Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

various | 10-8-22

[nuconvert]

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, September 2, 2025

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development.[1] The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024.[2] The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024.[3] CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports. Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran‘s nuclear program.[4] The Financial Times reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research.[5] Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[6]

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China.[7] Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue.[8] Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement.[9] Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Iran’s nuclear rights and emphasized China’s commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[10]

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China’s efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions.[11] Pezeshkian‘s interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3’s position. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback ”ambiguous.“[12] Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran.[13] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil.[15] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Samarrai as well as nine vessels and seven entities, tied to Samarrai as part of a broader US effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[16] Samarrai’s network blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before marketing it to international buyers and generated millions of dollars in revenue for Samarrai and the Iranian regime.[17] Samarrai used a fleet of oil tankers operated by one of his UAE-based companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with US-sanctioned Iranian vessels.[18] The Iraqi Navy seized one of Samarrai’s tankers in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Basra Province, Iraq, on August 6, for lacking proper documentation.[19] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[20]

he Institute for Science and International Security (The Institute) reported on September 2 that Iran has moved almost all the chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at the Natanz Enrichment Complex to more secured areas based on satellite imagery.[31] The Institute assessed that Iran has likely moved the chillers to make the chillers less vulnerable to future airstrikes. Satellite imagery from August 30 shows that Iran has dispersed 19 of the 24 total chillers from the two HVAC buildings at the FEP.[32] Chillers help an HVAC system maintain certain temperatures within a facility to protect critical equipment and personnel at the facility and enable optimal functioning. The Institute reported that the chillers are currently not in use because the centrifuges at FEP are still inoperable, and there is no electric power.[33] Israeli airstrikes damaged electrical substations and support buildings critical to the power supply at Natanz.[34] US and Israeli airstrikes rendered the underground centrifuges at Natanz inoperable due to the “sudden loss of external power,” according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi.[35]

Senior Iranian officials met with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan to discuss Iranian concerns about the Zangezur Corridor. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani and his newly appointed Deputy for International Affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss the recent US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement that would grant the United States exclusive development rights to a strategic corridor in the southern Caucasus.[36] Grigoryan stated that Armenia is ”ready to provide guarantees to Iran“ in order to preserve Iran-Armenia relations.”[37] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 to discuss Iran’s opposition to the presence of US soldiers along the new corridor and emphasized Iran’s commitment to deepening bilateral military relations.[38] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Grigoryan on August 30 and stated that Iran’s concerns about the presence of foreign forces in the southern Caucasus have been ”largely resolved” following Larijani and Grigoryan’s meeting.[39] Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence while increasing US influence.[40]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-2-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, September 3, 2025

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press.[1] The Associated Press reported on September 3 that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 32.5 kilograms between May 17 and June 13, citing the unreleased IAEA report.[2] Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile is equivalent to approximately 10.5 significant quantities, which refers to the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[3] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely to be able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however. The IAEA report added that Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,874.9 kilograms.[4] This amount marks a 627.3 kilogram increase in Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium since May 17.[5] The IAEA reported that the IAEA has not inspected any Iranian nuclear site except the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant since the Israel-Iran War.[6] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on September 3 that Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on the status of Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile since June 13.[7] CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated in July 2025 that the US and Israeli strikes during the war buried the “vast majority” of Iran's enriched uranium at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow and that it would be “extremely difficult” for Iran to extract the material.[8] The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence that Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the ENTC since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery.[9] Grossi said that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that Israel and the United States struck during the war.[10]

Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[11] The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.[12] The directive advised media outlets to frame potential sanctions as a sign of European dependence on the United States, emphasize Iran's ability to withstand economic pressure, and avoid portraying Iran's future negatively.[13] Iranian Judiciary Spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated on September 3 that the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was “a propaganda and psychological tool to target the people's morale through psychological warfare.”[14] Jahangir urged Iranian media outlets to act “intelligently” and “maintain national cohesion and unity.”[15] Iranian media outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on September 2 that encouraged Iranian civilians and officials to maintain “national self-confidence” and avoid “simplistic and exaggerated rhetoric” regarding the E3’s snapback decision.[16] The Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent reports about the negative economic impacts of sanctions from further increasing public frustration about Iran's poor economic conditions and potentially driving economic-related unrest. The regime's efforts to control the Iranian media space come as the Iranian rial has depreciated to near record-low levels in recent days and the Iranian economy faces exorbitant inflation.[17]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-3-2025/

