Non-Protest Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET, Protest Data Cutoff: 3:30 PM ET
The Iranian regime is using an unprecedented level of brutality to suppress protests. The actual death toll is likely significantly higher relative to the 1,500 people killed during the 2019 protests, though CTP-ISW cannot independently determine the number of protester deaths. Western media outlets have reported death toll estimates in Iran ranging from 2,000 to 20,000, and anecdotal information is consistent with the regime killing thousands in its crackdown.[1] The regime killed approximately 1,500 people in the span of two weeks during the 2019 economic protests.[2] Regime security forces have fired on crowds indiscriminately—in some cases with machine guns—and killed scores of citizens across numerous locations.[3] Some Iranians who have bypassed the internet shutdown have reported very high volumes of dead protesters on the streets and in hospitals and morgues.[4] Some reports alleged the presence of 700-1,000 dead protesters at just one morgue in Tehran, not accounting for other locations around the capital or the country overall.[5] Other Iranians have claimed that the regime's crackdown is much greater than the one it conducted in November 2019, during which security forces killed around 1,500 protesters.[6] This anecdotal information is most consistent with the regime killing many thousands in its crackdown.
This level of brutality may be discouraging protesters and decreasing the rate of protest activity. A protester from Shiraz told TIME on January 11 that the police attacks have been particularly violent compared to previous protests and that the protest turnout in Shiraz on January 9 ”was inhibited by aggressive security forces.”[7] CTP-ISW assessed on January 12 that the rate of protest activity across Iran may have decreased due to the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests.
Reports of protest activity across Iran continued at a relatively low level on January 13. We assess with low-to-medium confidence that protests are occurring beyond what we have recorded, however, and that the regime has successfully limited the amount of information leaving Iran. CTP-ISW recorded 7 protests across 6 provinces on January 13, compared to 156 protests across 27 provinces on January 8.[8]CTP-ISW continued to record protests primarily in large cities, such as Tehran, Esfahan, and Tabriz. The Iranian regime has historically struggled to suppress unrest in less populated and rural areas more than in urban areas. It would therefore be surprising if protests continued to take place in large cities and not in smaller towns and villages.
The regime has continued to take steps to severely restrict the flow of information out of Iran. The regime has maintained a nationwide internet blackout, designed to prevent Iranians from sharing videos of protests and the regime's crackdown, since January 8. Iranian security forces reportedly launched a massive operation on January 12 to search homes in several cities across Iran, including Tehran, and seize satellite dishes, according to Norway-based human rights group Hengaw.[9] The collection of satellite dishes would allow the regime to disrupt the use of Starlink and other satellite connectivity by Iranians who seek to share videos of protests with foreign media.[10]
Russia is likely helping the Iranian regime suppress protests and maintain control in the face of both protests and insurgent attacks. Politico reported on January 13 that Russia supplied Iran with Russian-made Spartak armored vehicles and attack helicopters in recent weeks.[11] Iran received these systems before the protests began, but Iran likely acquired these systems for use in internal disturbances, including protests. Iran is very unlikely to use such equipment in any conventional modern conflict. Israel and the United States, Iran's key adversaries, use long-range missiles and aircraft that could destroy attack helicopters long before the helicopter could engage the aircraft. Attack helicopters are more capable at fighting insurgencies or addressing internal conflicts due to the lack of serious enemy air defenses that could inhibit helicopter operations.[12] Iran is facing both large-scale protests and small insurgent attacks along its borders. Armored vehicles can be used to bolster the regime's efforts to suppress the protests and broader counter-insurgency efforts. Russia previously sent Iran Spartak armored vehicles in 2023, and Iranian border guards began operating them in November 2025.[13] These border guards could help support counterinsurgent operations against Balochi or Kurdish militias that operate in border areas and are conducting attacks amid the protests (see below). Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu held a phone call with SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani on January 13, almost certainly to discuss ongoing protests in Iran.[14] Iran previously sought Russia's help to quell protests in 2022.[15]
The overlap of protest activity and reported militancy in border areas is placing additional strain on the regime's security apparatus and risks allowing each to intensify the threat posed by the other. Recent regime responses to the protests, including the deployment of the IRGC Ground Forces to some cities, indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces. Reports indicate that the Iranian security forces arrested at least 550 Baloch protesters in Zahedan, Chabahar, and Iranshahr, over the past five days.[16] Prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid escalated his criticism of the regime's response to the protests in a January 13 post on X. Hamid stated that the killing of protesters constituted a “horrific and unprecedented catastrophe” that plunged the Iranian nation into grief and rage.[17] Abdol Hamid warned that those responsible would be held accountable both “in this world and the hereafter.”[18] Abdol Hamid’s statement marks an intensification from his January 9 sermon, in which he urged peaceful change and called on security forces to avoid confronting protesters.[19] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamid may be reemerging as a catalyst for protests in southeastern Iran, which would compound the bandwidth constraints that Iranian security forces are reportedly facing. Abdol Hamid was a catalyst for protests in Zahedan during and after the Mahsa Amini movement. A medium-sized anti-regime protest, which CTP-ISW defines as a protest with 100-1,000 participants, broke out in Zahedan after Abdol Hamid’s January 9 sermon.
