of articles by bioethicists, theologians, and various columnists. The entire time, I was haunted by the title of an essay by Stanley Hauerwas, who has written a lot about the moral nature of our care for the severely mentally retarded and more generally of those whose lives are incomprehensible and (thus?) burdensome to us. In "Must a Patient Be a Person To Be a Patient? Or, My Uncle Charlie Is Not Much of a Person But He Is Still My Uncle Charlie," Hauerwas challenged the conventional framework that guides many debates in bioethics: the definition of what constitutes personhood. According to this framework, to be alive and to be human is not sufficient to make a moral claim for care and protection. One must also be a "person," a status (in both beginning-of-life and end-of-life settings) that is usually defined in terms of capacities for reason and volition.

Leon Kass, in Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (Encounter, 2002), observes that the Western tradition of conferring dignity and respect on persons, on "rational beings" capable of "genuine moral agency," has preserved the unique value of human life by distinguishing it from beasts and machines. But, as we are painfully discovering on many issues addressed by bioethicists, it is an inadequate framework, appropriate perhaps for the Hellenistic view of human nature, but not rich enough for the account preserved by Jews and Christians in the account of Creation, and extended by Christians in reflection on the reality of the Incarnation. As Kass notes, "Precisely because it dualistically sets up the concept of 'personhood' in opposition to nature and the body, [this view of human dignity] fails to do justice to the concrete reality of our embodied lives—lives of begetting and belonging no less than of willing and thinking. . . . Precisely because 'personhood' is distinct from our lives as embodied, rooted, connected and aspiring beings, the dignity of rational choice pays no respect at all to the dignity we have through our loves and longings—central aspects of human life understood as a grown togetherness of body and soul. Not all of human dignity consists in reason or freedom." [page 17]

Reason and freedom are valued in the Biblical account of human nature. But in the modern, Enlightenment account that has shaped our political institutions and much of our thinking about the contours of caring for one another, reason and freedom are pretty much all there is to a person rightly so called. The modern picture of the human cannot account for our nature as embodied spirits created for and constituted by relationships of love.

In his book Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Eerdmans, 2nd edition 2005), Gilbert Meilaender reflects on how Christian thinking should challenge the common assumptions of our culture about "personhood": "[O]ur personal histories—precisely as histories of embodied spirits—do not require the presence of 'personal' capacities throughout. Our personal histories begin in dependence—first within our mother's womb and then as newborns. Often our life ends in the dependence of old age and the loss of capacities we once had. Personhood is not something we 'have' at some point in this history. Rather, as embodied spirits or inspirited bodies, we are persons throughout the whole of that life. One whom we might baptize, one for whom we might still pray, one for whom the Spirit of Christ may still intercede 'with sighs too deep for words' (Rom. 8:26)—such a one cannot be for us less than a person. Dependence is part of the story of a person's life." [2nd edition, page 6]

Meilaender concludes this section of his book with an observation that applies to Terri Schiavo's situation most particularly: "Those human beings who permanently lack certain empowering cognitive capacities—as well as all human beings in stages of life where those powers are absent—are simply the weakest and most needy members of our community. We can care for them and about them only by acknowledging the living bodily presence that they have among us—seeking to discern in their faces the hidden spirit, the call to community that their bodily presence constitutes, and the face of Christ." [ibid.]

In an article written for The Weekly Standard and posted online on Good Friday, Eric Cohen, the editor of The New Atlantis, also reflects on moral framework questions. "For all the attention we have paid to the Schiavo case," Cohen insists, "we have asked many of the wrong questions, living as we do on the playing field of modern liberalism."

Like Kass and Meilaender, Cohen is unhappy with the liberal idea that volition is the defining characteristic of the human: "[T]he real lesson of the Schiavo case is not that we all need living wills; it is that our dignity does not reside in our will alone, and that it is foolish to believe that the competent person I am now can establish, in advance, how I should be cared for if I become incapacitated and incompetent. The real lesson is that we are not mere creatures of the will: We still possess dignity and rights even when our capacity to make free choices is gone; and we do not possess the right to demand that others treat us as less worthy of care than we really are."

Cohen observes that liberalism's celebration of liberty as autonomy, as independence, distorts the meaning of the human and establishes "a set of assumptions about what makes life worth living and thus worth protecting" according to which we regard "incompetence itself as reasonable grounds for assuming that life is not worth living."

Cohen thinks that medical ethics organized around the single theme of autonomy is flawed. "[T]he autonomy regime, at its best, prevents the worst abuses—like involuntary euthanasia, where doctors or public officials decide whose life is worth living. But the autonomy regime, even at its best, is deeply inadequate. It is based on a failure to recognize that the human condition involves both giving and needing care, and not always being morally free to decide our own fate."