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, September 4, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency proposed a series of steps on September 3 that it argued the Iranian regime should take to confront hybrid warfare.[1] The regime defines hybrid warfare as “the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.”[2] The Tasnim report outlined the following three main areas that Iran must address to withstand hybrid warfare:

Redefining Governance Structures and Processes: Tasnim called for re-engineering Iran's governance system and warned that a centralized bureaucracy is too slow and brittle for hybrid war.[3] Tasnim urged the regime to create mechanisms to monitor internal divisions, accelerate bureaucratic processes, and provide more authority to governors and local officials. It argued that decentralized power would make governance more flexible and resilient, which would speed up the regime's responses to crises such as unrest, cyberattacks, or supply disruptions.

Reforming the Relationship Between the Regime and People: Tasnim called for the regime to treat the Iranian people as Iran's main strategic asset rather than dependents of the state.[4] It stressed that victory in hybrid war requires citizens to actively participate in governance, including via neighborhood security, the economy, and cultural resistance. Tasnim highlighted that small, agile grassroots groups involved with technology, media, and culture would counter stronger adversaries and shape public opinion so that people accept hardships as part of a larger struggle for independence and survival.

Developing Iran's “resistance economy:” Tasnim called for the regime to turn the economy into a “defensive stronghold.”[5] It emphasized the need to end dependence on crude oil sales, cut reliance on food imports and gas consumption, and enforce tight control over foreign exchange and trade. Tasnim also called for building long-term cooperation with Axis of Resistance members, neighboring states, and emerging powers such as Russia and China to secure essential goods and bypass Western economic pressure.

Tasnim also warned that adversaries use media narratives to target the minds and will of the people, which the outlet referred to as “narrative warfare.”[6] Tasnim’s call to prioritize narrative warfare is consistent with recent regime efforts to control domestic reporting on snapback sanctions.[7] Iranian officials have recently directed outlets to downplay the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) activation of the snapback mechanism and avoid negative portrayals of Iran's future.[8]

Iran continues to refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A Western media journalist posted on X on September 3 that Iran proposed a new inspection arrangement to the IAEA on August 14 that would delay IAEA inspection requests for Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), which are the three major Iranian nuclear facilities that were struck by Israel and the United States during the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian proposal would allow Iran to determine how Iran's nuclear activities would be investigated.[14] Iran also revoked the accreditations of two experienced IAEA inspectors in August for mistakenly taking documents from Fordow to Vienna that reportedly described the facility's interior.[15] The IAEA stated that the revocation was unjustified because the documents did not include any information that would compromise the facility's security.[16] This comes after the Iranian parliament passed a law on June 25 suspending all cooperation with the IAEA.[17] IAEA Director General Grossi said on September 3 that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, but it is unlikely that any agreement will be reached due to Iran's opposition.[18]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-4-2025/

[AdmSmith]

18JUN2025 This graphic from @Doron_Kadosh, an Israeli Army Radio correspondent, supports some of what we @criticalthreats and
@TheStudyofWar have been assessing: Iran may have suffered significant losses among its med-range ballistic missile launchers.

It is possible (and not mutually exclusive with the above) that Iran is shooting smaller salvos to minimize the number of launchers Israeli aircraft can find and destroy. Reminder: Iran fired at least a hundred missiles at once back in October 2024, and given the far more serious threat they now face (a threat to the regime itself), it is more likely that Iran is unable to fire large amounts of missiles rather than unwilling to do so.

https://x.com/brian_cartr/status/1935392563088798008

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, September 5, 2025

Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The E3 triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28.[1] The E3 previously told Iran that they would delay the reimposition of UN sanctions by up to six months if Iran met three key conditions, which include restoring the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear facilities, addressing concerns about Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, and engaging in direct talks with the United States.[2] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 4 in Qatar to discuss Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the resumption of IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear sites.[3] A Wall Street Journal reporter stated on September 4 that the talks produced no progress, and neither side shifted its stance during the talks.[4] Iran and the IAEA are expected to meet in Vienna on September 5.[5] Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna, Reza Najafi, stated on September 5 that the discussions will define cooperation under Iran’s parliamentary law and establish the “new form of cooperation” with the agency.[6] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA.[7] Iran recently allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to monitor fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), but has barred them from accessing or inspecting damaged nuclear sites.[8]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-5-2025/