A recent uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran may exacerbate the regime's bandwidth constraints by creating additional security challenges for the regime in southeastern Iran. Anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran will only further strain security force capacity as the protests continue. Iranian media reported on January 13 that Iranian security forces arrested several “terrorist teams” operating under Israeli direction in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[20] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on January 13 that those groups entered Iran from the east and established seven safe houses in Zahedan.[21] The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Sistan and Baluchistan border guards separately arrested a group of “smugglers” and seized several weapons in border areas on January 13.[22] The Mubarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, separately claimed responsibility for two attacks targeting LEC personnel in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 7 and 10.[23] The MPF stated on January 1 that it is monitoring the regime's response to the protests and emphasized that it will respond to any instances of regime violence, which suggests a potential willingness to escalate if conditions deteriorate.[24]
There also continue to be unconfirmed reports of Kurdish militant activity in northwestern Iran. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), which is an Iranian Kurdish militant group, issued a statement on January 13, claiming responsibility for attacks against IRGC positions in Kermanshah Province on January 12.[25] The group claimed that multiple teams conducted a coordinated attack and killed IRGC personnel.[26] The group stated that the operation was retaliation for the death of PAK fighters.[27] IRGC Ground Forces Nabi Akram Unit members have been involved in the suppression of protests in Kermanshah.[28] The Kurdistan National Guard separately announced on January 9 that its “Zagros Tornado units” attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.
Militant groups operating in Iran's border regions do not represent the ongoing protest movement, however. The recent uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran suggests that these groups may exploit the current unrest and the bandwidth issues facing regime security forces to advance their objectives. These groups are likely not solely focused on overthrowing the regime but are also positioning themselves for a potential post-regime environment in which they could pursue greater ambitions, including autonomy in Kurdish and Baloch areas.[29] Militant activity challenges the regime by diverting security forces and stretching resources across multiple regions, which may allow these groups to operate more freely. It is possible that regime collapse could create conditions for these groups’ separatist aims, which would have consequences beyond Iran into the broader Middle East and South Asia. The regime could use gains by these groups to support its framing that the protests are driven by ”terrorists,” just as Syrian President Bashar al Assad falsely claimed that all Syrian protesters were jihadists during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War.
US President Donald Trump is continuing to consider various options to intervene in the ongoing protests in Iran. Some US officials believe that Iran may be trying to delay a US attack on Iran rather than aiming to engage in sincere diplomacy, according to two officials speaking to the New York Times.[30] The Pentagon presented Trump on January 13 with a range of strike options and targets in Iran, including Iran's nuclear program and ballistic missile sites, according to a US official.[31] The official stated that a cyberattack on Iran's domestic security apparatus is more likely, however.[32] The official added that any attack is ”at least several days away.” President Trump also wrote on Truth Social on January 13 that he has canceled all meetings with Iranian officials until the regime stops killing protesters and emphasized that “help is on the way.”[33] He later added that US citizens in Iran should leave Iran.[34] Trump separately announced on January 12 that any country conducting business with Iran will face a 25 percent tariff on its bilateral trade with the United States.[35]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on January 12 to take unspecified kinetic action against the United States if it attacks Iran.[36] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, notably did not follow through with their threats to conduct major attacks targeting the United States after the United States struck Iranian nuclear sites during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi released a statement on January 12 that emphasized the “legitimate and moral duty” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to support Iran amid US preparations to attack Iran.[37] Hamidawi warned the “American enemy” that it would “pay a double price” if the United States attacked Iran.[38]
The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may be taking inspiration from recent Iranian threats to target US forces and following the intent of Iranian officials. Hamidawi’s threat comes after Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on January 11 that Iran could target US or Israeli military bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[39] A likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facade group also threatened on January 10 to attack the US Embassy in Baghdad and US interests in the Middle East in response to US support for the ongoing protests in Iran.[40] Iran's partners in Iraq conducted a few unclaimed attacks on US military bases in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not pursue greater kinetic action after the US struck Iranian nuclear sites.[41] The militias’ show of restraint in June 2025 was probably partially a response to a concern that attacking the United States would have negative political ramifications for the militias’ political wings in the November 2025 elections.[42] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors continue to vie to maintain their control of the Iraqi state during the ongoing Iraqi government formation process following the elections, however. The militias could reassess attacks on the United States at any time, however, including if the US strikes in Iran seriously threatened regime stability. There have been several unconfirmed reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, are helping the Iranian regime suppress protests.[43]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-13-2026/
Regime has initiated martial law.
