How Chinese-Made Radar Defense Systems Failed in Venezuela

The success of a lightning-fast raid on Caracas raises new doubts about Chinese military capabilities, a military analyst said.

U.S. forces stormed into Venezuela before dawn on Jan. 3 and captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in a lightning operation that punched in and out of Caracas before its air defenses could mount an effective response.

The operation resulted in no U.S. fatalities and no loss of U.S. military equipment, U.S. officials said.

The U.S. mission—code-named Operation Absolute Resolve—has quickly become more than a political shockwave. Analysts have said it was also a real-world test of U.S. military power against a country that has spent years buying Chinese- and Russian-made air-defense systems and showcasing them as proof that it could deter Washington.

The raid raised uncomfortable questions for Beijing about the limits of the Chinese-supplied systems that Venezuela has leaned on—especially “anti-stealth” radar that China advertised as capable of spotting and stopping U.S. stealth aircraft, a military analyst said.

The analyst told The Epoch Times that the most damaging takeaway for China isn’t the failure of a single piece of equipment—it’s what the operation suggested about deeper weaknesses: corruption in China’s defense industry and lack of reliability of the technology and command structure meant to tie those systems together.

“A system built to look modern on paper and intimidating in propaganda falls apart under the demands of real combat,” said Yu Tsung-chi, a retired major general from Taiwan and former president of the Political Warfare College at Taiwan’s National Defense University.

He said Beijing’s performance claims often lean more on messaging than combat validation.

China condemned the capture of Maduro and accused Washington of acting as a “world judge,” in a blunt response that underscored how closely Beijing saw the fallout tied to its influence and credibility in Latin America. Operation Measured in Hours President Donald Trump ordered the operation at 10:46 p.m. ET on Jan. 2, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine said. Aircraft launched from about 20 land and sea bases across the Western Hemisphere, and the helicopter force approached Venezuela at roughly 100 feet above the water to maintain the element of surprise.

Within five hours, by 3:29 a.m. ET, U.S. forces had Maduro and Flores aboard the USS Iwo Jima, an amphibious assault ship. They were then flown to the United States.

This illustration depicts Caracas and the states in which the Venezuelan regime said U.S. military strikes occurred before the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife on Jan. 3, 2025. Anika Arora Seth, Phil Holm via AP

U.S. officials said the operation involved more than 150 aircraft along with integrated electronic attack and nonkinetic effects from U.S. Cyber Command, Space Command, and other assets to suppress Venezuelan defenses and clear a path for the helicopters.

Briefings described a layered effects approach: bombers, fighters, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, electronic warfare jets, and drones overhead; space and cyber support to disrupt Venezuelan systems; and strikes intended to dismantle and disable air defenses as helicopters closed on Caracas.

According to officials, aircraft used in the operation included B-1B bombers, F-22 Raptors, F-35 Lightning II fighters, EA-18G Growler electronic attack jets, E-2 Hawkeye early warning aircraft, and numerous drones alongside transport and helicopter assets.

For years, Venezuela has spent heavily on Chinese and Russian equipment while claiming that it was building one of the region’s most modern defense systems.

In recent months, reports have highlighted Venezuela’s installation of Chinese-made JY-27A radar units, marketed as able to detect “low-observable” aircraft—exactly the kind of system meant to complicate U.S. operations involving stealth platforms.

Yu said neither Chinese nor Russian air-defense systems “made the slightest bit of difference” once the United States brought real-time intelligence, electronic warfare, and precision weapons to bear.

The real contest, he said, wasn’t just radar range or missile specs, but a fast chain of detection, communications, decision-making, and joint execution—exactly where weaker militaries tend to break.

Beyond radar, Venezuela has also displayed and fielded Chinese-made ground systems that Beijing has marketed abroad—from VN-16 amphibious assault vehicles and VN-18 infantry fighting vehicles to Chinese rocket artillery systems.

Venezuelan parades in recent years have showcased those platforms as symbols of a growing partnership and a tougher military posture.

But Yu said glossy displays don’t matter much if the wider network—sensors, communications, command, training, and logistics—can’t hold up under pressure.

Yu said the U.S. raid on Caracas exposed the limits of China’s propaganda-first military culture—one that rewards polished demonstrations more than hard, repeated combat validation.

He said the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought a major war since 1979, and it studies foreign conflicts in part because it lacks large-scale, recent battlefield feedback of its own.

“You can look perfectly aligned and advanced on a parade ground,” Yu said, “but without real combat to back it up, it’s all just stage effects.”

The U.S. operation in Venezuela, he said, hit Beijing especially hard because the communist regime has spent years promoting its weapons and integrated combat systems as “world-leading,” using high-profile showcases—such as the much-hyped military parade in September 2025—to project confidence at home and deterrence abroad.

In that vein, Yu said, “anti-stealth” detection is a headline capability meant to signal that China can threaten U.S. airpower. But what happened in Caracas cut straight through that messaging.

Yu also pointed to reports that a Chinese delegation visited Venezuela just hours before Maduro’s capture, further spotlighting how closely Beijing and Caracas have aligned.

