Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iran Update, September 2, 2025

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development.[1] The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024.[2] The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024.[3] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports. Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran‘s nuclear program.[4] The Financial Times reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research.[5] Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[6]

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China.[7] Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue.[8] Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement.[9] Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Iran’s nuclear rights and emphasized China’s commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[10]

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China’s efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions.[11] Pezeshkian‘s interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3’s position. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback ”ambiguous.“[12] Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran.[13] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil.[15] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Samarrai as well as nine vessels and seven entities, tied to Samarrai as part of a broader US effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[16] Samarrai’s network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before marketing it to international buyers and generated millions of dollars in revenue for Samarrai and the Iranian regime.[17] Samarrai used a fleet of oil tankers operated by one of his UAE-based companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with US-sanctioned Iranian vessels.[18] The Iraqi Navy seized one of Samarrai’s tankers in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Basra Province, Iraq, on August 6, for lacking proper documentation.[19] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[20]

he Institute for Science and International Security (The Institute) reported on September 2 that Iran has moved almost all the chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at the Natanz Enrichment Complex to more secured areas based on satellite imagery.[31] The Institute assessed that Iran has likely moved the chillers to make the chillers less vulnerable to future airstrikes. Satellite imagery from August 30 shows that Iran has dispersed 19 of the 24 total chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the FEP.[32] Chillers help an HVAC system maintain certain temperatures within a facility to protect critical equipment and personnel at the facility and enable optimal functioning. The Institute reported that the chillers are currently not in use because the centrifuges at FEP are still inoperable, and there is no electric power.[33] Israeli airstrikes damaged electrical substations and support buildings critical to the power supply at Natanz.[34] US and Israeli airstrikes rendered the underground centrifuges at Natanz inoperable due to the “sudden loss of external power,” according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi.[35]

Senior Iranian officials met with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan to discuss Iranian concerns about the Zangezur Corridor. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani and his newly appointed Deputy for International Affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss the recent US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor in the southern Caucasus.[36] Grigoryan stated that Armenia is ”ready to provide guarantees to Iran“ in order to preserve Iran-Armenia relations.”[37] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss Iran’s opposition to the presence of US soldiers along the new corridor and emphasized Iran’s commitment to deepening bilateral military relations.[38] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 and stated that Iran’s concerns about the presence of foreign forces in the southern Caucasus have been ”largely resolved” following Larijani and Grigoryan’s meeting.[39] Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence while increasing US influence.[40]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-2-2025

Iran Update, September 3, 2025

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press.[1] The Associated Press reported on September 3 that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 32.5 kilograms between May 17 and June 13, citing the unreleased IAEA report.[2] Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile is equivalent to approximately 10.5 significant quantities, which refers to the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[3] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely to be able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however. The IAEA report added that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,874.9 kilograms.[4] This amount marks a 627.3 kilogram increase in Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium since May 17.[5] The IAEA reported that the IAEA has not inspected any Iranian nuclear site except the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant since the Israel-Iran War.[6] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on September 3 that Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on the status of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile since June 13.[7] CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated in July 2025 that the US and Israeli strikes during the war buried the “vast majority” of Iran's enriched uranium at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow and that it would be “extremely difficult” for Iran to extract the material.[8] The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence that Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the ENTC since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery.[9] Grossi said that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that Israel and the United States struck during the war.[10]

Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[11] The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.[12] The directive advised media outlets to frame potential sanctions as a sign of European dependence on the United States, emphasize Iran's ability to withstand economic pressure, and avoid portraying Iran's future negatively.[13] Iranian Judiciary Spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated on September 3 that the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was “a propaganda and psychological tool to target the people's morale through psychological warfare.”[14] Jahangir urged Iranian media outlets to act “intelligently” and “maintain national cohesion and unity.”[15] Iranian media outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on September 2 that encouraged Iranian civilians and officials to maintain “national self-confidence” and avoid “simplistic and exaggerated rhetoric” regarding the E3’s snapback decision.[16] The Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent reports about the negative economic impacts of sanctions from further increasing public frustration about Iran's poor economic conditions and potentially driving economic-related unrest. The regime's efforts to control the Iranian media space come as the Iranian rial has depreciated to near record-low levels in recent days and the Iranian economy faces exorbitant inflation.[17]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-3-2025/

Iran Update, September 4, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare.[1] The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”[2] The Tasnim report outlined the following three main areas that Iran must address to withstand hybrid warfare:

Redefining Governance Structures and Processes: Tasnim called for re-engineering Iran's governance system and warned that a centralized bureaucracy is too slow and brittle for hybrid war.[3] Tasnim urged the regime to create mechanisms to monitor internal divisions, accelerate bureaucratic processes, and provide more authority to governors and local officials. It argued that decentralized power would make governance more flexible and resilient, which would speed up the regime's responses to crises such as unrest, cyberattacks, or supply disruptions.

Reforming the Relationship Between the Regime and People: Tasnim called for the regime to treat the Iranian people as Iran's main strategic asset rather than dependents of the state.[4] It stressed that victory in hybrid war requires citizens to actively participate in governance, including via neighborhood security, the economy, and cultural resistance. Tasnim highlighted that small, agile grassroots groups involved with technology, media, and culture would counter stronger adversaries and shape public opinion so that people accept hardships as part of a larger struggle for independence and survival.

Developing Iran's “resistance economy:” Tasnim called for the regime to turn the economy into a “defensive stronghold.”[5] It emphasized the need to end dependence on crude oil sales, cut reliance on food imports and gas consumption, and enforce tight control over foreign exchange and trade. Tasnim also called for building long-term cooperation with Axis of Resistance members, neighboring states, and emerging powers such as Russia and China to secure essential goods and bypass Western economic pressure.

Tasnim also warned that adversaries use media narratives to target the minds and will of the people, which the outlet referred to as “narrative warfare.”[6] Tasnim’s call to prioritize narrative warfare is consistent with recent regime efforts to control domestic reporting on snapback sanctions.[7] Iranian officials have recently directed outlets to downplay the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) activation of the snapback mechanism and avoid negative portrayals of Iran's future.[8]

Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian proposal would allow Iran to determine how Iran's nuclear activities would be investigated.[14] Iran also revoked the accreditations of two experienced IAEA inspectors in August for mistakenly taking documents from Fordow to Vienna that reportedly described the facility's interior.[15] The IAEA stated that the revocation was unjustified because the documents did not include any information that would compromise the facility's security.[16] This comes after the Iranian parliament passed a law on June 25 suspending all cooperation with the IAEA.[17] IAEA Director General Grossi said on September 3 that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, but it is unlikely that any agreement will be reached due to Iran's opposition.[18]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-4-2025/

Iran Update, September 8, 2025

Iranian officials are signaling openness to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiations with the United States, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran under the snapback mechanism during negotiations.[1] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback mechanism on August 28, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 unless the UNSC extends sanctions relief for Iran.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately published an op-ed in the Guardian on September 7 in which he stated that Iran is ready to accept limits on uranium enrichment and allow extensive international oversight of its nuclear facilities in exchange for sanctions relief.[3] Araghchi specifically directed his op-ed to the E3.