The article is posted online here.

In watching and reading the news coverage of Terri Schiavo's case, I can't remember hearing the word "euthanasia" once. And yet it should be clear that by withdrawing food and water from her, she is euthanized, not simply being "allowed to die." I doubt that a parent who withheld food and water from their children, or a warden who withheld food and water from a prisoner, could be excused from culpability on the grounds that they were simply allowing someone to die. In none of these cases, including Terri Schiavo's, is there a dying person, just a dependent one.

Two articles from First Things help sort through the issues involved in distinguishing killing from allowing to die. The first, "Always to Care, Never to Kill: A Declaration on Euthanasia," was produced by the Ramsey Colloquium, a group of Jewish and Christian theologians, ethicists, philosophers, and scholars that met periodically to consider questions of ethics, religion, and public life. The statement was prepared at a time when many states were considering laws liberalizing the practice of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, and its principal theme was declared quite concisely: "In relating to the sick, the suffering, the incompetent, the disabled, and the dying, we must learn again the wisdom that teaches us always to care, never to kill. Although it may sometimes appear to be an act of compassion, killing is never a means of caring."

Later in the declaration, a warning that has relevance to Terri Schiavo's case was offered: "Once we cross the boundary between killing and allowing to die, there will be no turning back. Current proposals would legalize euthanasia only for the terminally ill. But the logic of the argument—and its practical consequences—will inevitably push us further. Arguments for euthanasia usually appeal to our supposed right of self-determination and to the desirability of relieving suffering. If a right to euthanasia is grounded in self-determination, it cannot reasonably be limited to the terminally ill. If people have a right to die, why must they wait until they are actually dying before they are permitted to exercise that right? Similarly, if the warrant for euthanasia is to relieve suffering, why should we be able to relieve the suffering only of those who are self-determining and competent to give their consent? Why not euthanasia for the suffering who can no longer speak for themselves? To ask such questions is to expose the logical incoherence and the fragile arbitrariness of suggested 'limits' in proposals for legalized euthanasia."

The article is available online here.

Finally, the August/September 2004 issue of First Things featured an exchange between Robert D. Orr (director of Ethics for Fletcher Allen Health Care and Professor of Family Medicine at the University of Vermont College of Medicine) and Gilbert Meilaender. The exchange dealt explicitly with the question of the use of feeding tubes for patients in a "permanent vegetative state." Orr and Meilaender both agree that such patients (like Terri Schiavo) are not dying. Given that fact, Meilaender discusses this question: "Under what circumstances may we rightly refuse a life-prolonging treatment without supposing that, in making this decision, we are doing the forbidden deed of choosing or aiming at death?"

"The answer of our medical-moral tradition has been the following: we may refuse treatments that are either useless or excessively burdensome. In doing so, we choose not death, but one among several possible lives open to us. We do not choose to die, but, rather, how to live, even if while dying, even if a shorter life than some other lives that are still available for our choosing. What we take aim at then, what we refuse, is not life but treatment—treatment that is either useless for a particular patient or excessively burdensome for that patient. Especially for patients who are irretrievably into the dying process, almost all treatments will have become useless. In refusing them, one is not choosing death but choosing life without a now useless form of treatment. But even for patients who are not near death, who might live for a considerably longer time, excessively burdensome treatments may also be refused. Here again, one takes aim at the burdensome treatment, not at life. One person may choose a life that is longer but carries with it considerable burden of treatment. Another may choose a life that is shorter but carries with it less burden of treatment. Each, however, chooses life. Neither aims at death.

"It is essential to emphasize that these criteria refer to treatments, not to lives. We may rightly reject a treatment that is useless. But if I decide not to treat because I think a person's life is useless, then I am taking aim not at the treatment but at the life. Rather than asking, 'What if anything can I do that will benefit the life this patient has?' I am asking, 'Is it a benefit to have such a life?' If the latter is my question, and if I decide not to treat, it should be clear that it is the life at which I take aim. Likewise, we may reject a treatment on grounds of excessive burden. But if I decide not to treat because it seems a burden just to have the life this person has, then I am taking aim not at the burdensome treatment but at the life. Hence, in deciding whether it is appropriate and permissible to withhold or withdraw treatment—whether, even if life is thereby shortened, we are aiming only at the treatment and not at the life—we have to ask ourselves whether the treatment under consideration is, for this patient, either useless or excessively burdensome.

