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Posted on 01/17/2026 5:28:39 AM PST by MtnClimber
While Brussels lectures and dithers, Prague acts: Babiš’s transactional diplomacy shows how a mid-sized nation can thrive by aligning interests in a Trump-era world.
The Czech Republic is showing the rest of Europe how to prosper in an America First world. The new government is seizing opportunities created by President Trump’s assertive diplomacy. The latest example is the initiative of Czech Prime Minister Babiš to reestablish a diplomatic presence and trade relations with Venezuela.
The announcement was made today by the government at a press conference in the Chamber of Deputies. Prime Minister Andrej Babiš stated that, following the recent developments in Venezuela, the Czech government considers the country to be of great importance, particularly for Czech exporters.
“We have jointly agreed that the Czech Republic will be present in Venezuela, and we will do everything to ensure that we have our own representation there as quickly as possible,” Babiš said. The Czech Republic currently has neither an embassy nor a consulate in the country.
The Czechs closed their embassy and consulates in Venezuela in 2011 as a cost-saving measure. Czech interests in Venezuela have been handled by their embassy in Colombia since then. But the “recent changes in Venezuela” that Prime Minister Babis referred to are the American arrest of the Venezuelan dictator, Nicolás Maduro, and the release of a Czech doctor from Venezuelan prison.
Transactional vs. “Values-Based” Foreign Policy
The surprise diplomatic move out of Prague offers a sharp contrast with the EU. The top EU diplomat, foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, half-jokingly told members of the European Parliament last night that looking at the current state of world affairs, “now is probably a good time to start drinking.”
While Brussels is wringing its hands and issuing statements, Prague sees opportunity. As the European Union’s foreign-policy class once again retreats into its favorite refuge—process, procedure, and moral exhibitionism—PM Babiš has chosen a different path: realism. His decision to re-engage diplomatically with Venezuela and prepare a permanent presence in Caracas is not ideological. It is transactional. And that is precisely why it works.
For years, European leaders promised “values-based foreign policy” in Latin America and delivered nothing but paralysis. Venezuela became a symbol of European impotence: endless declarations, zero leverage, and no economic upside.
Interests-Based Diplomacy
Babiš has been back in the prime minister’s office for barely weeks, yet the contrast with the previous government is stark. Under Petr Fiala, Czech foreign policy functioned as a regional branch office of the European Commission—careful, cautious, and terrified of being accused of independence.
That era is over.
Where Fiala would have delayed, convened, and deferred, Babiš moved. He treated the evolving situation in Venezuela not as a moral seminar but as a commercial and strategic opening. While other European capitals debate whether engagement is “appropriate,” Czech exporters are positioning themselves to benefit from a first-mover advantage.
This is the difference between performative bureaucracy and an actual foreign policy. Germany, France, and the UK would do well to pay attention and start to follow their own interest-based diplomacy.
President Donald Trump has been clear that the United States respects allies who act in their own interest and align accordingly. He has no patience for nations that lecture Washington while freeloading off its power. Babiš understands this instinctively.
By reopening channels in Caracas and signaling readiness to work with the reality on the ground, he is positioning the Czech Republic as a serious partner—not a moral scold. This is how trust is built in the Trump era: through alignment, decisiveness, and results. Call it “Czechia First.” The label doesn’t matter. The substance does.
The Czech Republic is a mid-sized, export-driven economy. It cannot feed its people on communiqués or sustain growth on virtue signaling. What voters demanded in October was not applause from Brussels, but outcomes. Babiš is delivering exactly that, just as Trump is delivering what his voters wanted.
When Will The Rest Of Europe Learn?
Predictably, Europe’s progressive class is furious. They sneer at “transactional diplomacy.” They warn about “legitimizing power politics.” In reality, they are mourning the loss of a world where American strength was constrained, and European irrelevance could masquerade as principle.
That world is gone.