Yu said corruption and “black-box” decision-making have weakened Chinese military readiness, partly because bad news gets filtered upward and procurement incentives reward appearances. He pointed to recent corruption probes in China’s military-industrial complex and scandals that have raised questions about quality control and readiness.

In a closed system, he said, procurement decisions often happen behind doors, with limited independent oversight and strong incentives to hide failure.

Beijing’s “military-civil fusion” model can intensify those risks, Yu said. Profit-driven contractors pay bribes to obtain contracts, substitute inferior components, and still meet paperwork requirements as long as money moves and reporting looks clean.

Even if individual platforms are capable, he said, the system around them—maintenance, training realism, logistics honesty—can be hollowed out.

He contrasted that with what he described as Washington’s preference for letting battlefield results speak louder than slogans.

Yu also said integration and command speed often decide outcomes faster than platform specs.

The U.S. advantage, he said, is not just technology—it’s integration and delegation. Once a mission is approved, U.S. operations are designed to push authority downward, giving frontline commanders room to adjust in seconds.

China’s command system, he said, is the opposite: rigidly centralized and politically constrained.

“No matter how advanced the equipment,” Yu said, “it still has to wait for orders from the highest authority.”

Centralization is a built-in lag, he said, which is costly in a fight in which delays are punished instantly.

Yu said he believes that Washington’s decision to capture Maduro was meant to send a message well beyond Caracas: to Beijing, to pro-China and anti-U.S. governments, such as Cuba and Iran, and to other Latin American capitals weighing closer ties with China.

He framed the move as a hard-edged application of the Monroe Doctrine under Trump’s second-term national security approach—prioritizing U.S. security in the Western Hemisphere and working to block Beijing-aligned influence from taking root further in Central and South America.

“Venezuela may only be the first domino,” Yu said. “Pro-Beijing regimes across Latin America will face growing pressure to choose sides.”

As with all things, we should take these things with a grain of salt. (I do like the Epoch Times, and I comprehend and accept their open hostility to the CCP)

I think there is no doubt the CCP would want to see how its air defense hardware performed against US equipment. They would be stupid not to.

That said, there are two risks and one possible benefit for the CCP:

RISK: If a system such as the JY-27 fails, it will fail for all the world to see, and the CCP doesn't usually put its cards on the table that way.

For example, the ChiComs had three major bridge collapses in 2025. (We only know about these since they were high profile projects that people around the world were watching-showpieces for the CCP, I am told on the scale of the Francis Scott Key Bridge. We have no idea how many others throughout Communist China failed, but the West doesn't know about them.). The risk to the bridges are that large Chinese construction firms who were involved may have difficulty getting other projects around the globe due to those collapses.
RISK: There is the obvious same risk for these systems like the JY-27 radar systems is that many governments (who are hostile to American interests) won't buy the system.
BENEFIT: The opportunity to Communist China is: they may explore ways to see how it fell short and fix them, thus making it effective.

This is the nature of warfare. I am told that the Crisis character in Chinese is composed of two elements that are read as "Risk" and "Opportunity". That sounds about right to me.

Overall, I hesitate to read this much into this operation in Venzuela. I sure do wish we had access to the real story and could peer deeper into it, but we won't see that. The reason I say that is that I have always felt that the performance of military hardware in combat is related to these following things:

WEAPONRY: China's great strength is in its industrial base, not in the effectiveness or quality of what it produces. This is a problem for the West in many ways, and it is absolutely not saying all Chinese products are junk. They most certainly are not. Underestimating your enemy is a catastrophic mistake. What many people fail to realize is, overestimating your enemy can be equally as destructive in many ways that are not as obvious.

Many knowledgeable people feel (and I share their opinion) that the CCP industry and military problems are those of innovation and implementation. They have demonstrated an inferiority in practical innovation and implementation, and they compensate for that by stealing intellectual property (or buying the brains that can produce intellectual property and milking them)

The obvious problem is that stealing or appropriating ideas means they will always be behind in certain respects, though the advantage is, they wouldn't be as far behind if they weren't stealing the intellectual property.

The risk for the West is if we stop innovating.
DOCTRINE: (Note: what follows is my opinion from what I have read, seen, or discussed, as I have little practical experience or knowledge of "Doctrine". I may be incorrect in my interpretation, or others on this forum may well know far more that I do on this subject. I welcome any corrections. What I write has been derived from books, video seminars, and discussions with military personnel.) Military Doctrine defines the tactics and usage of military hardware and personnel.

Making a capable piece of hardware is useless if there is no specified doctrine on how it should be used. Very capable weaponry can be given to a group of people, but if they do not develop effective doctrine, that weaponry by definition will not preform as well as that same weaponry being utilized by a group that has developed and refined doctrine in how it should be used.

The risk for us is reading into this recent action that the Chinese J-27 or any other weaponry supplied by the CCP to the Venzuelans is crap.

In the hands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that same weaponry may not be crap, and may be effective. For all we know, the necessary doctrine developed by the PLA may not well have been effectively communicated to the Venezuelan military, or the Venezuelan military may not have created effective doctrine of their own in the usage of that weaponry.