"Is the treatment useless? Not, let us be clear, is the life a useless one to have, but is the treatment useless? As Dr. Orr notes—quite rightly, I think—patients 'can live in this permanent vegetative state for many years.' So feeding may preserve for years the life of this living human being. Are we certain we want to call that useless? We are, of course, tempted to say that, in deciding not to feed, we are simply withdrawing treatment and letting these patients die. Yet, as Dr. Orr also notes, these patients 'are not clearly dying.' And, despite the sloppy way we sometimes talk about these matters, you cannot 'let die' a person who is not dying. It is hard, therefore, to make the case for treatment withdrawal in these cases on the ground of uselessness. We may use those words, but it is more likely that our target is a (supposed) useless life and not a useless treatment. And if that is our aim, we had better rethink it promptly."
The article is available online here. [Posted March 2005, KAM]


2 posted on 04/03/2005 8:44:35 AM PDT by backhoe
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To: tacomonkey2002
"In watching and reading the news coverage of Terri Schiavo's case, I can't remember hearing the word "euthanasia" once."

For one very good reason. Terri Schiavo's case was not about euthanasia. It was about carrying out her expressed will to die if she were brain damaged and being supported by artificial means.

It was the extreme pro-life crowd that totally ignored Terri's wishes and turned this whole thing into a "hate Michael, he-wants-her-dead" euthanasia circus.

3 posted on 04/03/2005 8:45:51 AM PDT by robertpaulsen
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To: robertpaulsen
I checked your Freeper join-up date. Just in February 2005.

Are you sure you shouldn't have read the Schiavo threads more closely before channelling CNN on this thread?

At least, your comments gave the appearance that that is what was happening...

Cheers!

4 posted on 04/03/2005 8:58:41 AM PDT by grey_whiskers (The opinions are solely those of the author and are subject to change without notice.)
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To: robertpaulsen

How do you know what Terri wanted?


5 posted on 04/03/2005 9:02:01 AM PDT by mlc9852
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To: robertpaulsen
"It was about carrying out her expressed will to die if she were brain damaged and being supported by artificial means."

"It was the extreme pro-life crowd that totally ignored Terri's wishes..."



There is absolutely zero, none, nada, zilch evidence of Terri's expressed will to die if she were brain damaged and being supported by artificial mean.

Terri's husband alleged that this was what she wanted ~ her parents alleged it was not.

That is the total extent of anyone knowledge about what Terri wanted!

6 posted on 04/03/2005 9:18:24 AM PDT by Zacs Mom (Proud wife of a Marine! ... and purveyor of "rampant, unedited dialogue")
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To: robertpaulsen

You blind idiot! Terri was not dying at all. She was healthy! She was not on life support. She was not in a coma! There was no proof she wanted This terrible death. Hearsay is not proof in any court of law. Her loving parents wanted her. She was denied therapy. Her husband wanted her dead for his own selfish reasons.


7 posted on 04/03/2005 9:29:26 AM PDT by Old anti feminist
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To: Old anti feminist

Robertpaulsen obviously doesn't concern himself with the truth.


8 posted on 04/03/2005 9:35:31 AM PDT by mlc9852
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To: Zacs Mom
I don't know about 'pro-lifers'. I don't belong to them, but I agree with them more then not. Actually, ...I saw some wacko's on both sides this past week...if you ask me the pro-death crowd was actually just plain mean. The pro-life crowd had more wackiness I'll conceed, but they were nicer, and shared their food and drinks. They would sing and stuff...but were basically harmless nice people. The 'pro-kill Terri' crowd were a scary bunch. I saw Felos up *close*, man...and I have to tell you, he's a truly scary old coot (think 'Worm-toungue' from LOTR). It's about basic human decency!! Why not just err on the side of human decency and let her mother and father care for her. I never will understand the opposition to that.

I'm not 'God'...no one knew what SHE wanted.
I'm sure she didn't want to be bedridden and helpless for so long, but I'm doubly sure she didn't want to be starved to death.

I have seen vids of her laugh at music.

I may be young, but I know when a person laughs at music it means they are 'there' in some capacity.

Also, being in Pinellas county, you can't help but know this case. I grew up with it practically.
I know more then most people...and Clearwater is a town under siege. You all should come to some Town council meetings sometime.

From Xenu-city.net

"Since 1975, downtown Clearwater, Florida has been under occupation by the criminal paramilitary cult known as the "Church" of Scientology. For more than two decades, the organization has waged a covert war against the government, citizens, and institutions of the city in an attempt to seize economic and political control of the region, and establish the first "Scientology city"."


