I disagree. Why do you suppose Germany is deindustrializing? If gas is so plenteous and cheap? Why would we blow Nordstream?
I get your disagreement—Germany’s economic struggles are real and often tied to energy debates in discussions like this. But let’s break it down with current data (as of early 2026): While Germany has faced stagnation and industrial challenges, it’s not a full-blown “deindustrialization” driven solely by gas shortages. Gas is available (though not as cheap as pre-2022 Russian supplies).
I’ll explain each point with facts below.
1. Is Germany Deindustrializing?
Germany’s economy has been weak since 2023, with GDP contracting -0.3% in 2023, -0.2% in 2024, and growing just 0.1-0.3% in 2025—its longest stagnation in decades.
Manufacturing output has declined ~10-15% since 2018, with sectors like autos, chemicals, and steel hit hard (e.g., Volkswagen cutting 35,000 jobs by 2030, ThyssenKrupp shedding 11,000). Some firms (51% of large ones) are considering offshoring due to high costs.
However, this isn’t irreversible “deindustrialization”—it’s more a painful restructuring amid global shifts:
- **Causes beyond gas**: High labor costs (main driver of lost competitiveness), bureaucracy, skills shortages (unemployment up to 3.8% in 2025, but full employment expected by 2027), aging workforce (20M retiring vs. 12.5M entering by 2035), and external factors like US tariffs (e.g., frontloading exports caused Q2 2025 dip), China competition (second “China Shock” in EVs/steel), and trade fragmentation. Energy prices played a role (post-2022 spikes eroded margins), but they’ve stabilized, and services (+310,000 jobs since 2019) are growing.
- **Signs of recovery**: Q4 2025 GDP up 0.2% YoY; industrial orders rose for 3 months straight; forecasts for 1.2% growth in 2026-2027, driven by public investment (e.g., defense), exports rebound, and renewables. It’s a “turning point,” not collapse—similar to past slumps (e.g., 2000s “sick man of Europe” reformed into export powerhouse).
If gas were the sole issue, we’d see worse in gas-dependent sectors, but diversification (US/Norway LNG) mitigated that.
2. Is Gas “Plenteous and Cheap”?
Gas is **plenteous** (EU imports hit records in 2025, storage at 52% in Jan 2026—above norms), thanks to diversification: US LNG ~45-56%, Norway ~30-33%, others filling gaps.
But **not cheap**: TTF benchmark averaged €30-40/MWh in 2025 (up 40% YoY in spots), hitting €37.63/MWh on Jan 16, 2026—due to cold snaps, Middle East tensions, and demand. That’s higher than pre-2022 (~€20/MWh) but far below 2022 peaks (€345/MWh). Household prices averaged €0.11/kWh (up in some countries like Sweden, down in others). Forecasts: €12/MWh avg. in 2026 (down 10%), as LNG supply grows and demand stays flat.
High prices contribute to industrial woes, but they’re not the root—renewables/ efficiency cut demand 20% since 2021.
**Bottom line**: Germany’s issues are multifaceted (energy’s one piece, but not the only), gas is secure but pricier, and Nord Stream facts don’t support Western sabotage.
The EU’s pivot from Russia is working, even if bumpy.
Furthermore, you are focusing only on Germany when other EU countries are booming