Put another way, you can deliver to a customer a fantastic weapon, but without well designed doctrine or effective training in that doctrine, the weapon might be no better than a large branch from a tree.
TRAINING: Training is the way that effective doctrine is imparted to the end users of the weaponry, those on the pointy end of the stick. It ensures the maximum known benefit can be derived from the capability of the hardware.

This is one of the reasons the US Military is, and has been since WWII, unmatched in a direct conflict. We can be politically weak and effectively defeated that way as we were in Vietnam (and Iraq/Afghanistan) but in a direct match of weaponry and doctrine, the United States has universally come out on top.

It is my opinion that apart from the training the Israeli military provides, the United States provides the best and most realistic training to its military. This is crucial to total effectiveness. Fine or even adequate weaponry is needed. Doctrine in its usages is vital. But without effective Training, all the weaponry and doctrine is just blather. If the doctrine is not applied by effective training and spread to the lowest levels of usage, from the Naval Task Force that is maneuvering into position, to the Yellow Shirt on a flight deck spotting aircraft, to the pilot pushing the button on the stick to fire a missile...those units will never achieve their full combat potential.

The training our military receives is the best in the world, particularly when it comes to joint or large scale operations. The US military does suffer casualties and equipment loss in training more often than any of us would like, but that is because we try to train our forces the same way we expect them to fight, or at least as close as we can get. That training makes all the difference in the world.

I admit that I do not know how training is done the PLA, but I have long suspected it is inferior, as I long suspected of the Soviet military, and I view both in much the same light.

There is one other aspect to training: We use our training, not only to ensure that our equipment functions as expected, but to ensure that the doctrine we apply is sound. I had to laugh at some video I saw online about how the Saab Gripen soundly defeated the F-35s at a Red Flag exercise. The video was apparently made by someone with a euro-fighter inferiority complex, because it was dedicated to demeaning the F-35 and praising the Gripen. The Gripen seems like a nice platform, and I like the concept. In the video, they boasted about how the Gripens supposedly snuck in "under the radar", avoided jamming, and popped up in the middle of a bunch of F-35s and destroyed them all, or something like that. That may be true, it might have happened, I don't know.

And the creator of that video crowed about how that proved the that Gripen was a better platform, and the F-35 was a bloated, incapable platform when matched up with Gripens.

What I think wholly escaped the creator of the video was that part of what Red Flag is for is to evaluate the sum of the weaponry, doctrine, and training. If the F-35 was soundly beaten, our military would examine that situation, and if weaponry, doctrine, or training was found to be flawed, they would set about looking at those failures in order to identify the flaws, then embark on updating the weaponry, modifying the doctrine, or changing the training.

Many people seem to think that once any given weaponry is in service, that it the weaponry, doctrine, and training are static. That is asinine. And again, it is one of the reasons we train our military so hard. We try to train hard and realistically, and when something doesn't work, it will rise to the top in that community, and again, begin the process of modifications of weaponry, doctrine, and training. (Also, logistics, as described below, will be subject to change depending on results of training. If something is wearing out faster than it should when training in a given environment, modifications are made to logistics to try and supply more of those parts wearing out if they part itself cannot be modified, more man-hours for maintenance are taken into account for ongoing operations, etc.)
LOGISTICS:

I hesitated to include this category (simply because I am not sure that good or bad logistics would have made a difference for the Venezuelans in this action) but I do think it is critical in any kind of real conflict, and there is no military in the world that is better at logistics than the United States military.

There is an axiom that says something like: "Strategy is for amateurs. Logistics is for professionals." I believe that is absolutely true. You can have the best trained and equipped military in the world, but if you cannot supply them with bandages, beans, and bullets, they will not fare well when they fight another military that may not have those same supply issues for any number of reasons.
INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE: This is a key element (in my opinion) that is overlooked by people who may only look at the weaponry, doctrine, training, or logistics, and again, even if a military may do well in all those things (in other words, all things being equal) that individual initiative can be the deciding factor. And here is an example, in my opinion, of where American Exceptionalism comes into play. All militaries are hierarchical in nature, and the degree to which an individual is allowed to deviate from doctrine or training may make the difference between victory or defeat in any given engagement.

I believe we have, as Americans, a distinct advantage in this area. We provide greater latitude for deviation from doctrine, but as with any endeavor, one always must be prepared to justify that deviation, especially in the case of defeat. In the case of militaries in authoritarian societies, people who get shot for deviating from orders outnumber those who simply did what they were told and were defeated. (That is a simplification, I know, but I did it to make that point)

Everything is unknown about this action in Venezuela. Primarily, and this Epoch Times article does not answer it, is how well would this CCP supplied hardware perform if it were staffed by the PLA instead of the Venzuelans? Would it be effective or ineffective?

But it is a near certainty that both the doctrine and training in the use of those systems is going to be inferior to what exists in the PLA. And therein lies the risk for the United States.

As I mentioned above, the benefit to the PLA in having this hardware used against US military assets in a real conflict may possibly result in changes to that PLA weaponry, which will make it more effective. If we assume a system like the JY-27 is inferior Chinese junk, we may get a rude surprise in a future conflict such as a defense of Taiwan or an action against some other state allied with Communist China who is supplying them with weaponry.

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