Iranian leaders have recently expressed openness to resuming cooperation with the IAEA. Iran and the IAEA held their third round of talks in Vienna on September 6.[4] Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated following the meeting that Iran and the IAEA are close to reaching a new cooperation agreement.[5] Grossi suggested that Iran and the IAEA have not, however, agreed on a timeline for the resumption of IAEA inspections and stated that it is also unclear what the IAEA would do when inspections resume.[6] Iran may calculate that expressing willingness to cooperate with the IAEA and the United States will help Iran deter potential snapback sanctions. It is unclear if Iran is willing to make meaningful concessions on its nuclear program in talks with the IAEA or the United States, however. Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months in exchange for Iran restoring full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[7] Araghchi and Grossi will reportedly meet in Cairo this week to finalize a new cooperation agreement.[8]

Iran is likely preparing for future conflicts with Israel and the United States by increasing funding for the Iranian armed forces and evaluating the combat readiness of armed forces units. The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a six-clause bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities.”[9] The IDF destroyed Iranian air defense systems and achieved air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Israel-Iran War, and Iran likely seeks to bolster its defensive capabilities in preparation for potential future conflicts.[10] The bill includes the following clauses.

1. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry must pay the entirety of the funds allocated to strengthening the Iranian armed forces in the budget for the current Persian calendar year (March 2025-2026) and the previous Persian calendar year (March 2024- 2025).

2. The Planning and Budget Organization must fund the Supreme National Security Council’s defense allocations from public savings or the transfer of oil sales shares.

3. The Central Bank of Iran must provide the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) with up to two billion euros from blocked foreign assets or other overseas currency resources to implement emergency defense plans.

4. The Planning and Budget Organization, Central Bank of Iran, and Economy Ministry must provide the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry with two billion euros for “foreign purchases of major defense items.”

5. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry are authorized to allocate $1.5 billion in oil revenues to the Iranian armed forces.

6. Iran will allocate 30 percent of its revenue from air transit fees to Artesh air defense systems annually.[11]

The clause to purchase “major defense items” is notable given that Iran has signaled interest in acquiring military equipment from foreign countries, such as China and Belarus, since the end of the Israel-Iran War.[12] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who is responsible for Iranian arms sales and purchases, traveled to China in late June 2025 in his first foreign visit after the 12-day war.[13] Iranian media expressed support for purchasing Chinese military equipment, such as J-10 aircraft, after the war.[14] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian recently traveled to Belarus, where he reportedly sought Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[15]

The Institute for Science and International Security reported on September 7 that Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War destroyed a key Iranian centrifuge research and development site, the Kalaye Electric Company, in Tehran.[19] The Kalaye Electric Company is a subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and manufactures advanced centrifuges for the Iranian nuclear program. Centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. The United States sanctioned the Kalaye Electric Company in February 2007 for its involvement in Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program.[20] The Institute reported that centrifuge design teams developed new centrifuge models and improved existing ones at the site.[21] Iran also reportedly previously tested advanced IR-8 centrifuges at the site.[22] There have been no repair efforts at the site following the war, according to the Institute.[23] US and Israeli airstrikes during the war targeted Iran’s centrifuge production facilities as well as active centrifuges, which will likely hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[24]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei outlined a series of economic recommendations on September 7, which highlights the regime’s concern about worsening economic conditions and their potential to undermine internal stability.[25] Khamenei delivered a speech during a meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet on September 7 in which he called on the government to “discipline the market” and ensure Iranians’ access to essential goods.[26] Khamenei’s directive to “discipline the market” comes as the Iranian rial traded above one million rials per one US dollar on August 28.[27] Khamenei also ordered government officialsto build up reserves of essential goods, break import monopolies by diversifying suppliers, and guard basic goods against sudden price hikes.[28] The Iranian regime’s official data shows that Iranian household incomes have risen about 12.5 times since 2016, while the price of basic food items has increased more than 20 times.[29] Khamenei further emphasized that production is the key to economic progress and instructed officials not to cut electricity to factories except in emergencies.[30] Iranian media reported in late August that electricity shortages have forced about 50 percent of factories to go offline, which has created ripple effects across the economy.[31]

Khamenei also instructed Iranian officials and media outlets to emphasize Iran’s strengths and avoid portraying Iran as weak.[32] Khamenei’s directive comes after the Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry restricted “provocative” media coverage of potential snapback sanctions.[33] Iranian authorities directed outlets to frame the E3‘s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) recent decision to trigger the snapback mechanism as proof of European dependence on the United States and to emphasize Iran’s resilience.[34] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi similarly directed Iranian media on September 7 to present potential snapback sanctions as a political setback but not as an economic catastrophe and warned that exaggerating the impacts of potential sanctions could inflame public anxiety.[35] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent further public frustration about deteriorating economic conditions and reduce the risk of economic-related unrest.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-8-2025/

Iran Update, September 9, 2025

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9.[1] Several IAF fighter jets dropped at least 10 munitionson a residential building in northern Doha.[2] Several Hamas Political Bureau members resided at the targeted building, according to the Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry.[3] Senior Hamas officials and ceasefire negotiators, including Hamas Shura Council and Leadership Council head Mohammad Darwish and senior Hamas official and negotiator Nizar Awadallah, were reportedly meeting at the residence to review a recent US ceasefire proposal at the time of the strikes.[4] The Israeli strikes reportedly killed several Hamas officials, including:

· Khalil al Hayya: Hayya was the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the leader of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team, and a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[5]

· Zaher Jabarin: Jabarin was the leader of Hamas in the West Bank, a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council, and a member of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team.[6]

· Khaled Meshaal: Meshaal was a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[7]

Hamas confirmed that the Israeli strikes killed five Hamas members, including the director of Hayya’s office, Jihad Labad (Abu Bilal), and Hayya’s son, Hammam al Hayya.[8] Hamas claimed that its negotiating team survived the Israeli strikes but did not specify if any officials sustained injuries.[9]

Three US officials told Axios that the US military detected Israeli fighter jets flying toward the Persian Gulf on September 9 and sought clarification from Israel.[10] The officials stated that “missiles were already in the air” by the time that Israel provided clarification to the United States. Axios reported that the Israeli strikes “infuriated” some of US President Donald Trump’s senior advisers because the US government was waiting for Hamas’ response to a recent US ceasefire proposal. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Israel’s strikes in Qatar, which is a major non-NATO ally of the United States, do “not advance Israel’s or America’s goals,” but added that eliminating Hamas is “a worthy goal.”[11] Qatar condemned the strikes and stated that it will not tolerate “reckless Israeli behavior.”[12] A Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson denied claims that the United States warned Qatar about the Israeli strikes in advance.[13] Qatar has reportedly suspended its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas following the strikes.[14]

Iran appears to be trying to fulfill the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28.[15] The snapback process lasts 30 days, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 if the UNSC does not extend sanctions relief for Iran. South Korea, which is the current president of the UNSC, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran.[16] South Korea was required to table such a resolution 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member did so. Any permanent UNSC member (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto the South Korean resolution. The E3 previously outlined three conditions to extend the expiration date of the snapback mechanism, which is currently October 18, 2025. The three conditions are that Iran must account for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding inspections and verification of its nuclear sites, and resume negotiations with the United States. Iran rejected these conditions prior to August 28 but has since made progress toward fulfilling these conditions.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo on September 9 regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.[17] Some reports have indicated that the Iran-IAEA agreement would involve Iran submitting a report on the status of its HEU to the IAEA in one month, after which the IAEA and Iran would negotiate how the IAEA could verify the Iranian report. Neither Iran nor the IAEA has confirmed the details of the agreement at the time of this writing, however.[18] Araghchi stated after the signing of the agreement that “any hostile action against Iran,” including the reimposition of UNSC sanctions, would make the Iran-IAEA agreement “null and void.”[19] Araghchi similarly proposed an “interim deal” that would provide “more clarity” about the status of Iran’s HEU stockpile during a meeting with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in Qatar on September 5.[20]

