Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Crisis Update, February 3, 2023

The Iranian regime is in a steady pattern of escalation with prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, which risks stoking sectarian tensions in Iran.
At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces.
An Israeli open-source Twitter account tweeted a claim that the recent Israeli kamikaze drone strike in Esfahan targeted a centrifuge assembly facility.
Several protest groups, including the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union, circulated posts calling on “Turks” to publicly condemn the regime oppression of Iranian Baloch.
The Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun Division delivered a shipment of drones and rockets to the Mahin military storage facility near al Qaryatayn, Homs Province in Syria, according to anti-regime outlet Qasioun News.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-february-3-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 6, 2023

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has taken several public-facing measures in recent days likely to alleviate public frustrations toward the regime.
Recent rhetoric from senior reformist figures reflects the divisions within this faction.

Regime-affiliated social media accounts have claimed that the Artesh—Iran's conventional military—will make a major announcement, possibly related to the acquisition of Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, on February 8.

CTP recorded no protest activity on February 4. CTP recorded at least one protest on February 5 and at least three protests on February 6.
Parliamentarian Hassan Nowrouzi announced that a specialized parliamentary committee approved a controversial internet censorship bill, known as the Cyberspace Protection Bill, and will soon send it to the Guardian Council for final approval.
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani will travel to Moscow at some point in the next week, according to the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 7, 2023

Multiple Iranian political factions, including hardliners, are coalescing around the assessment that the regime has lost touch with its people.
Senior Iranian officials offered to provide humanitarian aid to Syria and Turkey following a 7.8-magnitude earthquake on February 6 amidst criticisms of the regime’s poor handling of a recent domestic earthquake.
At least two protests occurred in two cities across one province.
The Artesh Air Defense Force unveiled a new underground air base and cruise missile on February 7.
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani met with Russian Presidential Assistant Igor Levitin in Moscow.
The Financial Times reported that Tehran has substantially increased its efforts to help Moscow evade oil sanctions in recent months.
Iranian leadership may seek to use unspecified debts and infrastructure projects in Iraq to circumvent sanctions.
Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have deployed to Syria to provide humanitarian aid to earthquake victims

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-7-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 8, 2023

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Aleppo City, Syria on February 8.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei set rhetorical conditions for how officials should discuss responding to divides between Iranian leadership and its people, suggesting that he may tolerate limited debates on the future of the regime.
At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
The Iranian Judiciary announced on February 8 that it began releasing prisoners in Alborz, Ghazvin, Semnan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Tehran, and West Azerbaijan Provinces.
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani met with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in Moscow.
Vice President for Parliamentary Affairs Mohammad Hosseini announced that President Ebrahim Raisi will travel to China at an unspecified time in the near future.
The IRGC Aerospace Force displayed a Shahab-3 missile featuring “Death to Israel” during a military exhibition in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani met with Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri in Beirut.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-8-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 9, 2023

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid escalated rhetorically against the regime, expressing support for reformist calls for “fundamental” change in Iran.
Hardline officials may be inadvertently facilitating and amplifying the calls from Mousavi and other reformists for serious change.
Some protest groups are attempting to generate significant protest activity throughout Iran for the first time since late January 2022, indicating that they believe they have regained the ability to do so.
The newly appointed commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, traveled to Aleppo, Syria and may have met with IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.
At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
Prosecutor General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri stated that over 90 security officers have died in the Mahsa Amini protest movement.
President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian have tried to defend the regime’s protest crackdown and treatment of women to an international audience in recent days.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-9-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 10, 2023

The IRGC Quds Force is likely reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake on February 6.

The senior IRGC Quds Force and PMF officials’ highly publicized appearance in northern Syria probably also is part of an information operation aimed at Israel and Turkey.
Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid implicitly called for revolutionary change to the Iranian regime and sought to broaden his appeal beyond Sunni Iranians on February 10.
At least five protests occurred in four cities across four provinces.
Several senior regime officials called on the Iranian population to participate in pro-regime demonstrations commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Republic on February 11.
The Sunday Times reported on February 10 that IRGC personnel were experiencing “doubt and confusion” following the Mahsa Amini protest movement, citing inside sources.
Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexev Dedov announced on February 10 that the National Iranian Oil Company and Russian state-owned Gazprom were engaged in consultations on developing of gas fields inside Iran.
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the IRGC Intelligence Organization published a joint statement announcing the arrest of perpetrators behind the drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 13, 2023

The IRGC Quds Force is likely coordinating a large-scale effort to consolidate its control and influence over critical transportation routes and nodes through Syria. Iran has long sought to consolidate control of these key transportation nodes to deepen its control and influence in Syria.

