video of a brave young Persian woman defiantly lights her cigarette using the flames from a burning picture of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
the girl has gone viral and is an icon of the Iran protests now
Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
thanks
video of a brave young Persian woman defiantly lights her cigarette using the flames from a burning picture of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
the girl has gone viral and is an icon of the Iran protests now
Yes, I know Iran has used hired thugs from other countries in the past. Its their MO.
I hope the hired Iraqis remind every Iranian of which side MEK took years ago. It will disqualify them from ever having any following in Iran. ( not that they have much now)
Reports had govt agents going into hospitals and killing riot suspects.
Adms...This is what you suspected in your previous post
Non-Protest Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET. Protest Data Cutoff: 3:30 PM ET.
CTP-ISW has recorded significantly less protest activity across Iran since January 8.[1] We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW recorded 14 protests across six provinces on January 12, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8.[2] CTP-ISW recorded protests primarily in large cities, such as Tehran, Mashhad, and Karaj, on January 12.[3] The Iranian regime has historically struggled to suppress unrest in less populated and rural areas more than in urban areas and it would therefore be surprising if protests continued to take place in large cities and not in smaller towns and villages.[4] Iranians are also likely able to access tools like Starlink satellites more readily in urban areas and use these tools to share videos of protests with foreign media.[5] The regime's internet shutdown therefore likely explains, at least partially, the decrease in recorded protest activity since January 8.[6]
There are several indications that protests continue to take place in areas where we did not record protests on January 12. Fox News's chief foreign correspondent reported on January 12 that he was able to contact a source in Esfahan who confirmed that protests continue to take place in the city.[7] CTP-ISW has not recorded protests in Esfahan since January 9, which suggests that protesters in Esfahan have been unable to share videos of protests due to the internet shutdown. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency separately updated its security personnel death count on January 12 from 114 to 121.[8] Tasnim recorded seven additional security personnel deaths in Fars Province on January 12, which suggests that protests, or at least the regime's crackdown on anti-regime dissidents, have continued to take place in this province. CTP-ISW last reported a protest in Fars Province on January 10.[9] Tasnim’s death count likely does not account for the full scale of security personnel deaths, given that CTP-ISW has recorded three security personnel deaths in Tehran Province, while Tasnim has not reported any deaths in this province.[10]
It is possible that the rate of protest activity across Iran has decreased due to the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests. A Norway-based human rights group reported on January 11 that the regime has killed at least 544 people and arrested more than 10,681 people since the beginning of the protests on December 28.[11] Some estimates suggest that the protester death count is in the thousands. CTP-ISW has recorded 83 incidents across 24 provinces of security forces shooting live ammunition at protesters since December 28.[12] Hospitals and medical centers in Iran have also reported being overwhelmed by the number of wounded protesters. The regime's brutality could discourage some individuals from participating in the protests and thereby reduce the rate of protests.[13]
Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media threatened on January 12 to deploy more IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress protests.[14] The threat indicates that the regime continues to perceive protests as a significant threat to its stability, which is consistent with our assessment that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded. AFGS-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised the ability of the IRGC Ground Forces Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade to “confront terrorists in any situation,” suggesting that the IRGC could deploy these units to suppress protests.[15] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly described protesters as “terrorists.” The Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces, is considered the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[16] Brigadier General Amanollah Goshtasbi has commanded this base since March 2025.[17] The United States sanctioned Goshtasbi for his role in suppressing and killing Baloch citizens during the Mahsa Amini movement while serving as the IRGC Ground Forces Salman Corps commander in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[18] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought in Syria to defend the Assad regime in 2015 and suppressed protests in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement.[19] Brigadier General Ahmad Ali Feizollahi has commanded the Saberin Special Forces Brigade since June 2023.[20] Feizollahi previously commanded the IRGC Ground Forces Ansar-e Rasoul Special Forces unit and reportedly ordered forces to shoot directly at protesters in Javanroud, Kermanshah Province, in November 2022.[21]
IRGC Ground Forces units have already deployed to several locations in western Iran, which suggests that the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Basij may be struggling to contain protests in these provinces. The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division deployed to suppress protests in Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province, on January 8.[22] The 29th Nabi Akram Operational Division operates under the IRGC Ground Forces Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Hamedan provinces.[23] IRGC Ground Forces Command Brigadier General Mohammad Karami recently appointed Brigadier General Mohsen Najaf Karimi as the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base commander in November 2025.[24] The United Kingdom and European Union sanctioned Karimi for perpetrating serious human rights violations in his role as commander of the IRGC Ruhollah Corps in Markazi Province during the regime's crackdown on the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests.[25] A Kurdish human rights organization separately reported a “large deployment” of IRGC forces to Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 10.[26] It is possible that the IRGC forces in Bukan operate under the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base given that this base is headquartered in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province.[27] A BBC Persian journalist additionally circulated unverified reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam Province on January 8.[28] IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 12 that protesters killed IRGC Colonel Mehdi Rahimi in Ilam City, Ilam Province, which could corroborate the recent reports of IRGC deployments in Ilam.[29]
The Iranian regime is likely encouraging pro-regime demonstrations as a counter-protest tactic to broadcast public support for the regime, discredit the protest movement, and possibly even directly confront protesters in the streets. The regime called on the Iranian people on January 12 to participate in pro-regime protests.[30] IRGC-affiliated media reported that pro-regime protesters demonstrated in at least 13 cities, including Tehran.[31] Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian attended a pro-regime rally in Tehran on January 12.[32] The call for regime supporters to take to the streets inherently creates a risk that anti-regime protesters will encounter pro-regime supporters, many of whom are likely members of Iranian security institutions, such as the Basij.[33] The regime is almost certainly aware of this risk and may seek to frame any engagements between pro- and anti-regime protesters as an attack by protesters on civilians and perpetuate its narrative that anti-regime protesters are “terrorists” and “rioters.” The presence of additional security members in public areas could also help the regime quickly quell protests and prevent them from becoming large-scale demonstrations. The regime lastly likely seeks to use the pro-regime rallies to demonstrate that it maintains public support and to retain its legitimacy.