Iran has also indicated a greater willingness to negotiate with the United States on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran during negotiations.[21] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei reportedly asked Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to seek Qatar’s help in mediating with the United States and the E3 to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[22] UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on September 8 that Oman is “re-engaging” with Iran about “possible renewed dialogue.”[23] Araghchi held a phone call with his Omani counterpart on September 8.[24] Oman mediated the five rounds of talks between the United States and Iran before the Israel-Iran War.[25]

US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on September 8 that Iran no longer has a clear path to produce weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched up to 90 percent) because US and Israeli strikes destroyed Iran’s gas centrifuge enrichment program.[26] The Institute assessed that US and Israeli strikes destroyed or rendered inoperable all of Iran’s 20,000 centrifuges that it had installed across its three declared enrichment facilities.[27] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently reported that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[28] Iran would need to further enrich its 60 percent enriched uranium to be able to build a nuclear weapon. US and Israeli strikes also targeted Iran’s centrifuge production and research and development facilities, which will almost certainly also hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[29]

The Institute also published information about Iran’s fourth enrichment facility and reported that the facility does not appear to be operational after the war. Iran announced on June 12 that it would launch a newly built enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution that the IAEA Board of Governors had passed earlier that day.[30] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami stated that Iran would operationalize the facility by installing and activating centrifuges there.[31] Israel launched its first airstrikes targeting Iran on June 12, which suggests that Iran never installed centrifuges at the site. The Institute assessed that the new facility, known as the Esfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, is located within the tunnel complex at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center.[32] The Institute reported that US strikes damaged the site and assessed that the site is not currently operational.[33]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-9-2025/

Iran Update, September 10, 2025

The Wall Street Journal reported on September 10 that the Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement is unlikely to persuade the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to stop pursuing the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran because the agreement does not include a timeline for inspections or a deadline for Iran to clarify the status of its enriched uranium stockpile.[1] The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28, which will automatically reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran on September 27 if the UNSC does not extend sanctions relief for Iran or postpone the snapback mechanism’s expiration date.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo on September 9 regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.[3] The E3 stated in response to the agreement that “it is not enough for Iran to make promises for tomorrow.”[4] UK Ambassador to the UN Corinne Kitsell stated on September 10 that the E3 “must be prepared to hold Iran to account” if Iran does not grant full access to its nuclear sites to the IAEA.[5] Grossi stated that the details of the agreement will not be made public due to its “technical and operational” nature and that the agreement “will open the way for the respective inspections and access.”[6] Araghchi stated that the agreement will be considered “void” if the UNSC reimposes sanctions on Iran.[7] Araghchi also stated that Iran will not allow inspectors to access Iranian nuclear facilities besides the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant for fuel replacement.[8]

The casualties from Israel’s strikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9 remain unclear.[9] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders who were meeting to discuss ongoing ceasefire negotiations.[10] Saudi media reported that the Israeli strikes killed at least three Hamas leaders, including Hamas’ Gaza Strip leader Khalil al Hayya, West Bank leader Zaher Jabarin, and Leadership Council member Khaled Meshaal.[11] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on September 9 that the Israeli security establishment felt “optimistic” about the strikes’ success and estimated that it would take several hours to confirm which Hamas officials were killed in the strikes.[12] A senior Israeli official told the Guardian on September 10 that Israel’s optimism about the strikes’ success was “waning.”[13] Two Israeli defense and intelligence sources similarly told Israeli media that they felt pessimistic about whether the strikes killed “most or even all” of the intended targets.[14] Israel reportedly informed the United States that the likelihood of the strikes’ success has “decreased significantly.”[15] Hamas has denied that the Israeli strikes killed any of its negotiating team, which includes Hayya, Jabarin, and Meshaal.[16] Hamas has consistently lied about the deaths of senior commanders and waited weeks or even months to confirm the deaths of commanders who were killed by Israel in the Gaza Strip, however. There have been no official Israeli statements about which Hamas officials were killed in the strikes at the time of this writing.

Qatar and several regional countries have strongly criticized Israel’s recent strikes in Doha.[17] Qatar condemned Israel’s violation of its sovereignty and stated that it reserves the right to respond to the strikes and will “act firmly” against any “reckless breach” that threatens Qatari security.[18] Qatar also announced that it formed a legal team to take action against Israel in response to the strikes.[19] Several Gulf and regional countries also strongly condemned the Israeli strikes and expressed support for Qatar on September 9.[20] The UAE called the Israeli strikes a “reckless attack” and “flagrant violation” of international law, while Iran and Saudi Arabia characterized the strikes as a “criminal act.”[21] The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that the Israeli strikes indicate that Israel does not seek a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[22] Regional leaders are converging in Doha to meet with Qatari leaders and show support for Qatar following the strikes.[23] UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed al Nahyan and Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah arrived in Qatar on September 10, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salam is expected to arrive in Qatar on September 11.[24]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-10-2025/

Iran Update, September 11, 2025

The Iraqi Independence Gathering in Najaf, which is a political advocacy group, launched a campaign to pressure the Iraqi government to prevent parties tied to armed factions from running in the November 2025 parliamentary elections. The Iraqi Independence Gathering submitted a complaint to the Department of Political Parties and Organizations under the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC).[13] IHEC was established in 2019 as an “independent and impartial body” responsible for developing election rules and regulations, approving candidates running for elections, adjudicating electoral complaints and appeals, and approving election results.[14] The Iraqi Independence Gathering cited Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution in its complaints. Article 9 bars the formation of militias and excludes all Iraqi security forces from participating in or being affiliated with any political activity.[15] The organization also claimed that parties violated Articles 8 and 47 of the 2015 Political Parties Law Number 36.[16] Articles 8 and 47 of the 2015 Political Parties Law prohibit political parties from having any ties to armed factions and state that violators will face a prison sentence.[17]

The Iraqi Independence Gathering also filed a lawsuit with the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court against Parliament to challenge the current Elections Act.[18] The organization claimed that the Elections Act contained articles that contradicted the Iraqi constitution. The Iraqi Independence Gathering claimed the following political parties violated Iraqi federal and election laws:[19]