Iranian leaders and state-run media promoted the narrative that the regime has popular support surrounding the anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic.
Some Iranian officials focused on discussing economic grievances rather than publicly continuing the conversation they have had in recent days about the growing alienation of the population.
CTP recorded one protest on February 11, three protests on February 12, and ten protests on February 13.
Over 300 Iranian activists, journalists, and reformist politicians signed an open letter expressing support for Mir Hossein Mousavi and his calls for “foundational” change in Iran.
Amwaj Media—a UK-based, anti-regime site—reported on February 12 that Iranian officials have renewed internal discussions over whether to establish a parliamentary system, citing an unidentified hardline source.

President Ebrahim Raisi is conducting an official visit to China from February 13 to 16.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-13-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 14, 2023

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is positioning himself to reenter the public arena after a period of relative absence.

At least six protests occurred in six cities across six provinces on February 14.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) may be setting rhetorical conditions to escalate against Sunni protesters.
The regime is likely purging dissenting academics from the Iranian educational sphere.
Former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb defended ongoing, regime-imposed internet restrictions on February 13.
Iranian media outlets recirculated Parliamentarian Shahryar Heydari’s January 15 announcement that Iran will soon receive an unspecified number of Su-35 fighter jets.
President Ebrahim Raisi signed 20 agreements on Sino-Iranian in Beijing on February 14.

Iran-backed militias have recently withdrawn from military positions in Deir ez-Zour Province and may redeploy to Aleppo Province. Local Syrian media reported that Iran-backed militants began withdrawing from several locations near al Mayadin, Deir ez-Zour Province, Syria as early as February 6.[12] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) militants departed facilities in Makhan and al Quriyah near al Mayadin on February 13.[13] The militants departed once Assad-regime-aligned National Defense Force and Deir ez-Zour Military Security personnel arrived to relieve them.[14] The outlet also reported on February 14 that unspecified Iran-backed militants similarly evacuated positions in eastern Deir ez-Zour City and a Shia religious shrine near al Mayadin.[15] The unspecified Iran-backed militants could be from the Fatemiyoun Brigade forces that have previously occupied positions near the shrine.[16] Local media did not report Iran-backed militants crossing into Iraq from Deir ez-Zour, suggesting the withdrawing militants likely traveled westward further into Syria.

President Ebrahim Raisi’s February 13 op-ed in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee's People's Daily likely signals high-level Chinese support for increased Sino-Iranian cooperation. The People's Daily is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP, and its content often reflects the viewpoint of senior party officials.[18] Articles in the People's Daily typically appear under a pen name and directly communicate the party line or express the party-sanctioned view of a named reporter, making Raisi‘s op-ed particularly noteworthy.[19] Raisi’s op-ed contains multiple Chinese idiomatic, historical, and political expressions (such as the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s catchphrase “community of common destiny”), suggesting Chinese co-authorship or significant post-translation augmentation. Other Chinese media reporting on Raisi’s visit mirrors phrases from the People's Daily op-ed, further indicating Sino-Iranian message coordination.[20] Xi's continued backing of Putin since the Ukraine invasion has been controversial within China, and Xi's opponents have voiced criticism of his support for revisionist regimes like Russia and Iran.[21] It is possible that Raisi’s People's Daily op-ed targets internal critics of Xi's foreign policy and signals his full commitment to the Iran-China relationship.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-14-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 15, 2023

Protest coordinators have likely strengthened their organizational capabilities and internal infrastructure ahead of calls for anti-regime demonstrations on February 16.
Iranian leadership is setting rhetorical conditions for reinforcing further censorship and indoctrination measures.
At least three protests occurred in three cities across three provinces.
UK-based Amwaj Media reported on February 14 that Iranian and Ukrainian civil and military officials have held a series of “expert and technical” meetings in Oman since November 2022.
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger Rybar claimed on February 15 that Iran and Russia were creating and sharing technology on high-precision bombs, missiles for UAVs and attack aircraft.
President Ebrahim Raisi gave a speech to Chinese academics in Beijing on February 15.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-15-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 16, 2023

Iran and its proxies may be preparing for a major effort with military elements in northern Syria.
Protest organizers successfully generated significant turnout for the planned countrywide protests on February 16. At least 15 protests occurred in 13 cities across 12 provinces.
Hardline Iranian media is continuing to give increased public attention to prominent moderates and reformists who have criticized the regime.
Senior Iranian officials promoted the slogan “Woman, Chastity, Security” on February 14, capturing much of the regime response to the Mahsa Amini protests.
An unidentified individual threw homemade hand grenades at a Basij base in Mohammad Shahr, Alborz Province.