The Masoud Pezeshkian administration has expressed willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States in an effort to de-escalate tensions with the United States amid Iranian concerns about potential US strikes on Iran. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has softened its red lines for negotiations with the United States. Two sources “with knowledge” told Axios on January 12 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi recently contacted US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in an effort to “de-escalate” tensions with the United States or “buy more time” before potential US military action against Iran.[34] Araghchi and Witkoff discussed the possibility of meeting “in the coming days,” according to the sources.[35] Trump confirmed on January 11 that Iran reached out to the United States to propose negotiations for a nuclear deal.[36] The Axios report comes after Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and Araghchi in Tehran on January 10.[37] Political insiders in Tehran told UK-based Amwaj Media on January 12 that Albusaidi may have relayed a message from the Trump administration during his visit.[38] Oman has historically served as a mediator between Iran and the United States. The Pezeshkian administration's efforts to de-escalate tensions with the United States come as Trump has warned that the United States could intervene in the ongoing protests. Trump stated on January 11 that the United States is “looking at” options to support Iranian protesters.[39] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 12 that Trump is weighing diplomacy against military strikes but currently “favors” using military action against Iran.[40] Iran has refused to negotiate its ability to enrich uranium, support the Axis of Resistance, and develop its ballistic missile program in negotiations with the United States.[41] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran is willing to make concessions on these issues.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-12-2026/
Those red dots look like proper targets to me.
Non-Protest Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET, Protest Data Cutoff: 3:30 PM ET
The Iranian regime is using an unprecedented level of brutality to suppress protests. The actual death toll is likely significantly higher relative to the 1,500 people killed during the 2019 protests, though CTP-ISW cannot independently determine the number of protester deaths. Western media outlets have reported death toll estimates in Iran ranging from 2,000 to 20,000, and anecdotal information is consistent with the regime killing thousands in its crackdown.[1] The regime killed approximately 1,500 people in the span of two weeks during the 2019 economic protests.[2] Regime security forces have fired on crowds indiscriminately—in some cases with machine guns—and killed scores of citizens across numerous locations.[3] Some Iranians who have bypassed the internet shutdown have reported very high volumes of dead protesters on the streets and in hospitals and morgues.[4] Some reports alleged the presence of 700-1,000 dead protesters at just one morgue in Tehran, not accounting for other locations around the capital or the country overall.[5] Other Iranians have claimed that the regime's crackdown is much greater than the one it conducted in November 2019, during which security forces killed around 1,500 protesters.[6] This anecdotal information is most consistent with the regime killing many thousands in its crackdown.
This level of brutality may be discouraging protesters and decreasing the rate of protest activity. A protester from Shiraz told TIME on January 11 that the police attacks have been particularly violent compared to previous protests and that the protest turnout in Shiraz on January 9 ”was inhibited by aggressive security forces.”[7] CTP-ISW assessed on January 12 that the rate of protest activity across Iran may have decreased due to the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests.
Reports of protest activity across Iran continued at a relatively low level on January 13. We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW recorded 7 protests across 6 provinces on January 13, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8.[8]CTP-ISW continued to record protests primarily in large cities, such as Tehran, Esfahan, and Tabriz. The Iranian regime has historically struggled to suppress unrest in less populated and rural areas more than in urban areas. It would therefore be surprising if protests continued to take place in large cities and not in smaller towns and villages.
The regime has continued to take steps to severely restrict the flow of information out of Iran. The regime has maintained a nationwide internet blackout, designed to prevent Iranians from sharing videos of protests and the regime's crackdown, since January 8. Iranian security forces reportedly launched a massive operation on January 12 to search homes in several cities across Iran, including Tehran, and seize satellite dishes, according to Norway-based human rights group Hengaw.[9] The collection of satellite dishes would allow the regime to disrupt the use of Starlink and other satellite connectivity by Iranians who seek to share videos of protests with foreign media.[10]
Russia is likely helping the Iranian regime suppress protests and maintain control in the face of both protests and insurgent attacks. Politico reported on January 13 that Russia supplied Iran with Russian-made Spartak armored vehicles and attack helicopters in recent weeks.[11] Iran received these systems before the protests began, but Iran likely acquired these systems for use in internal disturbances, including protests. Iran is very unlikely to use such equipment in any conventional modern conflict. Israel and the United States, Iran's key adversaries, use long-range missiles and aircraft that could destroy attack helicopters long before the helicopter could engage the aircraft. Attack helicopters are more capable at fighting insurgencies or addressing internal conflicts due to the lack of serious enemy air defenses that could inhibit helicopter operations.[12] Iran is facing both large-scale protests and small insurgent attacks along its borders. Armored vehicles can be used to bolster the regime's efforts to suppress the protests and broader counter-insurgency efforts. Russia previously sent Iran Spartak armored vehicles in 2023, and Iranian border guards began operating them in November 2025.[13] These border guards could help support counterinsurgent operations against Balochi or Kurdish militias that operate in border areas and are conducting attacks amid the protests (see below). Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu held a phone call with SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani on January 13, almost certainly to discuss ongoing protests in Iran.[14] Iran previously sought Russia's help to quell protests in 2022.[15]
The overlap of protest activity and reported militancy in border areas is placing additional strain on the regime's security apparatus and risks allowing each to intensify the threat posed by the other. Recent regime responses to the protests, including the deployment of the IRGC Ground Forces to some cities, indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces. Reports indicate that the Iranian security forces arrested at least 550 Baloch protesters in Zahedan, Chabahar, and Iranshahr, over the past five days.[16] Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid escalated his criticism of the regime's response to the protests in a January 13 post on X. Hamid stated that the killing of protesters constituted a “horrific and unprecedented catastrophe” that plunged the Iranian nation into grief and rage.[17] Abdol Hamid warned that those responsible would be held accountable both “in this world and the hereafter.”[18] Abdol Hamid’s statement marks an intensification from his January 9 sermon, in which he urged peaceful change and called on security forces to avoid confronting protesters.[19] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamid may be reemerging as a catalyst for protests in southeastern Iran, which would compound the bandwidth constraints that Iranian security forces are reportedly facing. Abdol Hamid was a catalyst for protests in Zahedan during and after the Mahsa Amini movement. A medium-sized anti-regime protest, which CTP-ISW defines as a protest with 100-1,000 participants, broke out in Zahedan after Abdol Hamid’s January 9 sermon.
