The IRGC Quds Force is likely coordinating a large-scale effort to consolidate its control and influence over critical transportation routes and nodes through Syria. Iran has long sought to consolidate control of these key transportation nodes to deepen its control and influence in Syria.
Iranian leaders and state-run media promoted the narrative that the regime has popular support surrounding the anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic.
Some Iranian officials focused on discussing economic grievances rather than publicly continuing the conversation they have had in recent days about the growing alienation of the population.
CTP recorded one protest on February 11, three protests on February 12, and ten protests on February 13.
Over 300 Iranian activists, journalists, and reformist politicians signed an open letter expressing support for Mir Hossein Mousavi and his calls for “foundational” change in Iran.
Amwaj Media—a UK-based, anti-regime site—reported on February 12 that Iranian officials have renewed internal discussions over whether to establish a parliamentary system, citing an unidentified hardline source.
President Ebrahim Raisi is conducting an official visit to China from February 13 to 16.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-13-2023
Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is positioning himself to reenter the public arena after a period of relative absence.
At least six protests occurred in six cities across six provinces on February 14.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) may be setting rhetorical conditions to escalate against Sunni protesters.
The regime is likely purging dissenting academics from the Iranian educational sphere.
Former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb defended ongoing, regime-imposed internet restrictions on February 13.
Iranian media outlets recirculated Parliamentarian Shahryar Heydari’s January 15 announcement that Iran will soon receive an unspecified number of Su-35 fighter jets.
President Ebrahim Raisi signed 20 agreements on Sino-Iranian in Beijing on February 14.
Iran-backed militias have recently withdrawn from military positions in Deir ez-Zour Province and may redeploy to Aleppo Province. Local Syrian media reported that Iran-backed militants began withdrawing from several locations near al Mayadin, Deir ez-Zour Province, Syria as early as February 6.[12] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) militants departed facilities in Makhan and al Quriyah near al Mayadin on February 13.[13] The militants departed once Assad-regime-aligned National Defense Force and Deir ez-Zour Military Security personnel arrived to relieve them.[14] The outlet also reported on February 14 that unspecified Iran-backed militants similarly evacuated positions in eastern Deir ez-Zour City and a Shia religious shrine near al Mayadin.[15] The unspecified Iran-backed militants could be from the Fatemiyoun Brigade forces that have previously occupied positions near the shrine.[16] Local media did not report Iran-backed militants crossing into Iraq from Deir ez-Zour, suggesting the withdrawing militants likely traveled westward further into Syria.
President Ebrahim Raisi’s February 13 op-ed in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee's People's Daily likely signals high-level Chinese support for increased Sino-Iranian cooperation. The People's Daily is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CCP, and its content often reflects the viewpoint of senior party officials.[18] Articles in the People's Daily typically appear under a pen name and directly communicate the party line or express the party-sanctioned view of a named reporter, making Raisi‘s op-ed particularly noteworthy.[19] Raisi’s op-ed contains multiple Chinese idiomatic, historical, and political expressions (such as the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s catchphrase “community of common destiny”), suggesting Chinese co-authorship or significant post-translation augmentation. Other Chinese media reporting on Raisi’s visit mirrors phrases from the People's Daily op-ed, further indicating Sino-Iranian message coordination.[20] Xi's continued backing of Putin since the Ukraine invasion has been controversial within China, and Xi's opponents have voiced criticism of his support for revisionist regimes like Russia and Iran.[21] It is possible that Raisi’s People's Daily op-ed targets internal critics of Xi's foreign policy and signals his full commitment to the Iran-China relationship.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-14-2023