Mexico? Thailand?
The regime will likely tighten security around possible upcoming protest dates due to its fears of renewed unrest. IranWire reported on January 15 that Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani told media activists that the regime does not plan to restore domestic access to the international internet until the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in the recent protests.[1] The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. The 40th day could bring many Iranians out in the streets as they commemorate those killed during the protests. The regime has historically tried to block funeral and commemoration ceremonies because they often turn into anti-regime protests. Protests and clashes with security forces erupted at a gathering to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period for Hadis Najafi, a protester killed during the Mahsa Amini movement.[2] The regime also feared unrest after the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in November 2019 and briefly blocked mobile services on December 25 in anticipation.[3] Protest activity peaked on January 8 and 9, which is also when the regime expanded its use of lethal force and killed a significant number of protesters.[4] The end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed on January 8 is February 17.
The regime likely also fears public gatherings for Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, could evolve into anti-regime protests. Nowruz will take place on March 20, 2026. Nowruz will bring many Iranians out into public spaces, which increases the likelihood of protests. Iranian security forces arrested dozens of people across at least three provinces during Nowruz in 2025 to suppress public gatherings and dissent.[5] The recent unprecedented protests have likely heightened regime paranoia that any public gathering could escalate into mass unrest.
It remains unclear whether the regime will securitize in targeted pulses around February 17 and Nowruz or sustain its current securitization for more than two months. Prolonged securitization would likely severely strain Iran's economy. Internet monitor NetBlocks estimates that country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $1.5 million USD per hour, which means that the shutdown losses would exceed $1 billion by February 17 and $2 billion by Nowruz if maintained continuously.[6] Extended security force mobilizations also risk exhausting security forces, potentially diminishing their willingness and ability to continue to suppress protesters. Exhaustion in the security forces could be more pronounced if Iran needs to use units for both protest suppression and border security. The regime still faces uncertainty about how the population will respond once some security measures are lifted.
The Iranian regime appears to be concerned about Kurdish militancy in northwestern Iran, which may cause the regime to divert personnel and resources toward border security and constrain its protest suppression capacity. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami inspected the IRGC Ground Forces 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division in Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 16.[7] Karami stated that the Iranian armed forces are ”ready to respond to any attack.”[8] Karami’s inspection comes after the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised on January 12 the IRGC Ground Forces’ ability, including the IRGC Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, to “confront terrorists in any situation.[9] Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Force units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces and is considered to be the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[10] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought to defend the Assad regime in Syria in 2015 and suppressed protesters in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement in 2022.[11] The regime recently deployed the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division to Kermanshah Province on January 8, which indicates that the Iranian regime is treating the Kurdish-populated areas of western and northwestern Iran as priority theaters, where it must simultaneously manage cross-border militancy risks and domestic dissent.[12] Turkey's intelligence service warned the IRGC that armed Kurdish separatist groups have been attempting to cross the Iranian border “in recent days,” according to three unspecified sources familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters on January 14.[13] Iranian efforts to ensure border security will further stretch the bandwidth of its security forces, even without protests, due to the intense securitization the regime has imposed nationwide.