A recent uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran may exacerbate the regime's bandwidth constraints by creating additional security challenges for the regime in southeastern Iran. Anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran will only further strain security force capacity as the protests continue. Iranian media reported on January 13 that Iranian security forces arrested several “terrorist teams” operating under Israeli direction in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[20] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on January 13 that those groups entered Iran from the east and established seven safe houses in Zahedan.[21] The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Sistan and Baluchistan border guards separately arrested a group of “smugglers” and seized several weapons in border areas on January 13.[22] The Mubarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, separately claimed responsibility for two attacks targeting LEC personnel in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 7 and 10.[23] The MPF stated on January 1 that it is monitoring the regime's response to the protests and emphasized that it will respond to any instances of regime violence, which suggests a potential willingness to escalate if conditions deteriorate.[24]
There also continue to be unconfirmed reports of Kurdish militant activity in northwestern Iran. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), which is an Iranian Kurdish militant group, issued a statement on January 13, claiming responsibility for attacks against IRGC positions in Kermanshah Province on January 12.[25] The group claimed that multiple teams conducted a coordinated attack and killed IRGC personnel.[26] The group stated that the operation was retaliation for the death of PAK fighters.[27] IRGC Ground Forces Nabi Akram Unit members have been involved in the suppression of protests in Kermanshah.[28] The Kurdistan National Guard separately announced on January 9 that its “Zagros Tornado units” attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.
Militant groups operating in Iran's border regions do not represent the ongoing protest movement, however. The recent uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran suggests that these groups may exploit the current unrest and the bandwidth issues facing regime security forces to advance their objectives. These groups are likely not solely focused on overthrowing the regime but are also positioning themselves for a potential post-regime environment in which they could pursue greater ambitions, including autonomy in Kurdish and Baloch areas.[29] Militant activity challenges the regime by diverting security forces and stretching resources across multiple regions, which may allow these groups to operate more freely. It is possible that regime collapse could create conditions for these groups’ separatist aims, which would have consequences beyond Iran into the broader Middle East and South Asia. The regime could use gains by these groups to support its framing that the protests are driven by ”terrorists,” just as Syrian President Bashar al Assad falsely claimed that all Syrian protesters were jihadists during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War.
US President Donald Trump is continuing to consider various options to intervene in the ongoing protests in Iran. Some US officials believe that Iran may be trying to delay a US attack on Iran rather than aiming to engage in sincere diplomacy, according to two officials speaking to the New York Times.[30] The Pentagon presented Trump on January 13 with a range of strike options and targets in Iran, including Iran's nuclear program and ballistic missile sites, according to a US official.[31] The official stated that a cyberattack on Iran's domestic security apparatus is more likely, however.[32] The official added that any attack is ”at least several days away.” President Trump also wrote on Truth Social on January 13 that he has canceled all meetings with Iranian officials until the regime stops killing protesters and emphasized that “help is on the way.”[33] He later added that US citizens in Iran should leave Iran.[34] Trump separately announced on January 12 that any country conducting business with Iran will face a 25 percent tariff on its bilateral trade with the United States.[35]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on January 12 to take unspecified kinetic action against the United States if it attacks Iran.[36] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, notably did not follow through with their threats to conduct major attacks targeting the United States after the United States struck Iranian nuclear sites during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi released a statement on January 12 that emphasized the “legitimate and moral duty” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to support Iran amid US preparations to attack Iran.[37] Hamidawi warned the “American enemy” that it would “pay a double price” if the United States attacked Iran.[38]
The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be taking inspiration from recent Iranian threats to target US forces and following the intent of Iranian officials. Hamidawi’s threat comes after Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on January 11 that Iran could target US or Israeli military bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[39] A likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facade group also threatened on January 10 to attack the US Embassy in Baghdad and US interests in the Middle East in response to US support for the ongoing protests in Iran.[40] Iran's partners in Iraq conducted a few unclaimed attacks on US military bases in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not pursue greater kinetic action after the US struck Iranian nuclear sites.[41] The militias’ show of restraint in June 2025 was probably partially a response to a concern that attacking the United States would have negative political ramifications for the militias’ political wings in the November 2025 elections.[42] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors continue to vie to maintain their control of the Iraqi state during the ongoing Iraqi government formation process following the elections, however. The militias could reassess attacks on the United States at any time, however, including if the US strikes in Iran seriously threatened regime stability. There have been several unconfirmed reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, are helping the Iranian regime suppress protests.[43]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-13-2026/
Regime has initiated martial law.
Indicators of Iranian Regime Instability
This document identifies indicators of reduced regime stability and the degree to which we have observed evidence that those indicators have been tripped (that is, that a given indicator now points toward regime instability). Indicators are presented as tripped, partially tripped, or unobserved. When indicators are shown as unobserved, that simply means that we have not seen evidence using open source information.
read it here: https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/indicators-of-iranian-regime-instability/
The Iranian regime views the protests as a proto-revolution that it must crush completely and immediately. Some Iranians are resisting the regime, in some cases violently, which reinforces the regime's view that the protests retain the potential to transform into a revolution. The regime will likely succeed in quelling this resistance if it can retain the loyalty of security forces and prevent those who are resisting the regime from acquiring the wherewithal to challenge the regime's ability and willingness to sustain its crackdown. The regime has abandoned any effort it made in the beginning of this protest movement to distinguish between legitimate economic protests and illegitimate anti-regime protests. Iranian media and officials, including those who expressed sympathy for protesters in the beginning of this protest movement, are categorically describing protesters as “terrorists.”[1] Iranian Justice Minister Amir Hossein Rahimi stated on January 14 that any protester who has participated in protests after January 8—which is when the rate and scope of the protests expanded dramatically—is guilty of taking part in an “internal war.”[2] Rahimi’s statement highlights how the regime has stopped showing any tolerance toward protests, as it did to an extent in the beginning of the protest movement, and views any protest as a serious threat to the regime.