Trump did not create this shift—he recognized it. Babiš is doing the same. One shattered the stalemate; the other is capitalizing on it. While Brussels hosts summits and drafts statements, Prague is securing access, leverage, and opportunity.
The rest of Europe can keep lecturing. Babiš and Trump are busy winning.
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The EU does not act like an ally. The disease of leftism.
BUMP
“Headline is a double entendre.”
Excellent observation!
The EU needs cheap Russian gas to survive. Russia needs EU markets to sell. Neither need the US. I wouldn’t doubt they’re conspiring against us while acting as though they’re implacable enemies.
Jan Sobieski “The EU needs cheap Russian gas to survive”
The claim that “The EU needs cheap Russian gas to survive” is outdated and no longer reflects reality. The European Union has dramatically reduced its dependence on Russian energy since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, successfully weathering the energy crisis through diversification, efficiency measures, and accelerated nuclear etc. While Russian gas still plays a residual role (around 13-15% of imports in 2025), the EU is actively phasing it out entirely by 2027, proving it can—and is—surviving (and thriving) without it.
### Key Facts on the Shift (as of late 2025/early 2026)
- **Pre-2022 vs. Now**: In 2021, Russia supplied ~40-45% of EU gas. By 2025, this fell to ~13% overall (including both pipeline and LNG), worth about €15 billion annually—down sharply from peaks.
Pipeline gas mostly via TurkStream to a few countries are declining.
- **Diversification Success**:
- **Norway** is now the top supplier (~30-33% of imports, mostly reliable pipeline gas).
- **United States** dominates LNG (~45-56% of LNG imports, with record volumes in 2025).
- Other sources like Algeria, Qatar, Azerbaijan, and the UK have filled gaps.
- EU LNG imports hit record highs in 2025, with nearly 60% from the US.
- **Demand Reduction & Renewables**: EU gas consumption dropped ~20% from 2021-2024 due to efficiency, conservation, and renewables growth (e.g., wind/solar now major players in power generation). This structural decline helps offset any short-term price pressures.
- **Phase-Out Timeline**: The EU’s REPowerEU roadmap (updated May 2025) and a December 2025 agreement ban new Russian gas deals, stop spot contracts by end-2025, halt LNG imports by end-2026/early 2027, and end pipeline gas by autumn 2027. National plans are in place, and the bloc is on track.
Yes, some countries (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia) remain more exposed due to legacy pipelines but they are building more nuclear power plants. Energy prices spiked in 2022-2023 but have stabilized (though higher than pre-war), and the shift boosted energy security by ending Russia’s ability to “weaponize” supplies (as seen in 2022 cutoffs).
Far from “needing” Russian gas, the EU has spent billions more on alternatives (e.g., US LNG) precisely to avoid funding Russia’s war machine—while building a more resilient, greener system. The old dependency was a vulnerability, not a necessity.
**Bottom line**: The EU isn’t just surviving without cheap Russian gas—it’s actively choosing independence, even if it costs more short-term. The transition proves the claim is a myth from the pre-2022 era.
Trump is right to hold Europe at arms length and treat them with suspicion. Europe cannot be trusted.
What you describe as globalism is in fact Euroism.
The contagion has spread to the American city states but not elsewhere.
The concept does not exist in areas that I call East of Suez wehere most of the global population actually exists. The concept has not infected the South American continent nor that of Africa.
Europe was. Europe really isn’t anymore.
Czechs make great guns. :-)
Part of the government coalition is “motorist for themselves” party dedicated to fight global warming alarmists, and road diets, instead building roads and mining coal.
Czech republic main resource are huge coal deposits, now being rendered Earth dangers.
Yes. That they do!
Czechs also breed better German Shepherds.
It’s as if they actually read Max von Stephanitz’ book.
The socialist Maduro regime is still solidly in place in Venezuela.
All right-wing opposition there has now been crushed to pieces.
Maduro’s VP who is now running the country is seen by many as even more fanatic than Maduro himself.