Muntasirun Bloc: led by Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada head Safaa Salem Hamid al Maliki;
Islamic Movement of Iraq (Harakat al Iraq al Islamiyah): led by Imam Ali Brigades Secretary General Shibl Mohsen Ubaid al Zaidi;
Services Alliance (Tahaluf Hadmat): led by Imam Ali Brigades Deputy Secretary General Ali Zaidan Hamid al Gharawi;
Conservative Party: led by Popular Mobilization Forces member Wael Asim Hussein al Shammari;
Jihad and Construction Party (Harakat al Jihad al Bina): led by Saraya al Jihad founder Jawad Rahim Qasim al Saadi;
National Elite Alliance (Tahaluf al Safwat al Watani): led by Ansar Allah al Awfiya militia commander Haidar Mazhar Malak al Gharawi;
National Plateau Alliance (Tahaluf al Hadba al Watani): led by Kataib Sayyida al Shudada Secretary General Hashim Fityan Rahm (Abu Alaa al Walai);
Babylon Party: led by Raban Salem Sadiq al Kildani. The Babylon Party is the political wing of the 50th PMF Brigade (also known as the Babylon Brigade).
Badr Organization: led by Hadi al Ameri. Ameri also leads the Badr Organization’s military wing.[20]
Sadiqoun Movement: led by Qais al Khazali. Khazali also leads the armed wing of the Sadiqoun Movement, Asaib Ahl al Haq.[21]
The Iraqi Independence Gathering’s complaint to IHEC and lawsuit with the Federal Supreme Court are unlikely to achieve meaningful results. The parties listed by the Iraqi Independence Gathering have also co-opted many of Iraq’s adjudicating bodies and can protect members from prosecution. Parliament appointed a Shia Coordination Framework-approved judge, Abbas al Fatlawi, as the head of IHEC’s Electoral Administration in April 2023, in a move that was reportedly part of a broader effort to fill the IHEC Board of Commissioners with judges loyal to the Shia Coordination Framework.[22] The president of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, Faiq Zaidan, has similarly been accused of cooperating with Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors to pass favorable court decisions.[23]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-11-2025/

Iran Update, September 12, 2025

Iranian officials are using Israel's September 9 strike in Doha, Qatar, to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region. Israel's September 9 airstrike targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, caused the Gulf states to condemn Israeli actions.[1] Iran has exploited these frustrations among Gulf states by questioning the reliability of US partnerships. Iranian officials have made statements and held a series of meetings and phone calls with Gulf and Arab states since September 9, in which they condemned the Israeli airstrike as a “violation of international law.”[2] Iranian officials have misrepresented the degree of US knowledge of the Israeli strikes and have suggested that the US-brokered agreements are incapable of defending Arab states from Israeli attacks.[3] The United States did not have adequate foreknowledge of the Israeli strike to discourage the Israelis from conducting the strike. Iranian officials have painted the Israeli strike as a direct threat to the security of Gulf countries and called for the international community to hold Israel accountable for its “criminal act.”[4] Iran, of course, has repeatedly targeted Gulf states with much less precision and to much greater effect. Iran fired missiles and drones at the Saudi oil terminal in Dhafran in 2019, for example, which forced Saudi Arabia to dip into its oil reserves to support exports.[5] Tehran interim Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami addressed the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia — all countries that have security partnerships with the United States — during Friday prayers on September 12 and warned that Israel would strike their country next if it was allowed to grow in power.[6]

This Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel is extremely unlikely to succeed, but Iran has presumably designed a gradual coalition-breaking effort to undermine US-led efforts to forge an anti-Iran coalition in the Middle East. The US-led effort to forge this coalition has paid dividends for the United States in the Middle East already. Many Gulf and other Arab states contributed to Israel‘s defense against Iranian missile and drone attacks in April and October 2024, for example. This defense decreased the likelihood of further escalation between Iran and Israel by helping prevent any significant damage to Israel. One Iranian diplomatic push is extremely unlikely to undo the progress the United States has made towards forging an anti-Iran coalition, especially after the Iranian attack on Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar in June 2025. The recent Iranian rhetoric degrading US diplomatic and security partnerships is part of a long-running line of effort in a long-standing Iranian campaign to weaken the United States and secure Iran's role as a regional hegemon. This line of effort has had no success to date.

Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani called for an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 14 and 15.[7] An unspecified source cited by Lebanese media on September 12 claimed that the Qatari government is prepared to launch a ”comprehensive diplomatic campaign” against Israel through the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the United Nations Security Council, and “even within Washington itself and the halls of Congress.”[8] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will attend the emergency Arab-Islamic summit on September 14 and 15 in Doha, Qatar.[9]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is similarly trying to sow doubt about the United States’ role in the region. These narratives, although not coordinated with Iran, support Iranian objectives to decrease regional support for the United States. The PRC's Foreign Ministry stated on September 10 that the Israeli strikes were linked to the US bias towards Israel, implying that the United States ignored the Gulf states’ security concerns.[10] Chinese state-owned media widely covered the Israeli strike in Doha and accused the United States of foreknowledge of the strikes. Chinese state media Xinhua reported on September 10 that the Israeli airstrikes in Doha were “a clear escalation” involving a sovereign Arab country that has no direct military hostilities with Israel.[11] State broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) reported on September 11 that it would have been “very difficult” for Israel to have launched its airstrikes on Doha without US approval.[12] A Chinese scholar similarly told CCTV on September 11 that the United States did not attempt to stop the Israeli strikes after receiving advanced warning from Israel about the strikes.[13] The PRC has previously tried to exploit unpopular US policies among Arab states to undermine the US role as the primary regional partner.[14]

The PRC's statements incorrectly characterize the United States’ role in Israel's recent strikes in Doha and attempt to demonstrate that the United States is an unreliable security partner for Gulf states. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office indicated that Israel unilaterally conducted its airstrikes in Doha.[15] US officials stated that Israel's warning gave the United States no time to warn Qatar.[16] The United States was only informed while Israeli jets were in the air, giving the United States only enough time to briefly inform Qatar and no time to force Israel to call off the strike.

Members of the Iranian regime are trying to prepare for supreme leader succession by taking steps to secure their influence within the regime after the eventual passing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. UK-based media outlet “IranWire” reported on September 12 that, according to a senior Iranian diplomat, Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber are the regime stalwarts most in contact with Khamenei and are positioning themselves for more influence in the regime in the event of a succession.[17] The report comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[18] The diplomat stated that Larijani is actively engaging with reformists, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders, and grand ayatollahs to prepare the country diplomatically, economically, and militarily for the transition period.[19] Larijani has been a key figure within the Iranian policy space over the past two decades and supported major initiatives, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, also known as the 2015 nuclear deal).[20] Larijani has taken on a prominent role in shaping Iranian foreign policy as a pragmatic hardliner since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. The diplomat added that Mokhber is actively trying to undermine Larijani’s efforts by exploiting his “controversial” history with Iran's media and security apparatus.[21] Mokhber previously served as the head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order (EIKO)—a parastatal organization directly controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—between 2007 and 2021.[22]

This political maneuvering is occurring as Khamenei continues to be absent from important political decisions. The IranWire report stated that senior Iranian officials are growing increasingly concerned about the health of Khamenei following a reduction in communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[23] The senior Iranian diplomat stated that Khamenei’s office did not brief Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi before this year's UN General Assembly as it normally does, and that the Foreign Affairs Ministry is operating “almost independently.”[24] Khamenei’s personal absence could be explained by increased security measures, though it is unclear why his office could not communicate with other elements of the Iranian government. Khamenei did not make any public appearances during the Israel-Iran War except for three pre-recorded televised speeches.[25] Khamenei gave 12 speeches in the 80-day period before the Israel-Iran War (March 24-June 12), while he has only given four speeches in the 80-day period after the war (June 24-September 12).[26] Western media reported on June 22 that a group of Iranian businessmen, political and military figures, and relatives of high-ranking clerics had begun planning how to lead Iran without Khamenei.[27]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-12-2025/

Iran Update, September 15, 2025

A recent op-ed from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media offers insight into how some elements of the Iranian regime may be viewing the relationship between the United States, Israel, and the Gulf in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha.[1] IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim released an op-ed on September 14 in which it claimed that Israel has played an increasingly divisive role in the relationship between the United States and the Gulf states.[2] Tasnim suggested that the Gulf states should make their continued economic cooperation with the United States contingent upon US efforts to “contain” Israel.[3] The report also added that the Gulf countries can diversify their partnerships with other countries with US adversaries, particularly Russia and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC).[4] It is unclear if Iranian officials are directly attempting to convince Gulf states to undertake any of these efforts in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes on Hamas leaders in Qatar.