The extent and extremity of the regime's use of violence to quell the protests further demonstrate that the regime views the protests as a proto-revolution. Reports from eyewitnesses and protesters in Iran describe an unprecedented degree of regime brutality toward protesters. Iranians told BBC Persian on January 11 that the scale of deaths and injuries in the current protest movement is “unprecedented and incomparable” to previous protest waves.[3] Amnesty International reported on January 14 that regime security forces have committed “unlawful killings…on an unprecedented scale.”[4] Western media outlets have reported protester death toll estimates between 2,000 and 20,000.[5] These numbers surpass the approximately 1,500 protesters who were killed in 2019 and approximately 550 protesters who were killed during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement.[6] A US-based human rights organization also estimated that the regime has arrested over 10,000 individuals in the current wave of protests thus far.[7] The regime previously arrested around 7,000 individuals in the 2019 protests and 20,000 individuals during the Mahsa Amini movement. The regime arrested 20,000 individuals over a roughly three-month period, whereas the regime has arrested 10,000 individuals in the past two and a half weeks.
CTP-ISW recorded zero protests on January 14, but the regime is sustaining repressive measures that impose a significant cost on the regime. This suggests that the regime does not perceive that the threat from protests has subsided. The regime is maintaining security force mobilizations, which risks exhausting and burning out these forces. Security forces are patrolling streets in towns and cities across Iran to prevent Iranians from holding demonstrations.[8] Sources in Chalus, Mazandaran Province, for example, told a BBC Persian reporter on January 11 that “security forces with machine guns have been stationed in all streets.”[9] The widespread deployment of security patrols is likely contributing to the decrease in recorded protest activity because these patrols are likely deterring some Iranians from participating in protests. The sustained mobilization of security forces increases the risk that the regime will burn out these forces, potentially diminishing their willingness and ability to continue to suppress protesters. Iranian reformist media previously reported in September 2022—days after the Mahsa Amini movement began—that then-Law Enforcement Commander Hossein Ashtari discussed security forces’ exhaustion and bandwidth constraints with senior military and intelligence officials.[10] Security forces will likely experience similar exhaustion if the regime continues to mobilize them for a long period of time.
The regime has also suggested that it will sustain its nationwide internet shutdown for at least another week. Internet shutdowns have a detrimental effect on the Iranian economy, and a sustained shutdown will likely exacerbate the poor economic conditions that triggered this protest movement. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on January 14 that “relevant institutions” will decide in the “next week or two” whether to grant greater internet access to the population.[11] Iranian officials have frequently acknowledged that internet shutdowns prevent Iranians from being able to conduct business and therefore have a negative impact on the Iranian economy.[12] NetBlocks estimates that internet shutdowns cost Iran over $1.5 million per hour.[13] A resident in Tehran separately told anti-regime media on January 14 that most shops in Tehran remain closed.[14] The closure of businesses would likely compound the negative impact that the internet shutdown is having on the Iranian economy. The current protest movement was initiated by merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran in late December 2025 in response to Iran's deteriorating economic conditions.[15]
Some Iranians are resisting the regime's efforts to contain protests, which further indicates that the regime has not regained control over the security situation. A Europe-based outlet that appears to have sources in Iran reported on January 13 that some Iranians in Shiraz, Fars Province, are fighting back against security forces using knives and machetes.[16] The outlet reported that security forces have struggled to contain crowds by using tear gas and batons and have resorted to using military weapons.[17] The outlet added that communities are “self-organizing” and assisting individuals who are resisting the regime, such as by providing them with safe houses, to sustain protest activity.[18] Resisting security forces that are armed with military weapons is inherently more dangerous than participating in peaceful protests, which demonstrates the commitment of those who are resisting security forces to fight the regime. IRGC-affiliated media reported an increase in security personnel deaths in Fars Province between January 11 and 12, which could corroborate this report of resistance in Shiraz.[19] Shiraz was previously a hotspot for unrest during the 2019 protests.[20] Western and anti-regime media separately reported on January 12 and 14, respectively, that protests continue to take place in Esfahan and eastern Tehran, which highlights how Iranians are continuing to resist security forces in areas outside of Shiraz.[21]
The regime will likely succeed in quelling this resistance if it can retain the loyalty of security forces and prevent those who are resisting security forces from successfully challenging the regime's ability and willingness to sustain its crackdown. The regime has not indicated any intention to stop using lethal force and brutality to quell the current unrest. The most likely way for protesters to be successful would be through the defection of security forces because protesters are unlikely to degrade the regime's ability to sustain its crackdown. Security forces are the basis of the regime's stability, and the loss of security forces’ willingness to suppress unrest could pose an existential threat to the regime. CTP-ISW has not observed reports of defections, although the IRGC Intelligence Organization stated on January 9 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment.”[22] This statement suggests that some Iranian security forces may have already defected or that the regime is very concerned about this possibility.
Iranian regime officials have leaked various protester death counts to Western media. The leak of high protester death counts by some regime officials indicates that these officials may be disaffected by the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests. Two Iranian officials told the New York Times and Reuters on January 13 that 3,000 and 2,000 people have been killed in the protests, respectively.[23] Both officials claimed that “terrorists” caused the deaths, and the official speaking to the New York Times emphasized that the number of deaths included “hundreds” of security officers.[24] These claims suggest that these officials support the regime's violent crackdown and seek to emphasize the role of “terrorists” in the current unrest to justify the crackdown. A source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), two sources in the Iranian presidential office, and several IRGC sources contrastingly told anti-regime media that the protester death count is “at least” 12,000.[25] The leak of such a high protester death count by regime officials suggests that some members of the regime may oppose the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests. These leaks come amid reports that there are divisions among Iranian security forces over how to respond to the protests.[26]
The Iranian regime's concern about cross-border Kurdish militant activity will likely cause the regime to divert resources to address this threat, which would stretch the bandwidth of Iranian security forces that are suppressing protests. The regime is currently attempting to simultaneously defend against Kurdish militant activity and suppress protests in Iran's border provinces, particularly in Ilam, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan provinces.[27] Turkey's intelligence service warned the IRGC that armed Kurdish separatist groups were attempting to cross from Iraq into Iran “in recent days,” according to three unspecified sources familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters on January 14.[28] The Reuters report follows several attacks by Kurdish anti-regime groups against Iranian military sites in recent days. The Kurdistan National Guard announced on January 9 that it attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.[29] The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) separately claimed responsibility for an attack on IRGC positions in Kermanshah Province on January 12 that killed an unspecified number of IRGC personnel.[30] The uptick in Kurdish militant activity in western and northwestern Iran in recent days will likely force the regime to divert personnel and resources to confront this issue that it would have otherwise used to quell protests.