The UN released a report detailing that unidentified member states assess that the de facto leader of al Qaeda, Saif al Adel, is currently living in Iran. [38] The US State Department expressed support for this assessment on February 15.[39] Adel is a former Egyptian lieutenant colonel and has been a senior officer in al Qaeda for decades. He became al Qaeda leader after the US killed his predecessor, Ayman al Zawahiri, in Kabul, Afghanistan in July 2022. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian denied that Adel is living in Iran in response to the UN report.[40]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-16-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 17, 2023

Actors from across the Iranian political spectrum are publicly acknowledging Mir Hossein Mousavi’s February 4 call for “foundational change” in the Islamic Republic.
Iran is reportedly taking advantage of humanitarian aid convoys to move rockets or missiles into eastern Syria.
Iran targeted an Israeli-owned oil tanker in the Arabian Sea on February 10, according to Western reports.
At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces.
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security Deputy Hossein Hojjati stated on February 17 that approximately 30,000 security personnel participated in suppressing the Mahsa Amini protest movement.
Iranian officials continued to frame increased Sino-Iranian cooperation as a partial solution to Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-17-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 21, 2023

The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what the pattern and nature of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase.
Western media outlets have reported lingering discontent throughout the Iranian population, corroborating CTP’s prior assessment that conditions remain present for the resumption of significant anti-regime activity.
Moderate and reformist politicians are urgently renewing their calls for the regime to address protester grievances.
Iran continues to face severe economic issues, which may fuel increased political attacks against President Ebrahim Raisi and his administration.
The worsening economic conditions in Iran are facilitating solidarity and possibly cooperation between protest organizers and some domestic economic actors.
The efforts of regime officials and protest groups to associate the protest movement with economic issues will complicate any regime effort to de-escalate with the population.
Bloomberg reported on February 19 that International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) monitors had detected 84-percent-enriched uranium—the highest level of enrichment in Iran reported to date—at an unspecified nuclear facility, citing two senior diplomats.
At least 12 protests occurred in 10 cities across eight provinces on February 19, 14 protests occurred in 14 cities across 13 provinces on February 20, and seven protests occurred in six cities across five provinces on February 21. CTP did not record protest activity on February 18.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-21-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 22, 2023

Growing elements of the regime are publicly recognizing that the Islamic Republic has lost the confidence of its people as Iran faces a period of severe economic disruption that risks further popular discontent.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf framed anti-regime sentiments as economic in nature and called for a change in governance in an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated conference.

Parliamentarians are explicitly blaming the Raisi administration for Iran’s economic shortcomings.
Raisi officials have presented several superficial economic policies in recent days to confront growing criticisms of their administration.
Ideological hardliners are blaming inflation and the depreciation of the Iranian rial on foreign actors, signaling that they may be unwilling to pursue meaningful reforms to improve Iran’s economy.
At least eight protests occurred in four cities across four provinces on February 22.
An Iranian official confirmed on February 22 that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials were currently in Iran to investigate reports of 84 percent enriched uranium at an unspecified nuclear facility.
Axios reported that Iranian officials are currently deprioritizing ballistic missile exports to Russia, citing a senior Israeli official.
The IDF carried out a daytime raid to apprehend suspected Palestinian militants operating in Nablus, the West Bank.
Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Mohammed Mohie met with Aleppo Province Governor Ahmad Hussein Diab.
Between 250-300 Syrian Arab Army (SAA) Republican Guard personnel deployed to positions along the right bank of the Euphrates River near Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-22-2023

Iran Crisis Update, February 23, 2023

Senior regime officials are increasingly acknowledging that the Islamic Republic risks permanently alienating itself from its people and that the problem is urgent, but have seemingly drawn different conclusions about how to mitigate this risk.

An Israeli OSINT Twitter account circulated uncorroborated claims that unknown actors targeted two IRGC-affiliated complexes in the vicinity of Karaj, Alborz Province, citing inside sources.
At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
Sports and Youth Minister Hamid Sajjadi has sustained serious injuries following a helicopter crash in Baft, Kerman Province.
Iranian social media users continued to report symptoms of chemical poisoning among some high school students.
An unnamed senior Iranian official told Al Monitor on February 23 that Iran would support reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or establishing a separate nuclear agreement with the United States.
The Iranian rial continued to plummet on February 23, reaching approximately 526,500 rials to one US dollar.
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Tehran on February 21.
Independent Iraqi political parties boycotted a session of Parliament.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-23-2023

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