Tasnim’s op-ed is consistent with how Iranian officials have been framing Israel’s September 9 strikes as an opportunity to unite regional powers in an anti-United States, anti-Israel regional coalition.[5] Tehran interim Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami recently addressed the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia—all countries that have security partnerships with the United States—and warned that Israel would strike their country next if it was allowed to grow in power.[6] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani similarly urged regional Islamic countries on September 13 to establish a “joint operations room” against Israel to avoid their ”own annihilation.”[7] Proposals like Larijani’s are unlikely to be taken seriously by the Gulf states because Iran has consistently conducted military attacks targeting the Gulf and could continue to do so in the future.

Qatar hosted an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15 to discuss the recent Israeli strikes in Doha.[8] No Gulf state, including Qatar, has made any tangible moves to punish Israel for the strikes. Numerous Gulf and Arab leaders attended the summit, including Emirati Vice President Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sabah Khaled al Hamad al Sabah, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[9] The heads of state and other representatives condemned the Israeli strikes, reaffirmed solidarity with Qatar in its right to respond, and stressed the need for the international community to act urgently to ”deter Israel.”[10] The Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discussed the repercussions of the Israeli airstrikes and asserted that the strikes constitute a direct threat to the Gulf’s joint security.[11] The GCC stated that Israel’s ongoing ”aggressive policies” undermine the future of ”existing understandings and agreements” with Israel, likely referring to the Abraham Accords and other economic agreements between GCC countries and Israel.[12]

Iran does not appear to have made serious commitments in its new agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Iranian effort to secure an agreement was likely an attempt to delay or prevent potential snapback sanctions. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed the Iran-IAEA agreement on September 9.[13] Grossi stated on September 10 that the agreement sets procedures for inspections and reporting on all Iranian facilities, including sites damaged during the 12-day War.[14] Araghchi stated on September 11 that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA will solely take place under a “new framework” that is defined by parliamentary law and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[15] The SNSC Secretariat confirmed in a statement on September 14 that all cooperation with the IAEA requires SNSC approval and that Iran will provide reports to the IAEA only after establishing its own internal security and safety conditions.[16] Iran has continued to refrain from cooperating with the IAEA in the days since the agreement and has not provided the IAEA with any timeline for resumed inspections or any clarification about the whereabouts of its remaining stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium.[17] Iran’s newly defined limitations on its resumed cooperation with the IAEA follow a long pattern of Iran’s partial and conditional cooperation with the IAEA. Iran also restricted IAEA oversight after 2021 by removing monitoring equipment and expelling inspectors.[18] Iran has also historically restricted IAEA oversight by refusing access to certain facilities associated with its pre-2003 weapons program and by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[19] The European Union (EU) warned at the 69th IAEA General Conference on September 15 that the IAEA has not been able to access most safeguarded facilities since June 2025.[20]

Iran is simultaneously attempting to discourage the E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from imposing snapback sanctions by threatening to suspend Iran’s agreed cooperation with the IAEA if sanctions are imposed. Araghchi claimed on September 11 that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA is separate from its disputes with the Europeans over the snapback mechanism.[21] The SNSC specified on September 14 that any ”hostile” actions—including the imposition of snapback sanctions—would suspend Iran’s implementation of the Iran-IAEA agreement, which demonstrates that—contrary to Araghchi’s claim—Iran does view cooperation with the IAEA as connected with the snapback mechanism.[22] The E3 triggered the 30-day JCPOA snapback process on August 28 but offered to extend the deadline by six months if Iran restored full IAEA cooperation, resumed negotiations with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[23] Araghchi dismissed the E3 demands as “unrealistic, unreasonable, and contrary to Iran’s national interest.[24] Iran has not complied with E3’s demands, which, combined with Araghchi’s comments, have left the E3 unconvinced that the Iran-IAEA agreement reflects any meaningful movement towards an Iranian effort to avoid snapback.[25]

French diplomatic sources speaking to French media said that Israeli intelligence assesses that US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon in the short term. An unspecified French diplomatic source told French media outlet Le Monde on September 13 that Israeli intelligence assessed in early September that US and Israeli airstrikes destroyed Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing sites and uranium enrichment facilities, particularly at Fordow and Natanz.[35] The French source added that Israel assessed that Iran lacks the necessary equipment to begin rebuilding its nuclear weapons program in the short term, though Iran could rebuild its nuclear program over an unspecified longer period.[36] Israeli intelligence also assessed that Iran has maintained ”all” of its technical expertise despite Israel’s assassinations of more than a dozen scientists associated with Iran’s nuclear program.[37] The Israeli assessments are consistent with an Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) report from early September, which noted that US and Israeli strikes destroyed or rendered inoperable all of the 20,000 Iranian centrifuges that Iran had installed across its three declared enrichment facilities.[38] The Israeli assessments and ISIS report also agree that Iran retains approximately 450 kg of highly enriched uranium in gaseous form.[39]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-15-2025/

Iran Update, September 16, 2025

The United States sanctioned two Iranian financial facilitators and over a dozen Hong Kong- and United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based individuals and entities on September 16 for funding the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL).[17] The US Treasury Department stated on September 16 that two Iranian facilitators laundered more than $100 million in oil revenue through cryptocurrency, front companies, and exchange houses to support Iran’s weapons programs and the Axis of Resistance.