The regime's confrontation with Kurdish militant groups in western and northwestern Iran comes as the regime has simultaneously sought to suppress intense protest activity in these areas.[31] The regime has only deployed IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress protests in western and northwestern Iran, which suggests that the intensity of protests in these areas have challenged the Law Enforcement Command and Basij’s ability to contain them.[32] The regime has deployed the 29th Nabi Akram Division to suppress protests in Kermanshah and has threatened to deploy units that operate under the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base to suppress protests in northwestern Iran, for example.[33] A Kurdish human rights organization reported on January 9 that security forces in Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, sought reinforcements but could not receive reinforcements due to a shortage of forces.[34] The bandwidth constraints that security forces are reportedly facing in western Iran are exacerbated by Kurdish militant attacks and the regime may not be able to simultaneously confront both issues effectively. The regime previously not only threatened escalation but also shelled anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) during the Mahsa Amini movement, but Iranian security forces have notably neither threatened to do so nor done so during the current protest movement.[35] The lack of kinetic action against Kurdish militant groups suggests that security forces may be facing bandwidth constraints as they try to confront the Kurdish militancy issue and protest activity simultaneously.
Iran has continued to coordinate with Turkey and Iraq in an effort to contain cross-border Kurdish militant activity. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed the recent protests in Iran, and likely cross-border Kurdish militant activity, in a phone call with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on January 14.[36] Iranian SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani separately discussed the implementation of the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement in a phone call with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji on January 14.[37] The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate Kurdish anti-regime groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[38]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-14-2026/
The Iranian regime's extreme securitization of society and brutal crackdown on protests appear to have suppressed the protest movement for now. The regime's widespread mobilization of security forces is unsustainable, however, which makes it possible that protests could resume. The regime has also not addressed and likely will not address the underlying grievances that triggered this protest movement. The regime has reportedly imposed a curfew to prevent Iranians from going out at night, which is when protests often take place.[1] Two sources in Tehran and a resident in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, told a BBC Persian reporter and anti-regime media, respectively, that the regime has told Iranians not to leave their homes after 8:00 PM.[2] The regime has also deployed security forces to patrol towns and cities across Iran. A resident in Tabriz told anti-regime media on January 15 that security forces are deployed in “all areas” of Tabriz, including in “small neighborhoods far from the city center.”[3] An unspecified foreign diplomat in Iran similarly told the Washington Post on January 14 that security forces are “all over the town.”[4] An individual in Tehran separately told a Paris-based journalist on January 15 that the regime has deployed tanks in Tehran.[5] CTP-ISW has not observed any images or videos to corroborate this report, but the deployment of tanks would likely be meant to intimidate civilians and deter them from protesting.
The regime's pervasive securitization measures and violent crackdown on protests appear to have suppressed protest activity for now. CTP-ISW recorded zero protests on January 15, which marks the second consecutive day that CTP-ISW has not recorded any protest activity in Iran. Various sources in Iran told Western media that protest activity has subsided in recent days in response to the regime's brutal crackdown. An individual who participated in protests in Tehran told the Wall Street Journal on January 15 that clashes between security forces and protesters in Tehran intensified after January 8, but that Tehran “was quiet” by January 12.[6] The protester stated that it was “as if we realized what had happened to us and how many had been killed.”[7] Iranians separately told Reuters on January 14 and 15 that the protests appear to have subsided since January 12.[8] An unspecified foreign diplomat in Iran similarly told the Washington Post on January 14 that the protests have “generally subsided” and that “the fear factor has gained the upper hand.”[9] The regime has used unprecedented brutality to quell the recent protests, and this brutality appears to have deterred some Iranians from continuing to demonstrate against the regime, at least for the time being.[10] A US-based human rights organization reported on January 15 that the regime has killed at least 2,677 individuals and arrested 19,097 individuals since December 28.[11]
The regime's mobilization of security forces to securitize society is unsustainable, which makes it possible that protests could resume when the regime is no longer able to sustain this mobilization. Mobilizing security forces for long periods of time risks burning out and exhausting these forces. Senior law enforcement, military, and intelligence officials previously held discussions about security forces’ “exhaustion” during the Mahsa Amini protest movement.[12] The regime is also taking other measures to securitize society, such as sustaining its nationwide internet shutdown, that impose a significant cost on the regime.[13] The regime's willingness to sustain these securitization measures highlights how the regime still perceives its population as a serious threat. It is unclear, however, how long the regime will be able to sustain these measures.
The regime is also unlikely to address the underlying factors that triggered this protest movement, which makes it possible that protests could resume. The protest movement was initiated by merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran in late December 2025 in response to Iran's deteriorating economic conditions, including the fall of the value of the Iranian rial to a record low of 1,432,000 rials to one US dollar on December 28.[14] The value of the rial has since further depreciated to 1,482,500 rials to one US dollar on January 6 before depreciating slightly to 1,429,500 rials to one US dollar on January 15.[15] The regime has not introduced any economic reforms during the protest movement and is unlikely to fundamentally transform its economic policy in response to the protests. It is conceivable that the regime's brutal crackdown has deterred Iranians from protesting for the time being, but the regime's unwillingness to implement meaningful reforms creates the conditions for further protests. A Tehran resident told the Wall Street Journal on January 15 that he doesn't think that the current “calm” in Tehran “will hold” and that the situation in Iran is “very volatile.”[16] These statements reflect how the regime may have suppressed protest activity for now but that the situation could rapidly change.