The Iranian regime views the protests as a proto-revolution that it must crush completely and immediately. Some Iranians are resisting the regime, in some cases violently, which reinforces the regime's view that the protests retain the potential to transform into a revolution. The regime will likely succeed in quelling this resistance if it can retain the loyalty of security forces and prevent those who are resisting the regime from acquiring the wherewithal to challenge the regime's ability and willingness to sustain its crackdown. The regime has abandoned any effort it made in the beginning of this protest movement to distinguish between legitimate economic protests and illegitimate anti-regime protests. Iranian media and officials, including those who expressed sympathy for protesters in the beginning of this protest movement, are categorically describing protesters as “terrorists.”[1] Iranian Justice Minister Amir Hossein Rahimi stated on January 14 that any protester who has participated in protests after January 8—which is when the rate and scope of the protests expanded dramatically—is guilty of taking part in an “internal war.”[2] Rahimi’s statement highlights how the regime has stopped showing any tolerance toward protests, as it did to an extent in the beginning of the protest movement, and views any protest as a serious threat to the regime.
The extent and extremity of the regime's use of violence to quell the protests further demonstrate that the regime views the protests as a proto-revolution. Reports from eyewitnesses and protesters in Iran describe an unprecedented degree of regime brutality toward protesters. Iranians told BBC Persian on January 11 that the scale of deaths and injuries in the current protest movement is “unprecedented and incomparable” to previous protest waves.[3] Amnesty International reported on January 14 that regime security forces have committed “unlawful killings…on an unprecedented scale.”[4] Western media outlets have reported protester death toll estimates between 2,000 and 20,000.[5] These numbers surpass the approximately 1,500 protesters who were killed in 2019 and approximately 550 protesters who were killed during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement.[6] A US-based human rights organization also estimated that the regime has arrested over 10,000 individuals in the current wave of protests thus far.[7] The regime previously arrested around 7,000 individuals in the 2019 protests and 20,000 individuals during the Mahsa Amini movement. The regime arrested 20,000 individuals over a roughly three-month period, whereas the regime has arrested 10,000 individuals in the past two and a half weeks.
CTP-ISW recorded zero protests on January 14, but the regime is sustaining repressive measures that impose a significant cost on the regime. This suggests that the regime does not perceive that the threat from protests has subsided. The regime is maintaining security force mobilizations, which risks exhausting and burning out these forces. Security forces are patrolling streets in towns and cities across Iran to prevent Iranians from holding demonstrations.[8] Sources in Chalus, Mazandaran Province, for example, told a BBC Persian reporter on January 11 that “security forces with machine guns have been stationed in all streets.”[9] The widespread deployment of security patrols is likely contributing to the decrease in recorded protest activity because these patrols are likely deterring some Iranians from participating in protests. The sustained mobilization of security forces increases the risk that the regime will burn out these forces, potentially diminishing their willingness and ability to continue to suppress protesters. Iranian reformist media previously reported in September 2022—days after the Mahsa Amini movement began—that then-Law Enforcement Commander Hossein Ashtari discussed security forces’ exhaustion and bandwidth constraints with senior military and intelligence officials.[10] Security forces will likely experience similar exhaustion if the regime continues to mobilize them for a long period of time.
The regime has also suggested that it will sustain its nationwide internet shutdown for at least another week. Internet shutdowns have a detrimental effect on the Iranian economy, and a sustained shutdown will likely exacerbate the poor economic conditions that triggered this protest movement. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on January 14 that “relevant institutions” will decide in the “next week or two” whether to grant greater internet access to the population.[11] Iranian officials have frequently acknowledged that internet shutdowns prevent Iranians from being able to conduct business and therefore have a negative impact on the Iranian economy.[12] NetBlocks estimates that internet shutdowns cost Iran over $1.5 million per hour.[13] A resident in Tehran separately told anti-regime media on January 14 that most shops in Tehran remain closed.[14] The closure of businesses would likely compound the negative impact that the internet shutdown is having on the Iranian economy. The current protest movement was initiated by merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran in late December 2025 in response to Iran's deteriorating economic conditions.[15]
Some Iranians are resisting the regime's efforts to contain protests, which further indicates that the regime has not regained control over the security situation. A Europe-based outlet that appears to have sources in Iran reported on January 13 that some Iranians in Shiraz, Fars Province, are fighting back against security forces using knives and machetes.[16] The outlet reported that security forces have struggled to contain crowds by using tear gas and batons and have resorted to using military weapons.[17] The outlet added that communities are “self-organizing” and assisting individuals who are resisting the regime, such as by providing them with safe houses, to sustain protest activity.[18] Resisting security forces that are armed with military weapons is inherently more dangerous than participating in peaceful protests, which demonstrates the commitment of those who are resisting security forces to fight the regime. IRGC-affiliated media reported an increase in security personnel deaths in Fars Province between January 11 and 12, which could corroborate this report of resistance in Shiraz.[19] Shiraz was previously a hotspot for unrest during the 2019 protests.[20] Western and anti-regime media separately reported on January 12 and 14, respectively, that protests continue to take place in Esfahan and eastern Tehran, which highlights how Iranians are continuing to resist security forces in areas outside of Shiraz.[21]
The regime will likely succeed in quelling this resistance if it can retain the loyalty of security forces and prevent those who are resisting security forces from successfully challenging the regime's ability and willingness to sustain its crackdown. The regime has not indicated any intention to stop using lethal force and brutality to quell the current unrest. The most likely way for protesters to be successful would be through the defection of security forces because protesters are unlikely to degrade the regime's ability to sustain its crackdown. Security forces are the basis of the regime's stability, and the loss of security forces’ willingness to suppress unrest could pose an existential threat to the regime. CTP-ISW has not observed reports of defections, although the IRGC Intelligence Organization stated on January 9 that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment.”[22] This statement suggests that some Iranian security forces may have already defected or that the regime is very concerned about this possibility.