Alireza Derakhshan
Managed UAE- and Hong Kong-based front companies, including Alpa Trading – FZCO, Alpa Investment LLC, Alpa Hong Kong Limited, Paul AD Sons Trading FZE, Unique Station Trading, Minato Investment LLC, Minato Goods Wholesalers, Minato Commercial Brokers, Everest Investment LLC, and Alliance First Trading LLC.
Facilitated illicit flows of funds on behalf of MODAFL and the IRGC, with transactions worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Remained in contact with a sanctioned currency exchanger who manages Powell Raw Materials Trading LLC and Powell International FZE.
Arash Eskati Alivand
Coordinated cryptocurrency transactions and oil brokerage activities for the Iranian government.
Worked with the al Qaterji Company, a Syria-based IRGC Quds Force oil partner, to facilitate payments and sales.
Arranged a payment from Minato Commercial Brokers in 2023 (a Derakhshan-linked company) to an al Qaterji account.
Conducted transactions worth millions of dollars with Hezbollah-linked money changer Tawfiq Muhammad Said al Law, who provided Hezbollah with digital wallets to receive funds tied to IRGC Quds Force commodity sales.
A combination of larger oil stock levels at independent Chinese refineries and US sanctions on Chinese refineries using Iranian oil is forcing Iran to offer wider discounts on its oil exports to China.[18] The United States imposed sanctions on Qingdao Port Haiye Dongjiakou Oil Products on August 21 for receiving Iranian oil on designated tankers.[19] The Haiye Dongjiakou terminal, one of China’s largest handlers of Iranian crude, suspended operations shortly after the US sanctions.[20] Kpler reported that crude imports at Dongjiakou Port fell 65 percent in September after the terminal suspended operations. Reuters reported that demand for Iranian oil in China dropped because oil stockpiles in Shandong had reached record levels, which made refining at smaller refineries less profitable. Decreased Chinese government oil quotas further discouraged oil buyers.[21] Iranian suppliers responded to the slump in demand caused by high oil stockpiles, government quotes, and US sanctions by offering deeper discounts to buyers in the PRC, with Iranian light crude trading about $6 below Brent in mid-September compared to $3 below Brent in March. Kpler predicted that traders will divert Iranian oil imports to another hub in the Qingdao Port area in response to sanctions on the Dongjiakou terminal.[22]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with senior Saudi officials in Riyadh on September 16, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel following Israel’s September 9 strike in Doha.[23] Larijani met with Saudi officials, including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, to discuss the “future of the region” and economic and defense cooperation.[24] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian officials are using the strikes in Doha to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break up the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region.[25] Larijani urged regional Islamic countries on September 13 to establish a ”joint operations room” against Israel to avoid their ”own annihilation.”[26] The recommendation for a joint operations room is unlikely to generate any support in Gulf capitals because of Iran’s adversarial relationship with the Gulf states, most of which have all been attacked by Iran or its proxies within the last five years. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Qatari and Iraqi officials on the sidelines of the emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15.[27]

Iranian Artesh Strategic Studies Center head Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan stated on September 16 that Iran will engage Israel and the United States in areas beyond missile operations in future conflicts.[28] The Artesh Strategic Studies Center is responsible for conducting research to improve the Artesh‘s strategic plans.[29] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh similarly stated in August 2025 that Iran has “tools” other than missiles that it has not used yet.[30] Iranian leaders likely learned lessons about the limitations of missile attacks on Israel from the Israel-Iran War and Iran’s two large-scale missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-16-2025/

Iran Update, September 17, 2025

The E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) stated on September 17 that Iran has not taken any concrete steps required to delay the snapback mechanism.[1] The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[2] The UN Security Council will reimpose sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with the foreign ministers of the E3 and EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 17 to discuss snapback sanctions.[3] The E3 previously offered to extend the deadline by six months if Iran restored full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resumed negotiations with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[4] Iran signed an agreement with the IAEA on September 9 that set procedures for inspections on all Iranian nuclear facilities, but only within parameters set by Iran.[5] The agreement also did not provide a timeline for inspections or clarification about the whereabouts of its remaining stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium.[6] Araghchi stated on September 11 that the evaluation of enriched material buried under the rubble is still under review and will be submitted to the Supreme National Security Council, which will make the final decision based on Iran's security concerns. European states remain unconvinced that Iran's steps with the IAEA are serious.[7] Kallas separately warned on September 17 that the “window for finding a diplomatic solution” on Iran's nuclear issue is closing and added that Iran must take ”credible steps“ to meet E3 demands.[8] Germany's Foreign Ministry similarly stated that Iran has yet to take “reasonable and precise actions.”[9] British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper also stated that Iran has not taken the necessary steps to avoid the reimposition of snapback sanctions and emphasized that the UK needs “concrete action.”[10]

The US State Department designated Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Kataib Imam Ali, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) on September 17.[11] These four militias are part of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[12] US federal law makes it a crime for any person in the United States or subject to US jurisdiction to knowingly provide “material support or resources,” including financial services, training, or weapons, to a designated FTO.[13] The United States Treasury Department previously designated these militias and their leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).[14] The US Treasury Department has the authority to block the assets of SDGTs and any individual or entity that provides them with support or services.[15] US individuals or entities are also prohibited, with limited exemptions, from engaging in any transaction with a designated SDGT.[16] These designations come as the United States continues to pressure the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq and disarm Iran-backed militias by threatening sanctions.[17]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-17-2025/

Iran Update, September 18, 2025

Senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, met with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov in Tehran on September 18 to discuss energy cooperation, likely in an effort to address energy shortages in Iran.[1] Paknejad and Tsivilyov reviewed the Iran-Russia April 2025 agreement for Russia to export 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Iran annually via Azerbaijan.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated in January 2025 that Russian gas deliveries to Iran would start at 2 billion cubic meters per year and could increase to 55 billion cubic meters annually.[3] Iran, and especially northern Iran, faces recurring gas shortages during the winter because Iran has limited gas storage capacity, and energy production is concentrated in the South Pars gas field in southern Iran.[4] Iranian media reported that Iran faces a potential steep decline in overall gas production over the next five to seven years.[5] Iranian officials may be concerned about potential unrest as a result of ongoing chronic energy shortages. Energy shortages have previously caused protests in northeastern Iran.[6] Recent energy shortages have forced the Iranian government to temporarily shut down offices, banks, schools, and government buildings.[7]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi also met with Tsivilyov and emphasized the importance of deepening bilateral defense cooperation amid Western sanctions.[8] These meetings reflect Iranian efforts to deepen strategic cooperation with Russia under the framework of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.

French President Emmanuel Macron stated on September 18 that UN snapback sanctions on Iran are a “done deal” and will be reimposed at the end of September.[9] Macron told Israeli media that Iran has failed to make serious commitments.[10] Iran reportedly presented the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) with a proposal earlier this week to extend the snapback deadline by several months in exchange for positive steps to curtail its nuclear program and an Iranian move to resume talks with the United States.[11] The E3 reportedly viewed the proposal as “insufficient,” according to a source familiar with the proposal.[12] The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[13] The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA.

Iran views Russia and China as critical to its efforts to rebuild its military and prepare for future conflict. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet Defa Press published an article on September 15 discussing how Iran will benefit from an upcoming BRICS naval exercise.[14] BRICS, which is an international economic coalition comprised of the PRC, Russia, and others, was scheduled to conduct a combined naval exercise with Iran and others in November 2025, though BRICS has delayed the exercise indefinitely. This would mark the first combined exercise with Iranian participation since the Israel-Iran war. The Iranian article asserted that the exercise would help Iran develop “modern tactics” across multiple domains, test domestically produced weapons, and share weapons technology and intelligence with other exercise participants.[15] Indeed, combined exercises provide a controlled environment for militaries to test new tactics and equipment, enhance their interoperability, and learn from one another—all of which Tehran likely values heavily given its need to rebuild its military.

The Iranian discussion about the BRICS naval exercise came as Tehran has looked to the Adversary Entente for critical military and economic assistance. Iran has reportedly sought to buy advanced air defenses and fighter jets from the PRC and Russia in recent weeks.[16] Iran will need foreign help for the foreseeable future to reconstitute the damage that Israel inflicted upon Iranian air and air defense capabilities. Iranian officials and state media have separately emphasized in recent weeks the need to deepen economic cooperation with the PRC to withstand international sanctions.