Iranian leaders are reportedly moving their US currency reserves abroad, which indicates their lack of faith in Iran's banking system and may indicate concerns about the future of the regime. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on January 14 that Iranian officials have transferred “tens of millions of [US] dollars” out of Iran to unspecified locations.[17] An Israeli news outlet similarly reported on January 14 that Iranian officials have moved around $1.5 billion USD out of Iran in the past 48 hours and that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, has moved $328 million USD of that total to Dubai, citing a source familiar with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) activities.[18] Iranian officials’ transfer of money out of Iran reflects their lack of confidence in Iran's fragile banking system. Regime-affiliated Bank Ayandeh dissolved in October 2025 after suffering nearly $5 billion USD in losses.[19] The Iranian Central Bank folded Bank Ayandeh into regime-controlled Bank Melli and attempted to cover up the economic shock of Bank Ayandeh’s dissolution by printing more money, which in turn worsened the inflation cycle, weakened the value of the rial against the US dollar, and increased prices.[20] Iran's economic crisis requires structural changes in the regime's monetary and fiscal systems that would require unraveling decades of mismanagement.[21] The regime has indicated that it is unwilling to implement fundamental economic reforms and instead employs stopgap measures to keep the Iranian economy afloat. Iranian leaders’ reported money transfers will reduce the amount of hard currency in Iran, which will in turn likely make Iran's banking crisis more acute and inhibit the regime's ability to solve its liquidity crisis. These conditions will likely exacerbate Iranians’ economic grievances that triggered the protest movement in Iran in late 2025.
The Iranian regime is conducting an information operation to portray itself and Iranian security forces as victims of “terrorism,” despite the regime's violent crackdown on protests. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Fox News on January 14 that “terrorist elements led from outside” entered the protests, carried out operations similar to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), and shot security forces and civilians.[22] Araghchi claimed that “terrorist elements” captured police officers, burned them alive, and beheaded them.[23] Araghchi’s statements signal that the regime still views its own population as a critical security threat and is doubling down on its narrative that protestors are “ISIS” members and “terrorists” to justify its use of violence and lethal force. The regime also uses the narrative that protesters are “terrorists” to treat the public as a hostile force rather than as a population that has legitimate grievances. The regime is also trying to conceal its use of lethal force. Anti-regime sources have reported that Iranian security forces have pressured some families seeking to recover their relatives’ bodies from hospitals or morgues to sign statements attributing the deaths of their relatives to “terrorists” or claiming that their relative was a Basij member.[24] The regime's widespread internet shutdown enables the regime to perpetuate this information operation because the shutdown restricts independent reporting and limits the circulation of evidence about the regime's crackdown on protesters.
Hezbollah may be hesitant to conduct any direct action against Israel or the United States to support Iran that could trigger a full-scale conflict and disrupt the group's reconstitution efforts. Statements by Hezbollah officials indicate that the group is prioritizing domestic issues in Lebanon, including its reconstitution and efforts to prevent disarmament.[25] Hezbollah released a statement on January 13 in which it expressed support for the Iranian regime but notably did not offer any military support to Iran or threaten to retaliate against the United States or Israel if they attack Iran.[26] Hezbollah was previously unwilling and likely unable to defend Iran or retaliate against US or Israeli targets during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, despite previously serving as one of Iran's primary deterrents against Israel and the United States.[27] Hezbollah has also not responded militarily to any Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure and personnel in recent months, including Israel's killing of Hezbollah's “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in November 2025.[28] Hezbollah's continued hesitancy to act directly against Israel and the United States suggests that the group fears escalation due to its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of military escalation, which could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah's control. Any Hezbollah attack directly targeting US or Israeli forces would presumably prompt a US or Israeli response and could threaten the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement. The United States plays a key role in upholding the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, particularly through its role in the ceasefire monitoring committee and efforts to reduce tensions between Israel and Lebanon.[29] Hezbollah likely opposes any action that would threaten the ceasefire agreement because such action would undermine Hezbollah's objectives of limiting Israel's presence and operational scope in Lebanon. A US or Israeli response against Hezbollah would also likely disrupt Hezbollah's current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stockpiles.[30]
The US Treasury Department sanctioned “the architects of the Iranian regime's brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators” on January 15.[71] The United States sanctioned Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani.[72] The SNSC is Iran's highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body and plays a central role in determining how the regime responds to widespread protests, including authorizing and coordinating crackdowns by security forces.[73] The United States also sanctioned the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and IRGC commanders of Lorestan and Fars provinces.[74] The US Treasury Department stated that security forces in Fars Province have killed numerous peaceful demonstrators since protests began in December 2025.[75] The department added that security forces in Lorestan Province shot multiple civilians and withheld bodies to coerce families to falsely identify their relatives as government “martyrs.”[76] The United States also sanctioned five individuals and 18 entities for laundering proceeds from Iranian petroleum and petrochemical sales to foreign markets through clandestine shadow banking networks.[77]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-15-2026/
“Iranian leaders are moving tens of millions of dollars out of the country as they begin “abandoning ship” amid the deadly protests in Iran, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Newsmax on Wednesday.”
Which countries would they flee to? Venezuela (not anymore), North Korea, China, Russia, or some African country?
Mexico? Thailand?
The regime will likely tighten security around possible upcoming protest dates due to its fears of renewed unrest. IranWire reported on January 15 that Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani told media activists that the regime does not plan to restore domestic access to the international internet until the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in the recent protests.[1] The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. The 40th day could bring many Iranians out in the streets as they commemorate those killed during the protests. The regime has historically tried to block funeral and commemoration ceremonies because they often turn into anti-regime protests. Protests and clashes with security forces erupted at a gathering to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period for Hadis Najafi, a protester killed during the Mahsa Amini movement.[2] The regime also feared unrest after the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in November 2019 and briefly blocked mobile services on December 25 in anticipation.[3] Protest activity peaked on January 8 and 9, which is also when the regime expanded its use of lethal force and killed a significant number of protesters.[4] The end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed on January 8 is February 17.