Tom
9 posted on 04/03/2005 9:41:22 AM PDT by tacomonkey2002 (a Stranger in a strange world)
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To: grey_whiskers

I'm reading.

I thought the article was a balanced one.

tom


10 posted on 04/03/2005 9:42:32 AM PDT by tacomonkey2002 (a Stranger in a strange world)
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To: tacomonkey2002
" I'm doubly sure she didn't want to be starved to death."


There in lies the most troubling aspect of this whole event for me. I cannot, for the life of me, understand why food and water were withheld from Terri by court order. Removing the feeding tube so that there was no 'artificial' efforts being made to sustain her life is one thing, but Terri was capable of swallowing ~ (she swallowed her saliva without difficulty) ~ and to deprive this woman of the most basic sustenance required to live, to intentionally and deliberately starve her to death is an act of barbarism beyond comprehension.


Terri was not allowed to die, she was forced to die and (regardless of what a person 'right to life' or 'right to death' beliefs are) THAT should be absolutely, unequivocally unacceptable!

11 posted on 04/03/2005 10:15:32 AM PDT by Zacs Mom (Proud wife of a Marine! ... and purveyor of "rampant, unedited dialogue")
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To: grey_whiskers
"I checked your Freeper join-up date. Just in February 2005."

Dyslexic? robertpaulsen Since 2002-02-05.

"Are you sure you shouldn't have read the Schiavo threads more closely before channelling CNN on this thread?"

Channelling CNN? I'm speaking my own mind, not CNN's.

And I'm reading these Schiavo threads more closely that you're reading my join-up date.

12 posted on 04/03/2005 10:17:58 AM PDT by robertpaulsen
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To: mlc9852
"How do you know what Terri wanted?"

I read Judge Greer's court order dated February, 2000. He had "clear and convincing" evidence as to her wishes as required by Florida law.

13 posted on 04/03/2005 10:20:43 AM PDT by robertpaulsen
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To: robertpaulsen
Scuse me, son. Terri did NOT have anything written down about her care. Terri's usual response according to her family and friends was "where there's life, there's hope." Now, does that sound like someone who would say "I don't want to live like that"?

Michael conned the jury into a huge settlement with the promise that he needed the money to give Terri the care she needed for the next 41 years of her life. As soon as he got the monetary award, he stopped all treatment and eventually found the "Hospice" where she lived longer than any other "hospice" patient because she wasn't dying. Hospice is for people with less than a year and usually less than 6 months to live.

Michael is guilty of Medicaid Fraud as is Judge Greer AND Suncoast Hospice. Judge Greer, by judicial decree, allowed Michael to apply for Medicaid for Terri when she still had approximately $50,000 left in her Trust which was to provide for her therapeutic care. I work with Medicaid, there's a MAX of $2000 allowed a patient who applies for Medicaid.

Michael is also guilty of defrauding Terri's Trust fund by using it, again with the blessing of Judge Greer, to pay the legal costs of having Terri killed.

You think it's a 'right-wing conspiracy' and it's not. It IS a "CORRECT USE OF THE LAWS wing of the Pajama-Clad" bloggers.

14 posted on 04/03/2005 10:30:01 AM PDT by HighlyOpinionated ("You cannot 'let die' a person who is not dying." RETHINK that position promptly!)
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To: robertpaulsen

now remember, any deviation from the screamers in any terri thread is a big no no.....


15 posted on 04/03/2005 10:30:12 AM PDT by MikefromOhio (Iohannas Paulus II, Requiescat in Pacem)
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To: Zacs Mom
Sorry. I don't have one that says, "Ma'am", but you get my drift.

"There is absolutely zero, none, nada, zilch evidence of Terri's expressed will to die if she were brain damaged and being supported by artificial mean."

As required by Florida law, Judge Greer had "clear and convincing" evidence as to Terri's wishes and so ordered her feeding tube removed.

"Terri's husband alleged that this was what she wanted ~ her parents alleged it was not."

Terri's husband and .... c'mon .... keep going .... and who? There you go. Terri's husband AND his brother, Scott AND Terri's best friend, Joan all testified in front of Judge Greer in a court of law, under oath, subject to cross examination and under penalty of perjury what Terri told them as to her wishes.

Terri's parents didn't testify. Only Terri's mother testified. AND, she recanted her testimony, admitting that Terri had to have been only 11 years old when she made her statement.

Instead of spending your time cutting and pasting, you may want to educate yourself on this case before making a further fool of yourself.

16 posted on 04/03/2005 10:35:05 AM PDT by robertpaulsen
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To: HighlyOpinionated
Somehow it gives me the creeps when I consider that all the
letters in "Judge Greer" are in my screen name "GeekDejure" !!!

