Iran Update, September 23, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States in a speech on September 23.[1] Khamenei’s speech marks the first time that Khamenei has rejected all negotiations with the United States since the end of the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Khamenei previously rejected direct talks with the United States but did not explicitly rule out the possibility of indirect negotiations in a speech in August 2025.[2] Khamenei did not distinguish between direct or indirect negotiations in his September 23 speech, which indicates that he likely rejects any type of negotiation with the United States.[3] Khamenei stated on September 23 that negotiations with the United States “do not serve [Iran’s] national interests” and cause serious and sometimes “irreparable damage.”[4] Khamenei claimed that the United States approaches negotiations with a predetermined goal to end Iran’s nuclear activities and enrichment and stated that engaging in such negotiations means accepting coercion. Khamenei warned that negotiating under threat signals submission and would embolden the United States to demand more concessions from Iran, such as reducing Iran’s missile range. Khamenei also reiterated that Iran will not accept the United States’ demand for Iran to halt domestic uranium enrichment, stating that enrichment is a national achievement that was developed through decades of effort.[5]
Khamenei separately claimed that national unity was decisive in undermining Iran’s adversaries during the 12-day war. Khamenei stated that Iranians’ cohesion prevented unrest despite “enemy effort[s]” to kill commanders, disrupt state functions, and “eradicate Islam in Iran.”[6] Khamenei also highlighted the importance of swift leadership succession, the resilience of the Iranian armed forces, and effective state management during the war.[7] Khamenei’s remarks about unity echo other regime officials’ comments since the 12-day war about national cohesion and solidarity. Moderate and pragmatic figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, initiated calls for unity after the war.[8] Rouhani emphasized in July the need for unity and to rebuild trust between the regime and the Iranian people, for example. Other senior officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, have made similar statements about the importance of unity.[9]
Iran is highly unlikely to prevent the reimposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions by September 27 because Iran has failed to meet the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands for delaying the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with his E3 counterparts and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in New York on September 23 to try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[10] A European diplomat described the prospect of an agreement as “slim” because Iran has not fulfilled the E3’s conditions for delaying the snapback mechanism. These conditions include Iran granting inspectors full access to Iran’s nuclear sites, accounting for the location and amount of its highly enriched uranium stockpile, and resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States.[11] A US journalist reported on September 23 that Araghchi did not make progress toward preventing the reimposition of UNSC sanctions in his meeting with Kallas and the E3 officials.[12] Germany’s Foreign Office stated that the E3 and the European Union urged Iran to take “practical steps” in the coming hours and days to resume direct negotiations with the United States, among other steps.[13] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected negotiations with the United States on September 23, as noted above.
Iran is attempting to use the September 9 Iran-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement to pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process. The Iran-IAEA agreement reportedly sets procedures for future inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities but does not provide a timeline for inspections.[14] Araghchi met with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 22.[15] Grossi stated in an interview with PBS on September 22 that the IAEA has not received any “official communication” about Iran suspending the September 9 agreement.[16] Senior Iranian officials, including Araghchi, have maintained that the Iran-IAEA agreement will be voided if the E3 imposes snapback sanctions on Iran, however.[17] Iran may calculate that it can pressure the E3 to stop the snapback process by threatening to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, given that the E3 has repeatedly called for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and allow IAEA inspectors to resume inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-23-2025/
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Iran Update, September 24, 2025
Iran has begun reconstructing several ballistic missile facilities as part of a broader effort to rebuild its degraded ballistic missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Parchin and Shahroud military sites in October 2024 and during the Israel-Iran War.[2] Satellite imagery of the Parchin missile site from August 28 and of the Shahroud missile site from September 5 showed that Iran has begun reconstructing buildings that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential to producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The Associated Press assessed that Iran still does not have mixers at Parchin or Shahroud to produce solid fuel, however.[4] The IDF previously destroyed Iranian solid fuel mixers during its October 2024 attack on Iran. Israeli sources stated in October 2024 that Iran could not domestically produce solid fuel mixers and would need to purchase them from China, which could take at least a year.[5] China previously assisted Iran in rebuilding its ballistic missile program after the October 2024 Israeli attack on Iran by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a component of solid fuel.[6] The Associated Press report comes after Iran tested an unspecified ballistic missile in Semnan Province on September 18.[7] The report also comes after the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities,” which include Iranian missile capabilities.[8]
An Iranian parliamentarian who is affiliated with the ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front and a member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission claimed on September 23 that Russia delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran.[9] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim, but if the claim is true, Iran's acquisition of MiG-29 aircraft would almost certainly not help Iran defend against Israeli or US aircraft in a future conventional conflict. Abolfazl Zohrevand claimed that Russian MiG-29 fighter jets have arrived in Shiraz, Iran, as part of Iran's efforts to strengthen its air force.[10] Russia has not confirmed this report. CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm whether Russia has delivered MiG-29 fighter jets to Iran at the time of this writing. The MiG-29 is an antiquated system and would not be able to confront more advanced Israeli and US aircraft, such as F-35 fighter jets. Zohrevand also claimed that Russian Su-35 fighter jets are “gradually entering” Iran and that Russia will supply Iran with S-400 air defense systems.[11] Iranian officials have repeatedly claimed in recent years that Russia will provide Iran with Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air defense systems, but Russia has not yet delivered any such systems to Iran.[12] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia is unable to divert critical systems like the Su-35 and S-400 away from its war effort in Ukraine. Zohrevand further claimed that China would supply Iran with HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).[13] Chinese HQ-9 SAMs bear similarities to Russian S-300s. Senior Iranian officials have expressed openness to expanding military cooperation with China, but it is unclear whether China is willing to provide Iran with the advanced systems that it seeks.[14]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-24-2025/