The regime likely also fears public gatherings for Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, could evolve into anti-regime protests. Nowruz will take place on March 20, 2026. Nowruz will bring many Iranians out into public spaces, which increases the likelihood of protests. Iranian security forces arrested dozens of people across at least three provinces during Nowruz in 2025 to suppress public gatherings and dissent.[5] The recent unprecedented protests have likely heightened regime paranoia that any public gathering could escalate into mass unrest.
It remains unclear whether the regime will securitize in targeted pulses around February 17 and Nowruz or sustain its current securitization for more than two months. Prolonged securitization would likely severely strain Iran's economy. Internet monitor NetBlocks estimates that country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $1.5 million USD per hour, which means that the shutdown losses would exceed $1 billion by February 17 and $2 billion by Nowruz if maintained continuously.[6] Extended security force mobilizations also risk exhausting security forces, potentially diminishing their willingness and ability to continue to suppress protesters. Exhaustion in the security forces could be more pronounced if Iran needs to use units for both protest suppression and border security. The regime still faces uncertainty about how the population will respond once some security measures are lifted.
The Iranian regime appears to be concerned about Kurdish militancy in northwestern Iran, which may cause the regime to divert personnel and resources toward border security and constrain its protest suppression capacity. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami inspected the IRGC Ground Forces 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division in Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 16.[7] Karami stated that the Iranian armed forces are ”ready to respond to any attack.”[8] Karami’s inspection comes after the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised on January 12 the IRGC Ground Forces’ ability, including the IRGC Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, to “confront terrorists in any situation.[9] Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Force units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces and is considered to be the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[10] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought to defend the Assad regime in Syria in 2015 and suppressed protesters in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement in 2022.[11] The regime recently deployed the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division to Kermanshah Province on January 8, which indicates that the Iranian regime is treating the Kurdish-populated areas of western and northwestern Iran as priority theaters, where it must simultaneously manage cross-border militancy risks and domestic dissent.[12] Turkey's intelligence service warned the IRGC that armed Kurdish separatist groups have been attempting to cross the Iranian border “in recent days,” according to three unspecified sources familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters on January 14.[13] Iranian efforts to ensure border security will further stretch the bandwidth of its security forces, even without protests, due to the intense securitization the regime has imposed nationwide.
There are reports of a new protest in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 16. Protest activity in Zahedan is unique and may not reflect a resurgence in protest activity across Iran, however. A small group of protesters reportedly chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Khamenei is a murderer” and “his rule is invalid.”[14] The protest reportedly occurred after prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon, during which Abdol Hamid condemned the regime's brutality and suppression of protests.[15] The regime generally treats Abdol Hamid carefully due to his ability to energize protesters in Zahedan against the regime. Zahedan saw protests long after the end of the Mahsa Amini protests in the rest of Iran, even after the violent regime crackdown in September 2022 known as ”Bloody Friday.”[16] Footage circulated on social media on January 16 shows security forces increasing their presence around Maki Mosque in Zahedan, which is where Abdol Hamid gives his sermons.[17] Security forces’ on-the-ground presence but continued inaction against Abdol Hamid indicates that the regime still does not seek to confront Abdol Hamid or Zahedan residents. The regime may also be exercising caution in engaging protesters in southeastern Iran due to the presence of Baloch, Salafi-jihadi groups that have consistently attacked Iranian security forces.[18] A violent crackdown could give those groups an opportunity to expand recruitment. The regime has not attempted to prevent Abdol Hamid from delivering his sermons and has also been either unwilling or unable to shut down his website at the time of this writing, despite the country-wide internet blackout.[19]
There are additional reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran within the “past few weeks” to support the regime's crackdown on protests.[20] Anti-regime media sources have cited similar reports during previous waves of protests in Iran.[21] An Iraqi security source told CNN on January 15 that nearly 5,000 Iraqi militia fighters have entered Iran from the Shaib border crossing in Maysan Province and the Zurbatiya border crossing in Wasit Province.[22] A European military source corroborated the report that militiamen entered Iran, but told CNN on January 15 that only 800 militia fighters had crossed into Iran from Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces in Iraq under the pretense of religious pilgrimages.[23] CNN also cited an unspecified “European military assessment“ that assessed that Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Badr Organization militiamen entered Iran from Iraq.[24] This assessment stated that the militia fighters have helped the Iranian regime suppress protests in multiple areas of Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[25]
The details cited by both the European military source and the European military assessment are consistent with recent anti-regime media reports about Iraqi militia deployments to Iran.[26] Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on January 6 that unspecified Iraqi government officials were ”aware” of the fighters’ deployments, which have occurred under the guise of pilgrimage trips to the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran.[27] Several social media users also claimed on January 1 and 2 that members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi security service that contains militias backed by Iran, are suppressing protests in Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[28] CTP-ISW observed 13 protests in Hamedan City between December 29 and January 8, five medium sized and eight small.[29] The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime's efforts to contain the protests and ongoing nationwide securitization and could provide additional support if protests begin again. Iraqi militias may be more willing than Iranian security forces to use violence and lethal force against protesters, given that they are Iraqis, not Iranians, and lack personal connections to the Iranian communities that were protesting. Anti-regime media have circulated reports about the deployment of Iranian proxy forces to Iran to suppress protests during periods of unrest, including during the Masha Amini protests.[30] Iranian security forces notably helped the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[31]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-16-2026/
The regime will likely tighten security around possible upcoming protest dates due to its fears of renewed unrest. IranWire reported on January 15 that Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani told media activists that the regime does not plan to restore domestic access to the international internet until the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in the recent protests.[1] The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. The 40th day could bring many Iranians out in the streets as they commemorate those killed during the protests. The regime has historically tried to block funeral and commemoration ceremonies because they often turn into anti-regime protests. Protests and clashes with security forces erupted at a gathering to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period for Hadis Najafi, a protester killed during the Mahsa Amini movement.[2] The regime also feared unrest after the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in November 2019 and briefly blocked mobile services on December 25 in anticipation.[3] Protest activity peaked on January 8 and 9, which is also when the regime expanded its use of lethal force and killed a significant number of protesters.[4] The end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed on January 8 is February 17.