Iranian regime officials have leaked various protester death counts to Western media. The leak of high protester death counts by some regime officials indicates that these officials may be disaffected by the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests. Two Iranian officials told the New York Times and Reuters on January 13 that 3,000 and 2,000 people have been killed in the protests, respectively.[23] Both officials claimed that “terrorists” caused the deaths, and the official speaking to the New York Times emphasized that the number of deaths included “hundreds” of security officers.[24] These claims suggest that these officials support the regime's violent crackdown and seek to emphasize the role of “terrorists” in the current unrest to justify the crackdown. A source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), two sources in the Iranian presidential office, and several IRGC sources contrastingly told anti-regime media that the protester death count is “at least” 12,000.[25] The leak of such a high protester death count by regime officials suggests that some members of the regime may oppose the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests. These leaks come amid reports that there are divisions among Iranian security forces over how to respond to the protests.[26]
The Iranian regime's concern about cross-border Kurdish militant activity will likely cause the regime to divert resources to address this threat, which would stretch the bandwidth of Iranian security forces that are suppressing protests. The regime is currently attempting to simultaneously defend against Kurdish militant activity and suppress protests in Iran's border provinces, particularly in Ilam, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan provinces.[27] Turkey's intelligence service warned the IRGC that armed Kurdish separatist groups were attempting to cross from Iraq into Iran “in recent days,” according to three unspecified sources familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters on January 14.[28] The Reuters report follows several attacks by Kurdish anti-regime groups against Iranian military sites in recent days. The Kurdistan National Guard announced on January 9 that it attacked an IRGC base in Nourabad, Lorestan Province, and injured three IRGC members.[29] The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) separately claimed responsibility for an attack on IRGC positions in Kermanshah Province on January 12 that killed an unspecified number of IRGC personnel.[30] The uptick in Kurdish militant activity in western and northwestern Iran in recent days will likely force the regime to divert personnel and resources to confront this issue that it would have otherwise used to quell protests.
The regime's confrontation with Kurdish militant groups in western and northwestern Iran comes as the regime has simultaneously sought to suppress intense protest activity in these areas.[31] The regime has only deployed IRGC Ground Forces units to suppress protests in western and northwestern Iran, which suggests that the intensity of protests in these areas have challenged the Law Enforcement Command and Basij’s ability to contain them.[32] The regime has deployed the 29th Nabi Akram Division to suppress protests in Kermanshah and has threatened to deploy units that operate under the Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base to suppress protests in northwestern Iran, for example.[33] A Kurdish human rights organization reported on January 9 that security forces in Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, sought reinforcements but could not receive reinforcements due to a shortage of forces.[34] The bandwidth constraints that security forces are reportedly facing in western Iran are exacerbated by Kurdish militant attacks and the regime may not be able to simultaneously confront both issues effectively. The regime previously not only threatened escalation but also shelled anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) during the Mahsa Amini movement, but Iranian security forces have notably neither threatened to do so nor done so during the current protest movement.[35] The lack of kinetic action against Kurdish militant groups suggests that security forces may be facing bandwidth constraints as they try to confront the Kurdish militancy issue and protest activity simultaneously.
Iran has continued to coordinate with Turkey and Iraq in an effort to contain cross-border Kurdish militant activity. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed the recent protests in Iran, and likely cross-border Kurdish militant activity, in a phone call with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on January 14.[36] Iranian SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani separately discussed the implementation of the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement in a phone call with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji on January 14.[37] The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate Kurdish anti-regime groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[38]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-14-2026/
I wish we could see the night time satellite photos over Iran, where there were street demos, sometimes there have been big fires show, and even buildings burning.