There are reports of a new protest in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 16. Protest activity in Zahedan is unique and may not reflect a resurgence in protest activity across Iran, however. A small group of protesters reportedly chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Khamenei is a murderer” and “his rule is invalid.”[14] The protest reportedly occurred after prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon, during which Abdol Hamid condemned the regime's brutality and suppression of protests.[15] The regime generally treats Abdol Hamid carefully due to his ability to energize protesters in Zahedan against the regime. Zahedan saw protests long after the end of the Mahsa Amini protests in the rest of Iran, even after the violent regime crackdown in September 2022 known as ”Bloody Friday.”[16] Footage circulated on social media on January 16 shows security forces increasing their presence around Maki Mosque in Zahedan, which is where Abdol Hamid gives his sermons.[17] Security forces’ on-the-ground presence but continued inaction against Abdol Hamid indicates that the regime still does not seek to confront Abdol Hamid or Zahedan residents. The regime may also be exercising caution in engaging protesters in southeastern Iran due to the presence of Baloch, Salafi-jihadi groups that have consistently attacked Iranian security forces.[18] A violent crackdown could give those groups an opportunity to expand recruitment. The regime has not attempted to prevent Abdol Hamid from delivering his sermons and has also been either unwilling or unable to shut down his website at the time of this writing, despite the country-wide internet blackout.[19]
There are additional reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran within the “past few weeks” to support the regime's crackdown on protests.[20] Anti-regime media sources have cited similar reports during previous waves of protests in Iran.[21] An Iraqi security source told CNN on January 15 that nearly 5,000 Iraqi militia fighters have entered Iran from the Shaib border crossing in Maysan Province and the Zurbatiya border crossing in Wasit Province.[22] A European military source corroborated the report that militiamen entered Iran, but told CNN on January 15 that only 800 militia fighters had crossed into Iran from Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces in Iraq under the pretense of religious pilgrimages.[23] CNN also cited an unspecified “European military assessment“ that assessed that Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Badr Organization militiamen entered Iran from Iraq.[24] This assessment stated that the militia fighters have helped the Iranian regime suppress protests in multiple areas of Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[25]
The details cited by both the European military source and the European military assessment are consistent with recent anti-regime media reports about Iraqi militia deployments to Iran.[26] Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on January 6 that unspecified Iraqi government officials were ”aware” of the fighters’ deployments, which have occurred under the guise of pilgrimage trips to the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran.[27] Several social media users also claimed on January 1 and 2 that members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi security service that contains militias backed by Iran, are suppressing protests in Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[28] CTP-ISW observed 13 protests in Hamedan City between December 29 and January 8, five medium sized and eight small.[29] The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime's efforts to contain the protests and ongoing nationwide securitization and could provide additional support if protests begin again. Iraqi militias may be more willing than Iranian security forces to use violence and lethal force against protesters, given that they are Iraqis, not Iranians, and lack personal connections to the Iranian communities that were protesting. Anti-regime media have circulated reports about the deployment of Iranian proxy forces to Iran to suppress protests during periods of unrest, including during the Masha Amini protests.[30] Iranian security forces notably helped the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[31]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-16-2026/
The regime will likely tighten security around possible upcoming protest dates due to its fears of renewed unrest. IranWire reported on January 15 that Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani told media activists that the regime does not plan to restore domestic access to the international internet until the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in the recent protests.[1] The 40th day of mourning marks the end of the initial mourning period and is often observed with public commemorations and gatherings in Shia Islam. The 40th day could bring many Iranians out in the streets as they commemorate those killed during the protests. The regime has historically tried to block funeral and commemoration ceremonies because they often turn into anti-regime protests. Protests and clashes with security forces erupted at a gathering to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period for Hadis Najafi, a protester killed during the Mahsa Amini movement.[2] The regime also feared unrest after the end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed in November 2019 and briefly blocked mobile services on December 25 in anticipation.[3] Protest activity peaked on January 8 and 9, which is also when the regime expanded its use of lethal force and killed a significant number of protesters.[4] The end of the 40-day mourning period for those killed on January 8 is February 17.
The regime likely also fears public gatherings for Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, could evolve into anti-regime protests. Nowruz will take place on March 20, 2026. Nowruz will bring many Iranians out into public spaces, which increases the likelihood of protests. Iranian security forces arrested dozens of people across at least three provinces during Nowruz in 2025 to suppress public gatherings and dissent.[5] The recent unprecedented protests have likely heightened regime paranoia that any public gathering could escalate into mass unrest.
It remains unclear whether the regime will securitize in targeted pulses around February 17 and Nowruz or sustain its current securitization for more than two months. Prolonged securitization would likely severely strain Iran's economy. Internet monitor NetBlocks estimates that country-wide internet shutdowns cost over $1.5 million USD per hour, which means that the shutdown losses would exceed $1 billion by February 17 and $2 billion by Nowruz if maintained continuously.[6] Extended security force mobilizations also risk exhausting security forces, potentially diminishing their willingness and ability to continue to suppress protesters. Exhaustion in the security forces could be more pronounced if Iran needs to use units for both protest suppression and border security. The regime still faces uncertainty about how the population will respond once some security measures are lifted.