The regime likely also fears public gatherings for Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, could evolve into anti-regime protests. Nowruz will take place on March 20, 2026. Nowruz will bring many Iranians out into public spaces, which increases the likelihood of protests. Iranian security forces arrested dozens of people across at least three provinces during Nowruz in 2025 to suppress public gatherings and dissent.[5] The recent unprecedented protests have likely heightened regime paranoia that any public gathering could escalate into mass unrest.
It remains unclear whether the regime will securitize in targeted pulses around February 17 and Nowruz or sustain its current securitization for more than two months. Prolonged securitization would likely severely strain Iran's economy. Internet monitor NetBlocks estimates that country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $1.5 million USD per hour, which means that the shutdown losses would exceed $1 billion by February 17 and $2 billion by Nowruz if maintained continuously.[6] Extended security force mobilizations also risk exhausting security forces, potentially diminishing their willingness and ability to continue to suppress protesters. Exhaustion in the security forces could be more pronounced if Iran needs to use units for both protest suppression and border security. The regime still faces uncertainty about how the population will respond once some security measures are lifted.
The Iranian regime appears to be concerned about Kurdish militancy in northwestern Iran, which may cause the regime to divert personnel and resources toward border security and constrain its protest suppression capacity. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami inspected the IRGC Ground Forces 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division in Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 16.[7] Karami stated that the Iranian armed forces are ”ready to respond to any attack.”[8] Karami’s inspection comes after the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised on January 12 the IRGC Ground Forces’ ability, including the IRGC Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, to “confront terrorists in any situation.[9] Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Force units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces and is considered to be the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[10] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought to defend the Assad regime in Syria in 2015 and suppressed protesters in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement in 2022.[11] The regime recently deployed the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division to Kermanshah Province on January 8, which indicates that the Iranian regime is treating the Kurdish-populated areas of western and northwestern Iran as priority theaters, where it must simultaneously manage cross-border militancy risks and domestic dissent.[12] Turkey's intelligence service warned the IRGC that armed Kurdish separatist groups have been attempting to cross the Iranian border “in recent days,” according to three unspecified sources familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters on January 14.[13] Iranian efforts to ensure border security will further stretch the bandwidth of its security forces, even without protests, due to the intense securitization the regime has imposed nationwide.
There are reports of a new protest in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 16. Protest activity in Zahedan is unique and may not reflect a resurgence in protest activity across Iran, however. A small group of protesters reportedly chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Khamenei is a murderer” and “his rule is invalid.”[14] The protest reportedly occurred after prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon, during which Abdol Hamid condemned the regime's brutality and suppression of protests.[15] The regime generally treats Abdol Hamid carefully due to his ability to energize protesters in Zahedan against the regime. Zahedan saw protests long after the end of the Mahsa Amini protests in the rest of Iran, even after the violent regime crackdown in September 2022 known as ”Bloody Friday.”[16] Footage circulated on social media on January 16 shows security forces increasing their presence around Maki Mosque in Zahedan, which is where Abdol Hamid gives his sermons.[17] Security forces’ on-the-ground presence but continued inaction against Abdol Hamid indicates that the regime still does not seek to confront Abdol Hamid or Zahedan residents. The regime may also be exercising caution in engaging protesters in southeastern Iran due to the presence of Baloch, Salafi-jihadi groups that have consistently attacked Iranian security forces.[18] A violent crackdown could give those groups an opportunity to expand recruitment. The regime has not attempted to prevent Abdol Hamid from delivering his sermons and has also been either unwilling or unable to shut down his website at the time of this writing, despite the country-wide internet blackout.[19]
There are additional reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran within the “past few weeks” to support the regime's crackdown on protests.[20] Anti-regime media sources have cited similar reports during previous waves of protests in Iran.[21] An Iraqi security source told CNN on January 15 that nearly 5,000 Iraqi militia fighters have entered Iran from the Shaib border crossing in Maysan Province and the Zurbatiya border crossing in Wasit Province.[22] A European military source corroborated the report that militiamen entered Iran, but told CNN on January 15 that only 800 militia fighters had crossed into Iran from Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces in Iraq under the pretense of religious pilgrimages.[23] CNN also cited an unspecified “European military assessment“ that assessed that Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Badr Organization militiamen entered Iran from Iraq.[24] This assessment stated that the militia fighters have helped the Iranian regime suppress protests in multiple areas of Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[25]
The details cited by both the European military source and the European military assessment are consistent with recent anti-regime media reports about Iraqi militia deployments to Iran.[26] Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on January 6 that unspecified Iraqi government officials were ”aware” of the fighters’ deployments, which have occurred under the guise of pilgrimage trips to the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran.[27] Several social media users also claimed on January 1 and 2 that members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi security service that contains militias backed by Iran, are suppressing protests in Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[28] CTP-ISW observed 13 protests in Hamedan City between December 29 and January 8, five medium sized and eight small.[29] The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime's efforts to contain the protests and ongoing nationwide securitization and could provide additional support if protests begin again. Iraqi militias may be more willing than Iranian security forces to use violence and lethal force against protesters, given that they are Iraqis, not Iranians, and lack personal connections to the Iranian communities that were protesting. Anti-regime media have circulated reports about the deployment of Iranian proxy forces to Iran to suppress protests during periods of unrest, including during the Masha Amini protests.[30] Iranian security forces notably helped the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[31]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-16-2026/
I’m hoping the regime is pretty much neutralized by Nowrooz
According to the information, Afghanistan's Fatemiyoun Brigade, Pakistan's Zainebiyoun Brigade and Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces carried out a significant part of the killings. Hassan Hashemian, an expert on Arab affairs, told Iran International that Iranian authorities turned to foreign forces due to manpower shortages. He said the scale of protests across Iran exceeded the capacity of domestic security forces.
“The Islamic Republic is facing a shortage of forces, and the scope of Iran's national uprising was so wide that internal forces could not cover it,” Hashemian said. Hashemian said the reported scale of casualties points to the involvement of experienced militias. “The fact that between 12,000 and 20,000 people were killed within two days shows these groups were deployed specifically to kill. They have prior experience from Iraq and Syria.”
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