. HELP !!!

17 posted on 04/03/2005 10:51:46 AM PDT by GeekDejure ( LOL = Liberals Obey Lucifer !!!)
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To: Old anti feminist
"You blind idiot! Terri was not dying at all. She was healthy! She was not on life support. She was not in a coma!"

All true except the "healthy" part (and the blind idiot part. I can see.). I would not describe someone with liquid slush for a cerebral cortex as "healthy".

Not on life support? Well, if she was not on life support then certainly you didn't mind when they pulled the feeding tube. I mean, it's not as though, according to you, the feeding tube was providing life support. Correct?

"There was no proof she wanted This terrible death."

She sure as heck didn't want this terrible life. Judge Greer had "clear and convincing" evidence that Terri did not want to live that way.

"Hearsay is not proof in any court of law."

Bzzzzzzt! Wrong.

The Florida supreme Court in their 1990 Browning decision requires that oral evidence of oral statements be permitted to count in court.

"Her loving parents wanted her."

You know what? If they truly loved Terri, they would have honored her wishes.

Her husband wanted her dead for his own selfish reasons."

Her husband could have taken his $400,000 loss of consortium award, turned Terri over to "her loving parents" (who were loving the $800,000 trust fund, the greedy slimeballs), and gone on with his life.

He chose, instead, to stay to carry out her wishes.

18 posted on 04/03/2005 10:51:59 AM PDT by robertpaulsen
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To: robertpaulsen; All
It was the extreme pro-life crowd that totally ignored Terri's wishes and turned this whole thing into a "hate Michael, he-wants-her-dead" euthanasia circus.

Terri Schiavo's case was not about euthanasia. It was about carrying out her expressed will to die if she were brain damaged and being supported by artificial means.

Agree 100%. The amount of vitriol that has engulfed this once enlightened forum is depressing to say the least.

I applaud you for stating an opinion concerning Schiavo that has all but been shouted down during this whole ordeal. I, for one, have avoided "TS" threads as they had taken over by fanatics, who in turn hijacked this entire forum, tossing ad hominem attacks towards anyone who didn't toe Randall Terry's radical Operation Rescue platform.

Avoiding "TS" unfortunately, threads has been an exercise in futility as she has become FR's cause celebre for the last several weeks Even non "TS" threads are quickly hijacked and sent plunging off topic. Don't believe me? Look around. Click on many non-Schiavo threads and count how many posts before someone chimes in about Judge Greer or death by starvation. It has taken on something of an amusing quest.

This whole spectacle has been embarrasing. Long time FReepers are leaving in disgust. Naysayers are pointing in our direction saying, "what a bunch of nutjobs over at Free Republic." Sadly, they have a point!

Furthermore, I have never cared how long someone has been registered to post. As long as they did not sign on specifically to troll, it is irrelevant. We all started here at day one.

Finally, Schaivo "died" 15 years ago from complications due to bulimia. Her husband did not strangle her. The fact that medical science was able to keep her body from decomposing for the last 15 years does not mean that she was "alive" and was then murdured by the state!

Flame away people, I'm getting tired anyways. I really don't care anymore. I'll just bide my time on ebay till this whole mess cools down.

19 posted on 04/03/2005 10:52:28 AM PDT by Drew68
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To: HighlyOpinionated
"Terri did NOT have anything written down about her care."

Correct.

"Terri's usual response according to her family and friends was "where there's life, there's hope." Now, does that sound like someone who would say "I don't want to live like that"?"

Damn!

It's just too bad her family and friends neglected to testify to that, in front of Judge Greer, in a court of law, under oath, subject to cross examination and under penaly of perjury at his life and death hearing in January, 2000.

"Michael conned the jury into a huge settlement with the promise that he needed the money to give Terri the care she needed for the next 41 years of her life. As soon as he got the monetary award, he stopped all treatment and eventually found the "Hospice" where she lived longer than any other "hospice" patient because she wasn't dying. Hospice is for people with less than a year and usually less than 6 months to live."

Cut and paste blather. Give it a rest already.

As to the hospice, Terri was placed there following Judge Greer's order to remove the feeding tube. Since she was only expected to live for two weeks at the most, wouldn't you agree she qualified? Huh?

She ended up there for five years because of nosy, busybody, right-to-life, we-know-better fanatics like you filing appeal after appeal.

Then you question the hospice admission. Good one!

The rest of your post is the same blather. Conspracy, propaganda, lies, distortions and innuendo. Get some facts.

20 posted on 04/03/2005 11:10:54 AM PDT by robertpaulsen
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