The Iranian military establishment has discussed acquiring Russian-made Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems as part of the Iranian military reconstitution effort. An Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet published an article on September 13 discussing efforts to strengthen Iranian air defense following the Israel-Iran war and focusing particularly on using Krasukha EW systems.[17] The Iranian military establishment has been very interested in improving its EW capabilities, particularly against the backdrop of the Russian war in Ukraine.[18] The Iranian leadership has more broadly emphasized the need to improve domestic defensive capabilities since the June 2025 Israel-Iran war.[19] Russia developed the 1L269 Krasukha in 2010 as a ground-based EW system built to neutralize low earth orbit (LEO) spy satellites, ground-based radars, airborne surveillance radars, and radar-guided ordinance at ranges between 150-300 kilometers.[20] Russia deployed the Krasukha-4 to Syria in 2015.[21] Commander of US Special Operations Command General Raymond Thomas reported in 2018 that Russian EW attacks in Syria had disrupted communications, EC-130s, and other equipment.[22] Satellite imagery captured in January 2024 showed that Iran had deployed a Krasukha-4 system to Bandar Abbas.[23] Israel struck military targets at Bandar Abbas during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, though it is unclear whether the Krasukha systems were impacted.[24] Israel used F-35s during its strikes into Iran, which are equipped with advanced counter-electronic warfare capabilities and can likely evade the Krasukha-4.[25] The Iranian military establishment may therefore be interested in new Krasukha-4 systems to defend against Israeli drone operations. Israel launched a wave of drones at the onset of its strike campaign in Iran to suppress air defenses and electronic countermeasures and damage missile launchers.[26] Russia has used the Krasukha-4 EW system to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian military assets in the Russian rear and also explicitly credited the Krasukha-4 for the Russian ability to defend against Ukrainian ground-based counteroffensive operations in June 2023.[27] Iran is likely hoping to acquire the Krasukha-4 and integrate these operational lessons in future defensive operations against Israel.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2025/

Both Russia and Iran have a shortage of refined petroleum products, but Russia has a surplus of natural gas.

Iran Update, September 19, 2025

Iran is attempting to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), but avoids any meaningful commitments regarding its nuclear program and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian and US officials have reportedly been in direct contact in recent days to discuss a new nuclear proposal.[1] Iran‘s new proposal stipulates that Iran would resume talks with the United States over an interim deal while the E3 simultaneously halts the snapback process and extends UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 for several months to allow time for negotiations. UNSC Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, prohibited Iran from engaging in “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons…until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day.”[2] Iran's proposal said that the United States must also provide a guarantee that there will be no more strikes on Iran once an interim deal is reached. Iran would then begin retrieving its 60 percent highly enriched uranium stockpile. The proposal calls for the following three steps to be conducted after Iran's retrieval and the United States provides a security guarantee:

The UNSC will permanently terminate Resolution 2231.
Iran will dilute its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile to 20 percent for use in fuel plates at the Tehran Research Reactor.
The United States will lift sanctions it agreed to in the interim deal, and both sides will begin talks for a “final agreement.”

An unspecified political source told Amwaj Media that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi submitted the Iranian proposal to US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead nuclear negotiator Steve Witkoff on September 16.[3] Araghchi separately gave the same proposal to E3 foreign ministers and EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 17.[4] The E3 responded to the proposal, calling it “insufficient in substance.”[5] An unspecified source familiar with the proposal stated that the Iranian proposal demands “far-reaching actions,” but includes “no concrete action” from Iran.[6] The United States has not responded to the proposal at the time of writing.[7] These Iranian steps are inconsistent with the stated US position on any nuclear agreement with Iran.

The UNSC rejected a draft resolution on September 19 to permanently lift sanctions on Iran.[8] South Korea, which is the UNSC’s current president, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran.[9] South Korea was required to hold the resolution for 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member held the resolution. The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[10] The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA. Snapback sanctions target Iran's arms transfers and nuclear program more broadly, including its domestic enrichment activities.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, likely in response to multiple security concerns, including Iran.[11] The agreement is a mutual defense guarantee under which an attack on one party would trigger a response by both countries.[12] Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif stated on September 18 that Pakistan's nuclear program “will be made available” to Saudi Arabia if necessary.[13] Asif added that Pakistan or Saudi Arabia has not specified a “country whose attack would automatically trigger a retaliatory response,” which demonstrates that the agreement aims to address multiple security concerns rather than a single security threat.[14] Iranian media have portrayed the agreement as a response to Israel's September 9 strikes in Doha, Qatar, that drew condemnation from Gulf states.[15] Iranian outlets have also framed the agreement as a challenge to US influence in the region. An Iranian media outlet stated on September 19 that the agreement signals that “the era of unilateral dependence on America is over.”[16] The outlet claimed that the agreement shows that Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the United States toward other “independent options.”[17] Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been losing faith in US security guarantees for several years, at least since Iran targeted Saudi oil facilities with multiple missiles and drones in 2019, and a separate Iranian-backed attack struck Abu Dhabi, UAE, in 2022.[18] The timing of this agreement suggests that the recent Israeli strike in Doha factored in the Saudi decision to pursue and sign the agreement. But Iran has repeatedly targeted regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in the past, with much less precision and to a much greater effect than the Israeli strikes in Doha. The Iranian drone and missile attack in 2019 forced Saudi Arabia to dip into its oil reserves to support exports.[19] Iran has backed hundreds of Houthis and Iraqi militia attacks targeting the Gulf states since 2015 as well.[20] Iran similarly conducted missile and drone strikes in Pakistan in January 2024, claiming to target members of the Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl.[21] Iran has also repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of fomenting internal unrest in Iran and backing anti-regime groups in southeastern Iran.[22] Saudi Arabia has historically supported US efforts to curb Iranian influence in the region, including by fighting Iran‘s regional proxies such as the Houthis in Yemen.[23] CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran may be more concerned about this development than Iranian media coverage would suggest, given Iran's repeated attacks or support for attacks in both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The Iraqi federal government has reportedly suspended an agreement to import Turkmen gas due to US pressure. The deal would have enabled Iran to manage the gas flow and receive 23 percent of the gas daily.[24] Such an arrangement would have given Tehran additional revenue and leverage over Baghdad, depending on the specific terms of the deal. Iraq would have imported over five billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas through Iran under the deal, which Iraq and Turkmenistan first proposed in 2023, according to four unidentified Iraqi officials and documents viewed by Reuters.[25] The Iranian state-owned National Iranian Gas Company would have reportedly managed the gas flow, and Iran would have received up to 23 percent of that gas daily. This arrangement would have benefited Iran and presumably enabled Iran to gain some revenue. It would also give Tehran leverage over Baghdad, assuming Iran could adjust the specific amount of flow from Turkmenistan if Iran desired. The United States rejected the Iraqi federal government's previous attempts to justify the agreement, including an offer to employ a third-party international monitor to ensure that the agreement complied with US sanctions and anti-money laundering rules. An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on electricity issues implied that the United States would sanction Iraqi banks and financial institutions if the agreement moved forward. A source familiar with the matter told Reuters on September 19 that the United States refused to approve “arrangements that would benefit Iran.”[26] The US opposition to this agreement comes as the United States continues to pressure the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence in Iraq.[27] This deal would have nominally decreased Iraq's reliance on Iranian gas imports, but Iran's ability to ”manage” gas flows and receive 23 percent of the gas flow would have benefited Iran.