The Iranian regime appears to be concerned about Kurdish militancy in northwestern Iran, which may cause the regime to divert personnel and resources toward border security and constrain its protest suppression capacity. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami inspected the IRGC Ground Forces 3rd Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Special Forces Division in Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province, on January 16.[7] Karami stated that the Iranian armed forces are ”ready to respond to any attack.”[8] Karami’s inspection comes after the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press praised on January 12 the IRGC Ground Forces’ ability, including the IRGC Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base and the Saberin Special Forces Brigade, to “confront terrorists in any situation.[9] Hamzeh Seyyed ol Shohada Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Force units in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces and is considered to be the IRGC’s most important guard against political opposition in Kurdish-populated areas.[10] The Saberin Special Forces Brigade is a specialized counterterrorism brigade that fought to defend the Assad regime in Syria in 2015 and suppressed protesters in Tehran and other major cities during the Mahsa Amini movement in 2022.[11] The regime recently deployed the IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division to Kermanshah Province on January 8, which indicates that the Iranian regime is treating the Kurdish-populated areas of western and northwestern Iran as priority theaters, where it must simultaneously manage cross-border militancy risks and domestic dissent.[12] Turkey's intelligence service warned the IRGC that armed Kurdish separatist groups have been attempting to cross the Iranian border “in recent days,” according to three unspecified sources familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters on January 14.[13] Iranian efforts to ensure border security will further stretch the bandwidth of its security forces, even without protests, due to the intense securitization the regime has imposed nationwide.
There are reports of a new protest in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 16. Protest activity in Zahedan is unique and may not reflect a resurgence in protest activity across Iran, however. A small group of protesters reportedly chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Khamenei is a murderer” and “his rule is invalid.”[14] The protest reportedly occurred after prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon, during which Abdol Hamid condemned the regime's brutality and suppression of protests.[15] The regime generally treats Abdol Hamid carefully due to his ability to energize protesters in Zahedan against the regime. Zahedan saw protests long after the end of the Mahsa Amini protests in the rest of Iran, even after the violent regime crackdown in September 2022 known as ”Bloody Friday.”[16] Footage circulated on social media on January 16 shows security forces increasing their presence around Maki Mosque in Zahedan, which is where Abdol Hamid gives his sermons.[17] Security forces’ on-the-ground presence but continued inaction against Abdol Hamid indicates that the regime still does not seek to confront Abdol Hamid or Zahedan residents. The regime may also be exercising caution in engaging protesters in southeastern Iran due to the presence of Baloch, Salafi-jihadi groups that have consistently attacked Iranian security forces.[18] A violent crackdown could give those groups an opportunity to expand recruitment. The regime has not attempted to prevent Abdol Hamid from delivering his sermons and has also been either unwilling or unable to shut down his website at the time of this writing, despite the country-wide internet blackout.[19]
There are additional reports that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran within the “past few weeks” to support the regime's crackdown on protests.[20] Anti-regime media sources have cited similar reports during previous waves of protests in Iran.[21] An Iraqi security source told CNN on January 15 that nearly 5,000 Iraqi militia fighters have entered Iran from the Shaib border crossing in Maysan Province and the Zurbatiya border crossing in Wasit Province.[22] A European military source corroborated the report that militiamen entered Iran, but told CNN on January 15 that only 800 militia fighters had crossed into Iran from Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces in Iraq under the pretense of religious pilgrimages.[23] CNN also cited an unspecified “European military assessment“ that assessed that Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Badr Organization militiamen entered Iran from Iraq.[24] This assessment stated that the militia fighters have helped the Iranian regime suppress protests in multiple areas of Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[25]
The details cited by both the European military source and the European military assessment are consistent with recent anti-regime media reports about Iraqi militia deployments to Iran.[26] Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on January 6 that unspecified Iraqi government officials were ”aware” of the fighters’ deployments, which have occurred under the guise of pilgrimage trips to the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran.[27] Several social media users also claimed on January 1 and 2 that members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi security service that contains militias backed by Iran, are suppressing protests in Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[28] CTP-ISW observed 13 protests in Hamedan City between December 29 and January 8, five medium sized and eight small.[29] The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime's efforts to contain the protests and ongoing nationwide securitization and could provide additional support if protests begin again. Iraqi militias may be more willing than Iranian security forces to use violence and lethal force against protesters, given that they are Iraqis, not Iranians, and lack personal connections to the Iranian communities that were protesting. Anti-regime media have circulated reports about the deployment of Iranian proxy forces to Iran to suppress protests during periods of unrest, including during the Masha Amini protests.[30] Iranian security forces notably helped the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[31]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-16-2026/