The only good thing is that we managed to kidnap Maduro so he can be judged for his crimes.
Also we may have a somewhat successful blockade of Venezuela when it comes to Russian-Chinese oil-tankers.
But Venezuela remains a hardcore socialist dictatorship that is more powerful than ever in Venezuela.
That is the sad truth.
The European Union has become a quasi-messianic globalist enterprise.
And these days, so has the US Democratic Party.
Czechs better watch it, Europeans tend to like to invade it when they aren’t happy with it, see 1939 and 1968.
” **Norway** is now the top supplier (~30-33% of imports, mostly reliable pipeline gas).”
While lecturing about climate change
I disagree. Why do you suppose Germany is deindustrializing? If gas is so plenteous and cheap? Why would we blow Nordstream?
I get your disagreement—Germany’s economic struggles are real and often tied to energy debates in discussions like this. But let’s break it down with current data (as of early 2026): While Germany has faced stagnation and industrial challenges, it’s not a full-blown “deindustrialization” driven solely by gas shortages. Gas is available (though not as cheap as pre-2022 Russian supplies).
I’ll explain each point with facts below.
1. Is Germany Deindustrializing?
Germany’s economy has been weak since 2023, with GDP contracting -0.3% in 2023, -0.2% in 2024, and growing just 0.1-0.3% in 2025—its longest stagnation in decades.
Manufacturing output has declined ~10-15% since 2018, with sectors like autos, chemicals, and steel hit hard (e.g., Volkswagen cutting 35,000 jobs by 2030, ThyssenKrupp shedding 11,000). Some firms (51% of large ones) are considering offshoring due to high costs.
However, this isn’t irreversible “deindustrialization”—it’s more a painful restructuring amid global shifts:
- **Causes beyond gas**: High labor costs (main driver of lost competitiveness), bureaucracy, skills shortages (unemployment up to 3.8% in 2025, but full employment expected by 2027), aging workforce (20M retiring vs. 12.5M entering by 2035), and external factors like US tariffs (e.g., frontloading exports caused Q2 2025 dip), China competition (second “China Shock” in EVs/steel), and trade fragmentation. Energy prices played a role (post-2022 spikes eroded margins), but they’ve stabilized, and services (+310,000 jobs since 2019) are growing.
- **Signs of recovery**: Q4 2025 GDP up 0.2% YoY; industrial orders rose for 3 months straight; forecasts for 1.2% growth in 2026-2027, driven by public investment (e.g., defense), exports rebound, and renewables. It’s a “turning point,” not collapse—similar to past slumps (e.g., 2000s “sick man of Europe” reformed into export powerhouse).
If gas were the sole issue, we’d see worse in gas-dependent sectors, but diversification (US/Norway LNG) mitigated that.
2. Is Gas “Plenteous and Cheap”?
Gas is **plenteous** (EU imports hit records in 2025, storage at 52% in Jan 2026—above norms), thanks to diversification: US LNG ~45-56%, Norway ~30-33%, others filling gaps.
But **not cheap**: TTF benchmark averaged €30-40/MWh in 2025 (up 40% YoY in spots), hitting €37.63/MWh on Jan 16, 2026—due to cold snaps, Middle East tensions, and demand. That’s higher than pre-2022 (~€20/MWh) but far below 2022 peaks (€345/MWh). Household prices averaged €0.11/kWh (up in some countries like Sweden, down in others). Forecasts: €12/MWh avg. in 2026 (down 10%), as LNG supply grows and demand stays flat.
High prices contribute to industrial woes, but they’re not the root—renewables/ efficiency cut demand 20% since 2021.
**Bottom line**: Germany’s issues are multifaceted (energy’s one piece, but not the only), gas is secure but pricier, and Nord Stream facts don’t support Western sabotage.
The EU’s pivot from Russia is working, even if bumpy.
Furthermore, you are focusing only on Germany when other EU countries are booming
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