Iraq continues to rely on Iran to meet its energy demands. An unidentified Iraqi power official told Reuters on September 19 that Iranian gas fulfills nearly a third of Iraq's total power generation.[28] The United States revoked a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity in March 2025, but Iraq has continued to import Iranian gas.[29] Iran's ongoing, chronic energy shortages have complicated its ability to supply gas to Iraq, however. The office of Iraqi Electricity Minister Ziad Ali Fadel stated on August 1, ahead of Fadel’s meetings with Iranian officials in Tehran, that Fadel would discuss ways to ensure Iran's commitment to its contracts regarding oil exports to Iraq.[30] Iraqi energy shortages run the continued risk of threatening Iraqi political stability by triggering power outages, though the destabilizing effects of power outages in Iraq are less pronounced after the summer. Summer power cuts have previously caused major anti-government demonstrations in Iraq, which would be especially concerning ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[31] Iraq has continued to pursue alternative pathways to fulfill its energy demands beyond relying on Iran, including via potential imports of Qatari and Omani gas and improvements to its existing energy infrastructure.[32]

Iran tested an unidentified ballistic missile at the missile test range in the Semnan Space Center in Semnan Province on September 18.[33] Iranian provincial officials confirmed on September 18 that Iran had conducted a missile test.[34] Iranian security officials have not specified which missile they tested or the missile's specifications. A Western news outlet claimed that the tested missile may be part of the Sejjil-class system due to the missile's silhouette and launch characteristics. The Sejjil-class system is Iran's most advanced domestically produced medium-range ballistic missile.[35] Iran launched a Sejjil ballistic missile against Israel for the first time on June 18 during the Israel-Iran War.[36]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-19-2025/

Iran Update, September 22, 2025

Some Iranian hardliners are renewing calls to revise Iran’s nuclear doctrine as part of a broader effort to restore deterrence after the Israel-Iran War and two years of Israeli military actions that have collectively weakened Iran’s missile program and the Axis of Resistance, both of which were long pillars of Iran’s deterrence.[1] Seventy-one Iranian parliamentarians sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the heads of the three branches of government on September 22 and urged a revision of Iran’s defense doctrine.[2] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2003 that banned the production and use of nuclear weapons.[3] The SNSC and the three branches of government cannot overturn Khamenei’s fatwa, but they can advise Khamenei to allow Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. The new letter follows a similar effort in October 2024, when thirty-nine parliamentarians wrote to the SNSC and called for the revision of Iran’s “defense doctrine” and to issue permission and provide facilities for the “production of nuclear weapons.”[4] Paydari (Stability) Front parliamentarian Hassan Ali Akhlaghi Amiri was the lead signatory of both the October 2024 and September 2025 letters. The near doubling of signatories over the past year indicates that calls to weaponize Iran’s nuclear program have become increasingly normalized in regime discourse. An Iranian expert close to the regime stated, without evidence, on September 21 that 90 percent of Iranians support acquiring a nuclear weapon.[5]

Calls to revise Iran’s defense doctrine come as Iran has lost key pillars that it has traditionally used to deter its adversaries, including its missile and drone stockpiles and the Axis of Resistance. Israel has significantly degraded the Axis of Resistance and limited their ability or willingness to support Iran since October 2023. Iran’s proxies did not provide Iran with any meaningful support during the Israel-Iran War.[6] Only the Houthis attacked Israel at all, and the Houthis’ actions did not change Israeli behavior. Israel intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s missiles during the 12-day war and destroyed 35 to 45 percent of Iran’s missile stockpile.[7]

Iran is continuing to seek Russia’s help to solve Iran’s energy crisis. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami led an Iranian delegation to Russia on September 22 to discuss nuclear cooperation with Russian officials.[15] Eslami announced that Iran and Russia will sign an agreement to build eight nuclear power plants in Iran, including four in Bushehr.[16] Russia finished the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in 2010. BNPP supplies approximately two percent of Iran’s electrical consumption needs.[17] Russia agreed to build units two and three at BNPP in 2014.[18] Nuclear power plants, however, take a long time to construct and will not address Iran‘s energy crisis in the short term.[19] Eslami’s visit to Russia comes after senior Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, met with Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov in Tehran on September 18 to discuss energy cooperation, likely to address energy shortages in Iran.[20]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-22-2025/

Iran Update, September 23, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States in a speech on September 23.[1] Khamenei’s speech marks the first time that Khamenei has rejected all negotiations with the United States since the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Khamenei previously rejected direct talks with the United States but did not explicitly rule out the possibility of indirect negotiations in a speech in August 2025.[2] Khamenei did not distinguish between direct or indirect negotiations in his September 23 speech, which indicates that he likely rejects any type of negotiation with the United States.[3] Khamenei stated on September 23 that negotiations with the United States “do not serve [Iran’s] national interests” and cause serious and sometimes “irreparable damage.”[4] Khamenei claimed that the United States approaches negotiations with a predetermined goal to end Iran’s nuclear activities and enrichment and stated that engaging in such negotiations means accepting coercion. Khamenei warned that negotiating under threat signals submission and would embolden the United States to demand more concessions from Iran, such as reducing Iran’s missile range. Khamenei also reiterated that Iran will not accept the United States’ demand for Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment, stating that enrichment is a national achievement that was developed through decades of effort.[5]

Khamenei separately claimed that national unity was decisive in undermining Iran’s adversaries during the 12-day war. Khamenei stated that Iranians’ cohesion prevented unrest despite “enemy effort[s]” to kill commanders, disrupt state functions, and “eradicate Islam in Iran.”[6] Khamenei also highlighted the importance of swift leadership succession, the resilience of the Iranian armed forces, and effective state management during the war.[7] Khamenei’s remarks about unity echo other regime officials’ comments since the 12-day war about national cohesion and solidarity. Moderate and pragmatic figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, initiated calls for unity after the war.[8] Rouhani emphasized in July the need for unity and to rebuild trust between the regime and the Iranian people, for example. Other senior officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, have made similar statements about the importance of unity.[9]

Iran is highly unlikely to prevent the reimposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions by September 27 because Iran has failed to meet the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands for delaying the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with his E3 counterparts and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in New York on September 23 to try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[10] A European diplomat described the prospect of an agreement as “slim” because Iran has not fulfilled the E3’s conditions for delaying the snapback mechanism. These conditions include Iran granting inspectors full access to Iran’s nuclear sites, accounting for the location and amount of its highly enriched uranium stockpile, and resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States.[11] A US journalist reported on September 23 that Araghchi did not make progress toward preventing the reimposition of UNSC sanctions in his meeting with Kallas and the E3 officials.[12] Germany’s Foreign Office stated that the E3 and the European Union urged Iran to take “practical steps” in the coming hours and days to resume direct negotiations with the United States, among other steps.[13] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, as noted above.

Iran is attempting to use the September 9 Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement to pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process. The Iran-IAEA agreement reportedly sets procedures for future inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities but does not provide a timeline for inspections.[14] Araghchi met with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 22.[15] Grossi stated in an interview with PBS on September 22 that the IAEA has not received any “official communication” about Iran suspending the September 9 agreement.[16] Senior Iranian officials, including Araghchi, have maintained that the Iran-IAEA agreement will be voided if the E3 imposes snapback sanctions on Iran, however.[17] Iran may calculate that it can pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process by threatening to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, given that the E3 has repeatedly called for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and allow IAEA inspectors to resume inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-23-2025/

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